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This study examines the corporate governance of large and medium-sized auditing firms in South 
Africa. Auditing firms serve the public interest; it is therefore important for these firms to disclose 
relevant corporate governance information to the public and to practice good corporate governance 
principles. Due to a string of corporate scandals in recent years, the audit profession has been 
criticised and has come under media scrutiny. This has undermined the reputation of the 
profession, with experts and the public questioning whether auditing firms have corporate 
governance structures in place, and whether they are taking public interest into consideration. 
This study contributes to the existing body of academic knowledge by pursuing the following six 
objectives: (1) examining the development of corporate governance in the UK, USA, Australia, 
the Netherlands, and more specifically, in South Africa; (2) conducting a comparison between the 
UK Audit Firm Governance Code and King IV to identify the similarities; (3) exploring how the 
lack of corporate governance has contributed to some of the worst financial corporate failures in 
the UK, USA, Australia, the Netherlands and South Africa to establish whether auditing firms 
contributed to these failures; (4) determining the current legal and governance structures in 
auditing firms as well as the challenges associated with implementing corporate governance 
principles within auditing firms; (5) identifying what corporate governance practices are disclosed 
by firms; (6) determining the current corporate governance practices in auditing firms; and 
obtaining the expert opinions of the CEOs of auditing firms about corporate governance in auditing 
firms. 
To achieve these objectives, a pragmatist paradigm was applied. Both qualitative and quantitative 
information was gathered for analysis. The data was independently analysed and the qualitative 
results were then converted into quantitative data that was correlated with the quantitative results. 
A data transformation triangulation design was applied in this study. The secondary data was 
obtained from publicly accessible information published on the websites of the auditing firms. It 
included the firms’ transparency reports and integrated reports. Content analysis was selected to 
collect the qualitative data. The primary data was obtained through questionnaires which were self-
administered. The results revealed that the auditing firms are not disclosing or applying corporate 
iii 
governance principles and practices to the necessary extent. The CEOs of the auditing firms did, 
however, indicate that the principles and practices contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance 
Code were important and should be applied by auditing firms in South Africa. This finding 
confirmed that a corporate governance code for South African auditing firms should be developed 
in the future. 
The findings of the analysis corroborated those found in the literature, thus confirming the stated 
objectives. From these analyses, best practice recommendations were formulated as well as 
regulatory and statutory recommendations. Among these best practice recommendations were that 
auditing firms start implementing the relevant principles of King IV until further developments in 
future. It is also recommended that auditing firms appoint oversight boards which consist of 
members who are independent. Auditing firms should also consider combining their transparency 
reports and integrated reports as it would minimise the duplication of information.  
The statutory and regulatory recommendations included that the IoDSA consider the inclusion of 
a sector supplement for auditing firms in future King Code iterations. The IRBA should consider 
providing guidelines to auditing firms on corporate governance practice and disclosure. 
Amendments to the APA should be considered to facilitate the appointment of INEDs for auditing 
firms. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, auditing firms, independence, stakeholders, public interest, 
EXCO, oversight board, transparency report, integrated report.  
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION AND STUDY OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
The recent spate of corporate failures1 across the globe, such as Enron and WorldCom (Segal, 
2018), has attracted attention from corporate regulators and professional bodies. In South Africa, 
the Eskom and Tongaat scandals of 2019/2020 were preceded by the Steinhoff and VBS Bank 
corporate failures of 2017/2018, and before that, LeisureNet, Regal Treasury Bank and Randgold 
& Exploration, to name a few. Although corporate failures are not new, it is of increasing concern 
to stakeholders that many of these unexpected failures were of apparently financially robust 
companies. One of the repercussions of these failures has been the reputational damage of auditing 
firms as well as aspersions cast upon the audit process and the accounting profession in general 
(Kilgore, 2007). 
There are several examples of corporate failures leading to audit firm failures2, such as the case of 
Enron, where their auditors, Arthur Anderson, subsequently collapsed as well (Crotty, 2019). In 
South Africa, the auditing firm, KPMG, made headlines for their involvement in the Gupta and 
VBS Bank Scandals (Pilling, 2017), which led to changes in their leadership, changes to the 
governance structure of KPMG South Africa and improved quality control procedures in specific 
areas within the entity (Cotterill, 2017). This had a serious effect on the reputation of the auditing 
firms, and the profession as a whole. 
These real or alleged corporate scandals3 and audit failures4 have had material consequences by 
undermining public confidence in corporate governance and accountability. These corporate 
scandals and audit failures raise the familiar cry of ‘Where were the auditors?’. Such crises are 
often managed by state and professional bodies, which promise reforms, revising auditing or 
accounting standards, tweaking regulatory structures, disciplining accountants and auditing firms 
and promoting ethical guidelines. Domestic and international auditing standards are also relatively 
                                                 
1 Corporate failure is defined in section 1.3.  
2 Audit firm failure is defined in section 1.4. 
3 Corporate scandal is defined in section 1.3. 
4 Audit failure is defined in section 1.3  
2 
silent on the social obligation of auditing firms, with the exception of some codes such as the 
International Standard on Quality Control (ISQC). Strategies for managing crises at auditing firms 
pay very little attention to the values and governance processes that direct auditing firms. 
Therefore, audit failures continue unabated (Sikka, 2003). 
According to Sikka (2003), audit failures are often the result of the values that govern auditing 
firms. This view is supported by Peiter Koornhof of Allan Gray (an investment management 
company in South Africa), who states that major crises usually reflect a governance breakdown at 
multiple layers (Crotty, 2019). Sikka (2003) suggests that any reform of auditing and accountancy 
should bring about a major change in the values that govern auditing firms. He further states that 
the success of an auditing firm is measured by profits, rather than the service provided to all 
stakeholders. He states that auditing firms are entrepreneurial and find new ways of selling their 
services to the public. According to the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) of the United Kingdom 
(UK) (2010), strong audit firm governance is a way in which auditing firms can maintain public 
trust (Amirul, Salleh & Abu Bakar, 2015). Unfortunately, at present, the corporate structures of 
some auditing firms seem to be flawed as they do not apply codes of corporate governance 
(Aberian, 2019). Currently in South Africa, there is no corporate governance structure that 
regulates the corporate governance of auditing firms. From the literature, it is evident that the UK 
is at the forefront of corporate governance within auditing firms. No evidence of other corporate 
governance codes, specifically with reference to auditing firms, could be found. 
For this reason, this study aims to determine whether corporate governance guidelines could be 
provided for South African auditing firms to ensure that they too, adhere to sound corporate 
governance principles and practices. The next section discusses the developments in corporate 
governance. 
1.2  Evolution of corporate governance 
1.2.1 Corporate governance background 
In the 1970s the term ‘corporate governance’ came into use (Pargendler, 2016). It is often used to 
describe the principles or rules that govern relationships between corporate participants in 
3 
publicly-traded firms. The term especially refers to the relationships between directors, 
shareholders, managers, and sometimes employees (Aziri, 2014). 
Corporate governance was formally defined in 1992, in the UK, with the release of the Cadbury 
Report on Corporate Governance. Before the Cadbury Report, corporate governance was simply 
a topic that was discussed and debated by many (Marx, 2008). The Cadbury Committee defined 
corporate governance as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled” (Committee 
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992:18). Over the years many other 
definitions were released, but according to Marx (2008), corporate governance is, in essence, the 
system by which entities are controlled and directed. 
Other contributors to corporate governance literature expand the definition to the following: 
…a set of responsibilities and practices exercised by the board and executive management with 
the goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring that objectives are achieved, ascertaining that 
risks are managed appropriately and verifying that the enterprise’s resources are used responsibly 
(ITGI 2003:6). 
The exercise of ethical and effective leadership by the governing body towards the achievement 
of the following governance outcomes: ethical culture, good performance, effective control and 
legitimacy (IoDSA, 2016:11). 
Besides the obvious differences between the definitions cited above, most address an element of 
the entity’s responsibility towards various parties. This could include the responsibility of the 
corporation towards the shareholders, the stakeholders and the general public (Aziri, 2014). 
Based on the discussion above, the following definition of corporate governance has been 
formulated for the purposes of this study: 
A set of responsibilities and practices instituted by the governing body in order to direct a 
company to achieve its strategic objectives while remaining sustainable, accountable and 
transparent, and acting in the best interest of all the stakeholders. 
Historically, corporate governance only focused on the relationship between governing bodies, 
shareholders and management. Its main objective was to address agency conflicts and ensure that 
4 
the agents employed by business owners managed the organisation in a way that served the best 
interests of the shareholders (Panda & Leepsa, 2017). However, as a result of increased stakeholder 
interests and regulatory developments, the concept of corporate governance has evolved to become 
more inclusive in nature, taking into account the rights of all stakeholders involved in the corporate 
wealth creation process. Corporate governance further addresses issues relating to ethics, 
accountability, transparency and disclosure as well as organisations’ social and environmental 
impact (Raemaekers, 2014; Institute of Directors in Southern Africa [IoDSA], 2009). 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2015a) states that 
effective corporate governance is meant to guide those charged with governance in their decision-
making processes to create sustainable, long-term value through market confidence and business 
integrity. It forces companies to actively engage with the society in which they exist, and not only 
consider financial prosperity but to also take into account social and environmental value creation 
(Raemaekers, 2014). Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse (2002) agree, stating that corporate 
governance requires processes and procedures that serve as guidelines for accepted behaviour for 
both companies and society. Corporate governance should therefore be of a diverse nature that is 
inclusive in its decision-making and should support the weaker elements of society in pursuit of 
the common good (Frederikson, 1992). 
Humans display characteristics of self-interest and opportunism and therefore there is a need for 
corporate governance to ensure that those who are in a position of trust, act in the best interests of 
all stakeholders (Maseko, 2015). Barrier (2003) reiterates this statement, contending that 
organisations are expected to operate as good corporate citizens because they have an influence on 
the lives of many individuals. 
In simple terms, corporate governance is characterised by ethical and effective leadership. It 
requires those charged with governance to exemplify ethical leadership in discharging their 
responsibilities by demonstrating high levels of integrity, objectivity, competence, responsibility, 
accountability, fairness and transparency. At the same time, however, corporate governance 
requires those charged with governance to lead their companies towards the achievement of 
strategic objectives (IoDSA, 2016). 
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It is widely recognised that corporate governance can contribute to the long-term sustainability 
and the economic success of corporations (Armstrong, 2003, as quoted by Rossouw, 2005). 
Rossouw (2005) agrees, stating that corporate governance can improve the reputation of 
companies and enhance corporate responsibility, which attracts foreign and local investors. 
Maseko (2015) adds that the boundaries of accepted behaviour for societies and organisations are 
set by effective leadership and corporate governance. 
After the release of the Cadbury Report in 1992, many other countries developed their own 
corporate governance codes. The next section briefly explores the corporate governance 
developments that took place in various countries around the world. Chapter 2 contains a more 
detailed discussion of corporate governance and international developments—the literature review 
on corporate governance. 
1.2.2 Corporate governance developments globally 
Corporate collapses and business failures, combined with fraudulent financial reporting practices, 
created a need for corporate governance developments. This combination of factors gave rise to 
various corporate governance codes that were issued across the world since 1992 (Marx, 2008). 
This study focuses on the UK, the United States of America (USA), Australia, the Netherlands and 
South Africa, for the reasons provided below. 
The USA corporate governance practices are respected because the country was the first across 
the globe to legislate some key aspects of corporate governance compliance, culminating in the 
enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 (Langeni, 2018). 
The UK was selected due to its long history with corporate structures as well as governance in 
general. As mentioned earlier, the first formal code on governance was the UK-authored Cadbury 
Report of 1992 (Langeni, 2018). The UK is also the only country with a corporate governance 
code specifically for auditing firms, namely, the Audit Firm Governance Code (FRC, 2010). 
According to a survey conducted by KPMG in 2015, Australia ranked equal fourth for its corporate 
governance regime, only outranked by the UK, the USA and Singapore. This is particularly 
interesting given that Australia does not have the regulatory overlay present in the UK or the USA. 
6 
There is a significant commitment in Australia to reducing red tape around corporate governance 
and using a strong principles-based approach, which appears to be working well (KPMG, 2015). 
The Netherlands is one of a handful of countries to apply a two-tier board structure model, which 
is also different to the countries mentioned above. The two-tier board structure is a requirement of 
the Dutch Corporate Governance Code, which is applicable to all listed entities. From the 
integrated reports of the auditing firms in the Netherlands, these firms have also adopted this 
principle. For this reason, the Netherlands was selected as one of the countries for the literature 
review (Bendixen & Thomas, 2000). 
South Africa was selected for this study, as there have been various corporate failures in the 
country, which have resulted in audit failures. It was only after the Gupta and VBS corporate 
failures that KPMG decided to implement principles of the King IV Report on Corporate 
Governance (King IV) in their organisation. This raised the question, ‘Why had auditing firms not 
applied King IV prior to these corporate failures?’ One of the reasons could be that there is 
currently no sector supplement in King IV for auditing firms. There are specific sector supplements 
for municipalities, non-profit organisations, retirement funds, small and medium enterprises and 
state-owned entities. These sector supplements are primarily aimed at the governing body of these 
entities, as this is the focal point of corporate governance within the organisations (IoDSA, 2016). 
Unfortunately, as stated earlier, there is no sector supplement for auditing firms. It also within this 
context that the research gap was identified and the research question formulated. 
Below is an explanation of the corporate governance developments in the countries mentioned 
above. 
1.2.2.1 Corporate governance developments in the UK 
In the late 1980s, there was a string of sensational business scandals in the UK. The scandal of 
Robert Maxwell, in which pension funds were plundered, created outrage in the public. This too 
was the case with the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, where the auditors failed to 
expose the bankruptcy and the high pay rises of the senior business executives. Consequently, a 
special committee was formed by the City of London to examine the financial aspects of corporate 
governance. This resulted in the Code of Best Practice produced by the Cadbury Committee. Sir 
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Adrian Cadbury, an industrialist, chaired this committee. This report, which became known as the 
Report of the Cadbury Committee, consisted of guidelines through which the activities of company 
directors and executives could be controlled to ensure ethical conduct. The Cadbury Report (1992) 
defined corporate governance as the systems by which companies are directed and controlled. The 
Report suggested that non-executive directors should play a bigger role on corporate boards and 
that board operations should involve a more active role for auditors (Boyd, 1996). In 1995, the 
Cadbury Report was reviewed, giving rise to the Myners Report (Pandhu, n.d.). 
In July 1995, another review was done, and the Greenbury Report was published, suggesting more 
principles for inclusion into the new Report. It was suggested that the board of directors should 
appoint a remuneration committee, which should consist of non-executive directors. It was also 
suggested that directors should have long-term, performance-related pay, which should be 
disclosed in the annual reports of the company, and that the directors’ contracts should be 
renewable each year. The Report also suggested that progress should be reviewed every three 
years. In 1998, Sir Ronald Hampel, who was chairman and managing director of Imperial 
Chemical Industries plc, chaired a third committee. This committee drafted the new report, namely 
the Hampel Report, which was issued in 1998 (FRC, n.d.). 
Next in 2010 followed the Combined Code, which was a consolidation of all the principles in the 
Cadbury, Myners, Greenbury and Hampel Reports. The Combined Report included principles 
stating that the chairman of the board should be seen as the ‘leader’ of the non-executive directors. 
It also suggested that institutional investors should consider voting the shares they held at 
meetings, though it rejected compulsory voting and the disclosure of all kinds of remuneration, 
including pensions. 
In 2010, a new version of the UK Corporate Governance Code was submitted (FRC, n.d.). 
This Code (formerly the Combined Code on Corporate Governance) promotes corporate 
governance, with an emphasis on the relationships between stakeholders, shareholders and 
organisations. It also emphasises that the corporate culture of an organisation should be aligned 
with the company’s values, business strategy and purpose and that it should promote diversity and 
integrity. The Code provides guidance on how organisations should apply its provisions. 
8 
Companies are also required to disclose how they complied with the provisions, or provide an 
explanation if they were unable to comply (FRC, n.d.). 
In 2010, the FRC introduced the Audit Firm Governance Code. This Code was drafted to serve the 
interests of shareholders of listed companies to whom auditors address their reports. The objective 
of this Code was to ensure that auditing firms were seen as a good example of best practice 
governance, to enrich the transparency of auditing firm reports and to encourage changes in the 
governance of auditing firms. It also aimed to ultimately improve the way in which auditing firms 
are managed and to strengthen the regulatory regime by achieving effective and transparent 
governance without disproportionate regulation. It was recommended that auditing firms which 
audit public interest entities should comply with the provisions of the Code or give a considered 
explanation in cases where they cannot comply (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales [ICAEW], 2010). From all the literature reviewed, it can be seen that the UK is the only 
country that has a corporate governance code specifically for auditing firms. 
1.2.2.2 Corporate governance developments in the USA 
The expression ‘corporate governance’ did not even exist in the English language until the 1970s 
(Pargendler, 2016). In the mid-1970s, the federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
brought corporate governance on to the official reform agenda. Thus, the term ‘corporate 
governance’ first appeared in the Federal Register in 1976 (Cheffins, 2012). 
In the 1990s, as the USA economy recovered from the recession, the Anglo-Saxon model of 
corporate governance turned into a blueprint for financial and economic development around the 
world (Pargendler, 2016). The enactment of the SOX Act of 2002 was one of the most significant 
changes that occurred in the USA. It included a statutory requirement for audit committees and 
various corporate governance changes (Marx, 2008). The introduction of the SOX in 2002 was 
widely regarded as the most extensive USA federal law related to corporate governance (Uzun, 
Szewczyk & Varma, 2004). SOX was enacted to restore confidence in the markets after several 
high-profile corporate governance scandals in the USA (Cheffins, 2010). 
Another important response to the corporate scandals was that companies which traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or listed on National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
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Quotations (Nasdaq) had to comply with various corporate governance provisions. The SOX of 
2002 and the NYSE and Nasdaq proposals imposed several corporate governance provisions on 
publicly traded companies in the USA, with significant emphasis on improved oversight by the 
companies’ independent directors (Uzun et al., 2004). 
1.2.2.3 Corporate governance developments in Australia 
In Australia, Professor Ramsay—a Harold Ford Professor of Commercial Law at the Melbourne 
Law School and Director of the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation—produced a 
report in October 2001 detailing issues concerning the auditing profession as well as the current 
requirements on the independence of company auditors (Mirshekary, Yaftian & Cross, 2005). 
Following the Ramsay Report, in September 2002, a Discussion Paper named Corporate 
disclosure – Strengthening the financial reporting framework was released as part of the Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) (Marx, 2008). 
In April 2003, Justice Neville Owen submitted the Report of the HIH Royal Commission into the 
collapse of HIH Insurance Group Ltd. The CLERP 9 bill, which was tabled in Parliament in 
December 2003 and came into force in July 2004, was influenced by these three documents. In 
August 2002, a Corporate Governance Code was introduced by the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) while in March 2003, the first edition of the Corporate Governance Code’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations was released. These ten principles 
were only guidelines, and not prescriptive. If listed companies chose not to adopt a certain 
principle, they had to provide an appropriate reason as to why they had not done so (Hay & 
Redmayne, 2017). 
In 2007, after an extensive review, a second edition was released. This edition contained only eight 
principles and the title of the document was shortened to Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations. In 2010, additional amendments were made to the second edition. Another 
review was conducted in 20122013 to ensure that international trends in corporate governance 
were applied. This review resulted in the release of a third edition in March 2014. According to 
Hay and Redmayne (2017), the structure of the eight principles was simplified and there was more 
flexibility with regards to the disclosure requirements. 
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In 2017, after several emerging issues regarding values, trust and culture in listed entities, the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council decided to develop the fourth edition of the Principles and 
Recommendations. This new edition, which became applicable on 1 January 2020, consisted of 
eight principles that needed to be complied with by all listed entities (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2019). 
1.2.2.4 Corporate governance developments in the Netherlands 
In 2004 the first Dutch Corporate Governance Code came into effect. This Code was applicable to 
all listed entities. In December 2016, a revised version of the Code was published, focusing more 
on culture, risk management, the reporting of misconduct and long-term value creation. It also 
addressed how the principles of the Code should be applied in a company with a one-tier board. A 
comply or explain system was adopted for the Code. According to the Code, companies had to 
disclose on their websites how they had applied the Code’s principles and best-practice provisions. 
In the case where they were unable to do so, an explanation had to be provided. There is a separate 
monitoring committee that annually reports on the extent to which the Code is complied with and 
any problem areas that are identified (European Corporate Governance Institute [ECGI], 2020). 
1.2.2.5 Corporate governance developments in South Africa 
The notion of corporate governance and the development of related guidelines and codes has been 
a prominent feature in South Africa’s business environment since the early 1990s (Marx, 2008). 
The reasons for this are indicated by various researchers as follows: 
 The need to restore confidence and trust in South African institutions following the 
apartheid era (Burke & Clark, 2016); 
 The need for robust market discipline and corporate reform in order to attract and retain 
foreign investors (Marx, 2008; Maseko, 2015); 
 The expectation for South African companies to play a role in addressing the socio-
economic challenges facing the country (Croucher & Miles, 2010); 
 The call to respond to the first corporate governance code issued in the UK namely the 
Cadbury Report, in 1992 (Marx, 2008; Miles & Jones, 2009). 
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In 1994, a commission was formed by retired judge, Mervin King, to establish a code on 
governance in South Africa. South Africa’s corporate governance reforms now centre around four 
reports, namely the King Report on Corporate Governance (King I) issued in November 1994, the 
King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa – 2002 (King II) issued in March 2002 
(West, 2006), the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa – 2002 (King III) issued 
in 2009 and lastly the King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa – 2017 (King IV) 
issued in November 2016. 
King I was published in 1994. It was considered ahead of its time (Marx, 2008) as it set an 
international benchmark for standards and best practice (Jansen van Vuuren & Schulschenk, 
2013). King I drew extensively on the Cadbury Report and similarly adopted a self-regulatory 
approach of ‘comply or explain’ (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008). This meant that companies which 
complied with the report needed to disclose their level of compliance and in instances where they 
did not comply, explain their reasons for non-compliance. 
King II was drafted in 2001 and issued in 2002. Its effective date of implementation was 1 March 
2002. Vaughn and Ryan (2006) and Marx (2008) described it as a more comprehensive report, 
which was built on the foundation laid by its predecessor. King II maintained its original stance 
and was not in favour of legislation which forced companies to comply with its recommendations 
but rather, it stayed true to the ethos of self-regulation (Miles & Jones, 2009). However, the report 
expanded on its ‘inclusive approach’ to corporate governance, recommending the introduction of 
‘triple bottom line’ reporting to incorporate the economic, environmental and social aspects of a 
company’s activities (Miles & Jones, 2009; Hendricks & Wyngaard, 2010). 
The third report on corporate governance in South Africa came as a result of the new Companies 
Act of 2008 and changes in international trends in governance (IoDSA, 2009). King III, which was 
initially issued in 2009, promoted an integrated approach to governance and reporting, providing 
extensive guidance on integrated reporting and disclosures of governance-related matters (PwC, 
2009; Maseko, 2015). 
The most recent of the King reports, King IV, was published on 1 November 2016. The report 
replaced King III altogether and is applicable to all with financial years commencing on or after 1 
April 2017 (IoDSA, 2016). 
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According to Deloitte (2016), King IV takes a bolder approach than King III insofar as: 
 The report follows a principle- and outcome-based approach as opposed to being rule-
based. This is consistent with current global opinions which advocate heightened 
accountability and transparency. It also recommends that practices ought to contribute to 
the performance and sustainability of a company. 
 The report is resolute in its unyielding effort to reinforce the idea that corporate governance 
should be seen as a holistic set of arrangements that embraces ethical leadership, attitude, 
mindset and behaviour. 
 The report continues to stress increased transparency and targeted disclosures in all areas. 
From an application perspective, King IV is a framework which can be adopted across listed and 
unlisted companies, profit and non-profit as well as public and private entities (IoDSA, 2016). 
King IV steps away from the ‘apply or explain’ approach and recommends an ‘apply and explain’, 
relieving governing bodies from the burden of compliance by reducing the 75 recommended 
practices in King III to 16 basic principles. The 16 principles can be adopted by any company and 
are all necessary to substantiate the practice of corporate governance (IoDSA, 2016). The required 
explanation gives effect to each principle and enables stakeholders to make an informed decision 
on whether a company is well governed or not. The explanation also helps in shifting the focus of 
companies from a compliance mindset to a qualitative mindset, which encourages the achievement 
of objectives through careful consideration of the entity’s circumstances (IoDSA, 2016; Piek, 
2016). King IV also includes sector supplements that provide high-level guidance and direction on 
how the report should be interpreted and applied by a variety of sectors and organisation types. 
There is unfortunately no sector supplement for auditing firms (IoDSA, 2016). 
1.2.2.6 Other corporate governance developments in the world 
According to the the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) (2020), there are many 
corporate governance codes around the world. A short summary of these codes is provided below. 
More details regarding the countries and their codes are set out in Annexure A. 
In Austria, a corporate governance code was created as a set of rules and standards for the 
responsible management of companies. In Belgium there are corporate governance practices for 
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listed companies. The Brazilian Corporate Governance Code is applicable to listed companies in 
Brazil. Corporate governance practices in Canada are shaped by legal rules and best practices. The 
Danish corporate governance regime is applicable in Denmark. In Finland, corporate governance 
is based primarily on the Finnish Companies Act (ECGI, 2020). 
In France the corporate governance rules are mainly set out in recommendations contained in 
corporate governance codes and statutory provisions in the French Commercial Code. The German 
Corporate Governance Code 2019 is applied by listed companies in Germany. In Ghana the 
corporate governance is a combination of subsidiary legislation, statutory law and regulatory 
guidelines and directives. The Indian corporate governance framework is composed of statutes and 
regulations that require the supervision of multiple regulators. In Indonesia the general governance 
document of a company is its articles of association. Companies in Ireland are required to comply 
with both the Irish Corporate Governance Annex and the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
Companies in Japan are regulated by the national Companies Act. The Kenyan capital market is 
regulated by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA). In Luxembourg the main statutes on corporate 
governance include the European Union (EU) Market Abuse Regulation, the Companies Act and 
the Securitisation Act. The Nigerian corporate governance regime is characterised by a 
combination of a statutory framework and subsidiary legislation. The Norwegian Code of Practice 
for Corporate Governance includes important guidelines on the corporate governance of listed 
companies in Norway (ECGI, 2020). 
In Poland, the Commercial Companies Code of 2000, which replaced the former Commercial Code 
of 1934, contains the general corporate governance rules applicable to companies, including listed 
companies. The Portuguese Commercial Companies Code contains the main legal sources of 
corporate governance rules in Portugal. Russia’s corporate governance code and the listing rules 
of licensed stock exchanges contain the best practice provisions for listed companies in that 
country. The Singapore corporate governance regulatory framework is contained in certain 
mandatory rules. In Sweden, the statutory corporate law set out in the Swiss Code of Obligations 
is the main source of Swiss corporate governance regulation (ECGI, 2020). 
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1.2.3 Conclusion and critical link to the research problem 
According to Lakshan and Wijekoon (2012), poor corporate governance increases the probability 
of corporate failure, even for organisations with good financial performance. Corporate 
governance is seen as a tool to combat corruption and unethical business practices which harm 
many countries’ business image and reputation (Armstrong, 2003, as quoted by Rossouw, 2005). 
Critical link to the objectives of the study 
Corporate governance codes (like those mentioned above) were introduced because of corporate 
collapses, business failures and fraudulent financial reporting. However, regardless of all these 
codes, corporate failures continue to happen. It is therefore necessary to conduct a detailed 
literature review on the development of corporate governance codes in the UK, USA, Australia, 
the Netherlands and more specifically, South Africa. This review intends to identify the 
corporate governance principles that could be applied to auditing firms. It also provides grounds 
for the development of a checklist and the questionnaire which will be used in the empirical 
research. 
The section below briefly discusses well-known corporate failures that took place as a result of 
weak corporate governance. A detailed discussion of corporate failures is presented in Chapter 3. 
1.3 Corporate failures 
The subject of corporate governance has received increasing attention in recent years due to a 
series of international and local corporate scandals (Maseko, 2015). In this study, it is important 
to understand when a corporate ‘scandal’ is classified as a corporate ‘failure’. This is because there 
is a distinct difference between these two concepts. One should also be cognisant of the fact that 
corporate failures often occur as a result of audit failures. For this reason, it is important to 
distinguish between these concepts. 
According to the Merriam Webster online dictionary, a ‘scandal’ is defined as “a circumstance or 
action that offends propriety or established moral conceptions or disgraces those affected with it” 
(Abdoul Fatahi, 2017). According to Abdoul Fatahi (2017), a scandal is generally associated or 
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followed by disgrace upon the authors, shock on the part of the society and reprehensive action 
from social control agents. Hoffman (1999), as quoted by Abdoul Fatahi, (2017) says that a scandal 
is a public manifestation of a misconduct. 
In contrast, a ‘financial scandal’ is “a situation or event that has occurred as a result of financial 
resources being employed in a morally questionable manner where there are serious consequences 
for third parties, which are widely known” (Toms, 2019: n.p.). Financial scandals may involve 
accounting and financial market manipulation, different types of fraud and the possibility of 
corporate bankruptcy. A scandal is created when certain behaviours have an effect on innocent 
third parties and the wider public. This behaviour could be morally questionable, but may not 
necessarily result in a scandal. Only once there is a widespread financial impact on individuals, 
causing them to lose material amounts of money and trust, does a scandal exist. Every year, 
investors lose enormous sums of money to fraud and corporate scandals (Okaro & Okafor, 2013). 
According to Toms (2019), the larger the collateral losses and social impact of such behaviour, the 
greater the public’s appetite for regulation and reform. 
According to Pearson (1987), an ‘audit failure’ takes place when an auditor indicates to the public 
that a client’s financial statements are true and fairly presented when in fact they are not. Most 
corporate scandals often result in audit failures and the corporations fail as a result of fraud-related 
factors and behaviours (Muraina, Okpara & Ahunanya, 2010). In such cases, the investing public 
usually asks: ‘Where were the auditors?’ Audit failures are costly to the auditors, their clients and 
investors and to society as a whole (Okaro & Okafor, 2013). 
It is said that auditors have more statutory rights than the police because they can exercise their 
powers and gain right of access to a company’s books and any other document that they need to 
see, without a court order. Auditors can demand any information and explanation that they 
consider necessary to enable them to discharge their duties from company directors and officers. 
If anyone attempts to obstruct them, that person risks civil and possibly criminal penalties. 
Regardless of their powerful statutory rights and the huge social investment in auditing, auditors 
seem unable to deliver the promised accountability, surveillance, certainty, regulation and trust. 
Auditors often stand accused of covering up, and of injuring innocent third parties. According to 
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Sikka (2003), confidence in corporate governance and accountability is greatly affected by the 
audit failures. 
For the purposes of this study, a ‘corporate failure’ is defined as an event or situation involving 
the use of financial resources, where questionable ethical behaviour arises when management 
misrepresents financial statements and auditors fail to discover or report this misrepresentation, 
which then becomes public knowledge. 
Most of the well-known corporate failures have involved inadequate corporate governance and 
auditing processes and accountancy procedures that have been compromised (Maranga, 2018). 
The next section briefly discusses high-profile corporate failures in the UK, the USA, Australia, 
the Netherlands and South Africa. 
1.3.1 Corporate failures in the UK 
The 1980s saw an increase in the number of business scandals in the UK. This attracted criticism 
from the public, who felt that there was an apparent lack of controls on business conduct in the 
UK. There was considerable doubt about the efficacy of the existing system of self-regulation of 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Questions were raised about the 
perpetrators of well-concealed frauds within large firms (Boyd, 1996). The sections below discuss 
the less well-known instances of corporate failure, followed by high-profile cases. 
There were many low-profile fraud cases in the UK, such as Barlow and Clowes and Brent Walker, 
investment firms where the chief executives of the firms stole funds from investors. Another fraud 
case included the conglomerate Polly Peck, where corporate funds were illegally moved into 
offshore companies owned by the founder, Asil Nadir and the chief executive officer (CEO) 
(Boyd, 1996). There was also the scandal that involved stock manipulation by Blue Arrow. In the 
Guinness scandal, during the takeover battle for distillers, the business leaders inflated the value 
of the Guinness shares. The role of auditors in detecting fraud was debated after the collapse of 
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) (Boyd, 1996). 
There were also many significant corporate failures in the UK. The corporate failure of Robert 
Maxwell came to a head on 5 November 1991. The case brought the media business empire, which 
had continued commercial activity for over 40 years, to an almost immediate halt. The following 
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day the Swiss Bank Corporation contacted the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in London declaring a 
£57.5 million loan that was awarded to a private Maxwell company was in default. The Swiss 
Bank Corporation disclosed that the demand to repay the loan was refused by Kevin Maxwell, the 
CEO of Maxwell Communications Corporations (MCC). The day after, MCC shares crashed, 
share dealings in Mirror Group Newspapers (MGN) and MCC, the other large public companies 
in Maxwell, were suspended on 2 December. The final collapse occurred when it was discovered 
that Robert Maxwell stole £933 million from his two public companies in order to support the 
share price of MCC (Clarke, 1993). The enormity of the fraud in this corporate failure, as well as 
the effect it had on pensioners, shareholders and employees, prompted the most far-reaching 
questions ever addressed on the subject of corporate governance in the UK (Clarke, 1993). 
The corporate collapse of Barings Bank occurred in 1995. Before it came close to bankruptcy in 
1980 as a result of a disastrous risky investment in Buenos Aires, Barings was a great force in the 
City of London in the 19th century. A consortium arranged by the Bank of England (Ziegler, 1988) 
bailed the bank out. The effect of poor internal control was evident in the case of Barings Bank, in 
which the general manager of the Singapore office engaged in illegal speculative trading on the 
Nikkei (the leading and most valued Japanese stock index), resulting in a loss of £827 million in 
1995 without the knowledge of the management at the London headquarters (Coyle, 2010). 
On 22 November 2014, Tesco admitted that it had overstated its profits by £250 million. Top 
brands would pay top dollar to secure a place for their product on Tesco’s shelves. This was done 
in the form of rebates. However, increased competition from other grocery stores put Tesco under 
pressure. As a result, the fear of missing out on its volume-driven rebates grew even bigger. This 
ultimately led to management reporting inflated figures and Tesco’s shares slumped to a 14-year 
low. Very shortly afterwards, the SFO announced it would launch a criminal investigation into the 
accounting practices of Tesco. The impact of the event was of such a magnitude that the FRC 
decided to examine the role of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and individual auditors (Adibi, 
Aziz & Nur, n.d.). 
British Home Stores (BHS) failed in 2016. After falling into administration, the iconic chain closed 
for good. Thousands of jobs were lost and hundreds of stores were left vacant, many of them 
cornerstones of their high streets (Winter, 2019). BHS collapsed because it had not kept up with 
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consumer trends. It made an annual loss of £70 million in 2013, according to records filed at UK’s 
Companies House. The new owners were not able to turn their fortunes around due to a mixture 
of poor selling and not being able to collect enough cash from the portfolio of properties (Chu, 
2016). Their auditors, PwC, were fined £10 million (reduced to £6.5 million) for the shortcomings 
during their audit work (Butler, 2018). 
Many were surprised at the collapse of Carillion on 15 January 2018. Over the course of a 
weekend, the second biggest construction group in the UK went from going concern to compulsory 
liquidation. It came as a shock that Carillion had no real assets and more than £2 billion of debts 
and pension liabilities (Rogers, 2018). It was alleged that Carillion had not acted alone and 
members of parliament accused the Big Four auditing firms (Deloitte and Touche, KPMG, Ernst 
& Young and PwC), of contributing to this failure. These auditing firms, all of which had auditing, 
advisory or facilitation roles with Carillion, together earned £72 million in fees from the company 
in the decade before its failure (Sweet, 2018). 
The Patisserie Valerie corporate scandal occurred in 2018 when the chain announced that it had 
discovered important and possibly fraudulent, accounting irregularities. After having been 
suspended, finance director Chris Marsh was arrested and is currently being investigated by the 
SFO and the FRC while former Patisserie Valerie auditors, Grant Thornton, are under investigation 
by the FRC (BBC News, 2019). 
The Ted Baker collapse occurred in the same year, with the company announcing that its 
accounting mistake was actually almost three times as bad as first believed. During the 
investigation, audit firm Deloitte found that the valuation of the stock inventory of Ted Baker was 
overstated by £58 million. The initial projections of between £20 million and £25 million in 2019 
(Jahshan, 2020) had been growing tremendously. KPMG had audited Ted Baker since 2001 and 
critics say the accounting mistake posed ‘significant questions’ for KPMG. Prem Sikka, a Sheffield 
University accounting professor who advised members of parliament on audit reform, and Rachel 
Reeves, president of the House of Commons business committee, called on the FRC to investigate. 
The ‘serious questions’ need to be answered about how, just months after the auditors had signed 
off the books, a massive hole in the balance sheet of had Ted Baker appeared (Daily Mail City & 
Finance Reporter, 2020). 
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1.3.2 Corporate failures in the USA 
According to Becht, Bolton and Roell (2005), as quoted by Aziri (2014), scandals and major 
failures at USA corporations increased the importance of corporate governance. McKesson & 
Robbins was the first scandal of major importance in the USA, occurring in 1937, well before 
Enron and WorldCom. The public scrutinised the accounting profession for the first time when 
fraud was discovered at McKesson after 13 years, in 1937. This had a profound impact on the 
accounting profession (Shinde, Poznic & Buehne, 2010). Donald Coster, whose real name was 
Philip Musica, was the head of McKesson & Robbins. He had assumed a new name and identity 
to disguise his criminal record, which included bribery and grand larceny. Coster, together with 
his associates, formed a company and misappropriated $2.6 million. The accounting profession 
and the firm were shocked that the fraud continued undetected for such a long period of time 
(Previts & Thomas, 1996). 
The 21st century saw some of the biggest and well-known corporate collapses, of which Enron was 
probably the most significant. According to Terry (2007), at that time Enron was the largest 
bankruptcy case in American history. Enron filed for bankruptcy in December 2001. The failure 
of Enron not only resulted in huge financial losses for shareholders but it also had an enormous 
impact on employees, who not only lost their jobs but also their pensions and savings. The number 
of big auditing firms in the USA was reduced from five to four, when the Enron auditors, Arthur 
Anderson disappeared overnight. This debacle raised questions about the credibility and the 
capacity of the audit profession at large. 
However, Enron’s bankruptcy was soon eclipsed by WorldCom (the nation’s second largest long-
distance telecommunications company), whose less sophisticated accounting fraud let to a larger 
restatement of earnings, a larger bankruptcy filing and equally far-reaching civil and criminal 
investigations (Brickey, 2003). In June 2002, WorldCom announced that in 2001 and in the first 
quarter of 2002, it had overstated earnings by more than $3.8 billion. The accounting manoeuvre 
responsible for the overstatement was characterised by the press as scandalous. They classified 
payments for other companies’ communications networks as capital expenditures. Once again, 
doubt was cast over WorldCom’s external auditor at that time, Arthur Andersen, and questions 
were raised as to why the auditors had not detected the fraud (Lyke & Jickling, 2002). 
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The Tyco scandal of 2002 reflected the company’s unethical leadership. The company’s corporate 
governance system was compromised when the CEO, Dennis Kozlowski, appointed his close 
associates in prominent positions. This allowed his associates to abet his unethical behaviour 
(Brickey, 2008). A weak control environment enabled Kozlowski and some other executives to 
perpetrate crimes of fraud, grand larceny, conspiracy, embezzlement, accounting conflicts of 
interest, excessive unethical personal spending and other questionable activities (Kay, 2002). 
Kozlowski and Swartz, Tyco’s chief financial officer (CFO), were accused by the authorities of 
stealing $170 million from Tyco and fraudulently selling $430 million in stock options in 2002 
(Brickey, 2008). PwC, which had been responsible for checking the financial reports of Tyco, had 
failed to identify Kozlowski’s illegal financial transactions and therefore, his unethical business 
practices continued unchecked. 
In 2008, there were several more business failures in the USA. Lehman Brothers, Madoff and 
American International Group (AIG) were among these. Lehman Brothers applied for bankruptcy 
on 15 September 2008. The 164-year-old corporation was the fourth largest USA investment bank. 
Its bankruptcy, which was spurred by the global financial crisis (Amadeo, 2020), revealed the use 
of a system known as ‘Repo 105’. This system moved off-balance sheet assets and debt to make 
investors look more favourably on the bank’s financial position. This meant that, although 
ostensibly still complying with USA generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) limits, the 
bank was potentially misleading investors (Hail, Tahoun & Wang, 2017). Significant concerns 
were raised about the accounting practices of Lehman and the role that EY played in allowing 
these items to remain unchallenged and secret in its financial statements (Wiggins, Bennett & 
Metrick, 2015). 
The $65 trillion Madoff Ponzi system ruined the global economy. By soliciting billions of dollars 
of funds under false pretences, failing to pledge investor funds and misappropriating and shifting 
investor funds for the benefit of the company or for the benefit of others, without the knowledge 
or consent of the investors, Madoff initiated a scheme of defrauding customers (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation [FBI], 2009). Charges were brought against the auditors, Friehling & Horowitz 
(F&H), for false certification of having prepared the audit statements in accordance with GAAP. 
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In 2015, AIG (one of the biggest insurance companies worldwide) announced that it was being 
investigated for certain non-traditional reinsurance transactions. According to the management 
report that was released, as mandated by the SOX Act, certain members of senior management, 
including the CEO and CFO, overrode certain controls, transactions and accounting entries. The 
report noted a major deficiency in internal control over financial statements; this related to the 
valuation process and oversight of the AIG super senior credit default swap portfolio with respect 
to internal control concerns rather than valuation problems (Woods, Humphrey, Down & Liu, 
2009). It was clear that AIG’s control environment was not effective. The transactions and 
accounting entries that were manipulated were largely intended to achieve desired accounting 
results and were not properly accounted for in accordance with GAAP (Verschoor, 2005). AIG 
settled for nearly $1 billion and PwC, the auditor, settled for $97.5 million to assist the fraud 
(Lessambo, 2018). 
More recently, General Electric (GE) accounting executive, Harry Markopolos, charged the firm 
with fraud in 2018, covering up to $38 million, worth 40% of its market value. KPMG had been 
GE’s auditors since 1909 (de Luce, 2019). The shareholders voted to replace KPMG with a new 
independent auditor from 2020 onwards (Brasseur, 2020). It is claimed that KPMG’s lack of 
independence contributed to the organisational failure of GE and the failure of the audit. 
1.3.3 Corporate failures in Australia 
HIH Insurance, One.Tel and Harris Scarfe are only a few of the corporate failures that have taken 
place in Australia (Mirshekary et al., 2005). The corporate collapses that took place in the early 
years of 2000 in Australia indicated a weakness in the accounting and auditing professions (Kavrar 
& Yilmaz, 2017). 
On 15 March 2001, HIH Insurance collapsed, with debts estimated at AUD$5.3 billion. This 
resulted in a Royal Commission to investigate if there were any undesirable corporate practices as 
well as the extent to which the actions of directors, employees, auditors, actuaries and advisors 
contributed to the failure (Mirshekary et al., 2005). This corporate failure pointed out that there 
was a lack of corporate governance and that auditors played a role in the failure (Allan, 2006). 
According to du Plessis (2003), the HIH case was a perfect real-life example involving almost all 
aspects of bad corporate governance. Independence of the audit committee was clearly lacking, as 
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the chairman and another member of the audit committee were previously senior partners of the 
auditors of HIH, Arthur Andersen (Leung & Cooper, 2003). 
In the same year, the retailer Harris Scarfe was placed into voluntary administration after 
irregularities had been discovered, dating back six years. At that point, the company had been in 
operation for 150 years. In the beginning, it was alleged that Allan Hodgson, the CFO, had altered 
accounts to inflate the company’s profits. These allegations were later confirmed when it was 
found that Hodgson had played the leading role in falsifying reports and accounts (Leung & 
Cooper, 2003). Harris Scarfe was one of the biggest corporate failures in Australia, with debts of 
AUD$265 million (Kavrar & Yilmaz, 2017). EY and PwC were sued by the Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group (ANZ Bank) for the recovery of at least $70 million as the bank alleged 
that the auditors had been negligent (Leung & Cooper, 2003). According to Leung and Cooper 
(2003), the accountants were running two sets of books and the auditors failed to detect this. 
Another scandal which occurred in 2001 was that of One.Tel, a group of Australian-based 
telecommunications companies. One.Tel decided to invest in its own telecommunications system, 
but this proved to be unsuccessful and resulted in financial strain. One.Tel manipulated its accounts 
to hide losses and to ensure that bonuses and salaries would continue to be paid (Allan, 2006). In 
2001, a formal investigation was instigated by the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) to investigate the potential breaches of the Corporations Law. These breaches 
included market disclosure issues, insider trading and possible insolvent trading. One.Tel was 
wound up on 29 August 2002 (Leung & Cooper, 2003). 
In 2016, Australia witnessed the organisational scandal of Dick Smith Electronics. On 30 
November 2015, Dick Smith Holdings Limited surprised the market by announcing that an 
inventory write-down of AUD$60 million was required, while the company’s financial statements 
for 28 June 2015 were audited without adverse findings three months earlier. Inventory 
management is a retail company’s lifeblood and can be used as a key risk area by auditors. Gray 
(2016) states that the inventory problem therefore occurred only over a short period of time; 
alternatively, it developed over a longer period of time and was ignored by the auditors. During 
the company’s audits, Deloitte failed to recognise these inventory issues. This suggested that the 
auditors had failed to conduct their audits in accordance with the required standards and that they 
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did not practice reasonable competence and care, instead engaging in misleading and fraudulent 
class action practices (Richards, 2019). 
1.3.4 Corporate failures in the Netherlands 
The rise and fall of Royal Ahold (Koninklijke Ahold NV) is an important event in terms of the 
corporate failures in the Netherlands. This large international retail grocery and food service 
company, with its headquarters in the Netherlands, was at its peak in 2001. Sales and profits of 
€66.6 billion and €1.1 billion, respectively were reported in 2001. Royal Ahold had almost 250,000 
employees and operated in 5,155 stores in 27 countries. Ahold was established in 1887 as a family 
business by the Heijn family, but in 1948 the company went public. For over 100 years, it operated 
primarily in the Netherlands. In 1989, Ahold underwent a transition from a family-controlled to a 
management-controlled firm, which proved to be a very successful change. By November 2001, 
Ahold had a market capitalisation of €30.6 billion and generated over a 1000% return for its 
shareholders (de Jong, de Jong, Mertens & Roosenboom, 2007). Only two years later, in February 
2003, shareholders lost most of their returns generated since 1989 and the company suffered a 
complete meltdown. All that was left was a company with an accounting scandal, a failed business 
strategy and litigation filings from across the world. The litigation included the $1.1 billion 
settlement between the USA shareholders and the firm itself, making this the fifth largest 
settlement in the USA and the largest involving a European company in the USA (Bickerton, 
2005). Ahold became known as ‘Europe’s Enron’ (The Economist, 2003; Benston & Hartgraves, 
2002). 
1.3.5 Corporate failures in South Africa 
Well-known instances of fraudulent financial reporting and corporate scandals in South Africa 
include Masterbond, LeisureNet, Regal Bank, Unifer Bank, Saambou Bank, Tigon, Macmed, 
South African Airways, Randgold & Exploration, JCI and Fidentia (Marx, 2008), and more 
recently, VBS Bank, Steinhoff, Tongaat and Eskom. The most recent scandals involving auditing 
firms include KPMG, Deloitte, PwC and Nkonki, to mention only a few (Maranga, 2018). 
In the recent past, South Africa has also experienced widespread allegations of political 
misconduct in what has been termed an attempt at ‘state capture’ through illegal collusion between 
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private sector entities and politicians (Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors [IRBA], 2017; 
Thompson & Mahlaka, 2017, as quoted by Harber, 2018). ‘State capture’ is defined as a type of 
systemic political corruption in which private interests significantly influence a state’s decision-
making processes to their own advantage. In this regard, many allegations of collusion and 
misconduct in this state capture debacle have been laid against international organisations, notably, 
the audit firm, KPMG (Harber, 2018). 
In 2017, in the face of mounting evidence of state capture, KPMG was accused of deliberate 
collusion and political meddling as well as performing sub-standard work in a number of 
engagements with organisations linked to state capture (Thompson & Mahlaka, 2017; Dludla, 
2018 as quoted by Harber, 2018). Again, a lack of integrity, independence and professional 
scepticism by the audit firm was seen as the primary cause of the corporate failure (IRBA, 2017 
as quoted by Harber, 2018). KPMG South Africa suffered the loss of significant audit clients, who 
chose to terminate their relationships with the firm. This corporate failure resulted in investigations 
by the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) and the Independent Regulatory 
Board for Auditors (IRBA) (Dludla, 2018 as quoted by Harber, 2018). According to Nkuhlu 
(2020), there was a complete breakdown of controls at KPMG. He states that compliance with 
King IV would have significantly reduced the chances of the KPMG disaster. 
Another South African audit firm, Nkonki Inc., applied for voluntary liquidation in 2018 following 
a scandal involving a failed management buy-out transaction that was alleged to have been funded 
by parties linked to the state capture corruption allegations. As a result of these allegations against 
KPMG and Nkonki, the South African Auditor-General terminated its outsourcing of government 
audits to the two firms in April 2018, resulting in Nkonki seeking liquidation of one of its offices 
(Hill, 2018 as quoted by Harber, 2018). 
The 2017 collapse of share price in Steinhoff International Holdings amidst allegations of 
extensive accounting and financial fraud (case ongoing) is another recent example of corporate 
failure. Yet again, questions were asked about why the auditors (Deloitte) did not raise concerns 
earlier and why prior years’ financial statements had been signed off without qualification 
(Bowker, Bonorchis & Wild, 2017). Deloitte is now facing serious questions as to the quality and 
appropriateness of its prior audit work. 
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More recently, in 2019, Tongaat Hulett made headlines, which claimed that it was ‘another 
Steinhoff’ scandal. Tongaat stated that it would have to restate its profits, as they were not correct 
the first time. It seemed as though the auditors, Deloitte, had missed some important information 
and red flags. 
According to Comrie (2020), a confidential investigation carried out in 2019, delivered a damning 
assessment of PwC’s consulting work at Eskom, describing the fee structure as patently unlawful 
and stupendously egregious. Eskom issued PwC with a R95 million letter of demand. Eskom 
wanted the audit firm to pay back fees for a consulting deal that bore the signs of state capture. 
According to Eskom, PwC was taking the credit for work that they had already done, meaning that 
Eskom was paying PwC millions of Rands for work that they did not do, but merely duplicated. 
These South African examples of corporate financial misconduct, especially where the auditor was 
implicated, have resulted in the public and the IRBA questioning the independence and 
professional scepticism of the South African audit industry, especially with regard to public 
interest entities and exchange-listed companies (IRBA, 2016, 2017 as quoted by Harber, 2018). It 
could be argued that there is a ‘silver lining’ to these revelations in that accounting or reporting 
irregularities were being identified, even if it was after the fact, and that corrective action was 
taken. The corporate sector in South Africa may need to take some tough measures itself if it 
wishes to maintain its reputation for transparency and good governance (Stoddard, 2020). 
1.3.6 Other corporate failures 
The corporate failures discussed below are to set the context for this study and to show that 
corporate failures happens all around the world. 
The Satyam corporate scandal in 2009 was one of the worst in India’s corporate history. The fraud 
amounted to about $1.7 billion and involved 7,561 false invoices and 13,000 ‘ghost workers’. 
According to the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the auditors, PwC failed to check 
financial records and relied on management’s submissions in drawing up their ‘independent’ 
opinion (Maranga, 2018). This resulted in PwC being banned from auditing in India for two years. 
The former chairperson of Satyam was found guilty of falsifying accounts and income tax returns, 
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of fabricating invoices and of collusion in inflating the company’s reported gains. He was 
sentenced to seven years in prison (Maranga, 2018). 
In Nigeria there have been similar cases, with Cadbury Nigeria’s management overstating the 
company’s financial position for several years to achieve their growth targets. This fraud added to 
the value of between ₦13 billion and ₦42-million (Maranga, 2018). 
In Europe, other scandals included that of Parmalat in 2003. This Italian dairy products giant filed 
for bankruptcy when funds in excess of $18 billion were missing. Criminal charges, involving that 
of concealment of the financial condition of Parmalat to the public, were indicted on the directors 
and officers. Action was taken against Deloitte, Grant Thornton, Bank of America and Morgan 
Stanley by Italian prosecutors and the Parmalat bankruptcy estate. They alleged that these 
professional service providers assisted with the wrongdoing at Parmalat (Hughes & Lee, 2007). 
In Germany, Holtzman, Berliner Bank and Babok were big corporate failures (Marx, 2008) 
whereas in France, Crédit Lyonnais, Vivendi and Société Générale were large scandals in which 
accounting fraud took place (Hsu, 2008). 
1.3.7 Conclusion and critical link to the research problem 
According to Aziri (2014), corporate governance is not simply good business, but it also helps to 
prevent fraud, corporate scandals and potential civil and criminal liability of the organisation. An 
organisation with good corporate governance boosts the organisation’s reputation and attracts 
more investors, suppliers, customers and contributors. Corporate governance therefore produces a 
direct economic benefit to the organisation. 
Unfortunately, corporate failures and fraudulent financial reporting have continued to shock the 
public over the years (Marx, 2008) and have had a direct effect on the auditing profession. The 
quality of audit is often questioned after financial scandals of public companies such as Sunbeam, 
Waste Management, Xerox or Adelphia, to mention only a few. The public is losing confidence in 
the work of the auditors and the profession at large (Boynton, Johnson & Kell, 2006, as quoted by 
Teck-Heang & Ali, 2008). 
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Critical link to the objectives of the study 
Poor corporate governance practices, ‘creative’ accounting, fraudulent financial reporting, 
auditor inefficiency and independence issues are some of the common factors present in 
corporate scandals (Marx, 2008). This study explores how the lack of corporate governance has 
contributed to some of the worst financial corporate failures in the UK, the USA, Australia, the 
Netherlands and South Africa, as well as exploring whether weak governance practices at 
auditing firms have contributed to corporate failures or to the inability to detect such failures. 
Through a literature study, the most important principles of corporate governance are identified 
to assist in providing guidelines for corporate governance practices and oversight structures for 
auditing firms in South Africa. 
Audit quality and an audit firm’s ability to continuously provide audit services to the public is 
influenced by the corporate governance of the audit firm (La Rosa, Caserio & Bernini, 2018). It is 
clear from the literature that a lack of corporate governance has contributed to some of these 
corporate failures. Many of these corporate failures have resulted in audit firm failures, or at the 
very least, in damage to the reputation of the auditing firms. The next section briefly discusses 
audit firm failure. 
1.4 Audit firm failures 
Audit firm failures refer to the failure of the auditing firm that was involved in a financial scandal 
or corporate failure, such as Arthur Andersen in the case of Enron. The definition of a corporate 
failure previously used in this study is applied to that of an auditing firm, with an ‘audit firm 
failure’ being defined as follows: 
An event or situation involving auditing firms, where questionable professional and 
ethical behaviour arises, which then becomes the knowledge of the broader public, thus 
affecting the reputation of the auditing firm, which could ultimately result in the closure 
of the firm. 
In the case of Enron, the external auditors, Arthur Andersen, were also the financial consultants to 
the entity. This created a conflict of interest in terms of their auditing role and resulted in them not 
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giving a fair and true audit opinion on Enron’s operations. The scandal led to the failure of Enron 
and, subsequently, the failure of the audit firm itself (Maranga, 2018). 
There are also many corporate financial scandals and audit failures where the auditing firms did 
not fail; however, they suffered massive reputational damage—as can be seen in the examples of 
the KMPG scandals in South Africa. 
Critical link to the objectives of the study 
A literature review was conducted to determine the impact of weak corporate governance 
practices at auditing firms on the reputation and sustainability of the auditing firms as well as 
their role in possible audit firm failures. This review supports the research problem, to provide 
guidelines on corporate governance practices and oversight structures for auditing firms in South 
Africa, in order to minimise the possibility of corporate failures and audit firm failures. 
The research gap in this study is formed by the fact that very little research has been conducted to 
date on the corporate governance of auditing firms. As literature states, it is the lack of corporate 
governance that could lead to corporate scandals and thus the question is: ‘Could corporate 
scandals and audit failures be prevented if better corporate governance practices were to be 
implemented in auditing firms?’ 
1.5 Corporate governance in auditing firms 
1.5.1 Introduction 
The audit profession takes on the responsibility of detecting and reporting fraud as well as raising 
doubts about their clients’ ability to apply and disclose corporate governance matters (Teck-Heang 
& Ali, 2008). Auditing firms regard themselves as the ‘intellectual hub’ of corporate governance 
advisory, yet very few have a credible and compliant board of directors. To comply with corporate 
governance, the auditing firms should have a board of directors with a majority of non-executive 
directors, appropriately balanced in terms of the mix of competencies (Aberian, 2019). At present, 
the corporate structures of auditing firms are flawed. Some auditing firms argue that they need not 
comply with the codes of corporate governance as their business model is based on ‘partnership’ 
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(Aberian, 2019). According to Nkuhlu (2020), all auditing firms need to appoint independent, non-
executive directors (INEDs) and place risk and ethics under their oversight. 
Corporate governance disclosures of listed companies is a topic that has been researched and 
explored to some extent over the years (see, for example, Bauwhede and Willekens (2008), Collett 
and Hrasky (2005), Markarian, Parbonetti and Previts (2007) or Parum (2005)), however, very 
little empirical evidence exists on corporate governance practices and disclosures of auditing firms 
(La Rosa et al., 2018). 
The sections below explain the legislation, codes and regulation which offer guidelines to auditing 
firms with regard to corporate governance. 
1.5.2 South Africa 
According to the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA) (2016), King IV aspires to 
apply to all organisations, regardless of their form of incorporation. A main objective of King IV 
is to make it accessible and fit for application in different types of organisations and sectors. This 
implies that even auditing firms should apply King IV, yet, taking into consideration the recent 
corporate failures in South Africa, there is clearly a lack of application of King IV by South African 
auditing firms. According to the chairman of KPMG South Africa, Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu 
(2020), KMPG is one of very few, if not the only, audit firm to apply King IV. 
The Audit Profession Act (APA) does not have a specific chapter providing information or 
guidance on the governance of auditing firms. Chapter II, Part 4 provides details on the governance 
of the regulatory board, which in this case is the IRBA. 
In 2009, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) issued the ISQC 1. 
The ISQC 1 addresses “Quality Control for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of Financial 
Statements and Other Assurance and Related Services Engagements”. It is applicable to all 
auditing firms. However, the ISQC also makes little specific reference to audit firm corporate 
governance structures and practices (IRBA, 2018). In South Africa during 2018, the IRBA issued 
a call to auditing firms to release transparency reports in order to disclose the relevant internal 
information to the public. To date, the release of such transparency reports had been voluntary for 
auditing firms (IRBA, 2018). 
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1.5.3 Internationally 
Sir Donald Hood Brydon is a British businessman who is the chairman of the Science Museum 
Foundation, the Sage Group and the Charities Chance to Shine. He is also the author of the Brydon 
Report, published by the UK government. The report discusses the quality and effectiveness of 
audit. According to the Brydon Report, there are certain principles that provide a framework for 
the behaviour of auditors beyond simply following standards and the law (Brydon, 2019). The 
Brydon Report also makes no specific reference to audit firm corporate governance. The emphasis 
is placed on the individual auditor. 
As mentioned in section 1.2.2.1, there is only one specific corporate governance code in the world 
for auditing firms, namely the Audit Firm Governance Code in the UK. One of the objectives of 
this Code is to enhance auditing firms’ transparency reports. Regulators and standard-setters state 
that transparency about the corporate governance of auditing firms will reduce information 
asymmetry between auditing firms and the public and it will maintain high-quality audit services, 
thereby adding to the stability of the capital market (Deumes, Schelleman, Bauwhede & 
Vanstraelen, 2012). According to the CEO of the FRC, Stephen Haddrill, the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code enhances the trust and confidence of the public and investors in the value of 
audit services. He added that the Code reduces the risk of firm failure by contributing to the 
reputation of auditing firms and promoting greater transparency (ICAEW, 2017). The Code also 
consists of other corporate governance principles which auditing firms should implement, namely, 
(1) Leadership, (2) Values, (3) INED, (4) Operations, (5) Reporting, and (6) Dialogue (FRC, 
2016). 
To enhance transparency, auditing firms are expected to release any information that might affect 
market confidence (Kumar & Zattoni, 2014; Mallin, 2002; OECD, 2015b). Transparency reporting 
(or similar reporting) is usually mandatory for auditing firms which audit public interest entities 
(PIEs). Jurisdictions where this is the case include the European Union, Japan, Australia, the UK 
and New Zealand, among others. 
In 2013, Australia mandated that larger auditing firms of significant entities had to release a 
transparency report that makes specific reference to the audit firm’s internal governance systems 
(Fu, Carson & Simnett, 2015). The release of transparency reports has only been mandated in a 
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few countries. The majority of the research that is available was conducted in Europe, where 
auditing firms have been subject to mandatory transparency reporting requirements since 2008 
(Deumes et al., 2012; Pivac & Čular, 2012). 
In 2015, the IAASB issued the Invitation to Comment (ITC): Enhancing Audit Quality in the 
Public Interest: A Focus on Professional Scepticism, Quality Control and Group Audits, which 
introduced the topic of transparency reporting. According to the ITC, firms are required to release 
transparency reports that provide information on certain elements of the firm and its operations 
(IRBA, 2018). The IAASB (2014) states that audit firm transparency reports will assist third 
parties, such as the public and users of the audited financial statements, to understand the 
characteristics of the individual auditing firms and the drivers of audit quality in those firms. They 
further state that auditing firms can display to the public their approach to audits and therefore 
compete on aspects of audit quality by issuing transparency reports (Deumes et al., 2012). The call 
for greater transparency and disclosure by auditing firms is supported by the high-profile audit 
firm failures (such as the demise of Arthur Andersen) and the lack of confidence in the financial 
market in the post-global financial crisis era (Huddart, 2013). 
According to Aberian (2019), a new and different regulatory framework is needed for the auditing 
profession as well as new legislation and a new and effective independent regulatory board. It 
would seem that the time is ripe for corporate governance guidelines to be developed specifically 
for auditing firms in South Africa, to ensure that all stakeholders and public interests are protected 
and that corporate failures are kept to a minimum. 
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Critical link to the objectives of the study 
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the corporate governance of auditing firms is an 
area that requires extensive research. This study investigates the current corporate governance 
structures at auditing firms as well as determining the corporate governance expected to be 
implemented by South African auditing firms based on the literature review. 
1.6 Background to the research problem 
The research problem was identified from a gap in the body of knowledge. The literature proved 
to have limited information which made reference to corporate governance at auditing firms, and 
also indicated that there is only one corporate governance code for auditing firms in the world. 
Auditing firms in South Africa only started to implement King IV after various corporate scandals 
and corporate failures occurred in recent years in South Africa. In these scandals and corporate 
failures, it was specifically the auditing firms that were implicated. This led to mounting public 
interest questioning the auditing industry in South Africa (IRBA, 2016, 2017). 
The research problem is supported by the following literature. A study conducted by Uzun et al. 
(2004) examined how the occurrence of fraud was affected by the company’s governance features 
and various characteristics of the board of directors. The results indicated that the structure of 
committees and the composition of the board of directors had a significant effect on the occurrence 
of corporate fraud. The authors found that the more INEDs on the board, the less likely the 
occurrence of corporate fraud. 
Another study conducted by La Rosa et al. (2018) found that investors believed that transparency 
reports provide meaningful information about audit firm quality and independence. A 2019 study 
by the same authors suggests that transparency on corporate governance issues by all 
organisations, including auditing firms, contributes to the sound development of financial markets. 
According to DeFond and Zhang (2014), further research is needed on the characteristics of 
auditing firms such as the type of ownership structure, audit quality control systems, compensation 
schemes and governance systems. These characteristics would provide important insight into 
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factors that affect auditor competency and incentives. Transparency reports and the information 
they contain would allow researchers to examine these characteristics. 
A study conducted by Fu et al. (2015) on the governance structures of auditing firms in Australia 
found that the partners were majority members of the board of directors and three auditing firms 
(Grant Thornton, BDO and Brisbane and Moore Stephens from Melbourne) indicated that they 
had an independent chairperson. The information about local board composition was not specified 
in the transparency reports. Relatively few auditing firms disclose further information on their 
boards. 
As stated by the IRBA (2017), a lack of independence, integrity and professional scepticism by 
the audit firm are seen as the primary cause of corporate scandals. It is also evident from the 
integrated reports and transparency reports of the large auditing firms within South Africa that the 
governance structures of most auditing firms do not adhere to the King IV requirements in terms 
of board composition and independence. According to Nkuhlu (2020), corporate failures are a 
consequence of auditing firms becoming commercial enterprises driven by revenue and profits for 
the partners. He states that a lack of independence and ‘cosy’ relationships with clients result in 
corporate failures.  
From the above studies one can see the significant role that independence plays in corporate 
governance. This is also supported by the various corporate governance codes that have 
independence as one of the principles that should be applied in order to practice good corporate 
governance (more detail to be provided in Chapter 2). It is here that the gap has been identified 
within the literature on the lack of corporate governance within auditing firms and the impact that 
this has had on public trust. 
1.7 Research problem 
Although corporate governance issues have been thoroughly debated over the years and various 
studies have been conducted on the topic, virtually no research has been conducted on the corporate 
governance of auditing firms. It is essential that auditing firms understand the responsibility they 
have to implement corporate governance and appoint an independent governance structure. They 
need to understand the value it can add to the organisation and all stakeholders. Currently in South 
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Africa there is no legislation or code that regulates the corporate governance of auditing firms. 
Auditing firms are also not required by any law to disclose their corporate governance structure 
and application in any report. Auditing firms are encouraged by IRBA to issue a transparency 
report in which they disclose corporate governance structures and application, but this is not 
compulsory in South Africa. Moreover, the information issued in these transparency reports is 
limited and often only focuses on audit quality, and not governance. It is nonetheless clear from 
the limited amount of information disclosed that auditing firms do not apply corporate governance 
principles, specifically with regards to independent governance structures. 
As mentioned above, corporate governance addresses issues relating to ethics, accountability, 
transparency and disclosures as well as organisations’ social and environmental impact 
(Raemaekers, 2014; IoDSA, 2009). Should auditing firms apply better corporate governance 
practices and principles, it is expected that the incidence of corporate scandals and failures would 
lessen. The research problem is formulated below. 
Auditing firms in South Africa do not have effective governance structures and are not applying 
corporate governance practices and principles. This is evident from the amount of corporate 
scandals and failures that have taken place recently and the auditor implication in these scandals. 
The current corporate governance code in South Africa, King IV, does not have a specific sector 
supplement for auditing firms. Therefore, this study aims to provide guidelines on corporate 
governance practices and oversight structures for auditing firms in South Africa which could 
possibly be included as a sector supplement in future King Code iterations.  
The following literature supports the research problem: 
 Auditing firms are in the spotlight 
Recently in South Africa, the number of global corporate scandals has risen and this has 
led to huge financial losses. It has also led to increased calls for greater auditor 
independence and a better understanding of the role of the auditor. Most of the South 
African scandals have involved failed corporate governance and auditing processes and 
compromised accountancy procedures (Maranga, 2018). 
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 Corporate scandals and corporate governance 
Poor corporate governance practices, fraudulent financial reporting, ‘creative’ accounting 
as well as auditor inefficiency and independence issues, which are practiced by auditing 
firms, have all contributed to international and local corporate scandals (Marx, 2008). 
 Lack of literature and empirical research on the corporate governance of auditing 
firms 
While many studies have explored the determinants of corporate governance disclosures 
of listed companies (e.g. Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Markarian 
et al., 2007; Parum, 2005), there is very little evidence on corporate governance disclosures 
of auditing firms (La Rosa et al., 2018). 
 Failure to apply corporate governance in auditing firms 
To comply with corporate governance, the auditing firms should have a majority of non-
executive directors, with a mix of competencies on the board of directors (Aberian, 2019). 
Currently, most auditing firms do not have good corporate structures. Some auditing firms 
use a ‘partnership’ business model, arguing that they do not have to comply with the codes 
of corporate governance (Aberian, 2019). According to the South African Auditing 
Profession Trust Initiative (SAAPTI) (2020), there is a need to set out the principles and 
best practices that the auditing firms should apply to achieve good governance (setting the 
‘tone at the top’). There should be a set of principles for best practice on the effective 
governance of ethics within auditing firms. Governance structures for auditing firms should 
be clearly defined. According to SAAPTI (2020), there is uncertainty as to whether 
auditing firms have ethical leadership and effective structures to govern ethics and whether 
firms are structured in a way that encourages them to act as good corporate citizens serving 
the public interest. 
 The benefit of transparency reports for auditing firms 
Transparency reports provide all stakeholders with insights into an audit firm’s corporate 
governance processes and structures (IRBA, 2018). 
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1.8 Research objective 
The objective of this study is to provide guidance to auditing firms on corporate governance 
practices and structures that should be implemented to establish oversight on the corporate 
governance of the auditing firms. 
More specifically, the study seeks to add to the existing body of knowledge as follows: 
 To examine the development of corporate governance in the UK, USA, Australia, the 
Netherlands and more specifically, in South Africa. This analysis is necessary to identify 
the corporate governance principles that are applicable to auditing firms and provide 
grounds for empirical research on the application and disclosure of corporate governance 
within auditing firms in South Africa (Chapter 2); 
 To make a comparison between the UK audit firm governance code and King IV to identify 
the similarities (Chapter 2 and Annexure I); 
 To explore how the lack of corporate governance has contributed to some of the worst 
financial corporate failures the UK, USA, Australia, the Netherlands and South Africa and 
establish whether auditing firms contributed to these failures. Through this literature 
review, the most important principles of corporate governance are identified to provide 
guidelines on corporate governance practices and oversight structures for auditing firms in 
South Africa (Chapter 3); 
 To determine the current legal and governance structures in auditing firms as well as 
indicating the corporate governance that should be implemented by auditing firms (Chapter 
4); 
 To perform a content analysis of the integrated reports and/or transparency reports of large 
and medium-sized auditing firms with 20 or more partners and determine what is disclosed 
on their corporate governance practices (Chapter 5); 
 To formulate a questionnaire based on the literature and the current corporate governance 
practices at auditing firms to determine what the current practice at auditing firms. The 
questionnaire will also obtain the expert opinions of the CEO’s of the top nine auditing 
firms with regards to corporate governance at auditing firms (Chapter 5). 
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These objectives are achieved through a literature review (Chapters 1 to 4) and a content analysis 
and empirical study (Chapter 6) based on the research methodology selected for this study (Chapter 
5). 
The cut-off date for the study is set at 31 August 2020. Any developments after this date will be 
addressed in future research. 
1.9 Study layout 
The study is divided into seven chapters, summarised below. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction and Study Overview 
This chapter sets out the background to the study and the aspects that prompted the concerns over 
corporate governance in auditing firms. The background to the research problem and the 
motivation for the study are also explained. 
Chapter 2 – Corporate Governance 
This chapter discusses the developments in corporate governance in the UK, USA, Australia, the 
Netherlands and South Africa. Acts, standards and codes on audit firm governance are examined 
through a detailed literature review. 
Chapter 3 – Corporate Failures and Audit Failures 
This chapter investigates the corporate failures in the UK, USA, Australia, the Netherlands and 
South Africa. 
Chapter 4 – Current Corporate Governance Structures and Practices at Auditing firms 
This chapter considers the legal and corporate governance structures of auditing firms. It also 
addresses concerns over corporate governance practices at auditing firms and suggests solutions 
from the literature. 
Chapter 5 – Research Methodology 
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This chapter describes the theoretical framework, the research design and research methodology 
applied in this study. The chapter also describes data collection and analysis techniques, sampling 
and ethics applied in this study. 
Chapter 6 – Empirical Study, Analysis and Findings 
Chapter 6 presents the qualitative findings from the content analysis and compares these to the 
quantitative findings from the questionnaires. The results are analysed and discussed. 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion and Areas for Future Research 
Based on the findings from the literature and the results of the empirical study, conclusions and 
inferences are drawn and recommendations are made. Possible areas for future research are also 
identified. 
1.10 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a background on corporate governance and its impact on corporate failures, 
with a specific focus on the involvement of auditing firms in these failures. The chapter also 
explored the various corporate governance codes that have been adopted in the UK, USA, 
Australia, the Netherlands and South Africa. The literature indicated that a lack of corporate 
governance could lead to corporate scandals and corporate failures. Corporate governance thus 
plays a vital role in protecting the public interest. The literature also revealed that there is no 
specific corporate governance code that governs the corporate governance of auditing firms in 
South Africa. As a result, many auditing firms lack sound corporate governance practices and 
principles. It was posited that this could be the cause of many corporate failures and that should 
auditing firms implement a corporate governance code, corporate failures and audit firm failures 
would decrease. The corporate governance expectations for auditing firms were also discussed in 
relation to transparency reports. The research problem was explained and the research objectives 
were formalised. The chapter concluded with a summary of the study layout. 
The next chapter explores the development of corporate governance in the UK, USA, Australia, 
the Netherlands and South Africa.  
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Chapter 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains a literature review of corporate governance and related theories in the context 
of corporate governance developments in the UK, USA, Australia, the Netherlands and more 
specifically, South Africa. Then, literature addressing the corporate governance of auditing firms 
is discussed. Thereafter the principles that are applicable to auditing firms are identified to provide 
grounds for the empirical research on the application and disclosure of corporate governance 
within auditing firms in South Africa. 
The word ‘governance’ is derived from the Latin verb gubernare, which is in turn derived from 
the Greek word, kubernaein, which means ‘to steer’. As can be seen from its etymology, 
governance refers to the way in which a group of people or a state is governed, directed or 
controlled (Tamayao, 2014). 
According to Cochran and Wartick (1988), the term ‘corporate’ covers multiple aspects relating 
to theories and practices of boards of directors and their executive and non-executive management. 
The Institute on Governance (2020) indicates that governance consists of the following set of 
principles, which also frequently recur in much of the literature, namely, legitimacy and voice, 
direction, performance, accountability and fairness. These principles are also supported by various 
other authors and institutions that include them in their definitions of governance (Ally, 2016; 
Aziri, 2014; Bendixen & Thomas, 2000; Clarke, 2004; Cochran & Wartick, 1988; Frederick, 2000; 
Fung, 2014; Gillan & Starks, 1998; IoDSA, 2016; Millar, Eldomiaty, Choi & Hilton, 2005; Monks 
& Minow, 1995; Ntim, Lindop & Thomas, 2013; O’Donovan, 2003; OECD, 2015a; Patel, 2013; 
Rossouw et al., 2002; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 
2009; World Bank, 2016). 
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These principles are discussed in greater detail below. 
i. Legitimacy and Voice 
This refers to participation and consensus orientation. Participation means that a decision-making 
voice should be available to all individuals. This could be directly, or through the institutions that 
represent their intention. Board participation is built on freedom of speech and association as well 
as the opportunity to constructively participate. Consensus orientation refers to the manner in 
which the board of directors ensures that decisions on policies and procedures are made in the best 
interests of the group (Institute on Governance, 2020). 
This view is supported by Cochran and Wartick (1988), who state that governance concentrates 
on the relationship between boards, top management, regulators, stockholders, auditors and other 
stakeholders. Monks and Minow (1995) agree, contending that corporate governance is the 
relationship among various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations. The FRC (2019) also supports these principles, stressing that companies do not exist 
in isolation. Successful and sustainable businesses create prosperity and provide employment. In 
order to be a sustainable organisation, successful relationships have to be formed by the directors 
and the stakeholders. If these relationships are built on respect, mutual benefit and trust, they will 
be successful. 
According to Fung (2014), a corporate governance framework based on commitment to effective 
corporate control, transparency and accountability can restore trust between governing bodies and 
stakeholders by enabling informed decision-making for shareholders, potential investors and 
stakeholders in relation to the company’s operations. This will, in turn, enhance performance and 
improve corporate reputation and goodwill (Ntim et al., 2013). According to Cadbury (2004), as 
cited in Clarke (2004), the overall purpose of corporate governance is to align the interests of 
corporations, all stakeholders and society as closely as possible. 
ii. Direction 
This principle refers to having strategic vision in that governance and human development are a 
long-term perspective for leaders of organisations and the public. Direction also takes into 
consideration what is needed for such development. It is important to also consider the historical, 
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cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is grounded (Institute on Governance, 
2020). 
This view is supported by the World Bank (2016), which states that corporate governance concerns 
the system by which companies are directed and controlled. The same definition is echoed by 
Smerdon (1998) as quoted by Rossouw et al. (2002). 
iii. Performance 
This refers to responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency. To achieve this, organisations should 
serve all their stakeholders and achieve their objectives while making use of all their resources 
(Institute on Governance, 2020). According to O’Donovan (2003), corporate governance serves 
the needs of shareholders and stakeholders by directing and controlling management activities, 
through an internal system of policies, processes and people. The author also emphasises that 
integrity, accountability, objectivity and business acumen play an important role. A healthy board 
culture, legislation and reliance on external market place commitment contribute to sound 
corporate governance (O’Donovan, 2003). 
This view is supported by Stemberg, Hess, Schleifer, Vishny, Tricker, Cannon, Keasey and 
Wright, as cited by (Aziri, 2014), who agree that any actions that affect the interests of shareholders 
should always be supervised and controlled. They state that corporate governance includes the 
control and administration of human resources and the company’s capital. 
iv. Accountability 
This involves being accountable and transparent. Public and institutional stakeholders trust the 
decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organisations to be 
accountable. A free flow of information is key in ensuring transparency. It is also important that 
the parties which are concerned with the institution, their processes and information have access 
to adequate information to understand and monitor the institutions (Institute on Governance, 
2020). The World Bank (2016) confirms that governance is about accountability; owners and 
companies are able to build trust and confidence when they are accountable. 
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The importance of transparency and accountability has been widely recognised by both academics 
and market regulators. These are important elements of a robust corporate governance regime 
(Fung, 2014). These two traits assist governing bodies to minimise agency problems by reducing 
information asymmetry between those charged with governance and corporate stakeholders and to 
enhance goal congruence by aligning the goals of the company with those of society (Ntim et al., 
2013). 
Transparency also suggests that information is easily available and accessible to stakeholders who 
are affected by the decisions taken by the governing body and their enforcements (United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2009). Patel (2013) argues that 
transparency creates and maintains a level of openness and non-secrecy of information in 
companies. It is an effective way of protecting the interest of stakeholders by promoting disclosure 
of non-financial information necessary to hold governing bodies accountable for the decisions that 
directly or indirectly affect them (Frederick, 2000; Fung, 2014). 
Accountability is the obligation of a company to answer for and accept responsibility for its 
activities and disclose the outcomes in a manner that is transparent to all stakeholders (Patel, 2013). 
Accountability cannot be achieved without transparency; as such, the two concepts are inseparable, 
for if a company’s governance system is committed to transparency, it will promote accountability 
as well (Millar et al., 2005; Ally, 2016). 
The OECD (2015a) states that the integrity of businesses and markets is essential to the health and 
stability of the global economy. It is therefore important to ensure sound corporate governance 
through rules and practices which promote transparency and accountability in companies. 
v. Fairness 
The fairness principle makes reference to equity and the rule of law. Fairness means that every 
individual has an opportunity to maintain or improve their well-being. This is also supported by 
King IV (IoDSA, 2016), which states that if a governing body strives towards an ethical culture, 
effective control, good performance and legitimacy, good corporate governance will follow. It is 
also important that the legal frameworks, such as the human rights laws are enforced impartially. 
Gillan and Starks (1998) concur, stating that corporate governance is the system of laws, rules and 
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factors that control operations at a company. A Commonwealth Association for Corporate 
Governance report states that the governing body should govern the organisation with integrity 
(Bendixen & Thomas, 2000). The FRC (2019) maintains that a company’s culture should be 
responsive to all stakeholders and shareholders and should promote integrity and openness. 
According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (2009) 
transparency occurs when the governing body makes decisions that are consistent with established 
regulations and laws. 
From the above discussion, the following corporate governance definition has been formulated 
and is used in this study: 
Corporate governance is a set of responsibilities and practices instituted by the 
governing body in order to direct a company to achieve its strategic objectives while 
remaining sustainable, accountable and transparent and acting in the best interests of 
all stakeholders. 
The above definition is applicable to both corporate entities as well as auditing firms. 
What is important about governance structures, is that they have to be clear and understood by all 
individuals in order to be effective. Such structures are effective when individuals feel that their 
motives count. Corporate governance practices are diverse and differ across the world. Economic, 
political and legal backgrounds as well as the history and culture of a country further increase the 
diversity of governance structures (Clarke, 2004). 
It is widely recognised that corporate governance can contribute to the long-term sustainability 
and economic success of corporations (Armstrong, 2003, as quoted by Rossouw, 2005). Rossouw 
(2005) agrees, stating that corporate governance can improve the reputation of companies and 
enhance corporate responsibility, which attracts foreign and local investors. Good corporate 
governance deters unethical business practices and corruption, which are sure to have a negative 
impact on the reputation of an organisation. The benefits of corporate governance justify the 
implementation of sound corporate governance structures (Armstrong, 2003). 
From the above definitions, it is clear that corporate governance is about the ‘tone at the top’. ISQC 
1 has been substantially enhanced to improve the robustness of a firms’ governance and leadership. 
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In particular, it addresses the expected behaviour of firm leadership in setting the tone at the top. 
For this reason, this study emphasises the tone at the top of auditing firms’ governance and 
leadership structure. This study does not focus on audit quality, as many studies, codes, acts and 
legislation have already covered this topic. 
Theory of corporate governance is frequently described in terms of two apparently opposing 
models: the shareholder model and stakeholder model. The differences between these two models 
reflect different theories of the corporation (West, 2006). The following section discusses these 
two theories of corporate governance. 
2.2 Theories of corporate governance 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The agency theory, which arose when the ownership of companies became separated from their 
control, resulted in the birth of the concept of corporate governance (Rossouw et al., 2002). 
According to Corfield (1998), for the last 150 years, the purpose of the corporate structure has 
been to maximise profit purely to increase shareholder wealth. More recently, however, the focus 
has shifted to include social considerations as awareness has grown of interdependencies created 
between various groups, with which the corporation has a legitimate concern. These groups include 
customers, suppliers, employees and broader society (Corfield, 1998). 
Corporate governance was subsequently introduced to ensure that companies were controlled by 
their owners in a way that served the best interests of all stakeholders (Rossouw et al., 2002). 
Rossouw (2005) supports this by stating that the governing body is obliged to be accountable to 
stakeholders and shareholders. The ethical standards of the company are conveyed in the way the 
company treats its stakeholders. In other words, the moral sensitivity of the company is reflected 
in the way in which stakeholders are engaged with (Rossouw, 2005). 
From the above discussion, it is clear that there are two opposing theories in corporate governance, 
namely, the agency theory, also referred to as the shareholder theory, and the stakeholder theory. 
These two opposing theories are discussed in detail in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. Another theory 
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which is also discussed in this section is that of the one-tier and two-tier board structures. More 
about this theory will be discussed in section 2.2.4 below.  
2.2.2 Shareholder theory 
The shareholder theory and agency theory is in harmony, and therefore this section could refer to 
any of the two terms. Theory agency developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976 is defined as a 
contract whereby one party (the principal) hires another party (the agent) to perform a service on 
their behalf. Managers operating to further their own interests as agents are unlikely to maximise 
returns for shareholders (principals) unless adequate governance mechanisms are introduced to 
protect shareholders’ interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency problems resulting from 
the separation of ownership and control, if left unchecked, can result in firms being run less 
efficiently, thereby reducing their value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). An important assumption of 
the agency theory is that managers are extrinsically motivated and, in the absence of incentives 
and controls, will expropriate wealth from the principal for their own benefit (Dedman, 2016). 
Heath and Norman (2004) refer to the above as the shareholder theory. Shareholder theory deals 
with circumstances in which one person, the principal, wishes to compel another, the agent, to 
perform a function that is in the interests of the principal, but not necessarily of the agent. This 
effect can be accomplished either by moral persuasion or by offering rewards (Heath & Norman, 
2004). 
The shareholder model takes the view that the owners of the company (the shareholders) aim to 
supply consumers with products or services for the benefit of themselves, as owners; they are 
therefore expected to be responsible and accountable. This view is dominant in the USA and most 
English-speaking countries. The shareholder model includes the fundamental right to individual 
private ownership and the belief that economic efficiency is achieved by market forces. The right 
to individual private property lends itself to self-interested behaviour, which leads to the key issue 
in this model, such as the conflicting interests of owners and managers (West, 2006). 
The shareholder model holds that the corporation is an extension of its owners and is ultimately 
responsible to those owners (Andreasson, 2011). Key assumptions of the shareholder model 
include the inviolability of private ownership. This implies that the shareholders who own the 
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company have exclusive rights to determine company priorities and they also have rights to any 
profit generated (West, 2006). This model needs to resolve potential conflicts of interest between 
owners (principals) and managers (agents) (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985). It does so in most cases by 
linking managerial rewards to corporate performance, measured by share price, exercised by 
means of stock options (Letza, Sun & Kirkbride, 2004). This generally precludes any serious 
consideration of market interference in achieving the goals of the corporation, such as requiring 
corporations to consider matters beyond the financial ‘bottom line’ (Andreasson, 2011). 
There is also ample opportunity for executives to hide information, as demonstrated in the Enron, 
Steinhoff, VBS and Tongaat scandals, to name only a few, or to frustrate shareholder efforts to 
obtain access to information. Compounding the issue is the fact that when it comes to regulation 
and control, shareholders frequently face their own collective action crisis. It requires time, effort 
and money to keep an eye on management and criticise their decisions. Generally, when there is 
one single dominant shareholder, that person would find it in their interest to accept such charges 
(Heath & Norman, 2004). 
It is widely accepted that good corporate governance systems are required to alleviate the problem 
that occurs as a result of corporate ownership separation and control. Based on this, companies 
with stronger governance systems, such as more autonomous boards, are likely to provide their 
shareholders with greater returns than those with weaker governance structures (Christensen, Kent 
& Stewart, 2010). 
Corporate governance mechanisms have the primary purpose of minimising or addressing these 
collective action issues. If actions are entirely measurable and all other information is common 
knowledge, then it is easy to create such incentive schemes. The main-agent framework becomes 
interesting only when there is a certain asymmetry of information between the principal and the 
agent. Senior executives and shareholders or board members have this asymmetry. These 
asymmetries generate the opportunity for opportunistic behaviour, where executives can use their 
intimate knowledge of the business to enrich themselves at the expense of the shareholders (Heath 
& Norman, 2004). 
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The collapse of the governance relationship in the Enron-era scandals reflected the failure of these 
companies and their shareholders to defend themselves against conflicts with agencies (Heath & 
Norman, 2004). 
UK regulators, for example, adopted the agency view of corporate governance (McKnight & Weir, 
2009) and took steps to monitor, control and sanction companies and company directors to 
maintain the confidence of the capital market. One such step involved the formation of various 
committees, each with the remit to improve corporate governance in UK listed companies. Since 
the initial Cadbury Code of 1992, the UK has periodically ordered reviews of the corporate 
governance of listed firms, each one resulting in additions to the previous set of recommendations. 
This eventually came to be known as the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (Dedman, 
2016). 
2.2.3 Stakeholder theory 
Milton Friedman, an economist who posited the stakeholder theory in the early 20th century, 
suggests that a company’s aim is to make money for stockholders, which means that stockholders 
are the one and only group of stakeholders that managers can consider when making a decision. 
Nonetheless, in recent times, some economists have continued to embrace the stakeholder theory 
as offering a range of possible economic advantages. Many businesses understand that economic 
health affects all stakeholders including owners, vendors, staff and consumers (Corfield, 1998). 
The stakeholder model understands the company as a private body responsible and accountable to 
a wider group of stakeholders (Wieland, 2005). 
According to West (2006), the stakeholder model is focused on the company’s view of a social 
organisation that has duty (and accountability) to a range of stakeholders, in its broadest context, 
including all those who influence or are affected by the business. This typically includes 
shareholders, vendors, consumers, workers, management, government and local communities. 
This view is supported by Heath and Norman (2004), who state that the governance stakeholder 
theory is concerned with how specific groups of stakeholders should exercise oversight and 
management control. 
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According to Corfield (1998), under stakeholder theory, directors take into account the company’s 
best interests when discharging their duties. This binds them to consider the consequences of any 
action on all groups affected by their action, including shareholders, staff, vendors, clients, 
business creditors and community in which the company is located. 
A range of stakeholders has been identified, namely, contractual stakeholders such as employees, 
customers, suppliers, bankers and creditors, and non-contractual stakeholders such as the media, 
special interest groups, local communities, society at large, professional bodies, the state and the 
government. It is, however, evident that certain stakeholders, besides shareholders, enjoy distinct 
prominence. It is especially local communities and society that are being singled out as prominent 
stakeholders and the social responsibility of companies towards society is consequently 
emphasised (Rossouw, 2005). 
Two influential economists, the UK’s Will Hutton and the USA’s Margaret Blair, are ardent 
supporters of the stakeholder theory. Hutton sees this theory as the solution to massive injustice, 
underinvestment and a hollow-out manufacturing base that ultimately does little good to any sector 
of the economy. Blair believes that managing companies with the interests of all stakeholders in 
mind is in a country’s long-term economic interest (Corfield, 1998). Corfield supports Hutton and 
Blair’s views and argues that the age-old notion of ownership and control—where the corporation 
is an asset of the shareholders—should be discarded. Instead, the corporation should be treated as 
a governance system whose social function is to administer the wealth and investments made by 
all the stakeholders of the company (Corfield, 1998). 
According to Blair, boards of directors should recognise that they represent all the stakeholders of 
a company, and not just shareholders. They should aim to optimise the business’ wealth creation 
(Corfield, 1998). Heath and Norman (2004) concur, stating that in the stakeholder theory, 
shareholders are but one of several important stakeholder groups. Customers, suppliers, employees 
and local communities also have a stake in the firm’s success or failure and are affected by it. The 
firm and its managers have special obligations to ensure that shareholders receive a fair return on 
their investment, but the firm also has special obligations to other stakeholders, which go above 
and beyond those required by law. 
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The implementation of corporate governance stakeholder theory and the consideration of a wider 
group’s interests, other than just the shareholders, is in line with the rapidly evolving corporate 
world, including the increasing importance of environmental concerns and more demanding 
workers, societies and consumers. This means treating stakeholders equally and justly (Corfield, 
1998). 
Summative comment on theories of corporate governance 
The shareholder theory deals with situations where one person—the principal—wants to induce 
another—the agent—to perform some task that is in the interest of the principal, but not 
necessarily that of the agent. Governance stakeholder theory is concerned with how specific 
stakeholder groups can exercise regulation and management power. This is important when 
considering the impact that any event or decision would have on all of the organisation’s 
stakeholders. 
Corporate governance is sometimes defined as being either Anglo-American or European. 
Typically, the Anglo-American approach tends toward the shareholder model, which is also a one-
tiered board structure, while the European approach tends towards the stakeholder model, which 
is a two-tiered board structure (West, 2006; Maassen, 1999). The following section will provide 
an explanation on the one- and two-tiered board structures. 
2.2.4 One-tiered and two-tiered board structures 
Reed (2002) claims that developing countries implement corporate governance reforms in line 
with the Anglo-American (shareholder) approach, which he defines as having the following 
characteristics: 
 a single-tier board structure that gives the shareholders’ interests almost absolute primacy; 
 dominant role of financial markets; 
 a correspondingly weak financial position; and 
 little to no labour policy concerning businesses cooperating with state agencies. 
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In general, Anglo-American countries such as the USA, the UK and Canada have adopted variants 
of the one-tier board model. In this model, executive directors and non-executive directors operate 
together in one organisational layer (the so-called one-tier board). Some one-tier boards are 
dominated by a majority of executive directors while others are composed of a majority of non-
executive directors. In addition, one-tier boards can have a board leadership structure that separates 
the CEO and chair positions of the board. One-tier boards can also operate with a board leadership 
structure that combines the roles of the CEO and the chairman. This is called CEO-duality. One-
tier boards also often use board committees such as audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees (Maassen, 1999; Bendixen & Thomas, 2000). King IV is an example of a one-tier 
board recommendation. 
Continental European countries such as Germany, Finland and the Netherlands have adopted 
variants of the two-tier board model. This is also confirmed by Bendixen and Thomas (2000), who 
state that this structure is commonly found in Germany, France and the Netherlands and has been 
proposed as a model for boards in the EU. In this model, an additional organisational layer has 
been designed to separate the executive function of the board from its monitoring function. The 
oversight board (the upper layer) is entirely composed of non-executive supervisory directors who 
may represent labour, the government and/or institutional investors. The management 
board/executive committee (EXCO, which is the lower layer) is usually composed of executive 
managing directors. It is generally not accepted that directors combine the CEO and chairman roles 
in two-tier boards. Because the CEO has no seat on the oversight board, the board’s leadership 
structure is formally independent from the executive function of the board. This is particularly the 
case in two-tier boards in the Netherlands and Germany. In variants of the two-tier board model in 
these countries, executive managing directors are not entitled to have a position on the oversight 
board of the corporation (Maassen, 1999). 
Table 2.1 below illustrates the difference between the one-tier board model and the two-tier board 
model. 
Table 2.1: Difference between the one-tier board model and the two-tier board model 
One-Tier Board Model Two-Tier Board Model 
The Board of Directors The Oversight Board 
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In charge of decision management and 
decision control. 
In charge of decision control, oversight and 
governance. 
The Management Board/EXCO 
In charge of decision management on a day-to-
day basis. 
Source: Maassen (1999). 
Corporate failures and company collapses, combined with deceptive financial reporting practices, 
have prompted innovations in corporate governance, giving rise to numerous corporate governance 
standards, which have been issued since 1992 (Marx, 2008). The corporate governance literature 
is strongly dominated by research on one-tier corporate boards in the USA and the UK. Second in 
prevalence, but much less available, are studies on corporate governance models in Germany and 
the Netherlands. With the exception of a few studies, comparative research on governance systems 
and board models in (continental) European countries is hardly existent (Charkham, 1994; Pic, 
1997; Maassen, van den Bosch & Volberda, 2004). For this reason, the following section adds to 
the existing body of knowledge by discussing the development of corporate governance codes 
within the selected international countries, such as the UK, USA, Australia and the Netherlands. 
It then concludes with a detailed discussion of the corporate governance developments in South 
Africa. 
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Critical link to the empirical study: 
The stakeholder theory emphasises the importance of all stakeholders. Auditing firms have an 
important responsibility towards the public interest. For this reason, it is extremely important 
that auditing firms adopt the stakeholder theory as their corporate governance model and more 
specifically, a two-tier board structure.  
The empirical study aims to provide guidelines on corporate governance practices and oversight 
structures for auditing firms in South Africa (based on the stakeholder theory and a two-tiered 
board structure) with principles that are specifically relevant to auditing firms.  
2.3 Introduction to corporate governance codes 
Corporate governance is a new discipline that has grown out of deep-seated concerns stemming 
from spectacular and well-publicised corporate failures, which are also discussed in Chapter 3. 
This section in Chapter 2 aims to contribute to the body of knowledge by discussing the 
developments of corporate governance codes internationally and locally in South Africa. This 
section also discusses any corporate governance codes, acts or legislation that are applicable to 
auditing firms. 
According to Gregory and Simms (1999) the modern trend of developing corporate governance in 
the USA was a response to problems in the corporate performance of leading companies, the 
perceived lack of effective board oversight that contributed to those performance problems and 
pressure for change from institutional investors. The corporate governance developments in the 
UK and USA proved to be influential sources for other guidelines and code efforts. The UK also 
influenced the development of the King Code in South Africa. This is confirmed by West (2006), 
who states that South African corporate law and corporate practice have been adopted mainly from 
the UK. The UK and USA also faced some of the most well-known corporate failures that led to 
the development of corporate governance codes. These corporate failures include Enron in the 
USA and Robert Maxwell in the UK (Clarke, 1993; Aziri, 2014). For these reasons, the UK and 
USA were selected for this study. 
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Australia is no different to the UK and USA and also faced some well-known corporate scandals. 
These include HIH Insurance, One.Tel, Ansett Australia and Harris Scarfe (Mirshekary et al., 
2005). A corporate governance code was also developed after these scandals. 
The Netherlands was selected because it adopted a different board model to the UK, USA and 
Australia. According to Bendixen and Thomas (2000), the Netherlands adopted a two-tier board 
model. Countries like the UK, USA, Australia and South African mostly have a one-tier board 
model. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is very little legislation, standards or codes that govern the 
corporate governance of auditing firms. In South Africa, the APA 26 of 2005 only provides 
information on the governance of the regulatory board, but no specific information on auditing 
firms and audit firm governance. The Brydon Report was issued in 2019 and provided 
recommendations on the improved quality and effectiveness for auditing in the UK. The Brydon 
Report also specifically proposes a set of principles, namely, the Principles of Corporate Auditing, 
which relate to governance. From the extensive literature review, it emerged that the UK is the 
only country with a corporate governance code specifically for auditing firms, namely, the Audit 
Firm Corporate Governance Code. Globally, there is the ISQC 1 and ISA 220 that provide limited 
information on audit quality and governance. The drafts for the International Standard on Quality 
Management (ISQM) 1 and ISQM 2 were released in 2019, but are not yet effective. For this 
reason, this study discusses the literature on ISQC 1 and ISA 220 only. 
The following sections of the chapter discuss the corporate governance codes applicable in each 
country as stated above. Should there be a corporate governance code for auditing firms in a 
specific country, this code is also discussed under the relevant country’s heading. 
2.3.1 Corporate governance in the UK 
2.3.1.1 Corporate governance codes applicable to all corporate entities 
In the UK, corporate failures and scandals prompted the development of voluntary codes as well 
as some attempts at the legislated approach on corporate governance (Pandhu, n.d.). A series of 
sensational business scandals occurred in the UK in the late 1980s. There was particular public 
indignation at Robert Maxwell’s plundering of pension funds, at the inability of auditors to reveal 
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the Bank of Credit and Commerce International’s imminent collapse and at the relatively high pay 
increases earned by senior executives. In response, the City of London formed a special committee 
to investigate the financial dimensions of corporate governance. This was the Cadbury 
Committee’s Code of Best Practice. The Industrialist, Sir Adrian Cadbury, chaired this committee. 
The Cadbury Committee report, as it came to be known, created public awareness about the most 
effective means of regulating the actions of company managers and executives to ensure ethical 
behaviour. The 1992 Cadbury Report defines corporate governance as the systems that direct and 
control companies. The Cadbury Code proposed a greater presence on corporate boards for non-
executive directors, numerous improvements in board procedures and a more active role for 
auditors (Boyd, 1996). 
The Cadbury Committee released the first edition of the UK Corporate Governance Code, in 1992. 
It described corporate governance as the structure that guides and regulates businesses. Boards of 
directors are responsible for the management of their businesses. The position of the shareholders 
in governance is to appoint the directors and auditors and to ensure that there is an effective 
governance system in place. This remains valid today, but the world in which companies, their 
shareholders and wider stakeholders work, continues to evolve rapidly (FRC, 2019). 
The next report was called the Myners Report which was produced by a committee chaired by 
Paul Myners in 1995. It concentrated on the relationships between companies and institutional 
investors. It recommended that when a company is performing badly, institutional investors should 
attempt to rectify the problem instead of selling their shares and turning their backs on the 
company. It argued for a legislated approach in dealing with corporate scandals as opposed to the 
voluntary codes (Pandhu, n.d.). 
The next code was the Greenbury Report prepared by the Greenbury Committee. It was set up on 
the recommendation of the Cadbury Committee to review progress on corporate governance in the 
UK and state companies. Published in 1995, it focused mainly on directors’ remuneration. This 
report was a direct response to the UK media onslaught on the ‘fat cat’ directors who over-
remunerated themselves at the expense of shareholders, especially in newly privatised companies. 
This report recommended the establishment of remuneration committees and associated 
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disclosures on director remuneration. It also recommended the crafting of sound remuneration 
policies and performance-based director service contracts (Pandhu, n.d.). 
The next report was the Hampel Report which was drafted in 1995 by Sir Ronald Hampel. Its sole 
task was to review the recommendations of the Cadbury and Greenbury Committee Reports. The 
report was finally published in 1998 and covered the following corporate governance issues: the 
ideal composition of the board and the role of directors, directors’ remuneration, the role of 
shareholders, particularly institutional investors, communication between the company and its 
shareholders, financial reports, auditing and financial statements (Pandhu, n.d.). 
In 2003, the Hicks and Smith Report on corporate governance was published. It articulated the 
roles and responsibilities of non-executive directors and issued guidelines on the roles and 
responsibilities of audit committees (Pandhu, n.d.). 
Early in 2009 Sir John Walker prepared the latest code on corporate governance for the UK, giving 
rise to the Combined Code. The Combined Code was born out of the need to combine all efforts 
on corporate governance in the UK. It was important that the UK stock exchanges required listed 
companies to disclose in their annual report the extent of their compliance with the Combined 
Code. The Combined Code provided for periodic reviews of its terms, to take into account changes 
in corporate governance in the UK (Pandhu, n.d.). 
A variety of factors guided the review of corporate governance during 2017–2018 which 
contributed to the 2018 Code. These included a continuing lack of confidence in business, high-
profile corporate failures, lingering concerns that businesses had given little thought to long-term 
sustainability, and more generally, the impact that businesses have on wider society (FRC, 2020). 
Continued corporate failures also raised concerns about the effectiveness of the board’s long-term 
sustainability in considering and reporting on risks. Through the review by the FRC it became 
clear that many businesses only concentrated on ensuring strict compliance with regulations and 
that this strategy provided little insight into governance practices. Most companies declared 
themselves fully compliant with the Code; however, there was a lack of information on the results 
of governance policies and practices in many annual reports, including any areas for future 
improvement (FRC, 2020). 
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The 2018 Code reaffirms the value of implementing the Principles in a way that shareholders can 
determine. It is much more important to apply the concepts efficiently than to use a ‘tick box’ 
approach. It involves showing the actions that an organisation has taken and how these relate to its 
strategy and intent. This is supported by the language used in the 2018 Code. There are many cases 
in which companies are asked to explain the impact of their actions, such as stakeholder and 
employee engagement and progress against the outcomes of diversity (FRC, 2020). 
The Code has been updated and extended over the years to take into account rising demands on 
the UK’s corporate governance system. Theory of mutual accountability within a unitary board 
has been a success and has played a critical role in achieving good governance standards and 
promoting long-term investment alongside investor stewardship activities. Nevertheless, the 
debate on the complexity and scope of the system has escalated as a result of financial crises and 
high-profile cases of insufficient governance and corruption, leading to disappointing outcomes 
for a wide variety of stakeholders (FRC, 2019). 
The essence of the new Code is a revised collection of principles that stresses the importance of 
corporate governance to sustainable long-term success. By adopting the Principles, observing the 
more comprehensive guidelines and using the related guidance, businesses are able to show in 
their reporting how the company’s governance leads to its sustainable long-term performance and 
meets wider objectives (FRC, 2019). Achieving this depends crucially on the way boards and 
companies apply the spirit of the Principles. The Code does not set out a rigid set of rules; instead 
it offers flexibility through the application of Principles and through ‘comply or explain’ 
provisions and supporting guidance. It is the responsibility of boards to use this flexibility wisely, 
and of investors and their advisors to assess differing company approaches thoughtfully (FRC, 
2019). 
The 2018 Code focuses on applying the Principles. The listing rules require businesses to state 
how they have applied the Principles, in a manner that will allow shareholders to determine how 
the Principles were implemented. It is critical for investors to be able to assess the governance 
approach. Reporting covers the implementation of the Principles in the sense of the company’s 
specific circumstances and how the board set the mission and strategy of the company, reached 
targets and achieved results through its decisions (FRC, 2019). 
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When discussing the implementation of the Principles and avoiding ‘boilerplate’ reporting, it is 
necessary to report meaningfully. The emphasis would be on how the Principles were applied, 
articulating what action was taken and the consequences that resulted. High-quality reporting must 
involve signposting and cross-referencing to all sections of the annual report, explaining the 
implementation of the principles. This helps investors to evaluate business activities (FRC, 2019). 
Corporate governance reporting should also relate coherently to other parts of the annual report, 
particularly the Strategic Report and other complementary information, so that shareholders can 
effectively assess the quality of the company’s governance arrangements and the board’s activities 
and contributions FRC, 2019). 
The 2018 Code is applicable to all companies with a premium listing, whether incorporated in the 
UK or elsewhere. The new Code applies to accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 
2019 (FRC, 2019). 
The Principles of the 2018 Code include the following: 
i. Board leadership and company purpose; 
ii. Division of responsibilities; 
iii. Composition, succession and evaluation; 
iv. Audit, risk and internal control; and 
v. Remuneration (FRC, 2019). 
More details about these Principles can be found in Annexure B. 
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Summative comment on corporate governance codes in the UK 
Corporate failures in the 1980s led to the development of the Cadbury Code. Many more codes 
followed, such as the Myners Report, the Greenbury Report, the Hampel Report, the Hicks and 
The Smith Report and finally in 2009, the Combined Report, which was a combination of these 
reports. The Combined Report was reviewed several times, based on changes in corporate 
governance. The 2018 Code is applied in the UK, namely, the 2018 Combined Code. This Code 
consists of five principles, namely, (1) Board leadership and company purpose, (2) Division of 
responsibilities, (3) Composition, succession and evaluation, (4) Audit, risk and internal control 
and (5) Remuneration. The Code is not a set of rules, but rather principles that should be applied 
through a ‘comply or explain’ method. The Code is applicable to all companies with a premium 
listing and applied to accounting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2019. The corporate 
governance with respect of auditing firms are not specifically addressed. 
2.3.1.2 Corporate governance codes applicable to auditing firms in the UK 
As stated previously, the UK is the only country in the world that has a corporate governance code 
specifically for auditing firms. The Brydon Report was also released in 2019 in the UK, addressing 
some very important principles regarding auditing firms. Below is a detailed explanation of the 
Audit Firm Governance Code and some information on the Brydon Report which is applicable to 
this study. 
2.3.1.2.1 The Brydon Report 
As far as auditing companies are concerned, the Brydon Report was released in 2019. It includes 
a large number of recommendations that can be taken together to promote improved audit 
efficiency and effectiveness in the UK. The recommendations not only relate to auditors’ work, 
but also to the role of other individuals’ work in relation to the audit. There have been extensive 
discussions of the business framework with reference to audit as well as independence matters 
(Brydon, 2019). 
The Brydon Report recommends a set of standards, referred to as the Corporate Auditing 
Standards. These seek to accord more importance to auditor behaviours set out in existing 
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standards and codes, while incorporating additional concepts regarding transparency, freedom, 
challenge and the public interest. These standards would provide an opportunity to provide more 
detailed audits if successfully enforced and applied. The Brydon Report also provides 
recommendations for greater disclosure to help create trust in the corporate auditing profession 
(Brydon, 2019). 
The principles of Corporate Auditing are to fulfil the purpose of auditing. These principles include 
the following: 
 Auditors act with integrity, fulfilling their responsibilities with honesty, fairness, candour, 
courage and confidentiality; 
 Auditors are appropriately qualified and exercise professional judgment and appropriate 
scepticism or suspicion throughout their work; 
 Auditors act in the public interest and have regard for the interests of the users of their 
report beyond solely those of shareholders; 
 Auditors maintain independence from the entity and its officers on whom they are engaged 
to report; 
 Auditors are objective and provide findings and opinions unaffected by bias, prejudice, 
compromise and personal or corporate conflicts of interest; 
 Auditors work to verify and encourage openness and honesty in financial and other 
company reporting; 
 Auditors ask the directors to report any material information that may legitimately be 
disclosed to assist users in understanding the audit report and, if necessary, disclose it 
themselves; 
 Auditors provide appropriate challenges to management, assessing critically information 
and explanations received for signs of over-optimism, judgmental bias or possible fraud; 
 Auditors’ reports contain clear findings and expressions of opinion setting out all 
information necessary for a proper understanding of the opinion and its basis; and 
 Auditors’ reports transparently reflect any differences of view with management and how 
they were resolved (Brydon, 2019). 
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According to Brydon (2019), these principles should provide an overarching structure for auditors’ 
conduct beyond that which strictly follows norms and law. To ensure that the Corporate Auditing 
Principles are used as a living document, Brydon (2019) advises that each audit report include a 
declaration that the auditor has acted diligently, in compliance with the Corporate Auditing 
Principles in performing the audit. 
The core focus, according to Brydon (2019), should be on the ethics of the profession. He argues 
that understanding the law and regulations is not the only response to ethical problems. Of course, 
the rule of law is important, but ethics is motivated by something more, and can affect conduct 
that goes beyond compliance with the law. Indeed, an ethical culture in auditing firms can, and 
should, exist even without direct regulatory interference. 
From time to time the FRC has judged the actions of auditors against the expectations reasonably 
expected of a member. According to Brydon (2019), these judgments would be stronger if the 
Corporate Auditing Standards, as outlined here, were to be applied specifically to the auditor. 
Brydon (2019) also emphasises the importance of acting in the public interest. According to 
Brydon (2019), auditors cannot act alone in the public interest; they need directors to do so too. 
This statement supports why this study is so important and why auditing firms should be governed 
correctly. It is clearly all about the tone at the top. The Brydon Report, like most other acts, reports 
and codes, focuses more on the governance structures of the individual auditor and auditor quality 
and not specifically on the governance and leadership of the auditing firm. 
2.3.1.2.2 The Audit Firm Governance Code of the FRC 
As mentioned in section 1.1, the FRC implemented the Audit Firm Governance Code in the UK 
in 2010, specifically for auditing firms. 
The role of the FRC is to lead the development of auditing practice in the UK and establish high 
standards for auditing, meet the developing needs of users of financial information and ensure 
public confidence in the auditing process. To achieve these objectives, the FRC issues ISAs, which 
are mandatory practice notes that indicate good practice, and bulletins, which comment on items 
of current interest (Millichamp & Taylor, 2018). 
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Audit is a legislative role in which public interest is substantial. The UK Audit Firm Governance 
Code is intended to increase trust and confidence in the value of audit among the public and 
particularly investors. The Code refers to organisations that audit 20 or more of the listed entities 
(FRC, 2016). 
The Code’s aim is to provide a benchmark of corporate governance practice that can be disclosed 
to companies auditing listed firms. Its key objectives are to: 
 Improve the standard of audits; 
 Help the firm to secure its reputation more broadly, including its non-audit undertakings; 
and 
 Reduce the probability of business collapses which will be of systemic importance in 
relation to the largest companies. 
The Code is designed primarily to support investors. There is also interest from other stakeholders, 
including: 
 Directors, in particular members of the audit committee, with responsibility for nominating 
auditors; 
 Compliance audits; and 
 Review partners and staff (FRC, 2016). 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) founded an independent 
working group in 2007 under the chairmanship of Norman Murray (then chairman of Cairn Energy 
Plc) to establish the Audit Firm Governance Code, at the invitation of the FRC. In January 2010, 
the Audit Firm Governance Code was jointly released by ICAEW and FRC. It contained 20 
concepts and 31 rules and was ‘comply or explain’ based. This applied to companies that audited 
20 or more of listed firms. This Code implemented two new definitions as well as codifying current 
standards and practice: 
 Nomination of INEDs within corporate governance structures; and 
 Dialogue between the listed companies and investors (FRC, 2016). 
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The FRC reviewed the application of the Code during 2014–2015. The analysis found that 
organisations within its scope (and at least one outside of it) had implemented the Code. The Code 
had been applied in different ways by organisations, with a specific variation in the role of INEDs 
within governance systems. Within this area the FRC does not wish to recommend a uniform 
method. Nonetheless, by encouraging audit efficiency, companies can publicly report on why they 
have followed a specific approach and whether that approach supports the public interest. This 
version of the Code was released in July 2016 and applies to financial years commencing on or 
after 1 September 2016 (FRC, 2016). 
The review of the Code by the FRC also brought up a number of other issues: 
 The Code itself is barely noticeable; 
 Investors are not aware of the position played by INEDs and have doubts about their 
independence; and 
 Investor dialogue has not functioned as well as expected. Corporate governance code 
elements may be usefully integrated into the Code (FRC, 2016). 
Following the review, the FRC made a range of changes, in particular to help foster audit corporate 
governance, to improve transparency and to incorporate some additional provisions from the Code 
of Corporate Governance. The standards remain the same (FRC, 2016). 
As stated in Chapter 1, transparency plays a crucial role in corporate governance. Through law, all 
entities that audit listed companies are required to create annual disclosure reports that include, 
inter alia, details on the application of the Code within that entity. These reports, however, are not 
widely read and have been identified as limited interest enforcement documents. In addition to 
providing stakeholder information, reporting promotes transparency and helps to ensure that 
leadership reflects on the primary governance and performance concerns it addresses (FRC, 2016). 
The FRC believes companies should review their reports on transparency to provide information 
that is more applicable to investors, regulators and other stakeholders. In particular, companies 
applying the Code should ensure that their reports are fair, reasonable and comprehensible, as 
specified by the Audit Firm Governance Code. These reports should include the following aspects: 
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 Information on the work of the board of directors and the INEDs, including results against 
any of the members; 
 New key performance indicators; 
 A separate INED and/or Public Interest Committee report; some organisations are already 
doing this. This report should include an explanation of how, over the reporting period, the 
INED or the public interest committee in particular oversaw the UK audit practice and, 
more generally, the wider UK business; 
 Information on what the board and the INEDs have done to ensure that there is a positive 
atmosphere in the organisation; 
 An explanation of why the organisation has chosen to place its INEDs in the way it has and 
how it believes this serves the public interest by helping to improve the consistency of the 
audit; 
 A description of how the board and the INEDs worked throughout the year to fulfil the 
function of the Code; and 
 Information of any provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code which, in addition 
to those already in the Code, the organisation has incorporated into its own governance 
frameworks, and if there are any other provisions which it may implement in the future 
(FRC, 2016). 
The principles of this Code include: 
 Leadership; 
 Values; 




Detailed information on the above principles can be found in Annexure C. 
The FRC also provided a checklist in which it determines which principles contained in the UK 
Corporate Governance Code (as discussed in 2.3.1.1.) should be implemented by auditing firms. 
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This checklist, which can be found in Annexure D, is similar to the aim of the present study. This 
study seeks to provide guidelines on corporate governance practices and oversight structures for 
auditing firms in South Africa, based on King IV and guided by the UK Audit Firm Governance 
Code. These guidelines would be applicable to auditing firms in South Africa and could be 
included as a sector supplement to King IV. This checklist in Annexure D forms a key component 
of the empirical research in this study (FRC, 2016). 
Summative comment on corporate governance codes in the UK 
The Brydon Report was released in 2019, specifically providing principles to promote improved 
audit efficiency and effectiveness in the UK. The Brydon Report focuses more on the 
governance of the individual auditor and auditor quality, and not specifically on the governance 
and leadership of the auditing firm. In January 2010, the Audit Firm Governance Code was 
jointly released by ICAEW and FRC. It contained 20 concepts and 31 rules and was ‘comply or 
explain’ based. This Code applied to auditing firms which audited 20 or more of the listed firms. 
The FRC reviewed the application of the Code during 2014–2015. Following the review, the 
FRC made a range of changes, in particular to help foster audit corporate governance, to improve 
transparency and to incorporate some additional provisions from the Code of Corporate 
Governance. The fundamentals remain unchanged. All companies that audit listed companies 
are required to produce annual transparency reports by regulation. The Principles of this code 
include (1) Leadership, (2) Values, (3) Independent Non-Executives, (4) Operations, (5) 
Reporting, (6) Dialogue. The FRC provided a checklist that sets out which principles contained 
in the UK Corporate Governance Code should be implemented by auditing firms. From the 
checklist (see Annexure D) it is clear that Chapters 1 to 3 of the UK Corporate Governance Code 
can be applied to auditing firms.  
2.3.2 Corporate governance in the USA 
In the USA, no discernible interest existed in corporate governance before the 1990s Act (Marx, 
2008). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745) enacted on 30 July 30 
2002) marked a significant milestone for corporate governance in the USA. The Act, which was 
the legislative response to a series of high-profile financial scandals, was intended to rebuild 
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investors’ confidence in the capital markets (Engel, Hayes & Wang, 2007). Marx (2008) supports 
this statement, stating that the collapse of Enron, Arthur Anderson, World.Com and others from 
the late 2001, generated interest in corporate governance. As a result, a series of regulations and 
statutory provisions was enacted in 2002 through the well-known SOX Act (Marx, 2008). 
Murdock and Murdock, (2018) reiterated this, stating that the bill was enacted as a reaction to a 
number of major corporate and accounting scandals including those affecting Enron, Tyco 
International and WorldCom. These scandals, which cost investors billions of dollars when the 
share prices of affected companies collapsed, shook the public’s confidence in the nation’s 
securities markets. The USA approached the problem of corporate scandals by legislating 
corporate governance as opposed to opting for a voluntary code (Pandhu, n.d.). 
The SOX Act is also known as the ‘Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection 
Act’ (in the Senate), the ‘Corporate and Auditing Accountability and Responsibility Act’ (in the 
House) and is commonly called the Sarbanes Oxley, Sarbox or SOX. This federal law set new or 
enhanced standards for all USA public company boards, management and public accounting firms. 
It is named after the sponsors, Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) and Representative Michael G. 
Oxley (R-OH) (Murdock & Murdock, 2018). 
The SOX of 2002 is mandatory for all organisations, large and small (SOX, 2002). It does not 
apply to privately held companies (Murdock & Murdock, 2018). The legislation introduced major 
changes to the regulation of financial practice and corporate governance, with a number of 
deadlines for compliance (SOX, 2002). 
According to Uzun et al. (2004), the passage of the SOX of 2002 was widely regarded as the most 
extensive USA federal law related to corporate governance since the implementation of the federal 
securities laws in 1933 and 1934. Another important response was the requirement that companies 
whose stock is traded on the NYSE or listed on Nasdaq meet various corporate governance 
provisions. The SOX of 2002 and NYSE and Nasdaq proposals impose several governance 
provisions on publicly traded companies in the USA and a significant stipulation was improved 
oversight by the company’s independent directors (Uzun et al., 2004). 
Over the past 12 years, more than half of the states that form the USA have adopted legislation for 
the group of stakeholders or non-shareholder. These statutes propose a different model of corporate 
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governance to that traditionally used by American corporations, according to which directors act 
to maximise shareholder profits for the interests of the shareholders. These statutes of stakeholders, 
or statutes of non-shareholder interests, met with some opposition from the legal community and 
were reduced in many cases to being used as a pure anti-takeover tool. The statutes were used 
primarily in the USA to defend hostile takeovers that were viewed as contrary to public welfare 
(Corfield, 1998). 
The Act makes numerous provisions in areas ranging from additional corporate board 
responsibilities to criminal penalties, and requires the SEC to implement rulings on requirements 
to comply with the new law. Harvey Pitt, the 26th chairman of the SEC, led the SEC in the adoption 
of numerous rules to implement the SOX Act. It created a new, quasi-public agency, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), charged with overseeing, regulating, inspecting 
and disciplining accounting firms in their roles as auditors of public companies. The Act also 
covers issues such as auditor independence, corporate governance, internal control assessment and 
enhanced financial disclosure. The Act was approved by the House by a vote of 421 in favour, 3 
opposed and 8 abstaining and by the Senate with a vote of 99 in favour, 1 abstaining. President 
George W. Bush signed it into law, stating that it included the most far-reaching reforms of 
American business practices since the time of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Murdock & Murdock, 2018). 
Debate continues over the perceived benefits and costs of SOX. Supporters contend the legislation 
was necessary and has played a useful role in restoring public confidence in the nation’s capital 
markets by, among others, strengthening corporate accounting controls. Opponents of the bill 
claim it has reduced America’s international competitive edge against foreign financial service 
providers, saying SOX has introduced an overly complex regulatory environment into USA 
financial markets. Proponents of the measure view SOX as a ‘godsend’ for improving the 
confidence of fund managers and other investors with regard to the veracity of corporate financial 
statements (Murdock & Murdock, 2018). 
SOX contains 11 titles which describe specific mandates and requirements for financial reporting. 
Each title consists of several sections (Murdock & Murdock, 2018). The 11 titles include the 
following: (1) PCAOB, (2) Auditor Independence, (3) Corporate Responsibility, (4) Enhanced 
Financial Disclosures, (5) Analyst Conflict Interest, (6) Commission Resources and Authority, (7) 
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Studies and Reports, (8) Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability, (9) White Collar Crime 
Penalty Enhancement, (10) Corporate Tax Returns and (11) Corporate Fraud Accountability. A 
detailed review of the 11 titles can be found in Annexure E. 
From the literature review, no specific corporate governance code for auditing firms in the USA 
could be found. 
Summative comment on corporate governance codes in the USA 
The SOX was the response to high-profile scandals in the USA and was intended to rebuild the 
confidence of investors in capital markets. The main contributors to SOX were Senator Paul 
Sarbanes and Representative Michael Oxley, after whom the Act is named. SOX is regarded as 
one of the most extensive federal laws, as it is not a voluntary code, but rather legislation. SOX 
is mandatory for all organisations, large and small. The Act contains 11 titles include the 
following: (1) PCAOB, (2) Auditor Independence, (3) Corporate Responsibility, (4) Enhanced 
Financial Disclosures, (5) Analyst Conflict Interest, (6) Commission Resources and Authority, 
(7) Studies and Reports, (8) Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability, (9) White Collar 
Crime Penalty Enhancement, (10) Corporate Tax Returns and (11) Corporate Fraud 
Accountability. 
2.3.3 Corporate governance in Australia 
The Corporate Governance Council of the ASX released the Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations in 2003. It outlined 10 specific principles to 
create an effective governance framework for corporations. The recommendations, known as the 
Corporate Governance Guidelines (ASX, 2005), are not compulsory, but ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 
specifies that each listed company must disclose in its annual report the degree to which it complies 
with the recommendations and include any reason for failure to comply (Christensen et al., 2010). 
According to Alan Cameron, Chair of the ASX Corporate Governance Council (2014), the ASX 
Corporate Governance Council Principles and Recommendations were substantially re-written and 
a second edition was released in 2007. This version included new recommendations on diversity. 
The composition of the remuneration committee was added in 2010 (ASX Corporate Governance 
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Council, 2005). This is supported by Marx (2008), who explains that the 2001 Ramsay Report and 
the 2003 Owen Report recommended significant external audit changes as well as significant input 
into the process of CLERP 9. The ASX Corporate Governance Committee released principles on 
corporate governance and guidelines to guide listed companies (Marx 2008). 
Since the release of the second edition in 2007, there has been considerable focus across the world 
on corporate governance practices in light of the events leading up to and during the global 
financial crisis. In response, a number of jurisdictions have adopted new legislation regulating 
corporate behaviour and/or upgraded their corporate governance codes (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2005). 
Following a comprehensive review from 2012 to 2013, the 21 members of the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council agreed that it was an appropriate time to issue a third edition of the Principles 
and Recommendations. The changes in the third edition reflect global developments in corporate 
governance since the second edition was published. 
In 2017, the ASX Corporate Governance Council agreed that it was an appropriate time to 
commence work on a fourth edition of the Principles and Recommendations to address emerging 
issues linked to culture, values and trust, fuelled by recent examples of misconduct by some listed 
entities, which had fallen short of community standards and expectations. The fourth edition came 
into force for the financial years commencing on or after 1 January 2020 (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2019). 
These Principles and Recommendations set out recommended corporate governance practices for 
entities listed on the ASX that, in the Council’s view, are likely to achieve good governance 
outcomes and meet the reasonable expectations of most investors in most situations. The Council 
recognises, however, that different entities may legitimately adopt different governance practices, 
based on a range of factors, including their size, complexity, history and corporate culture. For that 
reason, the Principles and Recommendations are not mandatory and do not seek to prescribe the 
corporate governance practices that a listed entity should adopt (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2019). 
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The Principles and Recommendations promote eight central principles: 
i. Laying solid foundations for management and oversight; 
ii. Structuring the board to be effective and add value; 
iii. Instilling a culture of acting lawfully, ethically and responsibly; 
iv. Safeguarding the integrity of corporate reports; 
v. Making timely and balanced disclosure; 
vi. Respecting the rights of security holders; 
vii. Recognising and managing risk; and 
viii. Remunerating fairly and responsibly (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2019). 
A detailed description of the principles above can be found in Annexure F. 
In Australia there is no specific corporate governance code for auditing firms. 
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Summative comment on corporate governance codes in Australia 
In 2003, the ASX released the Ramsay Report of 2001, which contained the Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations. A second edition, namely the 
Owen Report, was released in 2007, with some new recommendations added in 2010. From 
2012 to 2013, there was a comprehensive review and a third report was issued. In 2017, there 
was another review and the fourth edition was released. This Report, which is applicable to all 
listed entities, consists of eight non-mandatory Principles: (1) laying solid foundations for 
management and oversight, (2) structuring the board to be effective and add value, (3) instilling 
a culture of acting lawfully, ethically and responsibly, (4) safeguarding the integrity of corporate 
reports, (5) making timely and balanced disclosure, (6) respecting the rights of security holders, 
(7) recognising and managing risk, and (8) remunerating fairly and responsibly. This fourth 
edition of the Report is applicable to accounting periods from 1 January 2020. The corporate 
governance with respect of auditing firms are not specifically addressed by the Australians. 
2.3.4 Corporate governance in the Netherlands 
The corporate governance system in the Netherlands has witnessed important changes over the last 
decade. Following a very public debate about the maintenance of the wide arsenal of defensive 
measures against takeovers in the first half of the 1990s, a first attempt was made to produce 
corporate governance recommendations for listed companies (van Bekkum, Hijink, Schouten & 
Winter, 2010). 
According to de Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wesley (2005), the Committee on Corporate 
Governance, also known as the Peters Committee, launched the debate on corporate governance 
in 1997. The Committee issued 40 recommendations designed to increase management efficiency, 
oversight and accountability to Dutch company investors. According to van Bekkum et al. (2010), 
40 Peters Committee guidelines were released in 1997, causing a general understanding of 
corporate governance (van Bekkum et al., 2010). As such, the Peters Committee’s 
recommendations may be seen as the Netherlands’ first corporate governance code (Akkermans, 
van Ees, Hermes, Hooghiemstra, van der Laan, Postma & van Witteloostuijn, 2007). 
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The discussions on corporate governance took place against the background of the Dutch corporate 
law system which imposed a stakeholder rather than a shareholder orientation of the company’s 
executive and oversight boards (also often referred to as supervisory boards). In general, Dutch 
corporate law also provides for a broad variety of measures that can be used not only to protect 
companies from hostile takeovers, but also to substantially minimise the participation of 
shareholders in corporate matters under normal circumstances, including non-voting depositary 
receipts for shares, priority shares with special control rights and formal delegation of authority to 
the executive board (van Bekkum et al., 2010). 
The Dutch code of corporate governance, also known as the Tabaksblat Code, was released in 
December 2003 and came into effect on 1 January 2004. As of that date, listed companies were 
required to present a separate chapter in their annual reports on corporate governance (Akkermans 
et al., 2007). Established at the initiative of the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economic 
Affairs, the Tabaksblat Committee included representatives of shareholders, listed firms, the stock 
exchange (Euronext Amsterdam) and institutional investors. Chaired by Mr Tabaksblat, its key 
mission was to draft a new code of corporate governance in the Netherlands. By doing so, it had 
to take into account international developments and the Peters Committee’s guidelines, focus on 
listed companies and formulate a principles-based code. The Committee was also required to 
accept current corporate law as a matter of fact, while it was free to make proposals to reform 
legislation. The Committee published its draft code in July 2003 and invited stakeholders to come 
forward with suggestions for change. More than 250 individuals and organisations responded. The 
final edition of the Tabaksblat Code was published in December 2003. The Code contains 21 
corporate governance principles which represent the most recent general views on good corporate 
governance (Corporate Governance Committee, 2003; Akkermans et al., 2007). 
These principles were developed in the form of specific provisions relating to best practice. 
According to the Committee, these regulations provided a set of criteria for the actions of members 
and shareholders of the management board and the oversight board (Corporate Governance 
Committee, 2003). The Tabaksblat Code presents principles and best practice provisions in five 
areas: (1) compliance with and enforcement of the Code, (2) the management board, (3) the 
supervisory board (referred to in this study as the oversight board), (4) the shareholders and general 
meeting of shareholders, and (5) financial reporting. 
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The Tabaksblat Code refers to all companies listed on the Dutch stock exchange as well as to 
foreign companies with a Dutch statutory residence. In addition, and similar to many other national 
corporate governance codes, the Tabaksblat Code is based on the principle of ‘comply or explain’. 
As of the fiscal year 2004, listed companies were legally required to show to what degree the 
organisation complied with the best practice provisions of the Tabaksblat Code, on the basis of the 
conformity or clarification principle (Akkermans et al., 2007). This is confirmed by van Bekkum 
et al. (2010), who indicate that the 2003 Corporate Governance Code was a ‘comply or explain’ 
code made mandatory by a Royal Decree as of 2004 for share-listed Dutch companies. 
The main objectives of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code are to increase transparency and 
accountability and to improve the quality and integrity of management and oversight boards. More 
broadly, the Dutch code seeks to improve corporate management behaviour (Akkermans et al., 
2007). 
Corporate governance scandals in 2003 spurred the adoption of the Code. The most notable of 
these scandals was linked to the deceptive financial statements released by Royal Dutch Ahold 
and Royal Dutch Shell’s oil reserves claims. The Corporate Governance Code includes concepts 
that are widely agreed and provide comprehensive guidelines on best practice of the Executive 
Board, the Supervisory Board (Oversight Board for the purposes of this study) and the General 
Meeting (call to institutional investors) (van Bekkum et al., 2010). 
The two-tiered board structure, consisting of a management board and an oversight board, is 
primarily implemented by Dutch listed companies. The Dutch board structure can be traced back 
to 1602, to the world’s first listed company, the VOC, or Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, 
which stands for Dutch East India Company. The VOC adopted a form of oversight board in 1623 
following shareholder pressure to strengthen the governance of the firm. For companies regulated 
by the structure system, the two-tier model is required, in which case the workers have the right, 
through the works council, to appoint candidates for one-third of the oversight board members. 
Most large, listed companies are excluded from the structure rule, which may result in them opting 
for a one-tier board. Among the larger listed firms, only one has formally accepted the one-tier 
board, namely Unilever N.V. (van Bekkum et al., 2010). 
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The oversight committee for Corporate Governance Law, otherwise known as the Frijns 
Committee, amended the December 2003 Dutch Corporate Governance Code. The revised Code 
substituted the 2003 Code (Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, 2008). The 
updated Code contained principles and best practice provisions which regulated relations between 
the management board, the oversight board and the shareholders (i.e. the general meeting of 
shareholders). The interests of the employees were taken into account when the interests of all 
stakeholders were weighed in connection with compliance with the Code (Corporate Governance 
Code Monitoring Committee, 2008). 
The principles were regarded as reflecting the general views on corporate governance, and enjoyed 
wide support. The principles were elaborated in the form of specific best practice provisions, which 
created a set of standards governing the conduct of management board members, oversight board 
members and shareholders. They reflected national and international best practices and were 
regarded as elaborating the general principles of corporate governance. Listed companies departed 
from the best practice provisions; however, departures could be justified in certain circumstances 
(Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, 2008). 
The new Code was based on the principle that a company is a long-term relationship between the 
different parties involved in the company. The stakeholders are groups and individuals (i.e. 
employees, shareholders, lenders, suppliers, customers, the public and civil society), that influence 
or are influenced directly or indirectly by the achievement of the company’s goals. The 
management board/EXCO and the oversight board have ultimate responsibility for balancing these 
concerns, usually with a view to ensuring the stability of the business, as the company seeks to 
build long-term value for shareholders (Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, 
2008). 
The management board/EXCO and the oversight board should take account of the interests of the 
various stakeholders, including CSR issues that are relevant to the enterprise. If stakeholders are 
to cooperate within and with the company, it is essential for them to be confident that their interests 
are represented. Good stewardship, which includes integrity and transparency of the management 
board’s actions, as well as effective supervision of their actions and accountability for such 
supervision, are essential conditions for stakeholder confidence in management and supervision. 
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These are the two pillars on which corporate governance is founded and which are the basis of this 
Code (Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, 2008). 
The amended Code came into force with effect from the financial year starting on or after 1 January 
2009. The Committee recommended that listed companies include a chapter in their annual report 
on the broad outline of their corporate governance structure and compliance with the amended 
Code. Companies were to present this chapter at the general meeting in 2010 for discussion as a 
separate agenda item (Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, 2008). The Code was 
divided into five chapters: (1) compliance with and enforcement of the Code, (2) the management 
board, (3) the supervisory board, (4) the shareholders and the general meeting of shareholders, and 
(5) the audit of the financial reporting and the position of the internal audit function and the 
external auditor. All these chapters contained principles and best practice provisions for listed 
companies. 
In December 2016, the Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee announced in a press 
release that the Dutch Corporate Governance Code would be adapted. Ongoing developments, the 
spirit of the times and overlaps with legislation were reasons for the proposed amendment. This 
new Code replaced the 2008 Code in 2016 (Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee, 
2016). 
According to the Oversight Committee for the Corporate Governance Code (2016), the most 
important changes in the amended Code compared with 2008 version were as follows: 
 Formulating and executing long-term value creation views allows the management 
board/EXCO members and members of the oversight board to behave in a sustainable 
manner by making deliberate decisions about the long-term sustainability of the plan being 
pursued; 
 The incorporation of culture into the Code requires members of the management 
board/EXCO and the oversight board to create an environment that facilitates the desired 
actions within the company and ensures the dignity of employees. In practical terms, this 
means that principles must be formulated which fit into the company’s views. The 
management board/EXCO is required to promote behaviour that is consistent with these 
values and to actively propagate these values by leading by example; 
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 An important part of the Code is provisions which promote insight into the quality of risk 
management systems; 
 In order to improve the internal audit process, the oversight board should be more closely 
involved in the hiring, assessment and potential dismissal of the lead internal auditor as 
part of the risk management program; 
 New emphasis was placed on the composition of the management board/EXCO and the 
oversight board, contributing to controls and balances, effective corporate governance and 
independent supervision. Diversity in the oversight board and the management 
board/EXCO encourages judicious decision-making in terms of male-to-female ratios, 
skills, competencies and history. More clarity is required about measure, goals and steps 
that are taken; 
 The appointment period for members of the oversight board was changed; 
 Another improvement was that the Code prioritised the EXCO; 
 Compared with the 2008 Code, the number of provisions on the subject of remuneration 
was reduced and the requirements were less detailed; 
 The Code applies to companies with a two-tier board structure but also to companies with 
a one-tier board structure; 
 Minimal amendments were made to the General Assembly. 
According to the Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee (2016) the principles of the 
2016 Code can be divided into five chapters, with each chapter containing several principles. The 
five chapters are as follows: (1) long-term value creation, (2) effective management and 
supervision, (3) remuneration, (4) the general meeting and (5) one-tier governance structure. These 
principles are discussed in detail in Annexure G. 
In the Netherlands, there is no specific corporate governance code for auditing firms. According 
to KPMG the Netherlands (2018) Integrated Report, the audit firm applies the two-tier board 
structure and have an independent supervisory board. This too is the case for PwC, EY and Deloitte 
in the Netherlands. These auditing firms have independence on their boards through the 
supervisory committee, as specified in the Dutch Corporate Governance Code. 
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Summative comment on corporate governance codes in the Netherlands 
In 1997 the Peters Committee issued 40 recommendations to investors of Dutch companies that 
triggered awareness of corporate governance. This came to be known as the first corporate 
governance code in the Netherlands. After corporate governance scandals in 2003, the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code, also known as the Tabaksblat Code, was published in 2003 by the 
Tabaksblat Committee and became effective on 1 January 2004. Companies were expected to 
present a corporate governance chapter in their annual reports. A stakeholder approach was 
followed, which consisted of the two-tier board structure. The Code was reviewed in 2008 by 
the Frijns Committee and the amended Code came into force on or after 1 January 2009. In 
December 2016, the Code was adapted again. The 2016 Code consists of five chapters that 
contain 24 principles. The five chapters are as follows: (1) long-term value creation, (2) effective 
management and supervision, (3) remuneration, (4) the general meeting and (5) one-tier 
governance structure. The Code applies to all listed companies on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. 
The corporate governance with respect of auditing firms are not specifically addressed by the 
Dutch. 
2.4 Corporate governance in South Africa 
2.4.1 Corporate governance applicable to all entities in South Africa 
Between 1961 and 1994, South Africa was virtually isolated from the global economy (Mathieson, 
Richards & Sharma, 1998; Sethi & Williams, 2000). Because of the country’s oppressive political 
environment, the United Nations excluded South Africa from participating in international 
organisations and imposed economic and trade sanctions against the country, effectively stifling 
its economic growth. These tariffs and political isolation also protected South African firms from 
foreign competition, as financial sanctions kept international institutions out of the domestic 
market and domestic firms out of international capital markets (Malherbe & Segal, 2001). 
Consequently, corporate practices and national laws and regulations fell far behind international 
norms and, by the late 1980s, many of South Africa’s corporations were unfocused entities run by 
complacent and entrenched managers (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). 
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In 1994, retired judge, Mervyn King was appointed to form a commission to establish a code on 
governance in South Africa. The South African document on corporate governance is the King 
Report on Corporate Governance that was published in 1994. The Report was commissioned by 
the IoDSA. This initiative was amongst others supported by the South African Chamber of 
Business (SACOB), the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), the South 
African Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). 
The terms of reference for the King Committee (named after its chair, Judge Mervyn King) 
included both the financial and ethical dimensions of corporate governance (Rossouw, van der 
Watt & Malan, 2002). South Africa’s corporate governance reforms now centre around four 
reports, namely King I issued in November 1994, the King II issued in March 2002 (West, 2006), 
the King III issued in 2009 and lastly King IV issued in November 2016. 
The notion of corporate governance and the development of corporate governance guidelines and 
codes has been a prominent feature in South Africa’s business environment since the early 1990s 
(Marx, 2008). The reasons for its prominence are indicated by various researchers as: 
 The need to restore confidence and trust in South African institutions following the 
apartheid era (Burke & Clark, 2016); 
 The need for robust market discipline and corporate reform to attract and retain foreign 
investors (Marx, 2008; Maseko, 2015); 
 The expectation for South African companies to play a role in addressing the socio-
economic challenges facing the country (Croucher & Miles, 2010); and 
 The call to respond to the first corporate governance code issued in the UK, namely, the 
Cadbury Report of 1992 (Marx, 2008; Miles & Jones, 2009). 
A ‘modified’ Anglo-American model of corporate governance has been evolving in post-apartheid 
South Africa as a consequence of the King reports and social pressures (Andreasson, 2011). The 
King reports have the potential to act as a catalyst for a hybrid model of corporate governance in 
South Africa that is characterised by combining shareholder and stakeholder interests and 
anchoring these interests in ‘African values’. Such a model would enhance the stability and 
legitimacy of South Africa’s economic system in what remains a volatile socio-political climate. 
A successful hybrid model must be capable of addressing both shareholder and stakeholder 
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concerns and to effectively anchor these concerns in a cultural framework that confers popular 
legitimacy on the system as a whole (Andreasson, 2011). This is supported by Rossouw (2005), 
who states that the dominant model of corporate governance that emerges in these national codes 
is an inclusive model of corporate governance in which boards of directors are not merely 
accountable to shareholders but also responsible to all other stakeholders of the company. 
The hybridisation of South African governance is a result of tensions between a traditional liberal 
emphasis on individual property rights imbued in the Anglo-American model and the 
communitarianism inherent in the concept of ‘African values’ or Ubuntu (West, 2006). Ubuntu 
denotes an African humanism emphasising empathy, understanding, reciprocity, harmony and 
cooperation and it constitutes a potential guiding principle for organising African societies and 
measuring well-being (Prinsloo, 1998). 
Below is a detailed discussion of the four King Reports. 
King I 
The first King Report on Corporate Governance (King I) was published in 1994. It was considered 
ahead of its time (Marx, 2008) as it set an international benchmark for standards and best practice 
(Jansen van Vuuren & Schulschenk, 2013). King I drew extensively on the Cadbury Report and 
similarly adopted a self-regulatory approach of ‘comply or explain’ (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008). 
This meant that companies that complied with the report needed to disclose their level of 
compliance and, in instances where they did not comply, explain their reasons for non-compliance. 
The report was, however, different from its British counterpart insofar as it looked beyond 
financial and regulatory facets; it was the first to successfully conceptualise the need for companies 
to acknowledge the society and the environment in which they operate as inseparable components 
of value creation (IoDSA, 2002). 
King I addressed the need for increased transparency and segmental disclosures required of local 
companies to counter declining ethics within the corporate environment. It also introduced 
measures to prevent non-executive directors, who represent the majority of shareholders, from 
overpowering the interests of the minority shareholders (Crous, 2017). 
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In 1995, the JSE adopted King I and effectively, all listed companies on the securities exchange 
were required to comply with the recommended principles (Crous, 2017). While the report drew 
unprecedented interest in South Africa’s corporate governance landscape (Rossouw, van der Watt 
& Malan, 2002) and was hailed as a potential catalyst to enhance the stability and legitimacy of 
South Africa’s economic systems (Andreasson, 2011), various researchers highlighted the 
shortcomings of King I (Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Marx, 2008; Maseko, 2015): 
 It encouraged a ‘tick-box’ approach to compliance; 
 It put too much emphasis on disclosure rather than encouraging best practice as its main 
incentive; 
 It protected the vested interests of corporate groups in South Africa; and 
 It lacked wider consultation, did not invite public discussion, did not draw on external 
expertise and thus did not directly address issues of corporate governance. 
The report was criticised for two other shortcomings: 
 Transparency and disclosure of certain issues appeared to be lacking in most South African 
companies, with only the top 30 or 40 JSE-listed companies introducing certain 
performance measures. By and large, investors were given little information to adequately 
assess the performance of the different units across the companies (Kakabadse & Korac-
Kakabadse, 2002). 
 The report did not address Information Technology (IT) issues. Maseko (2015) excuses the 
absence of IT governance in the report as at that time, IT was regarded as an enabling 
function rather than a strategic function, and hence it was not yet a critical issue worth 
addressing in any great detail. 
In response to the above criticisms as well as the need to evolve with global trends, the IoDSA 
decided to review King I. This resulted in King II (Maseko, 2015; Crous, 2017). 
King II 
King II was drafted in 2001 and issued in 2002. Its effective date of implementation was 1 March 
2002. Vaughn and Ryan (2006) and Marx (2008) described it as a more comprehensive report, 
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building on the foundation laid by its predecessor. King II maintained its original stance and was 
not in favour of legislation which forced companies to comply with its recommendations but 
rather, it stayed true to the ethos of self-regulation (Miles & Jones, 2009). However, the report 
expanded on its ‘inclusive approach’ to corporate governance, recommending the introduction of 
‘triple bottom line’ reporting to incorporate the economic, environmental and social aspects of a 
company activities (Miles & Jones, 2009; Hendricks & Wyngaard, 2010). It put a stamp on theme 
introduced in King I, stressing that companies ought to recognise that they do not exist 
independently of the society in which they operate and, although the primary duty of governing 
bodies is to protect the interests of the shareholders, the interests of other stakeholders such as the 
community, customers, employees and suppliers all need to be considered when developing 
company strategy. As a result, King II was hailed for its enhanced focus on transparency and 
disclosures of non-financial information through the adoption of integrated reporting which, 
according to Crous (2017), had not been included in any other corporate governance codes and 
documents around the world. 
Furthermore, King II motivated its push for more inclusive corporate governance practices by 
reinforcing the idea that companies which embraced inclusivity and demonstrated concern for non-
financial issues were more likely to build an atmosphere of trust and a better understanding of their 
corporate objectives amongst stakeholders. This meant that, when the next crisis comes (and these 
are inevitable for big companies) there will be a greater goodwill to help the company survive 
(IoDSA, 2002). 
While the King Committee went to great lengths to overcome some of the criticism levelled against 
King I (Maseko, 2015), King II was nonetheless criticised for its self-regulatory nature as well as 
the lack of enforcement through statutory channels (Marx, 2008). 
King II was reviewed in 2009 and subsequently, King III was introduced (IoDSA, 2009). 
King III 
King III came about as a result of the new Companies Act of 2008 and changes in international 
trends in governance (IoDSA, 2009). King III, which was initially issued in 2009, promoted an 
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integrated approach to governance and reporting, providing extensive guidance on integrated 
reporting and disclosures of governance-related matters (PwC, 2009; Maseko, 2015). 
Unlike its predecessor, King III was applicable to all entities irrespective of their size or whether 
they were listed or not. However, it placed no statutory obligation on companies to comply with 
its recommendations and principles, thus moving away from the traditional ‘comply or explain’ 
approach to an ‘apply or explain’ basis of reporting (PwC, 2009). This allowed governing bodies 
to apply the recommendations differently or to apply other practices, when they considered such 
practices to be in the best interests of the company while still abiding by the overarching principles 
of fairness, accountability, responsibility and transparency. However, according to Walker and 
Meiring (2010), proper compliance required adequate explanation of how the principles and 
recommendations were adopted and applied or, in cases where they were not applied, the reasons 
for deviating from best practice. 
Among the emerging governance trends and issues incorporated into King III were alternative 
dispute resolution, risk-based internal audit, shareholders’ approval of company remuneration 
policy, board evaluations, business rescue and importantly, an expansion of IT-related matters, 
with a chapter on IT governance (IoDSA, 2009). 
Turel and Bart (2014) state that as technology continues to increase in strategic importance and 
concomitant risk to companies, the rapid deployment of emerging technologies within companies 
can have a significant impact on sustainability. Thus, IT governance should be an integral part of 
corporate governance, which justifies its inclusion in the report. 
One critical consideration is that although King III addressed IT governance extensively, it did not 
provide any guidance on simplifying IT governance disclosures. Instead companies were only 
required to disclose their application of the principles and recommendations (IoDSA, 2016). 
As a result of the significant changes in both business and society and to address the shortcomings 
of King III, King IV was introduced in 2016. 
82 
King IV 
King IV was published on 1 November 2016. The report replaced King III altogether and is 
applicable to companies with financial years commencing on or after 1 April 2017 (IoDSA, 2016). 
According to Deloitte (2016), King IV takes a bolder approach than King III insofar as: 
 The report follows a principle-based and outcome-based approach as opposed to being 
rule-based. This is consistent with current global opinions which advocate heightened 
accountability and transparency. It also recommends that practices ought to contribute to 
the performance and sustainability of a company; 
 The report is resolute in its unyielding effort to reinforce the idea that corporate governance 
should be seen as a holistic set of arrangements that embraces ethical leadership, attitude, 
mindset and behaviour; and 
 The report continues to stress increased transparency and targeted disclosures in all areas. 
From an application perspective, King IV is a framework which can be adopted across listed and 
unlisted companies, profit and non-profit as well as public and private entities (IoDSA, 2016). 
King IV steps away from the ‘apply or explain’ approach and recommends an ‘apply and explain’ 
approach, relieving governing bodies of the burden of compliance by reducing the 75 
recommended practices in King III to 16 basic principles. These 16 principles can be adopted by 
any company and are all necessary to substantiate the practice of corporate governance (IoDSA, 
2016). The required explanation gives effect to each principle and enables stakeholders to make 
an informed decision as to whether a company is well governed or not. The explanation also helps 
in shifting the focus of companies from a compliance mindset to a qualitative mindset, which 
encourages the achievement of objectives through careful consideration of the entity’s 
circumstances (IoDSA, 2016; Piek, 2016). 
The principles addressed in King IV include the following: 
i. The governing body should lead ethically and effectively. 
ii. The governing body should govern the ethics of the organisation in a way that supports 
the establishment of an ethical culture. 
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iii. The governing body should ensure that the organisation is—and is seen to be—a 
responsible corporate citizen. 
iv. The governing body should appreciate that the organisation’s core purpose, its risks and 
opportunities, strategy, business model, performance and sustainable development are all 
inseparable elements of the value creation process. 
v. The governing body should ensure that reports issued by the organisation enable 
stakeholders to make informed assessments of the organisation’s performance and its 
short, medium and long-term prospects. 
vi. The governing body should serve as the focal point and custodian of corporate governance 
in the organisation. 
vii. The governing body should comprise the appropriate balance of knowledge, skills, 
experience, diversity and independence for it to discharge its governance role and 
responsibilities objectively and effectively. 
viii. The governing body should ensure that delegation within its own structures promotes 
independent judgment and assists with balance of power and the effective discharge of its 
duties; 
ix. The governing body should ensure that the evaluation of its own performance and that of 
its committees, its chair and its individual members, promotes continued improvement in 
its performance and effectiveness; 
x. The governing body should ensure that the appointment of and delegation to, management 
contribute to role clarity and the effective exercise of authority and responsibilities; 
xi. The governing body should govern risk in a way that supports the organisation in setting 
and achieving its strategic objectives; 
xii. The governing body should govern technology and information in a way that supports the 
organisation setting and achieving its strategic objectives; 
xiii. The governing body should govern compliance with applicable laws and adopted, non-
binding rules, codes and standards in a way that supports the organisation being ethical 
and a good corporate citizen; 
xiv. The governing body should ensure that the organisation remunerates fairly, responsibly 
and transparently so as to promote the achievement of strategic objectives and positive 
outcomes in the short, medium and long term; 
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xv. The governing body should ensure that assurance services and functions enable an 
effective control environment and that these support the integrity of information for 
internal decision-making and of the organisation’s external reports; 
xvi. In the execution of its governance role and responsibilities, the governing body should 
adopt a stakeholder-inclusive approach that balances the needs, interests and expectations 
of material stakeholders in the best interests of the organisation over time; 
xvii. The governing body of an institutional investor organisation should ensure that 
responsible investment is practised by the organisation to promote the corporate 
governance and the creation of value by the companies in which it invests (IoDSA, 2016). 
King IV also includes specific sector supplements for municipalities, non-profit organisations, 
retirement funds, small and medium enterprises and state-owned entities. These sector 
supplements are primarily aimed at the governing body of these entities, as it is the focal point of 
corporate governance within the organisations (IoDSA, 2016). Unfortunately, there is no sector 
supplement for auditing firms. More details about the 17 principles can be found in Annexure H. 
The next section discusses any legislation, codes or guidelines available for auditing firms in South 
Africa, if any. 
2.4.1.1 Legislation applicable to all auditing firms in South Africa 
In South Africa there is no specific corporate governance code for auditing firms. As stated above, 
the King IV Code is applicable to all types of organisations. South Africa has the APA which 
provides guidance for auditing firms. To develop a corporate governance code for South African 
auditing firms, one would have to ensure that the code stays within the guidelines of the applicable 
Act, as the code cannot contradict the Act. Accordingly, the following section discusses the APA 
in South Africa and any regulations on the governance structure of auditing firms that would have 
to be considered when drafting guidelines on corporate governance practices and oversight 
structures for auditing firms. 
2.4.1.1.1 The Audit Profession Act (APA) in South Africa 
The APA of 2005 in South Africa provides information on the establishment of the IRBA, the 
education, training and professional development of registered auditors, the accreditation of 
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professional bodies, the registration of auditors, the regulation of the conduct of the registered 
auditors, repealing an Act and providing for matters connected therewith (APA, 2005). This Act 
consists of seven chapters: 
 Chapter 1: Interpretation and objects of Act 
 Chapter 2: IRBA 
 Chapter 3: Accreditation and registration 
 Chapter 4: Conduct by and liability of registered auditors 
 Chapter 5: Accountability of registered auditors 
 Chapter 6: Offences 
 Chapter 7: General matters. 
From the above it can be seen that there is no specific chapter in the APA that provides information 
or guidance on the governance of auditing firms. Chapter 2, Part 4 provides details on the 
governance of the regulatory board, which in this case is the IRBA. 
Chapter 3 section 38 of the APA, discusses the registration of firms as registered auditors. 
According to the APA 26 of 2005, the word ‘firm’ means a partnership, company or sole 
proprietor. King IV clarifies that it is intended to apply to all organisations, regardless of their form 
of incorporation. The main objective of King IV is to broaden acceptance of corporate governance 
by making it accessible and fit for application across a variety of sectors and organisation types 
(IoDSA, 2016). In pursuit of this goal, King IV contains supplements for specific sectors. There 
is, however, no sector supplement specifically for auditing firms. 
Chapter 3 section 38 also states that the only firms that may become registered auditors are (1) 
partnerships of which all the partners are individuals and are themselves are registered auditors, 
(2) sole proprietors where the proprietor is a registered auditor, (3) companies which comply with 
sub-section 3. This sub-section states that a company may be registered as a registered auditor if 
it has share capital and its memorandum of incorporation provides for directors and past directors 
to be liable, jointly and severely, together with the company, for its debt and liabilities contracted 
during their period of office. Only individuals who are registered auditors are shareholders of the 
company; every shareholder of the company is its director (APA, 2005). 
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From the above it is clear why many auditing firms in South Africa struggle to find independence 
on their governance structures. As stated above, all directors must be registered auditors. This 
means that directors would be experienced auditors, who would most probably not be independent 
of the firm and its clients. This regulation will have to be taken into consideration when the 
corporate governance code for auditing firms in South Africa is developed. 
 Summative comment on corporate governance codes in South Africa 
In 1994 the first corporate governance report, King I, was released. This report was named after 
Mervyn King, the chair of the IoDSA who commissioned the report. King I was reviewed in 
2002 and King II was issued. In 2009, the Report was reviewed again and King III was issued. 
King IV was issued in November of 2016 and is applicable in South Africa. The King reports 
combine the shareholder and stakeholder theories. King IV consists of 17 principles and adopts 
an ‘apply and explain’ model. Its principles can be adopted by any company (including an audit 
firm), and are compulsory for listed companies. South Africa does not have a corporate 
governance code specifically for auditing firms and the APA does not provide any guidance on 
this topic. King IV also does not have a sector supplement which can be specifically applied to 
the auditing firms in South Africa. 
Critical link to the objectives of the study 
Corporate governance codes (such as those mentioned above) were developed due to corporate 
collapses, business failures and fraudulent financial reporting. Regardless of these codes, however, 
corporate failures still happen. This literature review was necessary to identify the corporate 
governance principles that are applied in each of the countries selected for the study. From the 
above it is clear that there is only one corporate governance code that is applicable to auditing 
firms, and this code can be found in the UK. The USA, Australia, the Netherlands and South Africa 
all have excellent corporate governance codes, but there is no specific code for auditing firms in 
these countries. 
As stated above, the APA does not contain guidelines on the corporate governance of auditing 
firms. The Audit Firm Corporate Governance Code of the UK can mostly be applied to auditing 
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firms and thus this code, together with King IV, will be used to develop a checklist and 
questionnaire for the empirical study. It will also provide guidelines on corporate governance 
practices and oversight structures for auditing firms in South Africa. 
2.5 International audit standards providing guidance on audit firm governance 
2.5.1 ISQC 1 and ISA 220 
ISQC 1 addresses Quality Control for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of Financial 
Statements and Other Assurance and Related Services Engagements. It is applicable to all auditing 
firms in the world. The IAASB’s ISQC 1 was issued in 2009. It recognises the role of external 
communication in a system of quality management and that a firm’s external reporting obligations 
could be established in law, legislation or professional standards in different jurisdictions. It further 
anticipates that the firm will communicate relevant information about its system of quality 
management to relevant external parties (IRBA, 2018). 
There are eight components that are relevant to an auditing firm’s system of quality management 
and provide a necessary link to the management of quality at the engagement level: 
i. Governance and leadership; 
ii. The firm’s risk assessment process; 
iii. Relevant ethical requirements; 
iv. Acceptance and continuance of client relationships and specific engagements; 
v. Engagement performance; 
vi. Resources; 
vii. Information and communication; and 
viii. Monitoring and remediation process. 
From the above eight components, the governance and leadership requirement is discussed in 
detail below, as this has a direct link with the ‘tone at the top’ in auditing firms that the study 
addresses. 
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Governance and Leadership 
The IAASB believes that governance and leadership of an organisation is of vital importance to 
quality of service, as it is the way the company envisions its culture and ethics. It is also the basis 
of how decisions in the business are made. Governance of a firm often influences the understanding 
of the firm by the public; and a firm without successful governance structure may be viewed as 
one that does not work in the public interest (IRBA, 2018). 
ISQC 1 has been greatly improved to improve the robustness of the governance and leadership of 
companies. It discusses, in particular, the expected actions of firm leadership in setting the tone at 
the top, the required leadership skills and keeping leadership accountable through performance 
assessments. The norm also now discusses the impact of the company’s strategic actions, including 
financial and operational decisions on quality of service and the role of the company in the public 
interest, as well as the capacity of firm leadership to influence decisions about the company’s 
resources (IRBA, 2018). 
The ISA 220 deals with the specific responsibilities of the auditor regarding quality control 
procedures for an audit of financial statements. It also addresses, where applicable, the 
responsibilities of the engagement quality control reviewer (IAASB, 2010). 
ISQM 1 and ISQM 2 were released by the IAASB in 2019, but they have not been implemented 
as yet. The Exposure Draft of ISQM1 (ED-ISQM1) states that the extant ISQC 1 does not 
specifically address firm governance nor does it contain much detail as to what is expected from 
firm leadership in relation to firm governance. It therefore includes various suggestions to address 
firm governance and enhance the role of firm leadership in sustaining and continually improving 
audit quality (SAAPTI, 2020). Because the ISQM is still in draft format, it is excluded from this 
study. 
The above discussion confirms the statement in section 2.1 that many codes, acts and legislation 
address the quality control of the audit firm, but very few specifically address the corporate 
governance of the auditing firm. This study aims to close this gap and to add to the literature on 
corporate governance of auditing firms. 
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2.6 Comparison of the UK audit firm governance code and King IV 
As stated above, it is clear that there is only one corporate governance code that is applicable to 
auditing firms, and this code can be found in the UK. The USA, Australia, the Netherlands and 
South Africa all have sound corporate governance codes, but there is no specific code for auditing 
firms in these countries. 
As indicated in Annexure D, in 2016 the FRC conducted a study to examine the UK Corporate 
Governance Code to determine how it could be applied to auditing firms (as well as how it was 
potentially already incorporated in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code). This analysis indicated 
that the Audit Firm Governance Code already included most of the principles contained in the 
Corporate Governance Code. Like King I, when it was initially developed, King I drew extensively 
on the Cadbury Report and similarly adopted a self-regulatory approach of ‘comply or explain’ 
(Mangena & Chamisa, 2008). It could be argued that the UK Audit Firm Governance Code could 
be used as the foundation and benchmark for developing corporate governance guidelines for 
South African auditing firms. For this reason, the present study compares the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code to King IV. As there are significant similarities, it would be possible to use King 
IV to further develop a sector supplement for auditing firms in South Africa and include it in future 
King iterations. A summary of this comparison is shown below. 
Table 2.2: Comparison between the UK Audit Firm Governance Code and King IV 
UK Audit Firm Governance Code 
Principles 
KING IV principles that address the same 
principle as the UK Code 
Leadership Principles 6, 7, 9 and 10 
Values Principles 1, 2, 16 
Independent non-executives Principle 7 
Operations Focuses on auditing firms, thus not applicable in 
King IV 
Risk Management Principle 11 
Reporting Principles 5, 11, 8 
Dialogue Principle 16 
Own comparison 
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A more detailed comparison can be viewed in Annexure I of the study. This comparison 
contributed significantly to the development of the checklist and questionnaire to be used in the 
data collection of the empirical evidence. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter a detailed literature review was performed on corporate governance, corporate 
governance theories and the development of corporate governance in the UK, USA, Australia, the 
Netherlands and more specifically, South Africa. The chapter also examined literature on the 
governance of auditing firms. 
Corporate governance consists of a set of principles, namely, legitimacy and voice, direction, 
performance, accountability and fairness. For the purposes of this study, corporate governance was 
defined as “a set of responsibilities and practices instituted by the governing body in order to direct 
a company to achieve its strategic objectives while remaining sustainable, accountable and 
transparent and acting in the best interest of all the stakeholders”. 
Corporate governance is often described in terms of two seemingly opposing models—the 
shareholder and the stakeholder models. The shareholder model deals with situations where one 
person, the principal, wishes to induce another, the agent, to perform some task that is in the 
interests of the principal but not necessarily of the agent. The stakeholder model is based on the 
corporate perspective of a private organisation that is accountable to a range of stakeholders, such 
as owners, vendors, consumers, staff, management, government and local communities. These two 
models are also known as one-tier and two-tier board structures. 
Corporate governance codes arose out of deep-seated concerns stemming from well-publicised 
corporate failures. In the UK, the 2018 Combined Code is currently the effective corporate 
governance code. This Code consists of five principles, which are applied on a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis. In the USA the SOX is the corporate governance legislation. This is not a voluntary code, 
but rather legislation. The Act contains 11 titles that range from corporate board responsibilities to 
criminal penalties. The Corporate Governance Report applicable in Australia consists of eight 
principles and is applicable to all listed entities. In the Netherlands, the 2016 Dutch Corporate 
Governance Code consists of five chapters, which contain 24 principles. This code is based on the 
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stakeholder approach. In South Africa, King IV is currently the effective corporate governance 
code. King IV consists of 17 principles and recommends an ‘apply and explain’ approach. The 
principles can be adopted by any company. 
Auditing firms are the guard dogs of the financial sector, yet there is very little legislation, 
standards or codes that govern the corporate governance structures of auditing firms. The APA of 
2005 provides information on the governance of the regulatory board, but not specifically the 
auditing firm. The Act states that an auditing firm can be either a partnership, a company or a sole 
proprietor, which means that King IV could be applied to an auditing firm as well. ISQC 1 and 
ISA 220 provide information on the governance and leadership and ethical requirements of an 
auditing firm. The information is, however, very limited, with no detailed guidelines on audit firm 
governance. The UK’s Brydon Report emphasises the principles of corporate auditing and the 
importance of acting in the public interest. This report, like most other acts, reports and codes, 
focuses more on the governance of the individual auditor rather than the auditing firm specifically. 
The UK Audit Firm Corporate Governance Code of 2010 is designed specifically for auditing 
firms. From 2014 to 2015, this Code was reviewed and several changes were made. The Code 
consists of six principles: (1) leadership, (2) values, (3) independent non-executives, (4) 
operations, (5) reporting, (6) dialogue. The FRC performed a study to determine which principles 
in the UK Corporate Governance Code could be applied to auditing firms and found that Chapters 
1 to 3 were suitable for auditing firms. 
Because South Africa has a strong colonial legacy and resultant ties with UK, its “corporate law 
and corporate practice have been adopted mainly from the UK” (West, 2006, p. 435). A similar 
analysis is thus performed in Chapter 6, to determine how King IV can be applied to South African 
auditing firms. As the UK already has a corporate governance code specifically for auditing firms, 
this code together with King IV, will also be used as a guideline to establish which principles could 
be applied to provide guidelines on corporate governance practices and oversight structures for 
auditing firms in South Africa. 
The following chapter discusses well-known corporate failures and audit failures in the UK, USA, 
Australia, the Netherlands and South Africa.  
92 
Chapter 3: CORPORATE FAILURES AND AUDIT FAILURES 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a literature review on how the lack of corporate 
governance has contributed to some of the worst financial corporate failures in the UK, USA, 
Australia, the Netherlands and South Africa, and in particular, to determine whether poor corporate 
governance practices at auditing firms contributed to these failures. This chapter also explores the 
impact of weak corporate governance at auditing firms on the reputation and sustainability of these 
firms, possibly resulting in their failure. 
As stated in Chapter 1, a ‘scandal’ is defined as a circumstance or action that offends propriety or 
established moral conceptions or disgraces those affected with it (Abdoul Fatahi, 2017). Toms 
(2019) defines a ‘financial scandal’ as a situation or event that has occurred as a result of financial 
resources being used in a morally questionable manner where there are serious consequences for 
third parties, which are widely known. An ‘audit failure’ takes place when an auditor indicates to 
the public that a client’s financial statements are fairly presented in accordance with GAAP, when 
in fact they are not (Pearson, 1987). Most corporate scandals are the result of fraud and often lead 
to audit failures as well (Muraina, Okpara & Ahunanya, 2010). For the purposes of this thesis, a 
‘corporate failure’ is defined as an event or situation involving the use of financial resources 
through questionable ethical behaviour, where management misrepresents financial statements and 
auditors fail to discover or report this misrepresentation, which then becomes public knowledge. 
According to Bauer, Gunster and Ottten (2003), corporate governance has received considerable 
attention after corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom in the USA, Royal Ahold in the 
Netherlands and Carillion in the UK. According to the McKinsey Global Investor Opinion Survey, 
corporate governance is more important than the firm’s financial performance for at least 15% of 
European investors. For companies that are well governed, at least 22% of institutional investors 
are willing to pay a premium of 19% for their investments. Well-governed companies have higher 
equity returns, are valued more and their accounting statements show better operating performance 
(Bauer et al., 2003). 
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According to Zerban (2018), good corporate governance can prevent corporate scandals as well as 
increasing the trust between society and business corporations. It also makes an organisation 
attractive to investors by enhancing its reputation and image. Todorovic (2013) concurs, stating 
that investors would rather invest in an organisation that practices sound corporate governance 
principles as this is likely to provide them with a good return on their investment. 
Firth, Fung and Rui (2007) observe that companies with a greater number of independent directors 
who separate the roles of chairman and executive director have higher earnings. The greater the 
independence of the board, the higher the quality of accounting information. Ho, Aripin and Greg 
(2012) agree, stating that the financial performance of a company is better when the board of 
directors is independent. Many of the corporate failures that are discussed in this chapter confirm 
this statement, as many failed due to a lack of independence on the board or weak auditor 
independence. 
According to Shinde, Willems, Sallehu and Merkle (2015), in the past few decades the media has 
been flooded with news on accounting scandals. This has resulted in the public calling for action 
to protect their interests. Individuals who invest money want the comfort of knowing that they are 
protected from fraud. These scandals have resulted in the development of many corporate 
governance codes (as discussed in Chapter 2). It is widely believed that audit failures are the result 
of corporate transgressions—as in the case of Arthur Andersen’s failure with Enron. According to 
Shinde et al. (2015), the Enron vs Arthur Andersen failures were not the first time a lapse in 
auditing standards and procedures allowed a major corporation to commit fraud. Many other 
countries have experienced the same phenomenon. More detailed examples of this are provided in 
this chapter. 
Despite numerous efforts and regulations to improve corporate governance as well as calls from 
the public to improve corporate governance at auditing firms, corporate failures and audit failures 
continue to occur. In many of these scandals, greed was the reason for the corporate fraud, together 
with a lack of accountability, transparency and weak ethical behaviour. Corporate governance aims 
to increase accountability, transparency and ethical behaviour, to avoid or detect problems before 
they occur and to ensure that the business is a success. If there is no corporate governance in an 
organisation, it is unlikely that unethical behaviour will be detected in time. Unfortunately, after 
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many corporate failures, the accounting and auditing professions have lost the trust and confidence 
of the public and many individuals question their credibility (Zerban, 2018). 
A lack of proper regulation, combined with auditing practices that share in company benefits as 
well as greedy partners are usually at the core of corporate accounting and auditing scandals. It is 
often the case that the auditor ‘watchdogs’ do not bark when they are supposed to (Zerban, 2018). 
Zerban (2018) predicts that more Enron-type scandals will occur if there is no drastic overhaul of 
corporate governance in auditing firms. 
Accounting scandals obscure the reliability, understandability and comparability of financial 
information contained in financial statements. In accounting scandals, therefore, fraud committed 
on financial statements plays a significant role. This is especially the case for corporate fraud, 
primarily due to inadequate corporate governance implementation and internal controls. Following 
the accounting scandals in recent years, a large majority of stakeholders has begun to believe that 
independent auditing firms do not fully discharge their duties (Kizil & Kasbasi, 2018). Below is a 
detailed explanation of the corporate scandals and failures which took place in the UK, USA, 
Australia, the Netherlands and South Africa.  
3.2 Corporate scandals and failures 
The world has seen more than two decades of corporate failures and scandals such as falling stock 
markets, dubious accounting practices, fraud and the abuse of corporate power associated with 
global companies such as WorldCom, Arthur Anderson, Enron, Murray & Roberts, and more 
recently, Steinhoff and KPMG (Arjoon, 2005; Lungisa, 2017; Monahan, 2012). These acts of self-
interest have undermined the confidence of all stakeholders, resulting in a relationship of broken 
trust between stakeholders and governing bodies (Arjoon, 2005; Monahan, 2012). According to 
Zerban (2018), there is usually not just one contributor to a failure, but many. Banks, regulators, 
management, accountants and auditors have all contributed to the failure of many corporate entities 
(Zerban, 2018). According to Leung and Cooper, (2003) the lack of effective corporate governance 
is one of the biggest reasons for most corporate failures. Such failures may be accompanied by 
‘creative accounting’, a lack of independence of the audit function, regulation inadequacies and 
large and inappropriate management compensation. Dube (2008) agrees, adding that corporate 
failures worldwide were caused inter alia by insider loans, compensation scandals, falsifying 
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financial statements, inefficient and unethical conduct by external auditors and closed decision-
making. All of these factors have led to waste and corruption. 
The next section discusses the corporate failures in the UK, USA, Australia, the Netherlands and 
South Africa. Each section also examines the role of auditors in the corporate failure and whether 
they contributed in any way to the scandal or failure. 
3.2.1 Corporate failures in the UK 
In the UK, accounting scandals ranged from the corporate failures of Barings Bank in 1995, Tesco 
in 2013, to the failure of Carillion in 2018, which went into liquidation without any warning signs, 
damaging investments of nearly £2 billion. The activities of these companies raised serious 
corporate governance issues. The role of company auditors was also concerning, as they failed to 
highlight red flags which would have indicated that the going concern of these companies was 
under serious threat (Awolowo, Garrow, Clark & Chan, 2018). Below is a detailed discussion of 
some of the corporate failures that took place in the UK. 
3.2.1.1 Robert Maxwell (1991) 
In November 1991, a successful business leader, Robert Maxwell disappeared at sea from his 
yacht, Lady Ghislaine. In the weeks following his disappearance, it emerged that his business 
empire had been in serious financial trouble for some time (Wearing, 2005). On 5 November 1991, 
Robert Maxwell, a media business empire in the UK, closed its doors after almost 40 years of 
activity (Clarke, 1993). 
According to Smith (1992), Maxwell used four techniques to misappropriate funds from the 
companies under his influence. First, he pledged assets for additional loans as insurance. Yet 
instead of providing the assets to the lender, Maxwell sold the assets for cash. Secondly, he 
redirected shares and cash from MGN to Maxwell-controlled Bishopsgate Investment 
Management. Maxwell then promised these shares to his private companies as protection for more 
loans. Thirdly, with the cash obtained from pledging shares, Maxwell funded the share price of 
MCC and MGN. These purchases should have been done under stock exchange regulations, but 
they were never disclosed. Due to the banks’ lending Maxwell money, Maxwell had to ensure that 
the share price was high in order to maintain his financial creditability. He sold options to Goldman 
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Sachs with a share price higher than the market value when the contract was written to further 
boost MCC’s share price. Because of this, Goldman Sachs purchased shares at a lower current 
market price and realised they would be able to make a profit when they sold the shares at a higher 
price stated in the option later. In the end, Maxwell stole MGN cash. Upon MGN’s flotation, £43 
million was passed on to private investors in Maxwell. The public wanted to know who would be 
held responsible for what happened at Maxwell (Smith, 1992). 
The Maxwell trustees blamed the auditors, Coopers and Lybrand, for failing to report Maxwell’s 
misuse of the fraud and pension funds. The Joint Disciplinary Scheme eventually disciplined 
Coopers and Lybrand and some of their audit partners. In 2001, PwC (Coopers and Lybrand’s 
successor firm) announced that after the controversy, they had made operational changes and 
acknowledged the recommendations raised in the Department of Trade and Industry report. PwC 
was charged a £3.5 million Mutual Disciplinary Scheme fine, as well as £68 million in an out-of-
court settlement that was used to settle the liquidators and donated an undisclosed sum to the 
defrauded pension funds. PwC’s credibility was in shreds following the scandal. In 1992, the 
Cadbury Committee stated that due to several financial scandals, specifically mentioning Maxwell, 
they were asked to report on corporate governance matters (Wearing, 2005). 
3.2.1.2 Barings Bank (1995) 
The collapse of Barings Bank in February 1995 proved to be a turning point in public attitudes to 
financial risk in the UK. The bank had been in existence for more than 200 years and still 
maintained close ties with the founding family. Barings was founded by Francis Baring, the son 
of a German immigrant, in the 18th century. 
Barings continuously expanded until the end of the 19th century and extended its operations to 
South America. Under Lord Revelstoke’s chairmanship, due to the speculative projects made in 
Argentina, the bank went almost bankrupt in 1980. Rivals like the Rothschilds and the Bank of 
England were well aware that such a crash could have consequences for the entire banking system 
and Barings was not allowed to go under. Barings was refinanced and reorganised into a limited 
company, from a partnership. The events of 1980 were a salutary lesson for the bank, which 
subsequently worked hard to restore its reputation in the banking world (Wearing, 2005). 
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During the 1970s and 1980s, as the capital markets became bigger and more complex. Barings 
responded by setting up Baring Securities to take advantage of new and lucrative opportunities. 
The separation of traditional merchant banking from the modern, more glamorous, brokerage 
activities appears to have led to tensions and conflicts within the Barings community. It is very 
likely that the group’s problems in the 1990s could have been partially due to this clash of cultures 
and the fact that many people at Barings simply did not realise the potentially enormous losses that 
could arise from the selling of derivatives that were poorly regulated. Unfortunately, Baring 
Securities was to be the downfall of the company. Despite the bank’s collapse in 1995, the name 
Barings persists, following the International Nederlanden Group’s (ING) acquisition of the bank. 
ING Barings survives but the Barings family connection has been largely lost (Wearing, 2005). 
The books of the Barings Bank were audited in Singapore by the local audit firm, Deloitte. In 
London, the Barings Bank London’s books were audited by Coopers and Lybrand. After the fall 
of Barings, KPMG, who were named as liquidators, began proceedings against Deloitte in 
Singapore. In 2003, the London High Court found that Barings Bank officers were responsible for 
the failure, and identified illegal trading by Nick Leeson (is a former derivatives trader who became 
notorious for bankrupting Barings Bank), rather than Deloitte in Singapore. In 2003, Deloitte was 
forced by a High Court decision to pay only £1.5 million in damages as a result of negligence on 
reasonably technical grounds. This was a tiny fraction of the £131 million in damages that Barings 
initially requested. The case was eventually settled at the Court of Appeal in London in April 2004, 
when a settlement was reached by KPMG and Deloitte (Wearing, 2005). 
3.2.1.3 Tesco (2013) 
Tesco is known as a multinational British grocery and general merchandise retailer with 
headquarters in Hertfordshire, England (Tesco, 2018). It is the world’s third-largest retailer on a 
gross sales basis (Reuters, 2011). In addition to being a market leader for groceries in the UK, 
Tesco also has stores in seven countries across Asia and Europe. Tesco was founded in 1919 in 
the form of market stalls by Jack Cohen (BBC, 2013). Tesco’s stocks are traded on the London 
Stock Exchange and as of 22 April 2015, it had a market capitalisation of around £18.1 billion 
(The Telegraph, 2015). The business was subjected to fraudulent accounting practices which led 
to resignations. In 2014, the Tesco debacle and fraud were estimated at £250 million. Accounting 
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pull-forward methods were used, indicating early registration and revenue reporting. It was also 
an illegal accounting procedure interpretation (Business Insider UK, 2017). 
On 19 September 2014, a whistle-blower informed the new chief executive, Dave Lewis, that the 
company’s first-half profit estimate, announced on 29 August, may have been overstated by £246 
million. The whistle-blower, who was a member of the finance department, was concerned that 
his department was not receiving the full documentation related to commercial income (Kukreja 
& Gupta, 2016). 
The CEO and Chairman were briefed by Tesco’s General Counsel on the situation. On 22 
September 2014, Tesco announced the overstatement of profits. As per the audited financial 
statements of Tesco for the year 2014–2015, the total overstatement of profit before tax for the 
year ended 22 February 2015 was £53 million and a total overstatement for the years prior to that 
was £155 million (Kukreja & Gupta, 2016). 
PwC had audited Tesco since 1983. The threat of familiarity was remarkably high after a 
relationship of 30-plus years. Arguably, this may have compromised the auditors’ independence 
in dealing with Tesco. Some reports also criticised the Tesco board for failing to have non-
executives with relevant experience in the supermarket sector. Furthermore, there was a severe 
failure in corporate governance by not having a CFO for five months. Many believed that the audit 
committee should have reacted promptly and decisively to the issues related to commercial income 
that PwC had raised. PwC, for its part, could have been more robust in dealing with the audit 
committee regarding this issue. After 32 years, Tesco’s external audit was put to tender and PwC 
mutually agreed that they would not take part in the tender. Tesco named Deloitte as its new 
auditors (Kukreja & Gupta, 2016). 
3.2.1.4 BP (2010) 
The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico highlighted concerns related to 
CSR and ethics in companies in general, and in large corporations in particular (Balmer, 2010). 
The BP oil spill was a failure of more than just environmental law and the functioning of 
government agencies tasked with regulating deepwater drilling; the philosophy of corporate law, 
corporate governance and CSR was likewise to blame for the disaster (Cherry & Sneirson, 2011). 
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BP moved from a prosperous, middle-of-the-pack oil company to one which was regularly ranked 
in the world’s top ten most profitable multinational firms. The company was rated highly in terms 
of employee care and became a favourite of advocates of CSR (Cherry & Sneirson, 2011). 
Deepwater Horizon, a drilling rig owned by Transocean and leased by BP to explore the oil field 
of Macondo, exploded, caught fire and sank on 20 April 2010. The accident killed 11 employees 
although one supply ship rescued others from the rig. The well attached to the rig started spewing 
oil at an alarming pace into the Gulf of Mexico. After the event, BP was found to have sacrificed 
protection to reduce the amount of time and money spent excavating the well (Cherry & Sneirson, 
2011). The spill included basic concerns about how businesses were run, how they portrayed 
themselves to the public and the objectives they intended to accomplish. The catastrophic 
explosion and oil spill at BP exposed a corporate culture that had routinely ignored safety and 
environmental standards for employees. BP had a weak safety record, with many injuries that 
could have been avoided through improved maintenance of their facilities and increased 
precautions (Cherry & Sneirson, 2011). 
3.2.1.5 British Home Stores (BHS) (2016) 
The collapse of BHS is considered one of the most controversial and noticeable retail failures 
(Meek, 2016). The department store chain, which was 88 years old, failed due to poor management, 
an inability to drive more sales and compete with other firms. BHS was founded in 1928, initially 
selling clothing and household products, but later extending to furniture, electronics, food and 
beauty products (Rankin & Fletcher, 2016). Sir Philip Green, a British businessman and the 
chairman of the Arcadia Group, a company which coordinates multiple clothing brands, bought 
the company in 2000. The company faced difficulties after 14 years of BHS being run by Green 
with just a short-term increase in earnings. Eventually, Green sold BHS for £1 to Dominic 
Chappell in March 2015. It was reported that Sir Philip Green extracted significant amounts of 
money during the ownership and left the company on life support. There were also those who 
criticised the new owner, Dominic Chappell, for his lack of retail experience and for having been 
declared bankrupt three times (Laurent, 2016). 
Apart from questionable behaviour in the sale, there were numerous strategic errors which kept 
the company back. Having nearly half of its assets invested in the stock market, the company was 
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affected by the financial crisis at that time. Unsurprisingly, shares fell dramatically and the 
company lost large sums of capital. Weak returns on investment had resulted in inadequate funds 
to finance already low-wage workers’ pension plans. The company experienced a small boost in 
revenue until BHS was sold to Chappell, receiving a 3.6% increase in 2014. The chain store did 
not compete with other companies, but the declining interest of people shopping in High Street 
stores was significantly influenced by the increase in internet shopping. There was a long drought 
of investment years before the agreement with Chappell happened in 2015, which led to revenues 
dropping every quarter and resulting in continuous losses (Laurent, 2016). 
The chain closed all of its department stores across the country, with the branches overseas being 
sold to the Al Mana Group of Qatar. Despite the fact that the UK lost one of its oldest businesses 
due to a lack of corporate governance, there was also a loss of 11,000 jobs (Laurent, 2016). 
Thousands of employees were still at risk of not being covered by the pension scheme, despite 
contributing annually. BHS itself had no money to tackle the problem of debt, struggling at £1.3 
billion. It was possible that the funds would be sought from the Pension Security Fund, to which 
thousands of other pension schemes contribute, many of which were much smaller than BHS. The 
Work and Pensions and Industry and Innovation and Skills Committees concluded in their joint 
report that Sir Philip Green was aware of the repercussions and hurried to sell the company to 
Dominic Chappell, a buyer he knew was manifestly unacceptable (Curwen, 2016; Laurent, 2016). 
The BHS controversy raised further questions about the state of corporate governance in the UK. 
The UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, concluded after a joint inquiry by numerous committees, 
that the nation needed to address corporate irresponsibility and reform capitalism to ensure that it 
worked for everybody, and not just the fortunate few. The powerful Institute of Directors (IoD) 
proposed that Theresa May should initiate a study of UK corporate governance in order to avoid 
similar cases in the future (Laurent, 2016). 
Key contributing factors to the demise of BHS were weak leadership and personal greed 
(Parliament UK, 2016). BHS was guilty of reckless mismanagement, led by Sir Phillip Green, its 
selfish and irresponsible creator. Continuously poor financial performance and high-cost systems 
contributed to massive corporate debts and a £571 million pension shortfall (Fuller, 2016). Bad 
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high-cost structure management can lead to a competitive disadvantage, which largely led to the 
failure (Slatter & Lovett, 1999). 
Many asked why the auditors had not raised any concerns. PwC faced a 15-year ban and a six-
figure fine from the FRC. PwC audited BHS’s finances before its sale for £1 just a year before the 
department store chain collapsed. Steve Denison, who spent more than 30 years at PwC as a 
partner, faced a £500,000 fine from the FRC, which was subsequently reduced to £325,000. PwC 
faced a record £6.5 million fine alone, which was lowered from the initial sum of £10 million after 
PwC decided to settle. The audit firm was also heavily reprimanded and ordered to track and help 
its audit practice and to provide the FRC with detailed annual reports on the practice for the next 
three years. PwC stated that their audit work raised significant shortcomings and that it is important 
to learn the required lessons. The apologised that their work dropped well below their planned 
professional expectations. The heavy penalties against PwC came after the FRC stated that it would 
double fines for bad audit work by the major accounting firms to £10 million. Until then, the largest 
fine issued by the FRC had been £5.1milion, also to PwC, for its audit of RSM Tenon in 2011 
(Butler, 2018). 
3.2.1.6 Patisserie Valerie (2018) 
Referring to Patisserie Valerie’s failure, SAAPTI (2020) reported that the failure of the auditor to 
identify the company’s fragility resulted in the loss of jobs, investments, pensions and tax 
revenues. The fall of the Patisserie Valerie was considered rapid and unforeseen by its Chairman, 
Luke Johnson. Johnson has attributed some of the responsibility for the debacle to his auditors, 
Grant Thornton, for failing to identify what was happening. It would appear that Johnson did not 
take any responsibility for the Patisserie’s loss. The food industry had seen its share of poor results 
that could be related to poor leadership practices, such as in the case of Patisserie Valerie (Garrow, 
Somerset, Awolowo & Clark, 2019). Over recent decades, deceptive audits have been at the core 
of organisational failures. The scandal at Patisserie Valerie showed that company’s accounting 
was not an accurate representation of its true financial position (Mujih, 2018). 
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3.2.1.7 Ted Baker (2018) 
Ted Baker is a luxury, multinational clothing retailer with 3,600 employees, listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. Recently in 2018, the luxury retailer revealed that an accounting mistake was 
twice as high as previously believed, leaving it with a £58 million void in its balance sheet (Jolly, 
2020; Sikka 2020). The overvaluation of £58 million suggested that 35% of the value of clothing, 
shoes and other products was overvalued (Jolly, 2020). On 2 December 2019, the company 
disclosed that inventories had been overstated by £20 to £25 million. These problems appear to 
have gone back many years. The profit for the company after tax for 2019 was £41 million. More 
than a year’s gains were wiped with the write-off of the overstated inventory value. The overstated 
inventory allowed the firm to report higher profits and paint a rosy picture of its affairs (Jolly 2020; 
Sikka, 2020). 
Ted Baker was audited by KPMG since 2001 and the auditors had always issued the accounts a 
clean health bill. The audit report dated 31 March 2019 suggested inventory valuation as an 
essential object, but indicated that nothing was wrong. The directors reported that on the basis of 
their audit work, the external auditors had not reported any discrepancies or misrepresentations in 
the financial statements. The accounts revealed that in 2019 KPMG had received fees amounting 
to £445,000 and £397,000 in 2018. Nothing was publicly documented about the time KPMG 
workers spent on audits, the size of its audit teams, substantial questions raised, answers from 
directors or audit work conducted to corroborate the assessment of the company’s inventory 
(Sikka, 2020). 
To investigate the overstatement of the inventory, Ted Baker hired Deloitte. Preliminary inquiries 
by the retailer indicated that the value of the stock it retained on 26 January 2019 had been 
overestimated. Ted Baker shares fell by nearly 10%. The findings of the accounting audit came 
after the banks had appointed Ted Baker advisors to conduct a business review in the face of 
concerns that its poor financial position could force it to seek capital support (Jolly, 2020). 
During the time at issue, Ted Baker was audited by KPMG. Due to a conflict of interest over its 
work with the retailer, KPMG was previously issued with a reprimand and a £3 million fine. After 
reports of ‘forced hugs’ at the Ted Baker, its founder and former CEO, Ray Kelvin, resigned in 
March 2019. Kelvin refuted any claims of corruption. Since the beginning of 2019, the company’s 
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shares had already lost more than three-quarters of their value and around 90% of their value since 
reaching a peak in November 2015. The fall in share price also wiped millions of pounds off 
Kelvin’s personal capital, who still owns 35% of the firm. Sales and profitability were also 
struggling for the retailer. In 2019, Ted Baker released four profit warnings and slumped in 
October to a first-half loss of £23 million, the first in more than two decades. Ted Baker stated at 
the end of 2019 that it had cut its pre-tax profit forecasts to just £5 million for the year ending 25 
January 2020. Since then, Ted Baker has said that trading was below expectations over November 
and the Black Friday period and that they expected difficult trading conditions would continue 
(Jolly, 2020). 
The Ted Baker episode forms part of a steady stream of failures in corporate governance, 
accounting and auditing. Executive directors continue to nominate their associates in the corporate 
world as non-executive directors, who almost always fail to supervise businesses. Auditors are 
also delivering bad audits but facing trivial penalties. Auditors are (re)appointed at company 
AGMs, but the resolutions are not followed by any audit process detail. Reports by the Competition 
and Markets Authority and Sir Donald Brydon have been published but even those guidelines have 
not been adopted. 
3.2.1.8 Carillion (2018) 
Carillion was the second biggest construction group in the UK, moving from a going concern to 
compulsory liquidation over the course of a weekend. Carillion employed approximately 71,600 
individuals and had annual sales of £5.2 billion. The corporate failure occurred due to Carillion 
failing to meet huge debt commitments in 2017 (Loxley, 2018). Over-expansion resulted in debt, 
which led to cash flow problems and reduced profits. In 2017, the share price dropped dramatically, 
however, the government continued to support private businesses and awarded Carillion contracts 
amounting to £1.3 billion towards the end of 2017 (Loxley, 2018). Unfortunately, the profit and 
cash flow problems continued and in January 2018 the share price was only 7% of its May 2017 
level and the company was liquidated. This meant that the government had to step in and look after 
the needs of the public that Carillion usually addressed (Loxley, 2018). 
The collapse of Carillion brought the usual suspects into the spotlight. Senior executives prospered 
on over-generous pay packets; one was paid handsomely months after departing. Shareholders did 
104 
not ask awkward questions as long as dividends were buoyant. Auditors did not raise issues about 
accounting methods that, in hindsight, inflated reported profits (Mabbet, 2018). Sweet (2018) 
concurs, stating that Carillion did not act alone in deceiving lenders and investors. Loxley (2018) 
maintains that issues regarding oversight by the auditors were also raised in the collapse of 
Carillion, again proving that Carillion did not act alone. The Big Four accounting firms (Deloitte, 
KPMG, EY and PwC), who all provided auditing and advisory services to Carillion and received 
£72 million in fees from the company the decade before its collapse, were accused of being 
involved in the scandal. Carillion’s auditors of 19 years, KPMG, had approved the financial 
statements only 10 months before the liquidation. The question was raised, “How could KPMG 
not have realised this?” (Silver, 2017). According to Sweet (2018), KPMG had failed to identify 
Carillion’s growing debts and their efforts to disguise their true financial position. KPMG 
countered that their 19-year relationship with Carillion had not affected their independence. 
According to Loxley (2018), large auditing and consulting companies struggle to be objective and 
they are hardly ever held accountable for their failings. Sweet (2018) concurs, stating that the 
economy needs a competitive market for audit and professional services which engenders trust. 
He urged the government to consider breaking up the Big Four into more auditing firms and 
detaching auditing firms from those providing other professional services (Sweet, 2018). 
In the Carillion failure, it is evident that the independence of the auditors contributed to the 
corporate failures. 
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Summative comment on UK corporate failures 
In 1991 Robert Maxwell, the UK media empire closed its doors. Funds were misappropriated 
and the auditors (PwC) had failed to report the fraud and misuse of pension funds. In 1995, 
Barings Bank which had been in existence for more than 200 years, failed. Their auditors were 
Deloitte and Coopers and Lybrand. The bank failed mostly due to illegal trading. Deloitte was 
fined £1.5 million in damages as a result of negligence on reasonably technical counts. Much 
later, in 2010, the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill took place in the Gulf of Mexico. This scandal 
emphasised the importance of ethical leadership. Tesco, a multinational grocery and 
merchandise retailer, announced in 2014 that profits had been overstated by £155 million. PwC 
had been Tesco’s auditors since 1983 and it seemed that the 30-plus year relationship had 
affected their independence. In 2016, BHS failed due to poor management, raising questions 
about the state of corporate governance in the UK. The auditors of BHS, PwC, faced heavy 
penalties for their poor audit work. In 2018, Carillion, the second biggest construction group in 
the UK, collapsed. Their over-expansion resulted in debt and this led to cash flow problems and 
reduced profits for Carillion. KPMG were the auditors for 19 years and once again it was argued 
that the auditors’ independence had been affected. The collapses of Patisserie Valerie and Ted 
Baker also took place in 2018. Sweet (2018) argues that the collapses did not happen due to the 
actions of the corporate companies alone, as the auditors had failed to raise issues about the 
accounting methods, speaking right to the core of corporate governance. As can be seen above, 
the auditor practiced poor corporate governance, which then contributed to the corporate 
failures.  
3.2.2 Corporate failures in the USA 
The revelations of serious accounting problems at several prominent companies such as Enron, 
WorldCom and Tyco at the start of the new millennium were watershed events. Following these 
scandals, a number of other companies admitted to having accounting problems of their own. The 
2007–2008 global financial crisis culminated, among others, in the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
(Harber, 2018). Most of these companies experienced large stock price declines upon the 
announcement of their accounting problems. Several of the companies involved in these scandals 
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(e.g. Enron and WorldCom) were forced into bankruptcy (Agrawal & Cooper, 2017). Investors, 
customers, suppliers and employees filed numerous lawsuits against many of these firms. 
Below is a detailed discussion of some of the corporate failures in the USA that received the most 
media attention. 
3.2.2.1 Mckesson & Robbins (1937) 
The fraud at McKesson & Robbins that occurred in 1937 preceded the scandals of Enron and 
WorldCom by many years. According to Barr and Galpeer (1987), this corporate failure had a 
profound effect on auditing standards. The McKesson & Robbins scandal was also the first time 
that the public and government scrutinised and criticised the accounting profession (Barr & 
Galpeer, 1987). 
In 1937, McKesson & Robbins faced a slump in their pharmaceutical industry. The board decided 
to turn the stockpile of synthetic drugs (valued at $4 million), which actually only existed on paper, 
into cash (Baxter, 1999). Since the inventory did not exist, Coster’s (the head of McKesson & 
Robbins) only choice was to pay the cash himself and reduce the inventory, but this was the last 
resort for Coster. He attempted to persuade the company’s director, Julian Thompson, to take out 
a loan but Thompson had to testify to McKesson & Robbins’ financial statements before he could 
do so (Thompson, 1953). Thompson found that there was unpaid inventory worth $21 million in 
Canada (Thompson, 1953). This discovery led Thompson to uncover the McKesson & Robbins 
was a scam. In 1938 the fraud was reported to the NYSE and all trading in McKesson & Robbins 
shares was suspended. It was found that the illicit drug division had totalled $19 million in false 
assets (Lodge, 1987). There was also $9 million in receivables from false accounts and $10 million 
in non-existent inventories (Baker & Bealing, 2006). According to Business: New Accounting 
(1939), 20% of McKesson & Robbins’ $86,556,270 total assets was a lie. 
For more than a decade, Coster had been able to keep his true motives secret from all, resulting in 
McKesson & Robbins thriving while several other businesses struggled (Baxter, 1999). He 
committed suicide in 1938 and because he had lived this lie for so long, the names F. Donald 
Coster was graved on his headstone instead of his real name, Philip Musica. Very little of Coster’s 
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$2.9 million was recovered, as much of the money was used to pay off former creditors 
(Thompson, 1953). 
For fraud of this magnitude to take place, many individuals would have had to have been 
implicated. McKesson & Robbins’ auditors, PriceWaterhouse, conveyed to the public that 
McKesson & Robbins was an organisation of good financial standing. Unfortunately, it was later 
found that the audits had not been performed with as much diligence as expected (Baxter, 1999). 
PriceWaterhouse had spent a great deal of time analysing the balance sheet but did not personally 
audit the quantities of inventory reported by management nor did they question management about 
other documents. Interestingly, they did not challenge any cut-off problems and the large inventory 
purchases made near year-end. The management of McKesson & Robbins also limited the amount 
of audit work that PriceWaterhouse should have performed while PriceWaterhouse failed to 
challenge this decision taken by McKesson & Robbins (Baxter, 1999). 
It was found that although PriceWaterhouse had followed the widely agreed audit procedures 
(Baker & Bealing, 2006), very little attempt had been made to understand the business of crude 
drugs (Baxter, 1999). The fraud should have been identified by applying the appropriate audit 
procedures, but the auditing profession was still evolving at that time and therefore the fraud passed 
undetected (Doron, 2009). PriceWaterhouse could have done much more, according to the SEC, 
as they failed to make proper use of the evidence available to them (Baxter, 1999). 
PriceWaterhouse was cleared of any wrongdoing and they accepted no responsibility for the fraud 
that had gone on undiscovered at McKesson & Robbins (Edwards, 1956). Many commentators 
claimed the acts of PriceWaterhouse indicated the opposite, because they repaid McKesson & 
Robbins the audit fees to the amount of $522,402.29 (Baxter, 1999; Edwards, 1956). 
The McKesson & Robbins scandal shone the spotlight on the auditing and accounting profession 
(Neuner, 1956). As with Enron, both auditors and accountants were labelled by the public as 
incompetent and immoral (Baxter 1999). 
3.2.2.2 Enron (2001) 
The Enron financial corporate failure highlighted the value of sound corporate governance in the 
USA. In the latter half of 2001, a Texas based company listed on the NYSE, namely, Enron 
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Corporation, filed for bankruptcy (Bottiglieri, Reville & Grunewald, 2009). With revenues of over 
$100 billion in 2000, Enron was a world leading paper, utility and communication company. In 
October 2001, Enron announced it had a $618 million net loss for the third quarter and it would 
reduce shareholder equity by $1.2 billion (Brickey, 2003). The following day, after this 
announcement, the SEC requested information from the Enron officials. Two days later, Enron 
notified their auditors, Arthur Andersen that the SEC had initiated an investigation into Enron’s 
financial accounting practices. A few days later, the Arthur Andersen engagement team started 
destroying Enron-related documents (Brickey, 2003; Markoff, 2013). This corporate failure had 
spanned 10 years and resulted in the convictions of corporate officers and the auditing firm, Arthur 
Andersen. In 2002, the SOX (which was discussed in Chapter 2) was introduced after this 
corporate failure (Primbs & Wang, 2016). 
During the investigation into the accounting practices at Enron, it was found that in order to 
maintain the company’s good credit rating, the accountants had kept assets and liabilities off the 
balance sheet, with Arthur Andersen’s acquiescence. They did this by taking advantage of a 
specific accounting structure, namely, special purpose entities (SPEs). According to accounting 
rules, if a company is a majority shareholder in another company, it must consolidate its financials 
with that company. However, when a company and an SPE transact, the financials of the SPE can 
be treated as independent if at least 3% of the SPE’s total capital comes from outside equity 
investors and that 3% remains at risk throughout the transaction. Moreover, the independent owner 
of the SPE must controls the SPE (Primbs & Wang, 2016). If all these conditions are met, the gains 
and profits from the transactions with the SPE may be recorded and the assets and liabilities may 
be excluded from the balance sheet. It became clear that the Enron managers took advantage of 
this accounting structure and eventually set Enron up for its downfall (Primbs & Wang, 2016). 
Arthur Andersen approved Enron’s bookkeeping practices (Markoff, 2013) and failed to detect 
these ‘creative accounting’ practices. According to Primbs and Wang (2016) the lack of 
governance at Arthur Andersen was striking. 
It was later proven that the allegations of irregular accounting procedures and fraud between Enron 
and Arthur Andersen were true and that corporate failure resulted in Enron’s share prices dropping 
from over $90 per share to just cents. This was also followed by the dissolution of Arthur 
Andersen, one of the largest accounting firms in the world at the time (Bottiglieri et al., 2009). Ben 
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Glisan, former Treasurer at Enron, was the first executive to be sentenced to prison since pleading 
guilty to criminal fraud and admitting to manipulating Enron’s financial statements. He was 
sentenced to five years in prison and also faced a fine of $900,000. Before joining Enron, Glisan 
had worked at Arthur Andersen, as had several other Enron employees. He partnered with Andrew 
Fastow and Michael Kopper at Enron to formulate collaborative arrangements that would strip 
Enron’s balance sheet of billions of dollars of debt. Kopper had pleaded guilty in August 2002 to 
multiple Enron-related criminal charges. In January 2004, Fastow pleaded guilty to two counts of 
theft (Wearing, 2005). 
The SEC eventually subpoenaed Arthur Andersen and the shredding of the documents stopped in 
November 2001. Unfortunately, by then literally tons of documents had already been destroyed 
that could have provided evidence of what exactly had occurred at Enron. The auditor was 
eventually convicted of obstruction of justice for destroying the documentation (Markoff, 2013). 
As it turns out, the shareholders of the Enron era did not have the power to ensure that their interests 
would be completely taken into account by the senior management. While there was no specific 
explanation of what had gone wrong, the root of the scandal can be traced to a deterioration of the 
governance relationship between shareholders, the board and senior management. The failure 
provided valuable lessons for those with a vested interest in the shareholder-focused capitalist 
system, namely, shareholders, brokerage, auditors, financial regulators and policymakers, whose 
reaction has been swift. Officials immediately sought to locate the defects in the governance 
relationship which had enabled the most egregious malfeasance, however, they simply introduced 
‘patches’, mostly in the form of updated rules or voluntary codes, to deter or avoid similar future 
scandals. Nearly all of the post-Enron efforts had the primary purpose of increasing the 
accountability of corporate executives to their boards and shareholders (Heath & Norman, 2004). 
SOX created the PCAOB to try and prevent such behaviour by accountants and auditors. SOX 
focused largely on auditor independence and accountability. According to SOX, auditors may not 
provide non-audit services to their audit clients simultaneously. In the case where both auditing 
and consulting work is required by one client, the company’s audit committee must pre-approve 
this and such approval of non-audit consulting services must be disclosed to all stakeholders of the 
company (Primbs & Wang, 2016). 
110 
The collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen in 2001 is considered one of the greatest financial 
scandals in American history, undermining public trust in the work of independent auditors 
(Hopkins, 2016; Thomas, 2002). The public felt that these corporate failures were the result of 
audit failures and that the independence of auditors was an ongoing threat (Baker & Bealing, 
2006). The Big Five accounting firms at the time promised to improve their disclosure to the 
public, but this was seen as too little, too late (Thomas, 2002). 
The Enron failure displayed a stark lack of corporate governance within the auditing firm, Arthur 
Andersen, where once again independence played the biggest role. As stated above, there was a 
lack of independence and this resulted in the two entities colluding, ultimately leading to the failure 
of both Enron and Arthur Andersen. 
3.2.2.3 WorldCom (2002) 
Enron, the biggest financial failure in the history of the USA was soon overshadowed by the 
corporate failure of WorldCom (Brickey, 2003), the fourth-ranked telecommunications company 
(Pandey & Verma, 2005). WorldCom’s far less state-of-the-art accounting fraud resulted in 
increased investment returns, massive financial disasters and similarly far-reaching civil and 
criminal investigations (Brickey, 2003). WorldCom’s organisational collapse had arisen in 2002. 
WorldCom raised its assets by $11 billion, through capitalising carrier line costs, rather than 
expensing them. Arthur Andersen was also the external auditor of WorldCom (Hopkins, 2016). 
The WorldCom corporate failure raised several questions regarding corporate governance, ethical 
leadership and unethical practices. Following this collapse, creditors, pension funds, banks and the 
economy were in turmoil. The company subsequently appealed to the USA court for reorganisation 
under Chapter 11 of the USA Insolvency Code and under the leadership of the new CEO, Michael 
Capellas, the new company (MCI WorldCom) not only reconsolidated its financial status, but also 
overhauled all its internal processes and turned it into an ethical company (Pandey & Verma, 
2005). 
An investigation into the WorldCom corporate failure found that it had overstated profits by more 
than $3.8 billion in 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. When this was announced, financial analysts 
were stunned. It also had a noticeable impact on financial markets. The press described this 
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unethical WorldCom accounting practice as scandalous and it was immediately questioned why 
Arthur Andersen had not identified it. On 21 July 2002 WorldCom filed for bankruptcy protection. 
On 8 August, the company announced that it had also manipulated its capital assets in recent years, 
costing another $3.8 billion. The SEC charged the company with major accounting fraud on 26 
June 2002 and immediately issued a court order prohibiting the company from destroying financial 
documents, restricting its compensation to current and former executives and ordering an 
independent company to monitor WorldCom. The House Committee on Financial Services held 
hearings on 8 July and the Senate Committee on Trade, Technology and Transportation held 
hearings on 30 July and many business officers were charged (Lyke & Jickling, 2002). 
The circumstances under which the fraud at WorldCom had occurred were brought to light were 
similar to the account of Sherron Watkins, the Enron whistle-blower. Like Sherron Watkins, 
Cynthia Cooper, the Vice President of Internal Auditing at WorldCom, also exposed and corrected 
a massive accounting fraud (Brickey, 2003). According to initial accounts, in May 2002, the 
internal auditor of WorldCom, Cynthia Cooper, discovered the treatment of line costs as capital 
expenditures. The auditor discussed the misclassification with then CFO, Scott D. Sullivan and 
then-company Controller David F. Myers. Ms. Cooper referred the matter to WorldCom’s board 
of directors’ head of audit committee, Max Bobbitt, who in turn asked the company’s current 
external auditor, KPMG, to investigate. The CFO was asked to explain the treatment and was fired 
after further discussions on the same day. WorldCom issued its public announcement on 25 June 
and on the very same day, David Myers resigned too. The chairman of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, Representative Tauzin, said on 15 July that the executives at WorldCom 
had realised as early as 2000 that the accounting treatment was unacceptable. 
Arthur Andersen claimed in its 2001 audit opinion that the balance sheets and income statements 
fairly represented the financial position of WorldCom and were consistent with the GAAP in the 
USA (Zekany, Braun & Warder, 2004). According to Zekany et al. (2004), WorldCom’s board of 
directors had been much too passive and management and had independent auditors failed to come 
forward. Arthur Andersen acknowledged that WorldCom’s management did not completely 
comply with them, but still did not communicate their concerns to the Audit Committee. The 
internal audit team was also found distracted and understaffed. 
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One concern about WorldCom was why finding the misclassification took the company’s internal 
auditors more than a year; this should have been found sooner, given the amount of expenses being 
capitalised (around $750 million per quarter) and the effect it had on net income and assets. To 
certain analysts, the fact that Arthur Andersen had not been told that line expenses were being 
capitalised was meaningless, as they claimed that Arthur Andersen must have formulated their 
audit to identify misclassifications of this extent. Some observers also note that Arthur Andersen 
should have taken into account WorldCom’s increasingly precarious financial condition and 
heeded the possibility of aggressive accounting practices (Brickey, 2003; Lyke & Jickling, 2002). 
The WorldCom scandal has come to be seen not only as a classic case of accounting fraud and 
organisational failure but also as a reference case for ethical leadership failure (Pandey & Verma, 
2005). The WorldCom case highlights topics such as ethical leadership, ethical work culture and 
corporate governance (Pandey & Verma, 2005). 
3.2.2.4 Tyco (2002) 
The Tyco scandal occurred in 2002. Tyco management stole $150 million from illegal stock sales. 
Tyco’s external auditor was PwC (Hopkins, 2016). Of all the businesses that came under post-
Enron scrutiny, none felt the glare more than Tyco (Greenburg, 2002). 
Tyco International was a major multinational company manufacturing a wide range of products, 
from computer devices to healthcare products and fire and safety systems. Tyco posted net sales 
of $14.50 billion for the 2004 fiscal year. In January 2002, concerns regarding the legitimacy and 
legality of Tyco’s bookkeeping started to emerge when investors began asking difficult questions 
about their accounting (Greenburg, 2002). This led to a criminal investigation of Tyco’s CEO, L. 
Dennis Kozlowski (Kay, 2002). Kozlowski, Mark Swartz, the CFO, and Mark Belnick, the Chief 
Legal Officer, were accused of behaving with self-serving and covert misconduct, systematically 
manipulating the corporation by raising over $170 million in loans without formal approval or 
consent from shareholders for themselves. Furthermore, Kozlowski and Swartz participated in 
lucrative party-related activities and were given luxurious rewards (SEC, 2005). Tyco’s stock 
plunged by 61%, from nearly $60 a share to $23, erasing $70 billion in market value in less than 
nine weeks (Greenburg, 2002). 
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However, even before the Enron corporate failure, some questioned whether the vaunted growth 
of Tyco was genuine or whether, in some of its acquisition accounting, the firm had been 
manipulating its figures by being too aggressive. In 2000, Prudent Bear fund short-seller, David 
Tice, blasted Tyco for unfairly taking huge turnaround funds for its acquisitions (Greenburg, 
2002). Tyco repeatedly and strongly denied doing anything that would raise profits in an artificial 
way. But it was not long before evidence surfaced that Tyco took measures to do just that in at 
least one case. The case involved a manufacturer of electronics called Raychem, which was 
acquired for $2.9 billion by Tyco in August 1999. While Raychem remained a single, small 
component in Tyco’s corporate structure, it was a structure that included 2,000 offshore 
subsidiaries. These facts raised some suspicion (Greenburg, 2002). Regardless, the executive 
president of Tyco strongly defended the accounting of the company and stated that Tyco did not 
manipulate earnings and cash flow (Greenburg 2002). 
This case unquestionably made headlines to the detriment of the company for its corporate 
wrongdoing but also for the flagrant personal excesses of the parties involved in the fraud. Both 
Kozlowski and Swartz were convicted on 22 theft and fraud-related charges, each earning a 
maximum term of 25 years in prison (Kemmerer & Shawver, 2011). 
It seems from a traditional viewpoint that a startling lack of values and ethics had brought about 
this end. According to Kemmerer and Shawver (2011), this was not an isolated occurrence or a 
closed event and it is doubtful whether these dishonest actions can be attributed to an unethical or 
immoral organisation. Rather, it was a representation of the prevalent social norms that have 
influenced individuals within an enterprise in today’s business world (Kemmerer & Shawver, 
2011). 
3.2.2.5 Arthur Anderson (2002) 
In 2001, Arthur Andersen had more than $9 billion in revenue, with a reputation for outstanding 
audit results and expertise (Squires, Smith, McDougall & Yeack, 2003). At the time of the Enron 
failure, Arthur Andersen was Enron’s official auditor (Hopkins, 2016). The company provided 
both audit and non-audit services to Enron, thus creating a possible conflict of interest. For 
example, the audit portion of Arthur Andersen would be reluctant to challenge Enron’s 
management, as it would mean losing not only the audit services but also the lucrative non-audit 
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services (such as management consulting). The company of Arthur Andersen had received $25 
million for Enron audit services in 2001 and $27 million for non-audit services (Squires et al., 
2003). 
Arthur Andersen was indicted on one count of obstruction of justice linked to Enron in March 
2002. The prosecution was the result of an investigation in which Andersen allegedly shredded 
work papers linked to the Enron scandal (Hopkins, 2016; Squires et al., 2003). The repercussions 
on Arthur Andersen were grave (Squires et al., 2003) and the company was convicted and decided 
to stop providing audit services to publicly traded companies (Hopkins, 2016). Public corporations 
lost trust in Arthur Andersen and moved to other accounting firms for their audit services. The 
audit branch of Arthur Andersen eventually folded, while the management consulting division was 
rebranded as Accenture (Squires et al., 2003). Wearing (2005) explains that by the end of 2002, 
Arthur Andersen as an audit firm was essentially finished, with a decline in its workforce from 
85,000 to 3,000 and a barrier to auditing in the USA (Wearing, 2005). 
The dissolution of Arthur Andersen served as a wake-up call and a turning point within the auditing 
community. Although Enron and Arthur Andersen were penalised, the public was not satisfied. 
The lack of corporate governance at Arthur Andersen was an obvious contributor to the corporate 
failures it was involved in. 
3.2.2.6 Lehman Brothers (2008) 
Lehman Brothers was founded in 1844, in Montgomery, Alabama, by German immigrant Henry 
Lehman. The company became known as Lehman Brothers, after Henry’s brothers Emanuel and 
Mayer, joined him in 1850. In 1994, under the leadership of CEO Richard Fuld, the investment 
firm started to broaden its offerings. In the newly deregulated financial market, Lehman Brothers 
expanded its involvement in property dealing (or dealing with the company’s own capital to make 
a profit for itself), securitisation, derivatives, wealth management and real estate. Lehman and 
other Wall Street companies were deeply involved in collateral debt obligations (CDOs) and 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) during the housing bubble of the early to mid-2000s. Between 
2003 and 2004, Lehman also expanded into loan origination, acquiring five mortgage lenders, 
including those specialising in subprime mortgages, which were offered to weaker-loan borrowers 
who would not usually be able to secure a mortgage. In mid-2006, when house prices started to 
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drop steadily, many subprime borrowers started defaulting on their payments, exposing the risky 
existence of these debts. Despite these warning signs, after housing prices declined, Lehman 
Brothers managed to produce subprime mortgages and expand its real estate holdings and by the 
end of fiscal year 2007, the company owned some $111 billion in commercial or residential real 
estate-related assets and securities (more than double what it owned at the end of the previous 
year). As investors and rating agencies expressed serious doubts about these types of assets due to 
their lack of liquidity on the market, they started to lose trust in Lehman Brothers and its investment 
banking peers because of the weakening of the real estate market. The first to go under was Bear 
Stearns, one of Lehman’s closest rivals. This firm narrowly escaped bankruptcy with a sale to J.P. 
Morgan in March 2008. Rumours circulated after Bear’s sudden collapse that Lehman Brothers 
would be the next to fall (History.Com Editors, 2018). 
Lehman Brothers filed a bankruptcy petition in September 2008. It was the biggest insolvency 
procedure in the history of the USA. The 164-year-old company was the fourth largest USA 
investment bank and the global financial crisis prompted its bankruptcy (Amadeo, 2020). The USA 
economy faced the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, which ultimately resulted in the fall of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008. The global recession was finally triggered by the effects of the USA 
subprime crisis (Foong, Ganesan, Pitchay, Haron & Hendayani; 2011). 
Thus, Lehman Brothers, one of the biggest USA banks (Foong et al., 2011), collapsed in 2008. 
Their bankruptcy exposed the use of a mechanism known as ‘Repo 105’ to transfer off-balance 
sheet assets and debt to make their financial condition appear more attractive to investors. This 
indicated that they remained within USA GAAP limits, but still potentially misled investors (Hail, 
Tahoun & Wang, 2017). During the crisis, both of these operations raised confusion about the 
capital position of the major banks and investment firms (Koniak, Cohen, Dana & Ross, 2010). 
The SEC (2005) and Hail, Tahoun and Wang (2017) also support this, arguing that during 2010, 
the investigation of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy by the court examiner revealed that off-
balance sheet instruments were used fraudulently, as Lehman used a mechanism called Repo 105 
to allegedly transfer assets and debt off-balance sheet to make its financial status more attractive 
to investors. The bank repeatedly participated in and listed short-term repurchase agreements as 
sales transactions. To convey the illusion of lower leverage to its buyers, it then used the sales 
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proceeds to pay down debt. Lehman Brothers’ auditors attested that the transactions conformed to 
GAAP (Hail et al., 2017). 
According to Yu and Rudge (2014), as was the case with Lehman Brothers, a weak board can 
cause failure, despite a strong CEO. It was also the lack of independence of the auditors that led 
to the audit failure in the Lehman Brothers case. At that moment, their auditors were EY (di 
Fabrizio, 2016). 
EY served as an independent auditor for Lehman Brothers from 2001 until Lehman filed for 
bankruptcy in 2008. It checked and signed-off on Lehman’s financial statements during this time, 
giving the preferred unqualified opinion in each case. Anton Valukas, the Lehman bankruptcy 
examiner, raised serious questions about some of Lehman’s accounting practices and the role EY 
played in enabling those things to remain unchallenged and concealed in its financial statements, 
in particular its use of and accounting for Repo 105 repurchase agreements, which allowed Lehman 
to move up to $ 50 billion from its quarter-end balance sheets. Valukas argued that the comments 
made by Lehman were deceptive and that there were credible allegations against EY for negligence 
and misuse (Wiggins et al., 2015). 
EY contended that no wrong had been done. It was its view that Lehman’s financial statements 
were prepared in compliance with GAAP and that no accounting problems had triggered Lehman’s 
bankruptcy (Wiggins et al., 2015). As Lehman’s Senior Vice President, Matthew Lee’s duties 
included consolidating Lehman’s subsidiaries’ financial and accounting details from around the 
world into a single consolidated financial statement used by the organisation as the basis for its 
public reporting. On 16 May 2008, Lee sent a letter alleging accounting errors and other 
irregularities to several senior Lehman officers. Lehman’s management sent the letter to its audit 
committee, which was requested to be aware of all the allegations made by Lee and to EY, which 
was directed to investigate the allegations. On 12 June 2008, William Schlich, the EY engagement 
partner, interviewed Matthew Lee at a meeting at which Lee also told EY about Lehman’s growing 
use of Repo 105 and its effect on the balance sheet of the company. Lehman management and 
Schlich met with the audit committee of the Lehman Board in June 2008 to review the company’s 
second quarter financial results. On 2 July 2008, Schlich met again to discuss the final statements 
with the audit committee. On 10 July, despite the Whistle-blower Document, EY released an 
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unqualified report for the second quarter. Schlich attended a full board meeting on 22 July 2008 at 
which a Lehman officer gave a presentation on the Whistle-blower Letter. The presentation did 
not discuss the use of Repo 105. Notwithstanding its legislative responsibilities under SOX and 
the request by the audit committee to be aware of all the allegations made by Lee, EY did not 
notify the audit committee or the full board at any of those meetings of Lee’s allegations 
concerning Repo 105. Anton Valukas argued that incompetence and malpractice amounted to such 
a mistake (Wiggins et al., 2015). 
3.2.2.7 Madoff (2008) 
The $65 trillion Madoff Dollar Ponzi scheme had been destroying the global economy. Questions 
were presented, such as “Why weren’t the suggestions and allegations made by the investigated 
‘whistle blowers’ years before the ‘crash’?” (Quigley & Williams, 2013). 
Bernie Madoff was very imaginative and saw the future of finance being done exclusively by 
robots and less and less through face-to-face contact. He was devoted to the digital future that 
sustained his rise on Wall Street (Quigley & Williams, 2013). According to the FBI, from at least 
1980 until his arrest on 11 December 2008, Madoff carried out a scheme of defrauding clients by 
soliciting billions of dollars of funds under false pretences, failing to pledge investor funds and 
misappropriating and transferring investor funds for Madoff’s own benefit and for the benefit of 
others without the investors’ knowledge or permission (FBI, 2009). 
Exactly when Madoff’s Ponzi scheme started is not known. He testified in court that it began in 
1991, but his account manager, Frank DiPascali, who had worked at the company since 1975, said 
that for as long as he knew, the scam had existed. Bernie Madoff made huge returns on 
investments, in ways that no other broker firm could (Quigley & Williams, 2013). 
Several people tried to voice their doubts and suspicions about Madoff before Madoff’s actual 
collapse. One such person was Harry Markopolos, a Rampart Investment Management portfolio 
manager in Boston. In 2000, Markopolos expressed concerns about the Madoff scam (Henriques, 
2011). He said that if the press or officials of the SEC had taken an interest in his grievances and 
investigated the charges, Madoff would have been stopped in 2006 and saved billions (Chew, 
2009). Michael Ocrant also tried to express his concerns and, in May 2001, he wrote an article 
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entitled “Madoff tops charts; critics wonder how”. This article was published. He said that many 
of those who know Madoff in the hedge fund world were puzzled by the way the business had 
generated such consistent non-volatile returns month after month and year after year (Ocrant, 
2001). Madoff’s tactics were criticised by so many analysts and individuals in financial circles, 
but no one was able to define precisely what was going on (Quigley & Williams, 2013). 
Notwithstanding those attempts, Madoff maintained the scam until 2008. 
Investors gradually started wanting their capital. Madoff confessed to his son in December 2008 
that he was struggling to collect $7 billion to cover redemptions (Henriques, 2008). Madoff 
proposed on 10 December that the organisation should allow bonus pay-outs. His sons confronted 
him and Madoff told them that they should continue the discussion away from the office at his 
house. Madoff admitted in the early hours of the morning that his company was a huge lie, and 
essentially, a giant Ponzi scheme. Madoff told his sons that nothing was left and he was completely 
preparing to go to prison (Henriques, 2008). On 11 December Madoff was apprehended by the 
FBI (Quigley & Williams, 2013), 
Bernie Madoff was charged with 11 counts of criminal offences, including securities fraud, 
investment consultant fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, international money laundering to facilitate 
specified unlawful activity, international money laundering to hide and mask the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity, false perjury claims, false filing with the SEC and theft from an 
Employee Benefit Plan (Quigley & Williams, 2013). He pleaded guilty and was convicted in June 
2009 by Federal District Judge Denny Chin. Judge Chin found the crimes of Madoff 
extraordinarily cruel and sentenced Madoff to a maximum of 150 years for his crimes (Quigley & 
Williams, 2013). 
Many asked why the auditors had not raised concerns. David Friehling of Friehling & Horowitz, 
CPAs was excluded from his membership of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) and the New York State Society of CPAs on 18 March 2009 following an 
ethics review. On the same day, the SEC lodged charges against F&H for false certification of 
having prepared the audit statements of broker-dealer company Bernard Madoff in accordance 
with GAAP. F&H was charged with misleading investors and faced a maximum term of 105 years 
in prison. The SEC further alleged that, as required under GAAP and GAAS standards, F&H failed 
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to test the internal controls and did not maintain professional independence (Quigley & Williams, 
2013). 
Madoff’s attorneys demanded that Madoff be released early from prison in February 2020, arguing 
that he had a terminal kidney disease that could kill him within 18 months. Madoff is 10 years out 
from his 150-year sentence. 
3.2.2.8 American International Group (AIG) (2008) 
AIG rapidly expanded to become the world’s largest insurance company, reaching a $213 billion 
peak market capitalisation in 2001. AIG’s combined assets were $1,072 trillion at the end of the 
third quarter of 2007 and shareholder equity was $104.07 trillion. It was the world’s 18th largest 
public corporation in early 2008. It had raised annual losses of nearly $100 billion less than a year 
later and was rescued by the USA government with a $182.5 billion credit facility, meaning it had 
been essentially nationalised (Fatahi, 2017). 
AIG was a global insurance company headquartered in the USA. In 2008, AIG was bailed out by 
the USA Federal Reserve. From 1999 to 2005, AIG was involved in a wide-ranging accounting 
scam that resulted in a $3.9 billion restatement in May 2005, which included various forms of 
transactions and claims related to a $500 million. In addition, AIG paid insurance brokers tens of 
millions of dollars in secret contingent commissions and engaged with insurance brokers and 
certain insurance firms in a bid-rigging scheme to split the market for certain forms of insurances. 
The chairman, Hank Greenberg, and Joseph Cassano, who led the financial products subsidiary of 
AIG, were among the many people who lost their jobs and reputations. In an already highly 
competitive climate, AIG’s shortcomings stemmed primarily from risk blindness and the 
overarching desire to expand the business and its profits by 15% per annum. New York Attorney 
General, Eliot Spitzer, accused the firm of bid-rigging by insurance agents although nothing was 
ever proved against AIG. One severe accusation was substantiated, however; AIG created 
misleading accounts and used spurious reinsurance policies to inflate profits (Fatahi, 2017). 
In its 2007 audit report for AIG, PwC noted a material weakness in internal control over financial 
statements related to the AIG super senior credit default swap portfolio valuation process and its 
supervision with respect to internal control concerns rather than valuation problems. The auditor’s 
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remarks influenced the market, as investors started to doubt the company’s level of exposure to 
the USA housing market, with AIG’s share price dropping by 11.7% in one day. After significant 
write-downs of its credit default holdings in mid-September 2008, the USA Federal Reserve issued 
AIG with an $85 billion dollar loan to avoid its chaotic collapse and further crises on the financial 
markets (Woods et al., 2009). 
One executive went to prison, the company paid $1.6 billion to resolve civil charges and Greenberg 
paid $15 million to settle charges from the USA regulator’s SEC for manipulating AIG’s 
documents to improve performance from 2000 through 2005. The resulting drop in the share price 
and decreased security ratings were a blow to the operation of the company’s financial products in 
London. As the AAA rating vanished and posting cash collateral for its derivative products became 
more costly, the company ended up destroying its profit. The subprime crisis eventually ruined the 
portfolio of AIG’s credit default swap. A seemingly risk-free stream of wealth turned into a 
liability of unprecedented proportions, almost overnight. This was a textbook example of risk 
blindness arising from a desire to seek profit at any expense (Fatahi, 2017). AIG settled for almost 
a billion dollars and PwC, the auditor, settled for $97.5 million to help the fraud (Lessambo, 2018). 
3.2.2.9 General Electric (GE) (2018) 
There is very limited literature available on the GE case, as this is still a relatively new case and 
the investigation is still in progress. In 2018, the American industry experienced the biggest annual 
stock decline of the modern period. Investors were blindsided against earnings by several multi-
billion-dollar charges (Rausch, Onaran & Smith, 2019). 
GE is a household name and has been around for decades since it was founded by Thomas Edison 
in the 19th century. The resulting stock slide wiped out more than half a trillion dollars in 
shareholder value since CEO Jack Welch developed GE into a banking giant with a peak market 
value of $594 billion in 2000, from less than $15 billion when he began in 1981. As of mid-January 
2019, the drastic downturn under former CEO Jeffrey Immelt continued under John Flannery and 
now new CEO Larry Culp, reducing the market cap to $75 billion. The net leverage of the group, 
the debt as a multiple of a calculation of earnings, had almost doubled over the same time (Rausch 
et al., 2019). 
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A declining demand for energy-related goods such as gas turbines and equipment for oilfields 
reduced the prospect of a turnaround. Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway holding company, 
which bailed GE out in 2008 through a $3 billion investment, sold GE shares worth $315 million. 
GE’s new blow came when accounting executive, Harry Markopolos, was charged with fraud for 
covering up $38 million, worth 40% of its market value. Markopolos said that to cover up its huge 
debts, GE had made false financial filings. Markopolos was allegedly working with an unidentified 
hedge fund, betting that the price of GE shares would fall. Markopolos maintained that GE was a 
bigger scam than Enron (de Luce, 2019). 
Deloitte was hired by GE as their new auditors in 2020. The announcement marked the end of a 
centuries-old partnership that dated back to 1909 between GE and KPMG. In early 2018, GE 
announced that after a $6.2 billion loss in 2017 resulting from its GE Capital insurance portfolio, 
the SEC was investigating the company’s accounting practices. GE said the SEC extended its 
inquiry in October 2018 after the firm took a $22 billion impairment charge on goodwill, much of 
which stemmed from the purchase of Alstom’s power and grid sector in France in 2015. In May, 
701 million shareholders, or 10.8% of the total votes cast, called on the GE audit committee to 
replace KPMG as the independent auditor of the company for 2020 (Brasseur, 2020). Once again, 
the lack of independence at KPMG may have led to GE’s corporate failure and audit failure. 
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Summative comment on USA corporate failures 
The McKesson & Robbins corporate failure of 1937 had a profound effect on auditing standards, 
leading to scrutiny and criticism of the accounting profession. It was found that there was unpaid 
inventory worth $21 million. The owner of McKesson & Robbins committed suicide in 1938. 
The auditors PriceWaterhouse did not perform the audits with the diligence expected from 
auditors and they repaid the audit fees to McKesson & Robbins. Enron was most probably one 
of the corporate failures which received the most media attention. Enron filed for bankruptcy in 
2001. It was found that some assets and liabilities were kept off the balance sheet. This corporate 
failure resulted in convictions against the audit firm. Their auditors, Arthur Andersen, destroyed 
evidence that could have disclosed what had really happened at Enron. Arthur Andersen later 
shut its doors. This corporate failure was followed by WorldCom in 2002. WorldCom overstated 
its profits by more than $3.8 billion in 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. This corporate failure 
was not simply a case of accounting fraud, but reflected poor ethical leadership. Their auditors 
were also Arthur Andersen. This failure was followed by Tyco, the multinational manufacturing 
company. Tyco’s management stole $150 million from illegal stock sales. The lack of corporate 
governance also contributed to this failure. In 2002, Arthur Andersen was indicted on one count 
of obstruction of justice linked to Enron and they decided to stop providing audit services to 
publicly traded companies. The audit branch of Arthur Andersen eventually folded, while the 
management consulting division was rebranded as Accenture. The lack of corporate governance 
at Arthur Andersen was an obvious contributor to the corporate failures it was involved in. In 
2008 there were many corporate failures such as Lehman Brothers, AIG and Madoff. Lehman 
Brothers were exposed for their use of the Repo 105 mechanism to transfer off-balance sheet 
assets and debt to make their financial condition appear more attractive to investors. Their 
auditors, EY, were accused for not challenging and concealing its financial statements. Madoff’s 
Ponzi scheme destroyed the global economy. The auditor, David Friehling of F&H, was charged 
with misleading investors and faced 105 years in prison. AIG, the world’s largest insurance 
company’s share price started to drop when their auditors noted material weaknesses in internal 
controls. AIG settled for almost a billion dollars while PwC settled for $97.5 million. In 2018, 
the household name, GE, made headlines when an inquiry was launched by the SEC into its 
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accounting practices. The investigation is still ongoing.  As can be seen above, the auditor 
practiced poor corporate governance, which then contributed to the corporate failures. 
3.2.3 Corporate failures in Australia 
The state of corporate governance in Australia has received media attention as the social and 
financial implications of major corporate collapses came to light. Most prominent in the local 
financial press have been the investigations of governance irregularities (and allegations of illegal 
management behaviour) at HIH and One.Tel, with supporting roles from companies such as Harris 
Scarfe (Fleming, 2003). Some of these high-profile corporate failures in Australia are discussed 
below. 
3.2.3.1 HIH insurance (2001) 
According to du Plessis (2003), HIH was the worst corporate failure in Australia’s history. 
HIH included a variety of insurance firms and became Australia’s biggest underwriter of 
insurance. The failure had far-reaching consequences, as HIH was a major provider of all forms 
of insurance in Australia, including most public risk coverage. HIH was seen as a price cutter and 
a more aggressive underwriter than its rivals in the insurance industry (Brown, 2001). An ex-
director, Rodney Adler, claimed that excessive discounting was one of the factors that led to the 
failure of the company (Gaylord 2001). Nevertheless, without proper due diligence investigations, 
it was undoubtedly the hostile takeover for AUD$300 million of FAI Insurance, a large Australian 
insurance firm, that marked the beginning of the end for HIH. Ray Williams, the founder and CEO 
of HIH, acknowledged that the price paid for the takeover was too high (Brown, 2001). HIH also 
suffered major losses in its operations in the US and UK, which contributed to its eventual demise. 
By 27 August 2001, when the company was wound up, the deficit was projected to be between 
AUD$3.6 billion and AUD$5.3 billion (Allan, 2006). The case of HIH was also unquestionably 
an auditing failure (Allan, 2006), reflecting poor corporate governance at Arthur Andersen, HIH’s 
auditors. Arthur Andersen audited HIH from 1971 until the company was partially liquidated in 
March 2001 (Kehl, 2001). During this time Arthur Andersen developed a professional relationship 
with HIH (Mirshekary et al., 2005). Andersen’s integrity was extremely doubtful (Allan, 2006) 
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and their independence was questioned, especially its relationship with HIH senior management 
(Mirshekary et al., 2005). The audit firm’s three former partners sat on the board of HIH. One of 
the partners, who was the beneficiary of Andersen’s continuing benefits, was made president and 
nominated to the audit committee just 17 months after his retirement. The day after his departure 
from the firm, another partner, who had been the engagement partner, was made CFO of HIH. Just 
five months after his retirement, the third was appointed to the board, having played a major role 
in HIH’s audit for 25 years (Allan, 2006). All three of these men were well-known to the current 
partners and employees of Arthur Andersen, as they held roles that considerably dominated the 
financial affairs of HIH (Mirshekary et al., 2005). There is evidence to suggest that the 
independence of Andersen was also in doubt due to the high-pressure relationship between HIH 
executives and Andersen’s audit team. Since HIH management refused to increase audit fees for 
Arthur Andersen, Arthur Andersen decided to reduce the amount of work that had been performed 
on the HIH audit (Mirshekary et al., 2005). 
In addition, Arthur Andersen’s long-time HIH audit partnership partner was replaced in 1999 after 
consulting with non-executive directors in the absence of senior managers. The Commission 
claimed that due to Andersen’s strong personal association with HIH and Andersen’s unquestioned 
approval of the findings of both the internal audit processes of the HIH and the consultancy work, 
Andersen was not impartial in performing the 1999 and 2000 audits (Allan, 2006). 
The HIH corporate failure highlights the lack of independence of the auditors and how this 
contributed to the failure of HIH (Correy, 2001; Mirshekary et al., 2005). 
3.2.3.2 Harris Scarfe (2001) 
Harris Scarfe represents one of the biggest corporate failures in Australia, with $265 million in 
debt. The consequences of this crisis certainly had a negative impact on the accounting profession 
and on the Australian auditing industry (Kavrar & Yilmaz, 2017). 
The retailer Harris Scarfe had been in business for 150 years before it was placed under voluntary 
administration by the directors on 2 April 2001. This occurred after irregularities were found dating 
back six years. The company was placed in receivership. In their report to creditors, the 
administrators pointed out that the systemic benefit overstatement was funded by increased debt, 
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both to the bank and to creditors (Peacock, 2001). After investigations by ASIC and official audits 
by the company’s receivers and managers, ASIC claimed that the CFO, Alan Hodgson, had altered 
Harris Scarfe’s accounts to inflate the company’s profits. In reality, it was found that Hodgson had 
played a leading role in falsifying accounts and records and creating a false image that Harris 
Scarfe was in good financial health, enabling it to trade when it was practically insolvent (Leung 
& Cooper, 2003). In a testimony given to the South Australian Supreme Court, Hodgson told the 
court that, if the company’s managing director or chairman asked for a particular profit result, he 
effectively allowed accounts to be changed (Tabakoff, 2001). Hodgson was sentenced to serve six 
years in prison (Leung & Cooper, 2003). 
ANZ bank filed a lawsuit against the auditors of Harris Scarf, EY and PwC, demanding 
reimbursement of at least AUD$70 million and alleging that the auditors were inept in failing to 
identify the accounting anomalies and fraudulent entries in the management accounts. A plaintiff 
also brought a class action against the management, alleging they have committed fraudulent, 
deceptive and misleading acts over a five-year period. As a result of the false statements, the 
shareholders argued that investors paid more than the true market value of the stock and ultimately 
lost the ability to sell their stock (Wood, 2002). 
In Harris Scarfe’s fall, it seems the accountants were running two sets of books which were not 
picked up by the auditors. The board’s audit committee also had independence problems. The 
company had an audit committee of three members, two of whom were clearly internal (including 
Hodgson) and one of whom was technically autonomous, meeting only twice a year. An audit 
committee should be an independent body in order to ensure effective and successful collaboration 
between external auditors and the senior management. Clearly, this did not work (Correy, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the principal creditor, ANZ bank, sued the auditors for many years, citing negligence 
in not reporting the discrepancies. According to Kavrar and Yilmaz (2017) the most unethical 
issues came from the management of Harris Scarfe and from the accounting firms, EY and PwC. 
3.2.3.3 One.Tel (2002) 
One.Tel, an Australian telecommunications firm, was put in bankruptcy and then liquidated in 
May 2001, with a total debt of AUD$600 million. The joint managing directors, Jodee Rich and 
Brad Keeling, had each received bonuses of AUD$7 million the year before One.Tel revealed a 
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loss of AUD$291 million. The bonuses totalling AUD$14 million were paid in 1999, but the 
benefits were treated as accrued expenditures by a change in accounting policy and viewed as set-
up costs associated with One.Tel companies in Europe and Australia. At one point, when the 
company owed AUD$33 million in bills, the bank had only $500,000 and the liquidity issue was 
not reported in a management report to the directors at that time (Leung & Cooper, 2003). 
During an investigation on One.Tel, it was found that questionable accounting practices 
successfully concealed multi-million payments to Jodee Rich and Brad Keeling (Hughes, 2002; 
Leung & Cooper, 2003). Along with other questionable ‘improvements’ in accounting, this 
practice had the effect of transforming a loss into revenue. The auditors allegedly supported the 
questionable accounting (ABC Newsonline, 2002). 
3.2.3.4 Dick Smith Electronics (2016) 
Dick Smith Holdings (formerly Dick Smith, Dick Smith Electronics or DSE) was an Australian 
retail chain that marketed consumer electronics products, electronic parts for hobbyists and 
electronic project kits for retail stores. The chain successfully spread to New Zealand, but was not 
successful in many other nations. Dick Smith founded the company in Sydney in 1968 and owned 
it together with his wife until they sold 60% to Woolworths in 1980 and the remaining 40% two 
years later. The firm closed in 2016, four years after Anchorage Capital Partners purchased it 
(Wikipedia, 2020). 
Dick Smith Holdings shocked the market on 30 November 2015 by revealing that it needed an 
inventory write-down of AUD$60 million, although the company’s financial statements for 28 
June 2015 were audited three months earlier with no adverse findings. Inventory management is 
the core of a retail company and can be seen by auditors as a main risk area. Therefore, the issue 
of inventory either existed over a short period of time or it grew over a longer period of time and 
was overlooked by the auditors (Gray, 2016). 
Dick Smith announced on 5 January 2016 that it had selected receivers and administrators. 
Customers who had bought Christmas gift cards in 2015 were told that they would not be 
honoured. The timing of the receivership was decided by the banks of Dick Smith as they ranked 
above other creditors (Gray, 2016). 
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Shareholder action was taken against former CEO, Nick Abboud and ex-CFO Michael Potts. They 
were accused that Dick Smith’s management did not properly account for its inventory, especially 
house brand goods that executives such as former Marketing Director, Neil Merola, said were 
stacking up in their warehouses when they did not sell. At the time, ChannelNews announced that 
the retailer had been supplying batteries for three years. Between June 2013 and June 2015, 
inventories at the retailer rose from AUD$171 million to AUD$293 million. In late 2015, Dick 
Smith wrote off AUD$60 million of inventory. The former directors were accused of not providing 
an accurate and realistic view of their financial situation in the 2013, 2014 and 2015 financial years 
as a consequence of failures to report details in their financial statements (Richards, 2019). 
Dick Smith’s auditors had been Deloitte. The audit firm was drawn into the legal battle between 
the beneficiaries, Dick Smith and their former directors (Spencer, 2015). Two years after one of 
Australia’s greatest consumer electronics retail disasters, Deloitte were still seeking to remove 
themselves from the AUD$400 million failure, with limited success. Deloitte was ordered by the 
New South Wales (NSW) Supreme Court, Justice Michael Ball, to submit an additional laptop 
containing data from its audits after failing to strike out complaints which were brought in by two 
shareholders, claiming that the company’s accounting work on the retailer was negligent 
(Richards, 2019). 
The order for the laptop was released on 24 April and it came after the court ruled against the 
company’s request to strike out the allegations. It was argued that if the financial statements of 
Dick Smith had been revised or a qualified audit opinion had been given in favour of them, Dick 
Smith would not have floated and been listed on the ASX. The NSW Court was told that the failure 
of Deloitte to detect these inventory problems during the company’s audits meant that Deloitte 
failed to perform its audits in compliance with the auditing standards necessary and that they did 
not exercise fair expertise and care and were engaged in misleading and deceptive activity. There 
were two more lawsuits against the bankrupt retailer, one against Abboud and Potts and non-
executive directors, and another against Abboud and Potts by NAB and HSBC. In February 2020, 
the four claims were expected to be heard together. The defendants had already lodged cross-
claims against Deloitte in each of the four cases (Richards, 2019). The case is still in progress. 
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Summative comment on Australian corporate failures 
The failure of HIH, an insurance underwriter, was the worst corporate failure in Australia. Their 
aggressive discounting was one of the factors that led to their failure. Poor corporate governance 
contributed to the failure of HIH. There were independence issues between HIH and their 
auditors, Arthur Andersen. This was followed by the failure of Harris Scarfe in 2001. It was 
found that the CFO falsified accounts and records, creating the impression that Harris Scarfe 
was in a sound financial position. The most unethical issues came from the management of 
Harris Scarfe and from the accounting firms EY and PwC. The telecommunications company, 
One.Tel, was liquidated in 2001. Their questionable accounting practices led to their failure, 
supported by their auditors. In 2016, Dick Smith Electronics revealed that AUD$60 million of 
inventory had to be written down. The former directors were accused of not providing an 
accurate and realistic view of their financial position in the 2013, 2014 and 2015 financial years. 
It is suspected that their auditors, Deloitte, did not perform their audits in compliance with the 
auditing standards.  
3.2.4 Corporate failures in the Netherlands 
The Royal Ahold failure was a high-profile accounting and auditing scandal in Europe (Knapp & 
Knapp, 2007). Even though there might have been smaller insignificant corporate failures in the 
Netherlands, Royal Ahold received the most media attention, as discussed below. 
3.2.4.1 Royal Ahold (2003) 
According to de Jong et al. (2007), the rise and fall of Royal Ahold (Koninklijke Ahold NV) was 
a major event. With its headquarters in the Netherlands, Ahold was one of the largest multinational 
food service and supermarket store firms in the world. Revenue and profits registered at their peak 
in 2001 with €66.6 billion and €1.1 billion, respectively and it operated 5,155 stores in 27 countries 
with almost a quarter of a million employees. Ahold started out as a family business in 1887 and 
went public in 1948. Under the Heijn family, the company was a family-controlled business, based 
mainly in the Netherlands for more than 100 years. Ahold underwent a transition from a family-
controlled company to a management-controlled company in 1989. The company witnessed a 
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remarkable period of success after the transition. It produced a return of over 1,000% for its 
shareholders and had a €30.6 billion market capitalisation by November 2001. Yet Ahold 
experienced a complete breakdown in February 2003, with shareholders having lost most of their 
produced returns since 1989. The era that followed saw a company in complete disarray: a botched 
plan, an accounting scandal and professional management dismissal and lawsuits from all parts of 
the world. The dispute involved the $1.1 billion settlement between the corporation itself and its 
USA creditors, the fifth largest settlement in the USA and the largest involving a USA foreign 
corporation (Bickerton, 2005). Ahold was branded ‘the Enron of Europe’ (The Economist, 2003; 
Benston & Hartgraves, 2002). 
In 2000, the Dutch company Royal Ahold, acquired Food Service. USA Food Service was the 
second-largest food distributor to restaurants, hotels, colleges, hospitals and the vast USA grocery 
stores chains of Ahold. A part of USA Food Service’s balance sheet was vendor-receivable 
promotional allowances (seller rebates). As part of the regular USA audit procedures, Deloitte, 
independent auditors of Ahold, sent confirmations for those receivables. Confirmations were sent 
to sellers and returned without exception. The auditors gave unqualified reports for the first two 
years after the acquisition. Nevertheless, during the 2002 audit, independent auditors of Ahold 
noticed problems and immediately revoked their audit opinions for 2000 and 2001 and postponed 
their 2002 audit (Masters & McCartney, 2003). Ahold announced on 24 February 2003 that it 
would restate earnings downward for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 and by a combined total of at 
least $500 million for the first three quarters of 2002 and that a forensic accounting investigation 
would be launched, mostly due to irregularities at Ahold’s subsidiary, USA Alimentary service 
(Sanchez & Agoglia, 2011). 
Jong et al. (2007) state that in 2002, Ahold had not reported major off-balance sheet commitments 
related to some of its joint ventures and recorded a second quarterly loss for the year by the third 
quarter. The chairman of the supervisory board announced on 23 February 2003 that earnings for 
2002 would be slightly lower than previously reported. Inflated USA Foodservice vendor rebates 
had theoretically overstated €466 million in earnings. Eventually, over the three-year period 2000–
2002, the amount was €820 million. Therefore, Ahold’s financial statements could not have 
merged four existing, and one former joint project. It was later announced that CEO, Cees van der 
Hoeven, and CFO, Michael Meurs, had resigned. The markets replied to the announcement with 
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an unprecedented 59.4% return on the stock market and a 27.4% to 28.3% decline in Ahold’s bond 
prices. 
The supervisory board had struggled to adjust to a professionally run company with a decentralised 
system of ownership. The OECD supervisory board structure and duties suggest that the problems 
reported for Ahold were mainly the responsibility of the board. The members of the supervisory 
board must be professional and willing to commit adequate time to the company (John & Senbet, 
1998). The supervisory board is particularly relevant in the Netherlands, where after 2001 main 
voting rights of shareholders were transferred to the supervisory board either by Dutch law or by 
company laws as in the case of Ahold. Thanks to the involvement of former executives and 
subordinates with competing interests with other stakeholders, Ahold’s supervisory board was not 
neutral (de Jong et al, 2007). 
Several members of the board had ties to Ahold-related institutions, which led to conflicts of 
interest with these stakeholders. Nelissen, a board member from 1987 to 2001, was the CEO 
of Amsterdamsche en Rotterdamsche Bank (Amro), one of the main banks of Ahold. When Amro 
and Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN) combined in 1990, Nelissen was the combination’s CEO 
until he retired in 1992. After the retirement he became a supervisory board member of the bank. 
Ahold had interlocked directorates with two other Dutch financial institutions, Nationale 
Investeringsbank and ING (a Dutch multinational banking and financial services corporation 
headquartered in Amsterdam), via Kreiken and Choufoer (members of the supervisory board). 
Choufoer was also from Royal Dutch Shell, a 15-year-old employer for van der Hoeven. Sir Perry 
was Unilever’s former CEO, an important consumer goods supplier to Ahold (de Jong et al., 2007). 
PwC’s independent report noted Ahold’s inadequate corporate controls and questionable financial 
and accounting practices. A total of 275 accounting violations out of 470 were attributed to 
insufficient internal controls. The forensic audit also revealed that there was a lack of information 
about the Dutch GAAP and USA GAAP in Ahold and the implications of the actions of the 
management as more accurately reflected in the USA GAAP numbers. Deloitte & Touche, Ahold’s 
auditor found the issues at an early stage of USA Foodservice. Around the time of purchase of 
USA Foodservice in 2000, Deloitte conducted a due diligence investigation. Deloitte suggested 
that the method used to monitor USA Foodservice vendor allowances was very opaque (Smit, 
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2004). As part of their 2002 year-end report, Deloitte also revealed the extent of Ahold’s 
accounting irregularities (de Jong et al., 2007). 
Ahold’s policy and investor relationships, combined with its poor corporate governance, had a 
huge effect on the accounting practices of the companies and their fraud. Starting with the family 
and continuing under skilled management, all the protections available to Dutch companies were 
embraced by the family and management to gain and retain full control over Ahold. These overt 
manipulations of management’s corporate governance by Ahold prevented shareholders from 
tracking day-to-day management and the market’s ability to influence management for corporate 
control. This power helped management to overtake the supervisory board, which was the last 
institution that stood in the way of the firm’s full control of management (de Jong et al., 2007). 
This situation forced the Netherlands and European officials to question their approach to 
corporate governance and accounting policies. A corporate governance committee was established 
in the Netherlands on 10 March 2003 (Tabaksblat Committee) to restore trust in public companies. 
In the USA, the PCAOB used Ahold as an example for successfully negotiating the expansion of 
its supervision to European accounting firms operating in the USA or operating on international 
companies listed in the USA (Schroeder, 2003). 
In the 1990s, Dutch efforts to improve governance were focused on self-regulation (de Jong et al., 
2005). With regard to other self-regulating regions, the track record of corporate governance self-
regulation was not promising (Coglianese, Keating, Michael & Healey, 2004). Since the 
dissolution of Ahold, the collection of standards and best practices of the Tabaksblat Committee 
has become a part of Dutch law, requiring companies to follow or justify their non-compliance. 
There is, however, no clear legal compliance or control, so defences to take over, such as 
certificates, are still valid. The Tabaksblat Committee assigns primary supervisory duty to 
shareholders; however, shareholder rights are not returned explicitly (de Jong et al., 2007). 
Among other claims, the SEC alleged that the two auditors had relied on implausible 
representations made by company officials. In failing to examine such questionable statements and 
other clear red flags during the 1999 audit, the SEC concluded that the two auditors had failed to 
demonstrate a reasonable degree of professional caution and failed to recommend sufficient 
changes to the USA financial statements from Foodservice and failed to collect adequate qualified 
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evidence to support their audit opinion. The SEC noted that the auditors had facts in their 
possession that could have prevented the fraud. Instead, since they failed to practice sufficient 
qualified cynicism, the fraud was allowed to proceed (Walker, 2006). 
In 2003, independent auditors of Royal Ahold suspended their firm’s fiscal 2002 audit after they 
found several possible anomalies in the accounting records of the company. The discovery of the 
huge accounting fraud resulted in criminal and civil litigation being filed in both Europe and the 
USA against the company and its top executives (Knapp & Knapp, 2007). Given the fact that the 
executives of the company knowingly misled Royal Ahold’s auditors, Deloitte, and the fact that 
those auditors were eventually responsible for stopping the fraud, several parties assumed that 
Deloitte should have detected and reported the fraud earlier than it did. In reality, Deloitte had 
been named a defendant in many major class action lawsuits filed following the fraud’s first 
published reports. Most are considered at least partly liable for the Royal Ahold fiasco by 
regulatory authorities and supervisory bodies within the accounting profession. Finally, several 
parties argued that a significant measure of blame for the audit failures involving multinational 
companies such as Royal Ahold and Parmalat should be collectively borne by the tiny fraternity 
of international accounting firms that dominate the global auditing discipline (Knapp & Knapp, 
2007). 
It should be noted that significant corporate failures in the Netherlands are considerably fewer than 
in other countries, which could be due to the fact that Dutch auditing firms apply the legislation, 
recommending that an independent supervisory board be appointed. The auditing firms’ annual 
reports also disclose that they appoint a supervisory board which is fully independent from the 
auditing firm. This proves the importance of independence in corporate governance and auditing 
firms. 
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Summative comment on corporate failures in the Netherlands 
Royal Ahold’s rise and fall was a major event in the Netherlands. This company did not report 
major off-balance sheet commitments related to joint ventures. Several members of the board had 
ties with Ahold-related institutions which led to conflicts of interest with these stakeholders. The 
forensic audit also revealed that there was a lack of information about the Dutch GAAP and USA 
GAAP in Ahold and the implications of the actions of the management as more accurately 
reflected in the USA GAAP numbers. Deloitte found the issues at an early stage of USA 
Foodservice. Ahold’s policy and investor relationships, combined with its poor corporate 
governance, had a profound effect on the accounting practices of the companies and their fraud. 
This forced the Netherlands and European officials to question their approach to corporate 
governance and accounting policies. Given the fact that the executives of the company knowingly 
misled Deloitte and the fact that those auditors were eventually responsible for stopping the fraud, 
several parties assumed that Deloitte should have detected and reported the fraud earlier than it 
did.  
3.2.5 Corporate failures in South Africa 
Prior to Steinhoff in 2017–2018, there were many other corporate scandals and failures in South 
Africa, such as LeisureNet, Regal Treasury Bank, Randgold & Exploration and Goldfields, to 
name only a few. According to Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu (2020), chairman of KPMG South 
Africa, corporate failures such as Steinhoff, Tongaat Hulett and VBS Bank happened because 
auditing firms are driven by revenue and profits and there is a lack of independence to provide 
effective oversight. The corporate failures in South Africa that received the most media attention 
in the recent years are discussed below. 
3.2.5.1 Steinhoff (2017/2018) 
Established in 1964, Steinhoff International Holdings NV (Steinhoff) was a South African 
company dealing primarily in furniture and household goods. Steinhoff suffered major setbacks in 
December 2017, when its share price plunged after an inquiry into accounting irregularities and its 
CEO, Markus Jooste resigned (Park, 2017). 
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Steinhoff released a statement in December 2017 on the Stock Exchange News Service (SENS) of 
the JSE, alleging that there were accounting irregularities requiring further investigation (Putzier, 
2019). In January 2018, within a month of the disclosure, Steinhoff’s market capitalisation 
decreased by $10 billion, flagging it as one of the greatest ever accounting scandals in South Africa 
(Cotterill, 2018b). Its market value plummeted by 80% following the announcement that Deloitte 
could no longer rely on its financial statements for 2015 and 2016, despite being signed off as 
unqualified (Putzier, 2019). 
Markus Jooste and his associates sought to enrich themselves thus defrauding the company and its 
shareholders. They used a global network of businesses to do so, including tax havens such as the 
British Virgin Islands (Open Secrets, 2020). The auditors at the time, Deloitte, were also hesitant 
to give a final opinion on the consolidated financial statements. The following question was left 
unanswered: ‘Why would Deloitte publish an unqualified auditors report for the financial 
statements of 2015/2016’ (Niselow, 2018)? Since the corporate crisis involved an accounting 
mistake, the question remained whether Steinhoff had followed the King Report recommendations 
(Naude, Hamilton, Ungerer, Malan & de Klerk, 2018). 
A forensic report by PwC found that a small group of former Steinhoff executives and other non-
Steinhoff executives led by a senior executive, orchestrated and executed false and fraudulent 
transactions and misrepresented a profit of over R100 billion for at least a decade (Open Secrets, 
2020). 
The failure of corporate governance was disastrous, severely damaging the public interest. A total 
of 948 pension funds had been invested in. The company lost 98% of its value in just two years as 
a result of the fraud and much of this occurred in September 2017 within 24 hours. The 
Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF), with accounts for retired civil servants alone, had 
lost more than R21 billion (Open Secrets, 2020). 
Questions were raised why Deloitte had not identified any irregularities. From the time the 
Steinhoff listed in 1998, Deloitte had been the external auditor to the company. Deloitte reported 
that Steinhoff’s financial statements “fairly reflected the financial condition of the company in all 
material respects” each year for 20 years. They were evidently unaware of the billion-rand void in 
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the company’s finances until 2017. It was too late, when they eventually declined to sign off the 
statements in November 2017 (Open Secrets, 2020). 
Deloitte acknowledged the need for an inquiry by the IRBA in 2018, but said they remained 
confident in their conduct. Deloitte defended itself by stating that it flagged concerns about the 
2017 accounts, but this was done only after a criminal investigation had started in Germany (Open 
Secrets, 2020). 
Deloitte had been an auditor of Steinhoff for two decades. This kind of strengthened relationship 
ultimately compromises the independence an auditor can exercise. The long-running work which 
Deloitte had done with Steinhoff meant that Deloitte should have had much greater insight into 
the business and how it worked (Open Secrets, 2020). 
In South Africa, Steinhoff is a recent example which exposed the gaps in the balance of power in 
the structure of the company. The position of auditors, as an autonomous body that should review 
records and check compliance with accounting processes, was at its core once again. Investigations 
found that top executives were purposely misrepresenting financial data (Maranga, 2018). 
3.2.5.2 VBS Bank (2018) 
The Steinhoff corporate failure was shortly followed by the VBS Mutual Bank scandal (Putzier, 
2019). Sipho Malaba, lead auditor for KPMG in the VBS R1.8 billion scam, played an active part 
in covering up the fraud and was rewarded with R34 million. Malaba attempted to cover up the 
money he had obtained from VBS as loans, but his reasoning was rejected by the investigator. 
Malaba received significant facilities from VBS which were not disclosed to KPMG and could not 
be considered arm length borrowings. In cases where he believed the financial statements were 
misstated, he gave an unqualified audit opinion. He also gave an opinion on the regulatory audit 
which he knew was inaccurate (Ritchie, 2018). Had Malaba and KPMG blown the whistle, theft 
may have ended sooner (Cowan, 2018). 
Both KMPG partners may be held responsible for a possible R1.89 billion lawsuit following its 
catastrophic VBS audit. Because KPMG is a company, anyone who was a partner with KPMG at 
the time of the audit would be responsible for the loss. An unnamed senior audit professional stated 
that the findings from the VBS scandal could spell the end of KPMG South Africa. He stated that 
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dissolving the partnerships and finding new partners and new employees would be best for KPMG 
South Africa (de Wet & Wasserman, 2018). 
KMPG took action when the matter came to light. Nkuhlu (2020) stressed that no behaviour that 
would compromise the quality and integrity of KPMG’s work would be tolerated. He also said 
KPMG has made improvements to ensure it rebuilt confidence in KPMG among the public and 
clients (Ritchie, 2018). 
3.2.5.3 Nkonki Inc. (2018) 
Auditing firm Nkonki Inc announced it was going into voluntary liquidation after auditor general 
Kimi Makwetu stated that Nkonki and KPMG would no longer work for his office (Haffajee, 
2018). According to Haffajee (2018), Salim Essa, who had links to the Gupta family, connived 
with a Nkonki partner to position Nkonki as an accomplice to the Gupta empire by giving its 
various questionable deals the stamp of auditor approval. 
Most of Nkonki’s work was in the public sector and therefore it would no longer be able to survive. 
About 180 staff were left without jobs (Haffajee, 2018; Institute of Certified Bookkeepers and 
Accountants, 2018). Nkonki’s chief executive, Mitesh Patel, resigned after the investigative 
journalism unit, amaBhungane revealed that his R107 million ‘management buyout’ of Nkonki 
was funded by Essa (Comrie & Brümmer, 2018). Patel’s 2016–2017 Gupta-funded purchase of 
roughly 82% of Nkonki from founders, Sindi Zilwa and her brother, Mzi Nkonki, was one of the 
latest scandals to undermine the increasingly discredited audit profession. Nkonki had become the 
freshest casualty of the Guptas’ state-capture project, joining the ranks of KPMG and McKinsey 
(Institute of Certified Bookkeepers and Accountants, 2018). 
According to amaBhungane, the intention was for Patel to hold 65% of the shares he bought as a 
front for his funders, ultimately Essa. After the transaction, Nkonki secured new work potentially 
worth hundreds of millions at Eskom, then under the sway of the Guptas. Patel denied this when 
confronted by amaBhungane but resigned on 9 April 2018. In a letter to staff, Patel said his 
resignation was ‘amicable’ and was reached in consultation with the firm’s EXCO (Institute of 
Certified Bookkeepers and Accountants, 2018). 
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Thuto Masasa was appointed as acting CEO and Nkonki hired a law firm to conduct a forensic 
investigation of the firm. It was impossible for Nkonki to have conducted and obtained the outcome 
of a thorough forensic investigation into the serious allegations posed in the media prior to the 
auditor-general terminating its mandate with the company. The firm also did not have the 
opportunity to address the serious and damaging allegations in respect of Patel’s shareholding in 
Nkonki. The company described its 180 employees as victims who had no involvement or 
knowledge in the shareholding and loan transactions, its funding or its due diligence processes 
(Institute of Certified Bookkeepers and Accountants, 2018). 
The IRBA confirmed that an investigation letter was issued to Nkonki on 29 March 2018 due to 
concerns that there may have been contraventions of Sections 38 and 41 (6) (e) of the APA. These 
provisions sought to ensure auditor independence and required auditing firm shareholders to be 
directors and vice versa and ban the sharing of audit fees with non-auditors. The loan at Nkonki 
potentially put Nkonki on the wrong side of both. 
From the events at Nkonki, the lack of corporate governance and unethical behaviour of the audit 
firm’s directors was evident. It possible that the audit firm failure of Nkonki could have been 
avoided had the firm implemented proper corporate governance and had an independent oversight 
board. 
3.2.5.4 KPMG (2017–2018) 
Eight senior executives were sacked from KPMG South Africa in September 2017. This followed 
on from the scandal involving President Jacob Zuma and the Gupta family. The layoffs at KPMG 
came after an internal inquiry found that the accounting firm had been ignoring red flags in the 
auditing of Gupta family-owned businesses. KPMG issued alerts about the honesty and ethics of 
the Guptas but failed to act early enough on those alerts. In March 2016 the political crisis 
deepened when KPMG terminated its 15-year association with the Guptas (Shoaib, 2017). At the 
time, KPMG CEO, Trevor Hoole, acknowledged the company should have stopped working for 
Gupta companies earlier than they did. KPMG and Bell Pottinger were accused by a civil society 
group, Save South Africa, of playing a central role in facilitating state capture. Many South 
Africans have little faith in the independence of state security agencies and the national 
prosecutorial authority (Cotterill, 2017). 
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KPMG became central to the Gupta family controversy, as the leaked emails revealed that its South 
African office allowed Gupta-owned company, Linkway Trading, to consider spending on a Gupta 
family wedding in 2013 as a business expense. KPMG executive Moses Kgosana, referred in an 
email to the wedding as the ‘Millennium Gathering’. Four KPMG partners also attended the 
wedding (Cotterill, 2017). 
KPMG has also disavowed its research on a 2015 study used by state prosecutors to try to discredit 
Pravin Gordhan, a former finance minister and one of the toughest critics of the Guptas (Cotterill, 
2017). KPMG stated it would pay an anti-corruption charity for the R40 million it received from 
auditing Gupta-owned companies since 2002. KPMG also paid back R23 million received from 
writing the 2015 report used to support allegations that Gordhan had set up a rogue tax surveillance 
unit when he headed the finances. KPMG said they would no longer rely on the report (Cotterill, 
2017). 
KPMG International performed an inquiry and, given the shortcomings in the audit work, they 
found that there was no proof of dishonesty or unethical actions by partners working on the Gupta 
audits. The auditing firm added that Gupta-linked company managers had reacted misleadingly 
and inadequately to KPMG’s inquiries about the existence of related party relationships and the 
extent of significant irregular transactions in the sector. KPMG denied participation in or 
condonation of any suspected money laundering activities related to Gupta-owned firms or 
facilitation of offshore tax evasion (Cotterill, 2017). 
Karthik Ramanna, professor of business and public policy at the Blavatnik School of Government 
at the University of Oxford, pointed out that KPMG had earlier ethical problems, including a 2005 
dispute with the US government over illegal tax shelters (Cotterill, 2017). South African Reserve 
Bank governor, Lesetja Kganyago, stated that KPMG had to take responsibility for their actions. 
They had acknowledged research which they have never should have. He also stated that KPMG 
audited or co-audited four of South Africa’s largest five banks and if they were to be fired by those 
banks, it would leave the country exposed, with only three auditing firms, which was not good for 
competition (Pilling, 2017). 
The IRBA investigated the claims that KPMG and the Gupta family were involved. IRBA CEO 
Bernard Agulhas, said the inquiry would take place regardless of the fact that KPMG had ended 
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its 15-year association with the Gupta family. He pointed out that the IRBA took these claims very 
seriously as it would have a huge impact on the public domain and the public interest (Crotty, 
2017). 
KPMG undermined the very core of corporate governance and the reputational credibility of the 
external audit, and had done so for a long time in the face of its clients’ clear financial and company 
malpractice (Abedian, 2017). KPMG’s actions had struck at the heart of corporate governance, 
according to Hlengiwe Zondo-Kabini, of corporate governance law firm Fasken Martineau. She 
stated that the executives’ poor judgment had undermined their fiduciary duties. She also claimed 
that the executives of the auditing company as well as other parts of KPMG, such as advisory, 
were guilty of poor governance of the business. The reputation of KPMG was seriously affected 
and the entire processes and management of KPMG needed to be checked (Hosken, 2017). 
KPMG strengthened its procedures in corporate governance. The company agreed to follow 
additional criteria as outlined in King IV and to nominate an INED to support the existing members 
of the board to restore public trust (KPMG, 2017). The question remains, why does it take 
corporate failures of this magnitude before corporate governance is taken seriously? Why have 
auditing firms waited so long to implement the King Code? 
3.2.5.5 Tongaat Hulett (2019) 
Tongaat Hulett released a SENS on 31 May 2019 stating that its analysis had uncovered past 
activities that were of serious concern to the board and the auditors of the firm (Tongaat Hulett, 
2019). Clear references were made to past activities that appear to have contributed to financial 
statements that did not adequately represent the actual operating results of Tongaat Hulett (Tongaat 
Hulett, 2019) and were subject to ongoing independent forensic review (Putzier, 2019). 
Senior executives at Tongaat Hulett, including the CEO of 15 years, Peter Staude, were suspected 
of making various misrepresentations in the financial statements. The alleged fraud ranged from 
misrepresenting the value of the assets, falsely reporting the expenditures as assets, claiming 
revenue from the sale of land that had not yet been sold and then failing to report it when some of 
those deals dropped. Tongaat reported in December 2019 that the ‘unwanted’ activities resulted in 
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the 2018 financial statements being incorrect by nearly R12 billion and that the company’s assets 
had been overestimated by R10 billion (Open Secrets, 2020). 
This was supported by Business Insider SA (2020) and Stoddard (2020), who state that Tongaat 
Hulett disclosed that the equity (the value of the business after liabilities) in its 2018 financial 
results had been overstated by between R3.5 billion to R4.5 billion. The adjustments were of a 
non-cash nature and related to the reassessment of land sales against the revenue recognition 
criteria defined by International Financial Reporting Standards and the associated profit margins. 
Therefore, the equity on its balance sheet was cut by between R3.5 billion and R4.5 billion. 
Analysts believed its property portfolio, in particular, was inflated. An external report blamed 10 
former executives, including ex-CEO Peter Staude, who was paid more than R170 million in a 
decade. Tongaat shares remain suspended on the JSE and in London (Business Insider SA, 2020). 
Tongaat stated that once the forensic investigation and report findings are complete and the final 
accounting treatments are resolved by the company, the auditors will complete the outstanding 
audit processes (Stoddard, 2020). As this corporate failure is very recent and the investigation is 
still in progress, there is very little information available. 
3.2.5.6 Eskom (2020) 
South Africa’s state power utility demanded that audit firm PwC repay it R95 million, alleging the 
money was disbursed under an invalid contract. PwC denied the allegation. PwC’s 2017 contract 
to cut costs at Eskom was illegal, unconstitutional and thus null and void, stated Sikonathi 
Mantshantsha, the utility’s spokesman. Eskom sent a letter of demand for the fees to be returned. 
An investigation Eskom commissioned from G9 Consulting and Advisory Services found that 
PwC took credit for work Eskom had done itself, according to the amaBhungane Centre for 
Investigative Journalism, which first reported the development. The probe also found the payment 
structure was unlawful. PwC said it won the Eskom contract after a competitive bidding process 
and that on average, 27 of its staff worked full-time for a year on the project, which identified 
potential savings of R56 billion for the utility. The quantum of fees referred to by Eskom in its 
letter of demand was for the entire project team, which included three other professional services 
firms (Burkhard, 2020). 
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PwC’s own investigations to date did not identify any basis on which to accept Eskom’s demand. 
While PwC cooperated with the forensic investigation that Eskom’s letter was based on, it had not 
seen the underlying report and therefore was unable to comment further. Eskom also sought to 
recover funds from other international companies that it accused of failing to deliver value for 
money or flouting state procurement rules during former President Jacob Zuma’s nine-year rule. 
Deloitte and McKinsey are among those who have agreed to settle (Burkhard, 2020). 
As in the case of Steinhoff and Tongaat, detailed findings of these ‘investigations’ have not been 
made public, nor is it clear if external investigators were consulted (Open Secrets, 2020). 
Summative comment on corporate failures in South Africa 
Corporate failures such as Steinhoff caused the public to doubt the auditing profession. Steinhoff 
suffered a major setback in 2017, with accounting irregularities resulting in an investigation. Top 
executives had been misrepresenting financial data and Deloitte had failed to act on time. In 2018, 
the VBS Bank failure highlighted the role of the auditors, KPMG. KMPG may be held responsible 
for a possible R1.89 billion lawsuit following its audit of VBS. In 2018, Nkonki also collapsed. 
Issues of auditor independence, unethical behaviour and a lack of corporate governance resulted 
in its failure. From 2017 to 2018, KPGM made many media headlines. Their involvement with 
the Guptas and the VBS Bank failure had a serious effect on their reputation as well as that of the 
auditing profession in general. KPMG has subsequently strengthened procedures in corporate 
governance, agreeing to follow additional criteria outlined in King IV and to nominate an INED 
to support the existing members of the EXCO. In 2019, Tongaat announced past activities that 
were of serious concern to the board and the auditors of the firm. It was found that their financial 
results had been overstated by R3.5 billion to R4.5 billion. The investigation of this case is still in 
progress. Very recently, Eskom announced that its auditors, PwC, owed them R95 million. Eskom 
claimed that PwC charged them for work that Eskom had already done themselves. The 
investigation is still underway.  
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Critical link to objectives of the study 
This chapter described some of the worst financial corporate failures the UK, USA, Australia, the 
Netherlands and South Africa. The literature also disclosed how the lack of corporate governance 
in both the public entities and the auditing firms contributed to these failures. It is clear that the 
lack of governance structures in auditing firms contributed in one way or another to the corporate 
failures and how these then had an effect on the reputation of the auditing firms. It was also seen 
that in some corporate failures, the auditing firms did not survive, ultimately resulting the collapse 
of the audit firm, such as Arthur Andersen and Nkonki. 
This supports the argument for the development of guidelines on corporate governance practices 
and oversight structures for auditing firms in South Africa, and why this study is so important.  
The recent string of corporate scandals and failures, both locally and internationally, has raised 
concerns regarding the effectiveness of corporate governance systems, the quality of work 
performed and independence of external auditors as a key assurance provider, as well as the role 
of regulators in overseeing and holding external auditors accountable (Putzier, 2019). 
3.3 Conclusion 
It would be fair to conclude that while auditors, accountants and other professionals are facing 
ethical dilemmas in their business careers, necessary action needs to be taken (Kavrar & Yilmaz, 
2017). According to David Evaratt, head of the Wits School of Governance in South Africa, a 
major challenge in trying to maintain probity in the auditing industry is that the industry appeared 
to prosper irrespective of the controversies, since these large corporations were no longer merely 
auditors. They were project managers as well as providing business services and positioned 
themselves as indispensable, particularly for governments. The KPMG controversy came to light 
not because of government interference, but because South Africans were tired of corruption. 
Evaratt hoped outside powers, such as the USA authorities where these auditing firms are based, 
would bring them to heel (Hosken, 2017). He added that large corporations have entered countries 
for too long, believing they were rulers of the world and could get away with anything (Hosken, 
2017). 
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External auditors play a vital role in ensuring corporate governance and upholding ethical 
standards such as fair or fact-based reporting, honesty, reliability, accountability and objectivity. 
External auditors and their reputation are therefore crucial (Abedian, 2017). Accounting ethics is 
of great importance to experts in accounting and to those who rely on their services. Many who 
work in the accounting sector know that people who use their services, especially decision makers 
who use financial statements, expect them to be highly qualified, accurate and objective. “Ethics 
is one of the factors binding a society together”, according to Arens, Best, Shailer, Fielder, Elder 
and Beasley (2005). However, in today’s intensely competitive markets, it is difficult for auditors 
and many other practitioners to provide customers with high-quality audits, instead of holding 
clients and worrying about revenues. Auditors are typically employed and paid by the financial 
report issuing entity but the main beneficiaries of the audit are consumers of the documents. As a 
result, it is unclear how impartial an auditor can be if they are paid for providing non-audit services 
to their clients. Situational factors such as the field of employment or the role held in an 
organisation may prejudice an auditor’s ethical sensitivity (Kavrar & Yilmaz, 2017). 
There is no question that a company with good corporate governance procedures is less likely to 
encounter accounting violations (Kavrar & Yilmaz, 2017). There is more to good ethics than 
simply doing the right thing. It is also best practice in any company (Verschoor, 2005). Many 
members of the accounting profession claim that the reputation of the profession has been 
irreparably damaged by corporate scandals such as those mentioned above. The negative publicity 
that accountants have brought upon themselves has undermined the reputation of the profession. 
The role of watchdog played by auditors includes educating the public about the financial state of 
a business, whether good or poor, and needs a demanding, even adversarial, attitude against a client 
(Zekany et al., 2004). 
South Africa has encountered situations where suspicious auditing has undermined corporate 
governance. Considering the nature of the work of auditors and their critical role, the compensation 
offered should be fair to allow them to conduct thorough and detailed reviews of the operations of 
an organisation. Reducing remuneration discourages lengthy, in-depth assessments, leading to 
superficial exercises that rely on management reports and explanations without having to check 
them (Maranga, 2018). 
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It is vital to have a credible board of directors. To be successful, the board must have the right 
combination of individuals, including members who understand the processes of financial 
accounting and auditing. Moreover, longstanding auditors are susceptible to compromise, 
especially when it comes to objectivity. The oversight board should implement internal controls 
in an audit firm to ensure good corporate governance. This would foster honesty, openness and 
accountability in auditing firms. Corporate governance may be illustrated through the EXCO, the 
oversight board and auditing. Accountants and auditors must protect shareholders’ interests, 
enforce policies to ensure accountability and transparency and perform regular risk assessments. 
As stipulated in the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, the principle of independence 
must be observed between auditors and users of their reports. This ensures that the roles of a 
company are isolated so that the auditors are not subjected to circumstances in which they may 
struggle to offer an accurate and objective opinion. This division of duties plays a crucial role in 
building trust among stakeholders. Auditors act as one of the key protectors of corporate 
governance in any organisation (Maranga, 2018). 
The following chapter discusses the current legal and corporate governance structure and practice 
of auditing firms to identify possible concerns and solutions in terms of audit firm corporate 
governance. The chapter also provides an international overview with a specific focus on South 
African auditing firms.  
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Chapter 4: CURRENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURES AND PRACTICES AT AUDITING FIRMS 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 discussed the importance of corporate governance, as well as the different corporate 
governance codes applicable in the UK, USA, Australia, the Netherlands and South Africa. It also 
discussed the corporate governance codes, legislation and/or principles applicable to auditing 
firms. It was found that the UK is the only country with a corporate governance code specifically 
for auditing firms. Chapter 3 discussed the corporate failures that took place in the UK, USA, 
Australia, the Netherlands and South Africa. The literature also provided evidence that most of the 
corporate failures took place as a result of a lack of corporate governance at both the public entities 
and the auditing firms. Chapter 4 discusses the current legal and governance structures of auditing 
firms, internationally and in South Africa to understand the reasons why it is difficult for South 
African auditing firms to simply apply the available corporate governance codes, such as King IV. 
The review also explores what reforms would be necessary to improve the corporate governance 
at auditing firms. 
Auditing firms across the world are generally structured as a partnership or a private corporation 
(Bradley, 2020; Shapiro, 2019). In South Africa, auditing firms also typically fall within these 
two categories. According to the IRBA (2020), the top nine auditing firms in South Africa, all 
of which have 20 or more partners, are either a partnership or a personal liability company (Inc.).  
The APA No 26 of 2005 regulates the auditing profession in South Africa and states who is 
regarded as the owner of an audit firm. According to the APA, only individuals who are 
registered auditors are shareholders of the company and every shareholder of the company is its 
director. This brings us to the board composition of an audit firm. Auditing firms are diverse and 
have different board structures. It is important to distinguish between the board structure and the 
governance structure of an auditing firm, as these terms are referred to in the empirical study 
and questionnaire. 
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‘Board structure’ refers to the directors who are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the 
audit firm. Based on the fact that all the shareholders are directors of the audit firm, as per the 
APA, it would be impossible for large auditing firms to have a board of directors composed of 
all the directors of the audit firm. For this reason, many auditing firms elect a management 
committee or EXCO which is responsible for the day-to-day management of the firm. This board 
consists of elected directors of the firm and is generally not responsible for the oversight of 
governance, but only the day-to-day management of the firm and audit quality. 
With reference to ‘governance structure’, some auditing firms appoint an independent 
board/committee to provide oversight and governance over the EXCO and the audit firm. This 
is mostly applicable in larger auditing firms. The governance structure is known as the ‘oversight 
board’ (for the purposes of this study) or the ‘supervisory board’ (mostly in the Netherlands) (as 
referred to in Chapters 1 and 2). The names of the governance boards could differ from one audit 
firm to the next. It is within this oversight committee that some auditing firms appoint INEDs to 
ensure that there is an independent oversight board. 
One of the latest challenges with regards to audit firm structures is the fact that most auditing 
firms not only provide auditing services but are multi-disciplinary entities and provide other 
services as well, such as consulting and advisory services (Duffield, 2020). In the UK, auditing 
firms are being forced by the FRC to split their audit and advisory services from one another to 
ensure independence. According to White and Miller (2020), the UK’s dominant accounting 
firms must separate their audit units from other operations by June 2024 as the FRC seeks to 
respond to the shortcomings that led to the collapse of several companies. The FRC is asking the 
Big Four auditing firms, namely, KPMG, Deloitte, PwC and EY, to agree to operational separation 
to ensure audit practices do not rely on persistent cross-subsidy from the rest of the firm. The 
guidelines seek to prevent accountants from being influenced by other parts of a firm’s business 
that could divert the focus away from audit quality. It is time that there is a genuine cultural change 
within the auditing firms and that we do away from the mindset that auditors are ‘advisors’, but 
rather senior executives. 
From this it can be seen that the role of the directors, the tone at the top and ethical leadership is 
becoming increasingly important in the auditing profession. Once auditing firms are split, it will 
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be easier to apply strict corporate governance rules or regulations within the firms. Until then, 
however, there is a pressing need for reform in the auditing profession. 
It is a common perception that the public misunderstands the auditors. The cases of wrongdoing 
have irreparably harmed the public image of the profession; yet positive cases where audit 
recommendations avoid company failures are not publicised (Mirshekary et al., 2005). For this 
reason, corporate governance guidelines specifically for auditing firms could enhance the public’s 
perception of auditing firms and improve the corporate governance at auditing firms. The public 
would then be able to see the change and reform in those firms. 
The following sections discuss the current legal and governance structures of auditing firms, with 
a specific focus on South Africa. Thereafter, the concerns arising from the current structure are 
discussed while the last section presents recommendations, as gleaned from the literature. 
4.2 Current legal structure of auditing firms 
This section focuses on the legal structure of auditing firms, such as partnerships or private 
corporations, with a focus on both international and South African auditing firms. The information 
on South African auditing firms is found in their integrated reports or transparency reports. 
4.2.1 Audit firm legal structures 
Audit companies are typically owner-managed associations (Bradley, 2020; FRC, 2010). Shapiro 
(2019) states that the vast majority of auditing firms has partnership agreements and the partners 
have opted to cede powers in those relationships to an EXCO and/or a managing partner. Defining 
management roles for partners and executive boards provides greater efficiencies in the day-to-
day management of an organisation (Shapiro, 2019). Bradley (2020) confirms that partnerships 
are the most common form of accounting and finance firms. Two or more individuals own shares 
in the company in this type of corporate structure, and share in the profits. 
The audit business can also be a sole proprietorship or a public corporation (Bradley, 2020). Sole 
ownerships are managed by businessmen who can hire part-time or seasonal staff to assist with 
the workload. Private corporations are both sole proprietorships and partnerships. ‘Public 
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enterprise’, on the other hand, is a term used to describe an accounting firm which issues stock 
shares in the open market (Bradley, 2020). 
As stated above, auditing firms have ties with top executives of organisations and these 
organisations may need strategic advice in other fields such as human resources and information 
technology. This results in having multi-disciplinary entities. Several accounting firms have 
expanded their services by hiring senior-level subject-matter experts in other fields to provide 
consulting advice and project research for existing audit clients. This helps the company to 
increase its per-client sales and expand its customer relationship (McDonnel, 2020). 
According to the IRBA (2020), only two of the top nine auditing firms in South Africa are 
partnerships. The other seven auditing firms are structured as personal liability companies (Inc.). 
This is also confirmed by the information disclosed in the transparency reports of the top nine 
auditing firms. 
4.2.2 Partners or directors of auditing firms 
There can be various groupings of partners and directors, depending on a company’s size and 
structure. These titles would each come with their own rights and privileges, especially as applied 
to income distribution and voting rights (Shapiro, 2019). 
The audit partner is a CPA with a professional accounting company and a full equity partner. 
When an employee is admitted to the partnership, they make a financial commitment to buy 
interest in the partnership. The partner gets a share of the profits, usually equal to their ownership 
percentage. The audit partner signs and endorses the audit report and the firm’s financial 
statements and the companies it represents (McDonnel, 2020). 
Should an audit firm decide to appoint a managing partner to take care of the day-to-day operations 
of the firm, the firm can elect to offer more rights and decision-making powers to the managing 
partner than others. This is especially true of founding partners who usually maintain effective 
control of the company by arrangement (Shapiro, 2019). For businesses that have granted the 
managing partner substantial power, the partnership arrangement will set out specific decisions 
that the managing partner has the authority to make in their own right, beyond the day-to-day 
business decisions. For example, the partnership agreement may state that the managing partner 
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has the authority to bring in lateral partners or conduct minor fusions without the approval of the 
EXCO or the partners as a whole (Shapiro, 2019). 
The promise of becoming a partner and the related financial benefits motivate many employees 
to work long hours and make personal sacrifices for the company. Obtaining a partner title brings 
additional respect because it means a degree of seniority and experience. Specialist accounting 
firms, however, usually require audit partners to be CPAs, which forbids a subject matter expert 
from becoming a non-CPA partner in a particular field (McDonnel, 2020). This statement is also 
supported by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) (2009), which 
states that the EU required that the majority of the voting rights in an audit firm be held by those 
permitted to undertake statutory audits within the EU (i.e. qualified auditors). Furthermore, the 
audit firm’s internal governance framework must contain provisions stating that a non-auditor 
could never gain control of the firm. Similarly, in the USA, the individual states, which are 
responsible for licensing public accountants, have historically regulated audit firm governance and 
have long required that a majority of audit firm owners be licensed accountants (IOSCO, 2009). 
Similarly, with reference to South African auditing firms, Deloitte (2019) states that the title of 
partner is granted only to the business owners. A partner must be a qualified chartered accountant 
(CA (SA)), registered with the SAICA and the IRBA (Deloitte, 2019). This is in accordance with 
the APA, which specifies that only persons who are licensed accountants (with the IRBA) can be 
audit firm shareholders (APA, 2005). As stated by McDonnel (2020), this results in the limitation 
that someone who is not a registered auditor, but a subject matter expert, could not be director or 
partner at an audit firm. This is also coupled with the challenge of appointing INEDs to the board 
or EXCO of an audit firm. This challenge is discussed further in section 4.5. 
The way partners vote on the major business decisions is often debated in a partnership agreement. 
The most common form of voting is the percentage ownership measure, where a partner’s vote is 
weighted by percentage based on their ownership of the company. Many voting techniques include 
voting per unit (that is equal to one vote per partner), voting on capital account balances and voting 
on the previous year’s income base. Depending on the size of their business and the relationship 
structure, companies will determine which strategy is right for them. Nevertheless, agreements do 
not need to connect a firm to only one vote. It is not unusual for an individual to have various 
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methods of voting on specific matters. Some problems will need a simple majority as well, while 
others will need a supermajority (Shapiro, 2019). 
Partners hold some prerogatives and privileges, usually including the appointment of the managing 
partner and members of the EXCO, as well as the approval privileges for large transactions and 
expenditures. Significant transactions may also include integration into a smaller business, new 
partner acquisitions, partner expulsions and addressing major financial problems, such as loans 
exceeding approved amounts and capital spending above a certain level. Partners are still entitled 
to approve a merger and related organic transactions (Shapiro, 2019). 
From the above literature it is clear that audit firm legal structures are diverse and differ from one 
firm to the next. What is evident is the fact that all the directors are shareholders and all 
shareholders have to be registered auditors with the IRBA. Each audit firm decides who will 
manage the day-to-day operations of the firm. Generally, this is either done by appointing a 
managing partner, or appointing an EXCO, which would have a similar role to that of a board of 
directors in a public firm. The next section examines literature on the governance structures of 
auditing firms, with specific reference to the executive board and the oversight board. 
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Summative comment 
Auditing firms are generally partnerships or personal liability (Inc.) companies. According to the 
IRBA (2020), the majority of the large auditing firms in South Africa are personal liability 
companies (Inc.). Some auditing firms appoint a managing partner to take care of the day-to-day 
operations of the firm.  According to the APA (2005), all the shareholders of the audit firm have 
to be registered auditors with the IRBA. All shareholders are regarded as directors and all directors 
are shareholders. Auditing firms generally appoint an EXCO to manage the day-to-day operations. 
In South Africa this is mostly known as the EXCO or the management committee. Very little 
information is provided on committees or structures responsible for governance and oversight of 
auditing firms. Some auditing firms argue that they need not comply with the codes of corporate 
governance due to the company structure (Aberian, 2019). This, however, is not true as King IV, 
from an application perspective, is a framework that can be adopted across listed and unlisted 
companies, profit and non-profit organisations as well as public and private entities (IoDSA, 
2016).  
 
Critical link to the research objectives 
The objective of the study is to provide guidelines on corporate governance practices and oversight 
structures for auditing firms in South Africa. From the above, it is evident that the majority of large 
auditing firms in South Africa are personal liability companies (Inc.) and would therefore be able 
to apply corporate governance principles that are specifically designed for auditing firms. As 
mentioned, there are difficulties in appointing INEDs to the EXCO of an audit firm and therefore, 
guidelines which take these challenges into account would be ideal for the auditing profession. 
4.3 Current governance structures of auditing firms 
In order for an audit firm to be well managed and provide efficient, high-quality customer service, 
it needs to be well governed. The individuals who have decision-making power, how they are 
selected and when they give up control are all relevant governance provisions that should be 
considered in a well-written partnership agreement (Shapiro, 2019). Below is an explanation on 
the EXCO and oversight board of auditing firms. 
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4.3.1 The Exco 
As stated above in section 4.2.2, all shareholders of auditing firms are also its directors. Some large 
auditing firms in South Africa have up to 195 partners, who are ultimately the directors of the firm 
(IRBA, 2020). It would be impossible to have an effective board of directors or EXCO of 195 
members. For this reason, some large auditing firms elect directors to become members of the 
EXCO, which is responsible for the day-to-day management of the firm. Shapiro (2019) supports 
this statement, stating that an EXCO of an audit firm is usually the company’s controlling body 
and has the power to make or delegate all decisions. 
Shapiro (2019) adds that governance decisions are crucial for the smooth day-to-day operation of 
the audit business. This is supported by KPMG (2019), which states that leadership plays a vital 
role in demonstrating dedication to quality, ethics and honesty. The tone at the top refers to an 
organisation’s senior leadership attitudes and actions, and it influences the atmosphere and the 
behaviour desired by all of the organisation’s employees. The embodiment of the right attitudes 
and actions desired through the company is an acceptable, cohesive tone at the top. Auditing firms 
are professional practitioners and have professional responsibilities that also include a duty to 
behave in a manner that takes proper account of the public interest (FRC, 2010) 
As stated in the APA (2005), only auditors registered with the IRBA are allowed to be shareholders 
in auditing firms. This means that any individual who is not a registered auditor cannot be a director 
or shareholder of an audit firm. Therefore, an individual who is a subject matter expert, but not a 
registered auditor, cannot be a member of the EXCO. This regulation also makes it very difficult 
to appoint a director who is independent to the EXCO. 
A reason often advanced for limiting ownership of auditing firms to licensed accountants is that 
practitioners have a public interest mandate as a result of the conditions under which the law grants 
their licenses in most jurisdictions. Public accounting, given its importance to the public, has long 
been considered a learned profession requiring an acceptable level of competence (e.g. through 
education, experience and certification). Limiting majority ownership and control to individuals 
who meet acceptable licensing credentials arguably promotes competence and a culture of 
professionalism and prevents non-practitioners from influencing, through management or control, 
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the attestation practice without having the attendant competence, professional obligations and 
experience (IOSCO, 2009). 
If a firm were owned by a majority of non-practitioners, the economic desire to generate a high 
return on investment could create pressures for a firm to place increased focus on cutting costs in 
areas such as training, development of firm methodologies and best practices and national office 
or other technical expertise. Each of these actions could provide short-term economic 
improvements, but may have long-term negative effects on audit quality. Therefore, many believe 
that restricting majority ownership of auditing firms to practitioners who operate with a public 
interest perspective and who have a significant and direct vested interest in the continuing viability 
of the firm helps mitigate the effect of such economic incentives. As a result, requiring a majority 
of ownership by licensed practitioners may decrease the likelihood that outside owners could 
influence an audit firm’s attestation practice (IOSCO, 2009). 
For the reasons mentioned above, there is a need for an independent governance structure, such as 
an oversight board, which can be appointed internally and which can provide independent 
governance and oversight to the EXCO of the audit firm. Very few auditing firms use independent 
governance structures such as an oversight board for overseeing their management (IOSCO, 2009). 
Securities regulators and legislators have recognised the value of independent oversight of an 
entity’s management (IOSCO, 2009). The next section discusses oversight boards. 
4.3.2 The oversight board 
The oversight of an audit firm’s management by an independent board, which could consist of 
non-practitioners, holds many benefits for the audit firm and its stakeholders. Such structures (like 
an independent oversight board) could be designed to improve investor protection against auditors’ 
conflicts of interest and to reinforce auditor independence. For example, oversight boards, to the 
extent that they have controlling voting rights, may help strengthen protection against conflicts of 
interest by maintaining the public interest perspective within the affairs of the firm. In addition, 
the oversight board could be charged with oversight of the firm’s independence and with 
management of conflicts of interest. The influence of an oversight board, comprising individuals 
of independent judgment, could also be established to ensure that management implements firm-
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wide policies and procedures designed to create consistency and performance as well as high levels 
of audit service quality (IOSCO, 2009). 
According to the 2019 transparency report issued by KPMG, the responsibilities of an oversight 
board could include independent oversight of strategy execution, protecting and enhancing the 
audit firm brand and overseeing the management of the firm. 
Independence on the oversight board is considered of utmost importance (Zattoni & Cuomo, 
2007). Shapiro (2019) also notes that the number of businesses that adopt two-tier board structure 
(an EXCO and an oversight board) is gradually growing. As stated in Chapter 2, auditing firms in 
the Netherlands apply the two-tier board structure and their oversight boards are entirely 
independent of the auditing firms. This appears to add to the independence and corporate 
governance of the auditing firms, based on the relatively small amount of organisational problems 
they have faced compared to other countries (SAAPTI, 2020). 
In Chapter 6, a detailed content analysis of large and medium-sized auditing firms in South Africa 
examines the EXCO and the oversight board structures that these auditing firms have 
implemented. Unfortunately, there appears to be very little independence in South African auditing 
firms. 
Summative comment 
Auditing firms elect directors to be members of their EXCO. The EXCO is responsible for the 
day-to-day management of the audit firm. According to legislation all directors on the EXCO have 
to be registered auditors, which makes the appointment of INEDs on the EXCO very challenging. 
For this reason, an independent governance structure, such as an oversight board could be 
appointed internally (in some auditing firms) and independent members can be appointed to this 
oversight board. The oversight board is generally responsible for independently governing and 
overseeing the EXCO and audit firm. This board structure is called a two-tier board structure. 
Unfortunately, in South African auditing firms there is room for improvement with regards to the 
appointment of oversight boards. More detail on this is provided in Chapter 6. 
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Critical link to the research objectives 
The research objective of the study is to provide guidance for best practice on corporate 
governance for South African Auditing firms. It is clear that the oversight boards of the auditing 
firms lack proper structure and independence and that in some auditing firms these boards do not 
even exist. This is also supported by the findings in Chapter 6. In developing guidelines for 
auditing firms, through the newly developed audit firm governance guidelines, auditing firms 
might find it easier to appoint an independent oversight board that will provide governance and 
oversight to the EXCO of the audit firm and ultimately improve the service provided to the public 
interest. 
4.4 Concerns about current audit firm governance structures 
As seen in Chapter 3, many corporate failures resulted in the public and other stakeholders 
questioning the audit profession. SAAPTI (2020) agrees and states that the past few years have 
been marked by global incidents of corruption and organisational failures that have placed the 
audit profession under a negative spotlight. Questions on the quality of an audit, the role of auditing 
firms and their obligation to the public interest have been raised (SAAPTI, 2020). South Africa is 
not exempt from these doubts. Historically, the World Economic Forum has ranked South Africa 
very high in terms of the quality of its auditing and reporting standards (Schwab, 2016). The 2016–
2017 Global Competitiveness Index rated South Africa first out of the 138 countries (SAAPTI, 
2020; Schwab, 2016). Yet in 2018, South Africa fell to 55th place, leading to the country’s decline 
in overall global competitiveness by 20 places (47th to 67th) over the same time (SAAPTI, 2020). 
This occurred amid questions about the quality of the services carried out by KPMG at the South 
African Revenue Services and an agency affiliated with the Gupta family (Cotterill, 2018a; Putzier, 
2019). According to Nkuhlu (2020), KPMG South Africa enabled state capture through its rogue 
unit report which gave credibility to then South African Revenue Services Commissioner, Tom 
Moyane’s agenda. He further states that KPMG’s risk management failed them and argues that 
compliance with King IV would have significantly reduced the chances of the KPMG disaster. 
Some of the concerns highlighted in the literature are discussed below. 
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4.5 No corporate governance code for auditing firms 
Chapter 2 provided evidence of the lack of corporate governance codes for auditing firms. The 
Audit Firm Governance Code in the UK is the only code in the world that provides guidance on 
corporate governance specifically for auditing firms. 
Many, if not all, auditing firms in South Africa welcomed King IV when it was published in 
November 2016 (IoDSA, 2016). The firms released numerous informative documents, offering 
their clients advice on how to incorporate the new values. The IRBA and SAICA are listed as 
members of the King Committee participating in King IV’s process of content creation. Through 
numerous publications, interviews and press releases, the audit profession praised and supported 
King IV as a step in the right direction for the King Committee, setting the right example and tone 
from the top to contribute to successful ethics governance. It was strongly believed that the 
application of King IV would lead to companies that are good corporate citizens and are perceived 
as such (Nkuhlu, 2020; SAAPTI, 2020). Yet most of the auditing firms themselves did not apply 
King IV. This is confirmed by Nkuhlu (2020), who states that only a few, if any, of the auditing 
firms apply King IV. This could be due to the fact that there is no sector supplement for auditing 
firms in King IV, together with the difficulty of applying some of the principles. Auditing firms 
find themselves in the intellectual centre of consulting on corporate governance, yet very few have 
a reputable and compliant independent governance structure. Currently, auditing firms’ 
organisational systems are flawed. Many firms claim that they do not need to adhere to corporate 
governance codes because their business model is based on a partnership (Aberian, 2019). In order 
to comply with corporate governance, auditing firms should have an oversight board with a 
majority of non-executive members, properly balanced with respect to the combination of 
competences (Aberian, 2019). 
Chapter 3 provided evidence on how the lack of corporate governance codes for auditing firms has 
contributed to the corporate failures in the world. Unethical behaviour can be directly linked to 
this shortcoming. Globally, integrity is seen as the audit profession’s bedrock. In South Africa, 
however, it has become more important than ever to demonstrate this concept because of a string 
of failures that has cast a negative spotlight on the audit profession (SAAPTI, 2020). These 
negative developments led South Africa’s Auditor General, Kimi Makwetu, to announce in 2018 
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that the reputation of the accounting profession in the country is in the gutter (Accountancy South 
Africa, 2019). 
The sections below describe the challenges that auditing firms face with regards to corporate 
governance, and more specifically independence. 
4.5.1 Lack of independence 
Nkuhlu (2020) strongly believes that individuals in auditing firms play a key role. He states that: 
…there’s already audit committees, a board, auditors and regulators. There should be increased 
capacity and effectiveness in all these layers of governance. Each of these layers must carry the 
responsibility of these corporate failures (Nkuhlu, 2020:n.p.). 
All of these layers have failed society and they need to be reviewed in order for their effectiveness 
to be significantly enhanced; it also comes down to individuals, independence and ethical 
behaviour (Nkuhlu, 2020). 
There are two key issues with respect to independence within an audit firm. First, there is the 
independence of the auditor. The lack of independence emerges when the relationship between a 
partner and an audit client preclude a company from serving as that entity’s auditor or otherwise 
decrease the confidence in the independence of the company. Second, there is the independence 
of non-executive directors. This refers to the concern that a partnership between an audit firm’s 
INED and its shareholders could be inconsistent with the characteristics of INEDs (FRC, 2016). 
According to the FRC (2016), with respect to the UK Audit Firm Governance Code, auditing firms 
are establishing their own auditor independence policies in order to help ensure compliance with 
the UK’s Ethical Standards and other national requirements. If a corporation establishes its own 
criteria for INEDs to facilitate compliance with the independence of auditors, that criteria should 
be reported in its transparency report (FRC, 2016). 
As for non-executive independence of an audit firm and its owners, a range of relationships that 
may trigger a concern for independence would already be precluded in the provisions of auditor 
independence (FRC, 2016). However, as there are no clear requirements that define non-executive 
independence, the audit firm should reveal the criteria for determining whether its INEDs are 
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independent of the company and its shareholders. These should include any time limits that apply 
to the company. If an INED has served longer than nine years, this should be subject to specific 
thorough scrutiny and should also be reported in the company’s transparency report (FRC, 2016). 
INEDs should not be prohibited from monitoring the processes of an organisation, for example, 
by serving on a remuneration committee, provided that they are unable to control any individual’s 
compensation and/or recuse themselves from any situation where this may occur (FRC, 2016). 
A firm is supposed to represent the views of an impartial, rational and knowledgeable third party 
when establishing criteria. Organisations should not therefore exclude individuals from 
consideration as possible INEDs solely on the grounds that issues of independence could arise in 
the future (FRC, 2016). Nonetheless, for these reasons, a current partner or staff member would 
never be deemed autonomous, so a plan to nominate a former partner or employee would need to 
be carefully considered (FRC, 2016). 
Once named, INEDs would need to be alert to possible conflicts of interest, report back on them 
and ensure that they are exempt from all relevant decisions. An INED, for example, who also sits 
on a company’s board contemplating hiring the audit firm as an auditor, may deny any participation 
on either side in the tender process. INEDs may also need to comply with applicable standards 
such as insider trading laws in relation to information they may become aware of through their 
association with a company (FRC, 2016). 
According to the FRC (2010), the appointment of INEDs in auditing firms reflects the belief that 
regulation is not a replacement for effective governance but rather that good governance 
supplements regulation in the promotion of audit quality (FRC, 2010). Auditing firms also share 
operations, products and reputations with companies that are subject to little or no regulation and 
this may present major risks to the firm’s credibility and continued life and its audit practice. This 
is where INEDs can play a part in helping to resolve such risks, as well as raising trust in the 
decision-making of companies and ensuring that stakeholder concerns are adequately addressed at 
the highest level (FRC, 2010). 
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4.5.2 Challenges in appointing an independent oversight board 
A study by the IRBA found that 25% of the top 40 JSE companies had named members who had 
previously been employed by the external auditor as chairs of their audit committees, thus posing 
a challenge to the independence of the appointed auditor (Crotty, 2017). Two major concerns 
regarding independence in auditing firms were highlighted in Section 4.5.1, namely, auditor 
independence and the independence of INEDs. Due to the difficulty of finding directors who are 
fully independent of the audit firm and the audit clients, the UK Audit Firm Governance Code 
makes provision for auditing firms to determine the criteria of an INED according to the firms’ 
purpose. 
Summative comment 
Chapter 3 demonstrated how the lack of corporate governance at auditing firms contributed to 
corporate failures and in some instances, to audit firm failures. This chapter explored the concerns 
that are most prominent with regard to audit firm governance. These include (1) the lack of a 
specific corporate governance code for auditing firms, (2) how to determine the independence of 
a director appointed to an audit firm board, and (3) the lack of independence on oversight boards 
that have been implemented at some auditing firms. It was also highlighted that even though most 
large auditing firms have oversight boards, there is still very little independence on these boards.  
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Critical link to the research objectives 
The above concerns and challenges with regard to corporate governance at auditing firms are taken 
into consideration when developing guidelines on corporate governance practices and oversight 
structures for auditing firms in South Africa. The guidelines make specific reference to 
independence and independent oversight boards. 
4.6 Suggestions for improving audit firm governance structures 
The following sections provide suggestions on improving the audit firm governance structures. 
These suggestions include more independence through supervisory boards, the implementation of 
ISQM 1, considerations by SAAPTI and the release of a transparency report. 
4.6.1 Independence through supervisory boards 
A study undertaken by SAAPTI (2020) found that a number of significant initiatives has been 
adopted in the Netherlands. These have not been enforced in South Africa, which should be given 
consideration. Some of those recommendations include the appointment of an independent 
oversight board which is mainly concerned with the governance and oversight of the executive 
management and the audit firm (SAAPTI, 2020). Nkuhlu (2020) also feel very strongly that 
auditing firms should appoint INEDs to provide more effective oversight. 
In Chapter 6 provides a detailed content analysis that examines whether South African auditing 
firms have appointed a South African oversight board. It can be said that not all auditing firms in 
the sample appointed oversight boards. In cases where there is such a board, there is very little 
independence. 
4.6.2 Implementation and application of ISQM 1 
As stated in Chapter 2, ISQC is the current standard for auditing firms, which discusses governance 
and leadership, but not the governance structures and practices. Since the release of the ISQC, the 
IAASB has produced a newly updated standard and released an Exposure Draft (ED) for ISQM1 
which states that the current ISQC 1 does not explicitly address firm governance or contains much 
information on what is required of firm leadership in relation to firm governance. The updated 
standard, ISQM1, includes numerous suggestions to address firm governance and enhance the role 
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of firm leadership in sustaining and continuously improving audiences. However, it is emphasised 
that any acts related to firm governance should be flexible in order to satisfy various jurisdictions 
and structures of companies. 
The IAASB believes that governance and leadership of an organisation are of vital importance for 
quality service, as this is the way in which a company embeds its culture and ethics in how 
decisions of the business are made. Accordingly, the component of governance and leadership was 
first put in ED-ISQM 1. Governance of a firm often influences the view of the firm by the public, 
and a firm without successful governance may be viewed as not serving the public interest. In 
designing the various quality targets and responses, the IAASB indicates that it considered 
numerous global tools addressing governance and leadership for all organisations in general and 
those more relevant to auditing firms’ governance. ED-ISQM 1 was greatly improved to strengthen 
the governance and leadership of auditing firms. It discusses in particular the desired actions of 
firm leadership in setting the tone at the top, the required leadership skills and keeping leadership 
accountable through performance assessments. The updated standards also discuss the effect of 
the company’s strategic actions, including financial and operational decisions, on the level of 
service and the role of the company in the public interest, as well as the capacity of firm leadership 
to influence decisions about the company’s resources (SAAPTI, 2020). As mentioned in Section 
2.3, the ISQM is still in draft format and at the time of the study, was not yet enforced. 
4.6.3 Considerations of the South African Auditing Profession Trust Initiative (SAAPTI) 
SAAPTI’s recommendations, which are still in draft format, include companies setting the 
following quality goals. These goals should address the company’s environment, supporting the 
design, execution and operation of the other components of the quality management system, 
including the company’s culture, decision-making processes, behaviour, organisational structure 
and leadership. 
 The organisation’s culture should be dedicated to quality, through appreciation and 
affirmation of professional ethics, principles and behaviours in the organisation. The 
responsibility of all staff for quality in the execution of quality management commitments 
or activities is stressed. 
 The organisation should be responsible and have transparent leadership over quality. 
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 The strategic decisions and activities of the organisation, including financial and 
organisational goals, should reflect dedication to quality and the role of the organisation in 
serving the public interest through clear quality commitments. 
 The organisation should have an organisational structure with the proper assignment of 
roles, responsibilities and authority, supporting the company’s commitment to quality and 
the design, implementation and operation of the company’s quality management system. 
 The organisation should plan its resource requirements, including financial resources and 
obtain or allocate resources in a manner that maintains the company’s dedication to quality 
and allows the design, implementation and operation of the company’s quality 
management system. 
 The organisation should fulfil its obligations in compliance with the relevant rules, 
legislation and professional practices relating to the company’s governance and 
management. 
 The organisation should design and execute solutions to resolve the quality risks found and 
evaluated by the organisation in relation to the goals of governance and quality of 
leadership. 
 The organisation should develop, align and enhance ISQM1 transparent governance 
mechanisms for the audit sector with a strong duty to behave in the public interest 
(SAAPTI, 2020). 
4.6.4 Release of transparency reports 
The IRBA has been calling on South African auditing firms to voluntarily release transparency 
reports. The regulator must also collaborate with auditing firms and transparency report users to 
decide what the minimum contractual criteria should be for auditing firms to issue such reports 
annually. These reports allow consumers to understand a company’s commitment to audit quality, 
leadership, culture and ethics, risk management procedures, employee and service provider 
relationships and independence. They also review the internal and external inspection and 
surveillance outcomes of the companies (IRBA, 2019). 
While still to be approved in South Africa, businesses are required to voluntarily submit 
transparency reports for their operations (IRBA, 2018). However, despite these attempts to 
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strengthen corporate governance in auditing firms, to date there is no corporate governance code 
in South Africa explicitly for auditing firms. 
Summative comment 
With the audit profession being in the spotlight after many corporate scandals, suggestions have 
been put forward on audit firm governance. These include (1) the voluntary release of transparency 
reports, (2) the development of the new ISQM 1 which places greater focus on the leadership and 
management of auditing firms, (3) suggestions by SAAPTI on improving governance at auditing 
firms, such as the establishment of an oversight board and (4) greater independence on the 
oversight boards of the auditing firms. 
 
Critical link to the research objectives 
The empirical study makes specific reference to an oversight board, its composition and 
responsibilities. Reference is also made to the release of a transparency report and the information 
it should include. From the findings of the empirical study, guidelines on corporate governance 
practices and oversight structures for auditing firms in South Africa are suggested. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Auditing firms are generally structured as partnerships or personal liability (Inc.) companies. Most 
auditing firms elect directors to be members of the EXCO who are responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of the firm but not its governance. Due to the requirements in the legislation, all 
shareholders and directors of auditing firms have to be auditors registered with the IRBA. This 
makes it difficult to appoint INEDs to the EXCO. For this reason, there is a need for the internal 
appointment of an independent oversight board, which would provide independent governance and 
oversight to the EXCO and the audit firm. Because there is no specific corporate governance code 
for auditing firms in South Africa, auditing firms have applied very little corporate governance 
principles and not all firms have appointed oversight boards. The Netherlands has seen the benefits 
of appointing supervisory boards that are 100% independent from the audit firm. The appointment 
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of such boards is considered in the guidelines on corporate governance practices and oversight 
structures for auditing firms in South Africa. 
In the IRBA’s 2019/2020 Annual Report, former CEO Bernard Agulhas, claims that governments 
and audit authorities are now calling for changes internationally and are keenly examining 
recommendations and research on reform of the audit profession and how it is governed. He states 
that the IRBA is specifically focusing on developments in the UK. The current negative state of 
the profession brought on by the unprofessional actions of a few has undermined trust in the 
auditing profession. He said the regulator would work even harder to restore confidence and make 
the profession one of the most trusted and valued once again. The auditing industry was called on 
to review current practices to restore faith in the profession. Such trust is strengthened when all 
participants in the financial reporting chain, including management, those in charge of governance 
and investors, assume the obligation to rebuild the requisite trust (IRBA, 2019). 
IRBA Chairman, Abel Dlamini, believes that everyone should work together and decide to make 
significant improvements to the profession to restore faith and trust (IRBA, 2019). The aim of 
corporate governance is to help create an atmosphere of trust, openness and accountability required 
to promote long-term investment, financial stability and business integrity, thereby promoting 
stronger growth and more inclusive societies (OECD, 2015a; Putzier, 2019). This is the ultimate 
objective of auditing firms and a good reason why guidelines on corporate governance practices 
and oversight structures for auditing firms in South Africa should be developed. 
The following chapter discusses the research methodology applied in the study.  
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Chapter 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, it was stated that the objective of this study is to provide guidance to auditing firms 
on corporate governance practices and structures. The methodology consisted of a comprehensive 
literature review that identified and discussed the development of corporate governance in the UK, 
USA, Australia, the Netherlands and more specifically South Africa, the corporate failures in these 
countries and the current legal and governance structures of auditing firms. From the literature 
review, a comparative analysis was conducted of the UK Audit Firm Governance Code and King 
IV. This comparison provided the basis for the principles that are tested empirically in the content 
analysis and the questionnaire. The empirical study followed a two-phase approach: firstly, a 
content analysis was performed on the transparency reports and/or the integrated reports of the top 
nine auditing firms in South Africa. Secondly, an analysis was conducted on the questionnaires 
sent to the CEOs of the top nine auditing firms. 
According to Kothari (2004), a research methodology is a way of systematically solving the 
research problem. It can be understood as the science of studying how research is conducted 
scientifically and includes various steps that are adopted in examining the research problem, along 
with the logic behind them. The methodology used in this study can be described in terms of the 
different steps in the research process. These steps include identifying the research problem, 
conducting the literature review, preparing the research design, selecting a sample, sample design, 
collecting the data and analysing and interpreting the data. This chapter provides a detailed 
explanation of the research methodology. The results of the empirical analysis are introduced and 
addressed in Chapter 6 while Chapter 7 presents the findings and suggestions that arise from them. 
5.2 Theoretical framework 
This study sought to establish corporate governance guidelines for large and medium-sized 
auditing firms in South African. The guidelines were centred on how auditing firms in South Africa 
could improve their corporate governance structures and act as custodians of corporate governance 
to look after the public interest. To achieve the research objectives, both the stakeholder theory 
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and the shareholder theory were considered as the best suited to the purposes of the study. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the stakeholder theory was found to be the most appropriate for the 
suggested corporate governance guidelines. This theory was incorporated into the design and 
development of the checklist and questionnaire of the study. 
5.3 Research paradigms 
The philosophic aspects of the social sciences are viewed through study paradigms. A paradigm is 
a collection of fundamental assumptions and beliefs as to how the world is viewed, which then 
directs the researcher’s actions (Jonker & Pennink 2010). Study paradigms are considered as a 
collection of principles and practices that direct the researcher in the research process (Ackermann, 
2014; Doyle, Brandy & Byrne, 2009; Harrits, 2011). Ackermann (2014) and Doyle et al. (2009) 
state that a specific paradigm is defined by three factors: (i) epistemology  how we perceive what 
we know, (ii) ontology  the nature of reality and (iii) axiology  the principles of the researcher. 
Moreover, there are three large paradigms of science that positions a researcher: (i) positivism  
quantitative paradigm, (ii) constructivism  qualitative paradigm and (iii) pragmatism  mixed 
process paradigm (Ackermann, 2014; Doyle, Brandy & Byrne, 2009; Harrits, 2011). Below is a 
detailed explanation of each paradigm as well as the paradigm selected for this study. 
5.3.1 Positivist paradigm 
Positivism is often referred to as a scientific method or study of science based on the rationalist, 
empiricist theory of Aristotle, Francis Bacon and John Locke, to name a few (Mertens, 2005). It 
represents a determinist philosophy in which causes are likely to determine outcomes (Creswell, 
2003). Positivists attempt to test a theory or describe an occurrence through observation and 
calculation to predict and monitor the forces that surround us (O’Leary, 2004). Positivism was 
replaced by post-positivism after World War II (Mertens, 2005). Positivist and post-positivist 
analysis is most explicitly concerned with approaches to quantitative data collection and 
interpretation (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). 
Stahl (2007) defines the philosophy of positivism as a study theory centred on the ontological 
concept that reality is independent of the observer. Ontological assumptions form the most 
essential conceptual foundations of how the universe is interpreted (Stahl, 2007). For this reason, 
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quantitative analysis is related to the positivist model (Aliyu, Bello, Kasim & Martin, 2014). 
Alessandrini (2012) specifies that, while qualitative data is favoured by the non-positivist or 
constructivist model, positivists prefer quantitative data. According to this model, facts can be 
created through observing numbers. 
5.3.2 Constructivist paradigm 
The constructivist model emerged from the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and his study of 
phenomenology, Wilhelm Dilthey’s study of interpretive perception as well as the philosophies of 
other German philosophers known as hermeneutics (Eichelberger, 1989 as cited in Mertens, 2005). 
Constructivist methods of study seek to clarify the world of human experience (Cohen & Manion, 
1994), given that reality is socially constructed (Mertens, 2005). The constructivist researcher 
focuses on the participants’ impressions of the situation (Creswell, 2003) and acknowledges the 
importance of their own history and experience. In general, constructivists do not begin with a 
hypothesis during the research process (as with post-positivists), but rather produce or create a 
hypothesis or pattern of meanings inductively (Creswell, 2003). They do so in a manner that 
confirms or extends qualitative data and deepens the context (Mackenzie & Knipe, 2006). 
5.3.3 Pragmatist paradigm 
As a study paradigm, pragmatism focuses on the notion that researchers should use a conceptual 
or methodological approach that is best-suited to the particular research problem under study 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie 1998). There is regular overlap between mixed methods or multiple 
methods research (Creswell & Clark 2011; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004; Maxcy 2003; Morgan 
2014; Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009), where the focus is not on the methods but on the consequences 
of study and research problems. Pragmatism can use both formal and informal rhetoric (Creswell 
& Clark 2011; Kaushik & Walsh, 2019). 
Although it is not completely new to adopt pragmatism as a social science approach, the 
understanding of pragmatism has been enhanced by its widespread association with mixed 
methods research. In an investigative stage that underlies the search for knowledge, pragmatism 
points to the importance of joining values and actions (Kaushik & Walsh, 2019). Pragmatism treats 
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science as a subjective experience based on the perceptions and actions of individual researchers 
(Morgan, 2014). 
For the purposes of this study, a pragmatist paradigm is applied. More detail about the application 
of this paradigm (mixed methods) is discussed in the following section. 
5.4 Research design and research methodology 
5.4.1 Defining a research design 
William and Donnelly (2006) defines a research design as the overall methodology used to 
coherently and logically integrate the different components of a study, thereby ensuring that the 
research issue is adequately addressed. This understanding is further supported by Kumar (2005), 
who observes that the research design is the model for data collection, estimation and analysis. De 
Vaus (2001) argues that the object of a research design is to ensure that the data allows the 
researcher to address the research problem as logically and unambiguously as possible. Bryman 
and Bell (2007) concur, stating that a research design offers a structure for the collection and 
analysis of data. 
The research design selected for this study is explained below. The explanation considers the 
relevant paradigm, data collection method and data analysis technique. 
5.4.1.1 Research design selected for this study 
Mixed method analysis is typically a knowledge (theory and practice) approach that takes into 
account various viewpoints, positions and perspectives (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). 
A mixed approach, and more precisely, the simultaneous transformation triangulation model, is 
the research design selected for this study. Denzin (1978) first indicated how to triangulate 
methods, describing it as the combination of methodologies (always including qualitative and 
quantitative analysis perspectives) (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). This design allows 
both quantitative and qualitative data to be collected simultaneously, which can then be combined 
to provide an overall picture of a phenomenon as part of the final discussion of findings 
(Ackermann, 2014; Edmonds & Kennedy, 2013; Grbich, 2013; Mamaile, 2018). 
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Morse (1991) demonstrated two types of methodological triangulation, namely, simultaneous 
triangulation and sequential triangulation. According to Morse (1991), simultaneous triangulation 
reflects the simultaneous use of qualitative and quantitative methods. There is little contact 
between the two data sources during the data collection stage; however, at the stage of data 
interpretation, the results complement one another. On the other hand, sequential triangulation is 
used when the findings of one approach are necessary for the preparation of the next approach 
(Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). 
The data from all the sources is therefore complementary. An overview of the data transformation 
triangulation model adopted in this study is given in Figure 5.1 below. 
 
Figure 5.1: Data transformation triangulation design 
Source: Ackermann (2014:146) 
While recognising that triangulation may not be appropriate for all research purposes, Jick (1979) 
notes the following advantages of triangulation: (1) it allows researchers to be more confident of 
their findings; (2) it encourages the creation of innovative methods for collecting data; (3) it can 
lead to denser, richer data; (4) it can lead to the synthesis or incorporation of theories; (5) it can 
re-introduce theories; and (6) it can serve as a litmus test for contrasting viewpoints of ideas 
because of its comprehensiveness (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). 
During the analysis of this study, both qualitative and quantitative information was gathered. This 
data was independently analysed and the qualitative results were then converted into quantitative 
data that was correlated with the quantitative results. 
























5.5 Methods of data collection 
The methodology used for data collection, which can be primary and/or secondary data, is outlined 
in this section. Leedy and Ormrod (2013) clarify that the process of data collection starts after 
defining the research problem and explaining the research design. Babbie and Mouton (2010) 
describe the processing of data as the assembly of quantitative numerical data or qualitative textual 
data (Flick, 2011). Therefore, data is empirical evidence or information carefully obtained in 
accordance with the study procedures (Neuman, 2011). 
Pre-existing (or secondary) knowledge was gathered in this study. This form of data was originally 
collected for a different purpose and is reused for another research query (Hox & Boeije, 2005). 
Secondary data is thus publicly available. For the purposes of this study, the secondary data was 
collected through the literature review and content analysis. 
Primary data refers to the information which was gathered directly from the participants, through 
the study questionnaires. The different methods used to collect the secondary and primary data are 
discussed below. 
5.5.1 Secondary data collection 
Secondary data is further defined as information collected by others for their specific purposes and 
made accessible to a wider audience, including researchers, through books, libraries and websites 
(Adams, Khan & Raeside, 2014; Diamantopoulos & Schlegelmilch, 2004; McCaston, 2005). 
The secondary data for this study was obtained from publicly accessible data published on the 
websites of the auditing firms. It included the transparency reports and integrated reports. The 
secondary data was also collected by means of a literature review, conducted in Chapters 1 to 4. 
The content analysis which was performed is described in greater detail below. 
5.5.1.1 Definition of a content analysis 
Content analysis is a form of examining written, verbal or visual communication messages, 
according to Cole (1988) and Downe-Wamboldt (1992). This is supported by Cavanagh (1997), 
who notes that researchers consider content analysis as a flexible method for analysing text data. 
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Weber (1990) suggests that the study of material goes beyond merely counting words to extensive 
language analysis. The purpose of content analysis is to shed light in a phenomenon (Downe-
Wamboldt, 1992). Harwood and Garry (2003) note that in the 19th century, content analysis was 
first used as a tool to analyse hymns, newspaper and magazine articles, advertisements and 
political speeches. Content analysis was later predominantly used as a quantitative research tool, 
with text data coded into simple categories and then statistically interpreted (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005). This technique is often referred to as qualitative data quantitative analysis (Morgan, 1993). 
The seven steps typically followed in content analysis include (1) formulating the research 
questions, (2) selecting the sample, (3) specifying the categories to be used, (4) explaining the 
coding process and preparing the coder, (5) starting the coding process, (6) determining 
trustworthiness and (7) analysing the coding process. Content analysis depends significantly on 
the coding process. The basic coding approach in content analysis is to organise large amounts of 
text into much smaller categories of content (Weber, 1990). Categories are patterns or themes 
directly represented in the text or derived from it by research. Relationships between categories 
are the established. In the coding method, researchers using content analysis build or develop a 
coding scheme to direct coders to make decisions on content analysis (Kyngas & Vanhanen, 1999; 
Poole & Folger, 1981). 
5.5.1.2 Application of content analysis in this study 
For the purposes of this study, content analysis was selected as part of the collection of qualitative 
data. After conducting a comparison between the UK Corporate Governance Code and King IV 
(see Chapter 2, section 2.5 as well as Annexure I), a checklist was developed based on corporate 
governance elements that auditing firms are expected to disclose in their transparency reports and 
integrated reports. The checklist was then used to analyse the reports of the top medium and large 
auditing firms in South Africa. The check list also included information based on literature 
identified during the literature review. 
As stated in the literature, at present, it is not compulsory for auditing firms to issue a transparency 
report in South Africa, however, the IRBA is in the process of making this compulsory for auditing 
firms. For this reason, not all the auditing firms had a transparency report. It should also be noted 
that the disclosure in the transparency reports do not reflect the actual governance practices at the 
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auditing firms. The fact that auditing firms do not have to issue transparency reports, and that there 
is no guidance as to what information regarding governance should be disclosed by auditing firms, 
contributes to this point made by the researcher. More details about the analysis appear in Chapter 
6. 
The checklist can be viewed in Annexure M. 
5.5.2 Primary data collection 
The primary data for this study was collected by means of a questionnaire which was sent to the 
CEOs of the top nine auditing firms in South Africa. Below is a detailed explanation of the 
questionnaire data collection. 
5.5.2.1 Questionnaire design and control 
A self-completed questionnaire was used for the purposes on this study. In other words, the 
respondents answered the questions by completing the questionnaire online themselves. Both 
open- and closed-ended questions were included. For the open-ended questions, respondents could 
reply however they wished. For the closed ended questions, the answers were presented as a set of 
fixed alternatives from which they had to choose an appropriate answer. 
The questionnaire was compiled using Google Drive and the Google Forms feature. The 
questionnaire was completed and presented to the participants (CEO’s from the top nine auditing 
firms in South Africa) via a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) online. The questionnaire was then 
sent online and the respondents completed and submitted the questionnaire. The answers were then 
extracted from Excel and entered into the IBM Statistical Analysis Software Package (IBM SPSS) 
for analysis. 
A mixture of polar questions, multiple choice questions and Likert scales was used in the 
questionnaire. Space was allocated under each section of the questionnaire in case the respondent 
wished to elaborate. 
The SAAPTI provided a cover letter to show their support of the study. This letter, which was sent 
out with the questionnaire, can be found in Annexure L. 
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The questionnaire can be viewed in Annexure N. 
5.5.2.2 Preparation, review and distribution 
The questionnaire was compiled in July and August 2020 on the basis of a comprehensive literature 
review, in line with the problem and goals of study research. To ensure the validity, the 
questionnaire was sent for review to corporate governance experts, academics and audit 
practitioners in the field. After receiving excellent feedback from the pilot study, the questionnaire 
was finalised and completed on Google Forms. Once completed, a final test was performed by an 
independent academic in order to test the functionality of the questionnaire. 
Communication with the auditing firms was made mid-September 2020 to invite potential 
participants to take part in the research. Emails were sent out containing the SAAPTI covering 
letter and the URL for completing the online survey using Google Documents. The survey was 
closed on 15 October 2020, after continuous follow-up by email and mobile. 
5.6 Analysis of data 
5.6.1 Qualitative data analysis 
The latest transparency reports and integrated reports for the top nine auditing firms from 
2018/2019 were obtained from their websites. In cases where such a report was unavailable on the 
website of the audit firm, the researcher sent the audit firm an email asking for a transparency 
report and an integrated report. These were the most recent reports available, as some of the 2020 
reports were only published after this study was completed. These transparency reports and 
integrated reports were then read and analysed in depth and compared to the criteria on the 
checklist. Since there are only nine medium-sized and large auditing firms in South Africa, the 
researcher was able to conduct the content analysis by reading each report in depth. 
5.6.2 Transforming qualitative data into quantitative data 
Each of the transparency reports and integrated reports was analysed. The checklist contains a 
‘yes’ and ‘no’ code asking whether the information stated in the checklist was present in the 
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reports. This information was then used to quantify how many firms disclosed the relevant 
information as per the checklist. 
5.6.3 Quantitative data analysis 
To explain the meaning of the data together for all answers, descriptive statistics, frequency tables 
and graphs were used to explain the findings. Inferential statistics were not used because of the 
smaller sample. The findings were then correlated with the qualitative data that was transformed 
into quantitative data. 
5.7 Validity and reliability of research 
The results of the study contain both quantitative and qualitative data. Therefore, the validity, 
reliability (for quantitative data) and trustworthiness (for qualitative data) must be ensured. 
Some scholars have proposed that qualitative studies should be measured or evaluated according 
to somewhat different standards to those used by quantitative researchers with regard to the 
reliability and validity of qualitative research. They suggest first assessing the trustworthiness of 
the analysis. Four criteria, each of which has an analogous criterion in quantitative analysis, make 
up trustworthiness. These include: 
 Credibility, which parallels internal validity; 
 Transferability, which parallels external validity; 
 Dependability, which parallels reliability; 
 Confirmability, which parallels objectivity (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
Establishing the credibility of results involves both ensuring that the study was carried out in 
accordance with good practice principles and submitting research findings to the participants in 
order for the participants to confirm that the researcher understood their feedback properly 
(Bryman & Bell, 2007). The findings from the analysis will be shared with all participants who 
confirmed they would like a copy of the results to maintain integrity. 
Since qualitative research usually includes the extensive study of a small group or individuals who 
share certain features, qualitative results appear to be based on the contextual uniqueness and 
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importance of the social environment being examined (Bryman & Bell, 2007). The fact that all 
auditing firms comply with the same regulations makes a major contribution to external validity. 
Even though the emphasis was on the top nine auditing firms with 20 or more partners, the findings 
are still transferable (see Section 5.8.3 on generalisation). In the work of Ackermann (2014), this 
rationale is also apparent. 
Researchers should follow an ‘auditing’ method to determine the merit of research in terms of the 
criterion of trustworthiness. This includes ensuring that comprehensive records are held in an 
appropriate manner for all phases of the study (Bryman & Bell, 2007). All records were maintained 
for in this study. The study supervisor reviewed the report. Independent individuals were also used 
to verify that the content review results were a fair reflection of what was portrayed in the auditing 
firms’ disclosure reports and integrated reports. 
Although full objectivity in business research is unlikely, confirmability seeks to ensure that the 
researcher acts in good faith. In other words, it should be clear that the researcher has not permitted 
personal beliefs or theoretical inclinations to manifestly affect the research results (Bryman & Bell, 
2007). The researcher of this study remained impartial and neutral throughout the research process. 
Internal validity, specifically material validity, was strengthened with regard to the quantitative 
findings through peer debriefing of the questionnaire by experienced academics and industry 
experts. Input from the reviewers was used to refine the questionnaires. Overall, it was determined 
that the questionnaire measured what it was meant to measure. 
The data from the transparency reports and the integrated reports were used to corroborate and 
confirm the results of the questionnaire in order to enhance the validity of the findings. Therefore, 
overall, the study design contributed significantly to validity and trustworthiness. 
5.8 Population and sample selection 
The sampling frame for this study consisted of all the large and medium-sized auditing firms in 
South Africa. The sampling unit refers to each of the individual auditing firms in the sampling 
frame. The population for the study consisted of the medium and large sized auditing firms in 
South Africa, as determined by the IRBA (2020). These firms have 20 of more audit partners. The 
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transparency reports and integrated reports of these auditing firms were obtained and the content 
analysis was performed. For the quantitative analysis, questionnaires were sent to the CEO’s of 
each of these auditing firms. As the population of medium and large auditing firms was small, the 
whole population was used as the sample of the study. 
5.8.1 Sampling design 
In non-probability sampling, the sampling units do not have an equal opportunity to be included 
in the sample. The researcher thus purposely chooses sample units to be sampled from the sample 
frame. There are five distinct non-probability sampling methods, namely, quota sampling, 
accidental sampling, judgmental sampling or purposeful sampling, expert sampling, snowball 
sampling and modal instant sampling (Etikan & Bala, 2017). 
‘Expert non-probability sampling’ was used for the study questionnaires. This refers to where the 
researcher receives the approval of others in the field of study who are experts or recognised 
experts and starts the process of gathering data directly from the person or group of respondents. 
The motives for the use of expert sampling are to provide a clearer way of constructing the opinions 
of people who are experts in a specific field (Etikan & Bala, 2017). 
The sample consisted of the top nine auditing firms in South Africa, as confirmed by the IRBA 
(2020). These include: 
 PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. 
 Deloitte and Touche 
 KPMG Inc. 
 Ernst and Young Inc. 
 BDO South Africa Inc. 
 Mazars 
 SizweNtsalubaGobodo Grant Thornton Inc. 
 A2A Kopano Inc. 
 SAB and T Chartered Accountants trading as Nexia SAB & T (IRBA, 2020) 
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5.8.2 Sample size 
The sample size of this study was 100% of the nine medium and large sized auditing firms, as per 
IRBA’s classification (refer section 5.8.1). 
5.8.3 Generalisability 
Due to the fact that the whole population of auditing firms with 20 of more partners was used as 
the sample in the study, the findings cannot be generalised to other medium or large auditing firms 
in South Africa. Smaller auditing firms would have less partners, staff and clients. As a result, 
applying corporate governance guidelines may not be cost effective or affordable for smaller firms. 
A future study for smaller auditing firms could be considered. Another option is that should a 
corporate governance code be formulated based on the recommendations and guidelines of the 
study, the code could be based on a ‘comply and explain’ basis. In doing this, smaller auditing 
firms could apply the principles that they could and explain why other principles were not applied. 
The study can most definitely be generalised to other medium or large sized auditing firms in the 
world. 
5.9 Ethics 
Ethics can be described as the norms of behaviour that distinguish between good and reasonable 
behaviour and unacceptable behaviour (Östman & Turtiainen, 2016). Ethical considerations are 
important in research because by looking for the truth and fostering the ideal of trustworthiness 
ensures that researchers are responsible for their actions (Cacciattolo, 2015). 
During this study, the researcher was honest when communicating with participants and in dealing 
with collected data. Every effort was made to remain unbiased during the data analysis phase and 
in all other areas where this was needed. Caution was taken during the research process to avoid 
errors and carelessness. The researcher was sincere in procedures used when obtaining data. 
Participants who asked to have access to the results were assured that a copy of the study would 
be sent to them. This was done in the interests of transparency. 
The researcher was aware of intellectual property by giving credit where it was due and accepting 
any contributions produced by others. Informed consent was obtained from all the participants 
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who had the right to stop their engagement at any time they wished to do so. The study data and 
information will not be used to damage any entity or any participant’s credibility. At all times, the 
researcher aimed to prevent actions that would undermine the participants’ confidence and treated 
all information as confidential. In addition, the companies’ names were not revealed. Instead, 
numerical values were used as a means of identification, e.g. Organisation 1. 
Prior to sending the questionnaire to the prospective participants, ethical approval was received 
from the University of Johannesburg. The certificate of ethical clearance can be viewed in 
Annexure J. 
The security of the companies involved in this study was of the utmost importance. However, no 
ethical issues emerged as only publicly accessible sources of data were used and no modifications 
were made to the data. 
5.10 Response rate 
A 100% response rate was obtained for the content analysis for the firms that publish transparency 
reports and/or integrated reports. A 100% response rate was obtained for the questionnaire as all 
questionnaires were returned and completed in full. 
5.11 Cut-off date 
The cut-off date for the study was 31 August 2020. Any literature and developments made 
available after this date will be considered in future research. 
5.12 Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the research methodology used in the study. A description 
was given of the research design and the triangulation design for data transformation. For both 
qualitative and quantitative data, the research methodology was clarified, mentioning the 
population, the sampling technique and measurement efficiency. The next chapter discusses the 
empirical results and findings.  
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Chapter 6: RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the qualitative and the quantitative empirical study. The results 
are examined with reference to the problem stated in Chapter 1. This is then used to provide a 
typical representation of the current status of corporate governance practices and disclosures in 
South African auditing firms as well as the expert opinions of the CEOs of the top nine auditing 
firms in South Africa regarding an Audit Firm Governance Code for South African auditing firms. 
The chapter first presents the qualitative findings obtained through a content analysis of the 
transparency reports and integrated reports of the top nine auditing firms in South Africa. The 
chapter then provides the quantitative results which were obtained through questionnaires sent to 
the CEOs of the top nine auditing firms in South Africa. Lastly the comparison (triangulation) 
between the qualitative and quantitative data is presented. 
As stated in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.1.2, the checklist for the content analysis and the questionnaire 
were developed based on the UK Audit Firm Governance Code—currently the only audit firm 
governance code in the world. A comparison between King IV and the UK Code found that many 
of the King IV principles are already addressed in the UK Code, thus making it relatively easy for 
South African auditing firms to apply the principles. As King was initially developed based on the 
UK Cadbury report, it is submitted that the UK Audit Firm Governance Code could also be used 
as the foundation to develop guidelines for South African auditing firms. Hence, it was used to 
inform the checklist and questionnaire. 
As stated in Chapter 1, the UK Audit Firm Governance Code contains six principles: (1) 
Leadership, (2) Values, (3) INED, (4) Operations, (5) Reporting, and (6) Dialogue (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2016). Annexure I also provides a detailed summary of the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code as well as all the principles and provisions contained in the Code. 
The empirical findings have been grouped according to the principles in the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code. The findings are thus discussed according to the following headings (for the 








The tables used to present the findings are in the following format: 
  
Reference 




Yes % No % Total 
Total 
% 
Requirement according to 
principle/provision in the UK Audit Firm 




      
The first column represents the principles/provisions as contained in the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code that were analysed in the content analysis and questionnaire. A detailed example 
of the checklist can also be viewed in Annexure M. The second column is a cross-reference to the 
number of the principle/provision contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. The next 
columns provide the responses ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as well as the percentage of the population represented 
by this response. The final two columns contain the total of auditing firms and a total percentage, 
indicating the percentage of the population on which the analysis was performed. 
6.2 Content analysis 
This section contains a qualitative discussion on the disclosure of corporate governance structures 
and practices of the top nine auditing firms in South Africa, as indicated in their transparency 
and/or integrated reports. Only seven of the auditing firms published transparency reports; thus, 
the sample used in the content analysis consists of these seven firms. 
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Only two of the auditing firms published integrated reports; however, the information contained 
in these reports was duplicated in the transparency reports. To minimise duplication in the findings, 
the findings were combined for both reports. Thus, if the audit firm disclosed information in either 
the transparency report or the integrated report, it was regarded as disclosure of governance 
information. 
The following sections will be discussed in detail below: 6.2.1 Release of transparency and 
integrated reports, 6.2.2 Leadership, 6.2.3 Values, 6.2.4 INEDs, 6.2.5 Operations, 6.2.6 Reporting 
and 6.2.7 Dialogue.  
6.2.1 Release of transparency and integrated reports 
The first objective was to establish whether the auditing firms published transparency reports 
and/or integrated reports on an annual basis. According to the literature, the publication of such 
reports is not compulsory in South Africa, although it is recommended by the IRBA. According to 
the IRBA (2019), the release of transparency reports allows consumers to understand the audit 
firm’s commitment to audit quality, leadership, culture and ethics, risk management procedures, 
employee and service provider relationships as well as independence. The IRBA has been calling 
on South African auditing firms to voluntarily release transparency reports in South Africa. 
According to the FRC (n.d.), the disclosure of information in the transparency reports will provide 
investors with a holistic view of the governance of the company. The call for greater transparency 
and disclosure by auditing firms has been further validated by high-profile audit firm failures (e.g. 
the demise of Arthur Andersen) and the lack of confidence in the financial markets in the post-
global financial crisis era (Huddart, 2013). Patel (2013) argues that transparency creates a level of 
non-secrecy and openness of information in companies. It is an effective way of protecting the 
interest of stakeholders by promoting disclosure of non-financial information to hold governing 
bodies accountable for the decisions that directly or indirectly affect them (Frederick, 2000; Fung, 
2014). The Brydon Report also provides recommendations for greater disclosure to promote trust 
in the corporate auditing profession (Brydon, 2019). 
182 
Table 6.1 Reports published 
  
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Transparency report A.1.2. 7 77.80 2 22.2 9 100 
Integrated report A.1.2. 2 22.20 7 77.8 9 100 
As can be seen in Table 6.1, seven of the auditing firms published transparency reports while only 
two published an integrated report. The two firms that published integrated reports also released 
transparency reports. 
It was pleasing to see that the majority of the auditing firms issued transparency reports on an 
annual basis. This could be an indication that they were aware of the call from the IRBA to issue 
such reports and that they were already preparing themselves should the IRBA make it compulsory 
for auditing firms to release these reports annually. However, it was concerning that one of the 
firms that failed to issue a transparency report is regarded as one of the bigger auditing firms in 
South Africa. The other firm that did not issue a transparency report is regarded as a smaller 
medium-sized audit firm. Both these firms did, however, indicate that they planned on issuing a 
transparency report in the near future. 
The fact that only two of the nine auditing firms issued an integrated report could indicate that the 
firms were not yet ready to prepare such reports or alternatively, that they did not understand the 
purpose of these two reports. A suggestion could be made for auditing firms to combine these two 
reports to eliminate the duplication of information. One comprehensive report would add more 
value than two reports with duplicated information. This is also an indication that auditing firms 
need guidance, through a formalised corporate governance code, stating what information should 
be included in these reports. Such a code would also ensure consistency amongst the firms. 
In the sections below (section 6.2.2 – 6.2.7) the findings of the content analysis are discussed 




According to the FRC (2016), the objective of the leadership principle is for auditing firms to 
display effective management, which has responsibility and clear authority for running the firm. 
Leadership also expects the management of a firm to be accountable to the firm’s owners, with no 
individual holding unfettered powers of decision (FRC, 2016). 
Findings 




Yes % No % Total Total % 
Available on the website A.1.2. 4 57.14 3 42.86 7 100 
EXCO information disclosed in transparency 
report 
A.1.1. 7 100.00 0 0.00 7 100 
Oversight board information disclosed in 
transparency report 
A.1.1. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.2 first indicates the platform used to publish the transparency reports. Four auditing firms 
published their transparency reports on their websites while three of the firms had to be emailed 
to request the transparency reports. 
From the analysis of the transparency reports, it was found that seven of the auditing firms 
disclosed information about an EXCO but only two disclosed information about an oversight 
board. 
Literature and deduction 
As stated in the literature review, according to the IoDSA (2016), corporate governance is 
characterised by ethical and effective leadership. It requires those charged with governance to 
exemplify ethical leadership in discharging their responsibilities by demonstrating high levels of 
integrity, objectivity, competence, responsibility, accountability, fairness and transparency. At the 
same time, however, corporate governance requires those charged with governance to lead their 
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companies towards the achievement of strategic objectives (IoDSA, 2016). Maseko (2015) adds 
that the boundaries of accepted behaviour for societies and organisations are set by effective 
leadership and corporate governance. 
From the above discussion, it can be deduced that all auditing firms appointed an EXCO, and 
disclosed information about the EXCO in their transparency reports. The EXCO refers to the 
executive committee of the audit firm, and the members are selected from the partners of the firm. 
As stated in Chapter 4, a partner must be a qualified chartered accountant (CA(SA)), and registered 
with the SAICA and the IRBA (Deloitte, 2019). These appointment of INEDs to the EXCO can 
be challenging; very few auditing firms (only two) disclosed information about their oversight 
board. The oversight board is where the auditing firms appoint the INEDs, who ensure oversight 
and governance of the firm. Due to the difficulty of appointing INEDs in auditing firms, it is 
concluded that few auditing firms have appointed these independent boards. This could also be an 
indication that the auditing firms are waiting for reform in terms of the APA and additional 
guidance on how to appoint and implement more independent members in the firms.  
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate the leadership provisions that are disclosed with reference to the 
EXCO and the oversight board. 
Findings 
Table 6.3 Leadership disclosure about the EXCO 
Is the following be disclosed in the 
transparency report about the EXCO? 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Duties A.1.2. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Decisions made A.1.2. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Job titles A.1.3. 3 42.86 4 57.14 7 100 
Election and appointment A.1.3. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Terms A.1.3. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Length of service A.1.3. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Meeting attendance A.1.3. 0 0 7 100.00 7 100 
Biographical details  A.1.3. 0 0 7 100.00 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.3 illustrate the information disclosed by the auditing firms with reference to the EXCO. It 
indicates that two firms disclosed the duties of the EXCO members and one firm disclosed the 
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decisions that were made by the EXCO members. Three auditing firms disclosed the job titles of 
their EXCO members. One firm disclosed information about the election and appointment of their 
EXCO members. One firm disclosed the terms of their EXCO members. Only two firms disclosed 
information about the length of service of their EXCO members. None of the firms disclosed 
information about meeting attendance or any biographical details of their EXCO members. 
Table 6.4 Leadership disclosure about the oversight board 
Is the following be disclosed in the 





Yes % No % Total Total % 
Duties A.1.2. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Decisions made A.1.2. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Job titles A.1.3. 3 42.86 4 57.14 7 100 
Election and appointment A.1.3. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Terms A.1.3. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Length of service A.1.3. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Meeting attendance A.1.3. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Biographical details  A.1.3. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.4 presents the information disclosed by the auditing firms about oversight boards. The 
table illustrates that two firms disclosed the duties of the oversight board members and two firms 
disclosed the decisions that were made by the oversight board members. Three firms disclosed the 
job titles of their oversight board members, one firm disclosed information about election and 
appointment of board members and one firm disclosed the terms of their board members. Two 
firms disclosed information about length of service while only one firm disclosed information 
about meeting attendance and the biographical details of its oversight board members. 
Deduction 
The above findings are proof that more structure and guidance should be provided to auditing firms 
with regards to leadership disclosure in the transparency reports. The firms disclosed very little 
information about their EXCO and oversight board and there were inconsistencies between the 
firms in terms of the information that was disclosed. This makes it difficult for the users of reports, 
as there is no standardisation of information that should be disclosed. Once again, it seems that 
auditing firms are willing to disclose information about their EXCO and oversight boards, but the 
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According to the FRC (2016), the objective of the value principle is that auditing firms should 
perform quality work by exercising judgment and upholding the values of integrity, objectivity, 
confidentiality and due care. They should exercise professional competence and behaviour in a 
way that properly takes the public interest into consideration and meets auditing and ethical 
standards. A firm should also maintain a culture of openness which encourages people to consult 
and share problems, knowledge and experience in order to produce quality work (FRC, 2016). 
Findings 





Yes % No % Total Total % 
Code of conduct on website B.1.3. 5 71.43 2 28.57 7 100 
Discloses on the website to whom the code of 
conduct is applicable? 
B.1.3. 5 71.43 2 28.57 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.5 shows that five auditing firms disclosed their code of conduct on their website, also 
indicating to whom the code of conduct was applicable. 
Literature and deduction 
As stated in the literature review, Sikka (2003) contends that audit failures are often the result of 
poor values prevalent in auditing firms. This view is supported by Peiter Koornhof of Allan Gray 
(an investment management company in South Africa), who states that major crises usually reflect 
a governance breakdown at multiple layers (Crotty, 2019). Sikka (2003) suggests that any reform 
of auditing and accountancy should bring about a major change in the values that govern auditing 
firms. 
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According to the IoDSA (2016), King IV is resolute in reinforcing the idea that corporate 
governance should be seen as a holistic set of principles that embrace ethical leadership, attitude, 
mindset and behaviour. The literature supports the notion that corporate governance guidelines for 
auditing firms would assist the firms in governing with the necessary values. 
The empirical findings illustrate that auditing firms do disclose information about their codes of 
conduct and the values that govern the firms. However, the concerns stem from the application of 
these values. Due to the lack of a formal corporate governance code for auditing firms, these values 
differ from one firm to a next, thus creating inconsistencies. Once again, it is submitted that the 
values that govern the auditing firms should be formalised through specific guidelines or a 
corporate governance code for auditing firms. 
6.2.4 Independent non-executive directors (INED) 
Objective 
According to the FRC (2016), a firm should appoint INEDs to its governance structure whose 
involvement would collectively enhance the firm’s efforts to meet the principles of a corporate 
governance code. The INEDs’ duty of care is to the firm (FRC, 2016). The following principles 
were analysed through the checklist in order to establish whether the INED principles were already 
being applied to some extent in South African auditing firms. The reader is reminded that the study 
focused on South African governance structures; thus, global oversight boards were not analysed. 
Tables 6.6 to 6.9 indicate the information that the auditing firms disclosed about their INEDs. The 
principle of INEDs comprises separate provisions, including involvement of INEDs, disclosure of 
INEDs, characteristics of INEDs and the rights and responsibilities of INEDs. Tables 6.6 to 6.9 




Table 6.6 Involvement of INEDs: Content analysis 
  
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Consists of majority of INEDs? C.1.1. 0 0 7 100 7 100 
Has at least three INEDs?  C.1.1. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Discloses reasons for not having at least three 
INEDs? 
C.1.1. 0 0 7 100 7 100 
Has a majority of INEDs who are members of other 
relevant governance structures in the firm? 
C.1.1. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.7 Disclosure about INEDs: Content analysis 
 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Appointment, retirement and resignation of 
INEDs 
C.1.2. 1 14.29 6 85.7 7 100 
Remuneration of INEDs C.1.2. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Duties of INEDs C.1.2. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
INEDs’ discharge of duties C.1.2. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Firm support for INEDs C.1.2. 1 14.29 6 85.7 7 100 
How the firm positioned INEDs C.1.2. 3 42.86 4 57.14 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.8 Characteristics of INEDs: Content analysis 
 Ref to UK Code Yes % No % Total Total % 
Has INEDs who have skills and experience in 
audit 
C.2. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Has INEDs who are competent in 
auditing/accounting 
C.2.1. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
How INEDs impact on independence C.2.1. 1 14.29 6 85.7 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
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Table 6.9 Rights and responsibilities of INEDs: Content analysis 
 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Discloses on its website procedures for dealing with any 
fundamental disagreement? 
C.3.6. 0 0 7 100 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.6 on the involvement of INEDs shows that none of the auditing firms had an oversight 
board that consisted of a majority of INEDs. Two of the auditing firms appointed at least three 
INEDs to their oversight boards. The five auditing firms that did not have at least three INEDs did 
not disclosed on their website why this was so. Only two of the auditing firms had a majority of 
INEDs who were members of other relevant governance structures in the firm. 
Table 6.7 on the disclosure about INEDs shows that only one of the auditing firms disclosed the 
appointment, retirement, resignation, remuneration and duties of INEDs, how they discharged their 
duties and how the auditing firms supported the INEDs in this regard. The table illustrates that 
three of the auditing firms disclosed how the firms positioned the INEDs within the firm. 
Table 6.8 on the characteristics of the INEDs reveals that two of the auditing firms had INEDs on 
their oversight boards with skills and experience in audit, and who were competent in the field of 
auditing and accounting. One only firm disclosed how its INEDs contributed to their 
independence. 
Table 6.9 on the rights and responsibilities on INEDs indicated that none of the auditing firms 
disclosed procedures for dealing with any fundamental disagreement on their websites. 
Literature and deduction 
According to SAAPTI (2020), South African auditing firms should improve their governance 
structures through the appointment of an independent oversight board that is mainly concerned 
with the governance and oversight of the executive management and the audit firm. Nkuhlu (2020) 
strongly contends that auditing firms should appoint INEDs to provide more effective oversight. 
A study by Uzun, Szewczyk and Varma (2004) examined how the occurrence of fraud was 
influenced by the company’s governance features and various characteristics of the EXCO. The 
study results indicated that the structure of committees and the composition of the EXCO had a 
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significant effect on the occurrence of corporate fraud. The study found that the more INEDs on 
the board, the less likely the occurrence of corporate fraud. 
According to the FRC (2010), the appointment of INEDs in auditing firms reflects the belief that 
regulation is not a replacement for effective governance but rather, that good governance supports 
regulation in the promotion of audit quality (FRC, 2010). At present, the corporate structures of 
auditing firms are flawed. Some auditing firms argue that they do not need to comply with the 
codes of corporate governance as their business model is based on ‘partnership’ (Aberian, 2019). 
According to Nkuhlu (2020), all auditing firms need to appoint INEDs and place risk and ethics 
under their oversight. 
As stated in Chapter 2, the empirical study aims to provide guidelines on corporate governance 
practices and oversight structures for auditing firms in South Africa (based on the stakeholder 
theory and a two-tiered board structure), with principles that are specifically relevant to auditing 
firms. As the UK Code is currently the only audit firm-specific code in the world, the principles 
and provisions of this code were used in the checklist. This ensured that the checklist contained 
requirements that were relevant to auditing firms. Because of the APA, which only allows for 
registered auditors to be partners and shareholders of auditing firms, and members of the EXCO, 
it is not possible for auditing firms to appoint INEDs to their EXCO. Thus, there is a need for 
auditing firms to establish an independent oversight board. This results in auditing firms applying 
a two-tier board structure. By applying such a structure through the appointment of an oversight 
board, firms can still adhere to the APA and implement an independent governance structure. 
It does seem from the above findings that very few auditing firms have implemented South African 
oversight boards. As stated earlier, only two firms have such boards, and of these, it seems that 
only one firm has implemented some of the INED principles and provisions, as stated in the UK 
Audit Firm Governance Code. The lack of independence and independent oversight of auditing 





According to the FRC (2016), the objective of the operations principles is that a firm should 
comply with professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements. 
Findings 





Yes % No % Total Total % 
Policies and procedures to manage conflicts of 
interest exist? 
D.1.3. 4 57.14 3 42.86 7 100 
Effectiveness of the internal control system? D.2.2. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Process followed in review performed? D.2.2. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Weaknesses in internal control system? D.2.2. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Actions to be taken to deal with weaknesses? D.2.2. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
How the firm will support its commitment to 
professionalism, openness and risk 
management? 
D.3. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Whistleblowing policies and procedures? D.4. 6 85.71 1 14.29 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.10 presents the information the auditing firms disclosed on their operations. Four of the 
firms disclosed information about policies and procedures to manage conflicts of interest. Only 
two firms disclosed information about the effectiveness of their internal control systems as well as 
the process followed to review the effectiveness of internal control systems. Only two firms 
disclosed the weaknesses identified within their internal control systems, and the actions taken to 
address these. One firm disclosed how it supported its commitment to professionalism, openness 
and risk management. Six of the firms disclosed information about their whistleblowing policies 
and procedures. 
Literature and deduction 
According to the IRBA (2019), transparency reports provide consumers with information on the 
company’s commitment to audit quality, leadership, independence, culture, ethics, risk 
management procedures as well as employee and service provider relationships. The literature 
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reviewed on the Netherlands also found that the corporate governance code in that country requires 
information on the quality of risk management systems. The literature thus confirms that the 
disclosure of operations in auditing firms is important. When referring to corporate failures at 
auditing firms, Nkuhlu (2020) states that KPMG’s risk management failed the company. It can 
thus be argued that guidelines—issued through a corporate governance code for auditing firms in 
South Africa—could have mitigated corporate failures such as KPMG South Africa. 
From the empirical findings on operations disclosure, is it evident that most of the principles 
discussed above are not disclosed by the majority of the auditing firms. This is concerning since 
auditing firms should disclose to the public and all stakeholders how their risks are managed and 
whether their internal controls are effective. As auditing firms serve a large part of the public 
interest, it is important to maintain transparency in their disclosure about risks and internal 
controls. 
It should be noted that one audit firm had disclosed all of the above principles in its integrated 
report but not in its transparency report. This was therefore included in the findings as a ‘Yes’ with 
reference to the disclosure. 
6.2.6 Reporting 
Objective 
According to the FRC (2016), the objective of the reporting principle contained in the UK Audit 
Firm Governance Code is for the management of a firm to ensure that members of its governance 
structures, including owners and INEDs, are supplied with information in a timely manner, and in 
a form and of a quality to allow them to discharge their duties. The principle also requires auditing 
firms to report on their compliance and non-compliance with the relevant governance code and 
publish, on an annual basis in its transparency report, a commentary on the firm’s performance, 
position and prospects. 
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Findings 





Yes % No % Total Total % 
Includes a commentary on the firm’s 
performance, position and prospects 
E.3. 3 42.86 4 57.14 7 100 
Includes fair and balanced information E.3.2. 4 57.14 3 42.86 7 100 
Explains everything in an understandable 
manner 
E.3.2. 6 85.71 1 14.29 7 100 
Has an audit committee E.4.1. 3 42.86 4 57.14 7 100 
Has a risk committee E.4.1. 5 71.43 2 28.57 7 100 
Has a nomination committee E.4.1. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Has a remuneration committee E.4.1. 3 42.86 4 57.14 7 100 
Has an ethics committee E.4.1. 2 28.57 5 71.43 7 100 
Audit committee constituted according to 
King IV 
E.4.1. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Publishes audited financial statements E.5. 0 0 7 100 7 100 
Publishes audited financial statements 
prepared with the financial reporting 
framework 
E.5. 0 0 7 100 7 100 
Publishes audited financial statements that 
are clear and concise 
E.5. 0 0 7 100 7 100 
Explains who is responsible for preparing 
the financial statements 
E.5.1. 0 0 7 100 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.11 presents the information that the auditing firms disclosed on their reporting. This refers 
to the way that the information was reported, the committees that the auditing firms reported on as 
well as the publication of audited financial statements. 
Only three of the auditing firms included commentary on the firm’s performance, position and 
prospects. Four firms included information that was fair and balanced. Six of the firms explained 
their information in an understandable manner. 
With reference to committees, three of the auditing firms disclosed information about having an 
audit committee, five disclosed information about having a risk committee and two disclosed 
information about a nomination committee. Three of the firms disclosed information about a 
remuneration committee and two firms had ethics committees. Only one firm indicated that its 
audit committee was constituted according to the principles contained in King IV. 
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No evidence could be found of published audited financial statements nor was there any 
information regarding the reporting framework or who was responsible for preparing the financial 
statements. None of the firms disclosed that their financial statements were clear or concise. A 
further search was performed to determine whether the audited financial statements were possibly 
published on other platforms, however, no such evidence was found. 
Literature and deduction 
A study conducted by La Rosa, Caserio and Bernini (2018) found that investors are of the opinion 
that transparency reports provide meaningful information about audit firm quality and 
independence. According to the IRBA (2018), auditing firms are required to release transparency 
reports that provide information on certain elements of the firm and its operations. 
The objectives of the UK Audit Firm Governance Code are to ensure that auditing firms are seen 
as examples of best practice governance, to encourage changes in the governance of auditing firms 
and to enrich auditing firms’ transparency reports. Regulators and standard-setters maintain that 
transparency about the corporate governance of auditing firms will reduce information asymmetry 
between auditing firms and the public and will maintain a high quality audit service, thereby 
stabilising the capital market (Deumes, Schelleman, Bauwhede & Vanstraelen, 2012). 
In 2018, the IRBA issued a call to auditing firms to release transparency reports disclosing the 
relevant internal information to the public. Such transparency reports are voluntary in South Africa 
(IRBA, 2018) and have been mandated only in a few countries. The majority of the research that 
is available was conducted in Europe where auditing firms have been subject to mandatory 
transparency reporting requirements since 2008 (Deumes et al., 2012; Pivac & Čular 2012). 
The IAASB (2014) states that audit firm transparency reports assist third parties, such as the public 
and users of the audited financial statements, to understand the characteristics of individual 
auditing firms as well as the drivers of audit quality in those firms. They add that auditing firms 
can display to the public their approach to audits, thereby competing on aspects of audit quality 
(Deumes et al., 2012). The call for greater transparency and disclosure by auditing firms is further 
justified by high-profile audit firm failures (e.g. the demise of Arthur Andersen) and the lack of 
confidence in the financial markets in the post-global financial crisis era (Huddart, 2013). 
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To improve corporate governance, it is suggested that various committees be formulated within 
the organisations (Dedman, 2016). One-tier boards also often use board committees, such as audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees, to improve their corporate governance (Bendixen & 
Thomas, 2000; Maassen, 1999). Nkuhlu (2020) argues that individuals in auditing firms play an 
important role. 
As stated above by the IoDSA (2016), transparency is an important element of corporate 
governance. According to the FRC (2019), it is critical that investors are able to assess the 
governance approach applied in an audit firm. Reporting on governance would cover the 
implementation of the principles of the relevant code with regard to the company's specific 
circumstances, how the board defined the mission and strategy of the company, reached targets 
and achieved results through its decisions (FRC, 2019). Corporate governance reporting should 
also relate coherently to other parts of the annual report so that shareholders can effectively assess 
the quality of the company’s governance arrangements and the board’s activities and contributions 
(FRC, 2019). In addition to providing stakeholder information, reporting promotes transparency 
and ensures that leadership reflects the primary governance and performance concerns it addresses 
(FRC, 2016). 
The FRC believes that companies should review their transparency reports to provide information 
that is more applicable to investors, regulators and other stakeholders. In particular, companies 
applying the UK Audit Firm Governance Code should ensure that their report is fair, reasonable 
and comprehensible, and that it should include, among others, a description of how the EXCO and 
the INEDs worked throughout the year to fulfil the principles of the Code. 
From the above empirical findings, only two of the provisions were implemented by the majority 
of the auditing firms. The findings on the understandability of the information in the reports could 
be subjective, and in this study, the assessment was based merely on the opinion of the researcher. 
Each user of the transparency reports of the auditing firms may have a different opinion. It was 
pleasing to see that five of the auditing firms disclosed information about having a risk committee. 
The other principles were not implemented by most of the auditing firms, which raises concerns. 
Once again, this could be due to the fact that there are no specific guidelines for auditing firms, 
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explaining what information should be included in transparency reports as well as which 
committees should be established. 
The fact that none of the auditing firms published its audited financial statements is also a concern. 
The public interest that these firms serve has no insights into the financial information of these 
firms. This too is something that could be addressed though formal guidelines for auditing firms. 
6.2.7 Dialogue 
Objective 
According to the FRC (2016), the dialogue principle in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code seeks 
to ensure that auditing firms engage in dialogue with listed company shareholders as well as listed 
companies and their audit committees. The aim is to enhance mutual communication and 
understanding and make sure that the firm keeps in touch with shareholder opinion, issues and 
concerns. 
Findings 




Yes % No % Total Total % 
Discloses policies and procedures for dialogue with 
listed company shareholders and listed companies? 
F.1.1. 3 42.86 4 57.14 7 100 
Discloses the nature and extent of the involvement 
of INEDs in the dialogue? 
F.1.1. 1 14.29 6 85.71 7 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.12 presents the information that the auditing firms disclosed on dialogue. Three firms 
disclosed policies and procedures for dialogue with listed company shareholders and listed 
companies. Only one firm disclosed the nature and extent of the involvement of the INEDs’ in the 
dialogue 
Literature and deduction 
The term ‘governance’ refers to the relationships between directors, shareholders, managers and 
sometimes employees (Aziri, 2014). The FRC (2019) maintains that a company’s culture should 
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be responsive to all stakeholders and shareholders, and should promote integrity and openness. 
Rossouw (2005) concurs, stating that the governing body is obliged to be accountable to 
stakeholders and shareholders. 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the auditing firms failed to disclose appropriate 
information with reference to the dialogue principle. The literature states that governance includes 
communication and involvement with shareholders and stakeholders. It is thus important that the 
auditing firms have regular dialogue with these parties and disclose the relevant information in 
their transparency report. 
6.2.8 Conclusion 
This section discussed the qualitative findings from the content analysis of the transparency reports 
and integrated reports of the top nine auditing firms in South Africa. Based on the findings, it can 
be concluded that the disclosure of the corporate governance information in the transparency 
reports and integrated reports was not always of the quality and quantity that would be expected 
of reputable companies. 
The lack of disclosure reduces the reliance that stakeholders can place on the corporate governance 
of the auditing firms. This undermines public trust in the profession. The minimal disclosure by 
auditing firms confirms that auditing firms are not aware of the information they should be 
disclosing in their transparency reports. Consequently, there is a clear need for guidelines about 
the disclosure that is expected of auditing firms. Formal guidelines or a code would ensure that 
auditing firms disclose the right information in a consistent manner. 
As can be gathered from the questionnaires administered to the CEOs of the top nine auditing 
firms in South Africa (discussed below in section 6.3), auditing firms appear to have done more 
with regards to corporate governance than the information they have disclosed in their 
transparency reports. This lack of quality and inconsistent disclosure can have negative 
repercussions for the auditing firms and the auditing profession as a whole. 
In section 6.3, the quantitative findings are examined in greater detail. The triangulation model 
compares the qualitative and quantitative findings in section 6.4. 
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6.3 Questionnaires 
The following section describes the results of the questionnaires that were completed by the CEOs 
of the top nine auditing firms. A 100% response rate was obtained for the survey. 
The questionnaire consisted of two parts. The first part asked the participants about their current 
practice at their audit firm while the second part asked their expert opinion on a Corporate 
Governance Code for South African auditing firms (see Annexure N for the questionnaire). The 
findings from the questionnaire were also categorised according to the six principles contained in 
the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. 
6.3.1 Leadership 
Objective 
The objective of these questions was to establish whether large and medium auditing firms in 
South Africa apply the provisions of the leadership principle, as contained in the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code. An additional question was asked about the application of King IV. The CEOs 
were also asked to provide their expert opinions and commentary after each question. 
Findings 
Table 6.13 Leadership application in auditing firms 
Application in the firm 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
EXCO A.1.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Oversight board A.1.1. 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Issues a transparency report A.1.2. 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Issues an integrated report A.1.2. 3 33.30 6 66.70 9 100 
Governance disclosure in transparency report A.1.2. 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Performance evaluations  A.1.4. 6 66.70 3 33.30 9 100 
Terms of reference (TOR) for the EXCO A.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
TOR for EXCO with authority over whole 
firm 
A.2.1. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
TOR disclosed on website A.2.1. 2 22.20 7 77.80 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
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Table 6.13 presents the current practice of the leadership principle and provisions at the auditing 
firms. It can be seen that all the auditing firms indicated that they had an EXCO although only 
seven had an oversight board. Interestingly, seven of the firms indicated that they issued 
transparency reports, which is in line with the amount of transparency reports that were identified 
and analysed for the content analysis. Three auditing firms indicated that they issued integrated 
reports, which contradicts the only two integrated reports that were found for the content analysis. 
Seven of the auditing firms indicated that they disclosed governance information in their 
transparency reports. Six stated that they provided information on performance evaluations of the 
members of the governance structure in their transparency report. Eight of the firms indicated that 
they had terms of reference for the EXCO, which included clear authority over the whole firm and 
its non-audit business. It is concerning that only two of the firms disclosed their terms of reference 
on their website. 
Deduction 
The findings of the content analysis and the questionnaire contradict each other. From the content 
analysis, it was found that two auditing firms had appointed oversight boards, yet in the 
questionnaires, seven of the auditing firms indicated that they had oversight boards. It could be 
that the auditing firms had appointed the oversight boards, but had not made the necessary 
disclosure in their transparency report. All the firms stated that they had implemented the necessary 
terms of reference, but only two disclosed this information on their website. Once again, there are 
inconsistencies between the firms with regards to disclosure, which could be eliminated through 
formal guidelines or a code. 
The CEOs made the following comments on the terms of reference: 
“The terms of reference is [sic] part of our partnership agreement and Africa JV agreement.” 
“Not sure if the terms of reference is [sic] on the website.” 
“Largely due to the recent restructuring, we are in the process of establishing the frameworks 
etc.” 
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The following question sought to establish whether the auditing firms applied some or none of the 
principles contained in King IV. Specifically, the question asked the extent to which the auditing 
firms had implemented corporate governance principles. 
Table 6.14: Application of King IV principles in auditing firms 
 Some % None % Total Total % 
Application of King IV 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Source: CEO questionnaire (SPSS output) 
Table 6.14 reveals that seven of the auditing firms’ oversight board had applied some of the 
principles of King IV. Two of the firms did not have an oversight board, thus indicating that they 
did not apply any of the King IV principles. 
From the additional comments received below, it is clear that one audit firm was applying more 
principles than some of the other firms. The CEO stressed that most of the principles had been 
applied. Three other auditing firms made the following comments: 
“We do not have an independent board member and a Lead Director, however, all other 
principles are followed.” 
“Most of the principles, not only some.” 
“The independent members are not in the majority.” 
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Table 6.15 provides the expert opinions of the CEOs on the leadership principle. 
Expert opinions 
Table 6.15 Disclosure in the transparency report about leadership 
Should the following be disclosed in the 
transparency report? 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Duties A.1.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Decisions made A.1.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Job titles A.1.3. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Election and appointment A.1.3. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Terms A.1.3. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Length of service A.1.3. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Meeting attendance A.1.3. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Biographical details  A.1.3. 9 100 0  9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.15 reflects the expert opinions of the CEOs of the top nine auditing firms and their opinion 
on the type of information which should be disclosed in the transparency reports about their 
oversight board. The feedback was very positive as eight of the CEOs indicated that auditing firms 
should disclose the duties, decisions, terms, length of service and meeting attendance for the 
members of the oversight board. All firms believed that the job titles and election and appointment 
methods of the members of the oversight board should be disclosed. 
Deductions 
The above findings indicate that auditing firms understand the importance of disclosing relevant 
governance information in their transparency reports. The majority (88.9%) of the CEOs indicated 
that leadership provisions should be disclosed in the auditing firms’ transparency reports. Even 
though the firms did not disclose this information at present, the CEOs were of the opinion that 
the information should be disclosed. A formalised code or corporate governance guidelines would 
assist in the proper disclosure of such information by all auditing firms. 
The CEOs of the auditing firms made the following comments: 
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“All of the above are critical information for transparency reasons.” 
“King IV, might not be entirely applicable to [the] audit firm environment and structure.” 
6.3.2 Values 
Objective 
The objective of these questions was to determine whether auditing firms apply the values 
principle and provisions contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. The CEOs were also 
asked for their expert opinions on the provisions in the Code. 
Findings 
Table 6.16 Application of values in auditing firms 
Application in the firm 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
KPIs for performance  B.1.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Code of conduct on website? B.1.3. 6 66.70 3 33.30 9 100 
Discloses on the website to whom the code of 
conduct is applicable? 
B.1.3. 6 66.70 3 33.30 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.16 indicates the application of the value principle and provisions within the auditing firms. 
Eight of the auditing firms indicated that they had introduced KPIs for the performance of their 
governance system. Six firms indicated that they disclosed their code of conduct on their website 
and stated to whom the code applicable. 
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Expert opinions 
Table 6.17 Responsibilities of the oversight board with reference to the value principle 
Should the oversight board: 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Upholds values of objectivity? B.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Considers public interest? B.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Complies with relevant standards? B.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Promotes ethical culture? B.1.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Assists with achieving an ethical culture? B.1.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Oversees compliance with a code of conduct? B.1.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Commits itself to a corporate governance code? B.2. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Incorporates the principles of a corporate governance 
code into the internal code of conduct? 
B.2.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Maintains a culture of openness? B.3. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Provides oversight? B.3. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
In Table 6.17, the findings represent the expert opinions of the CEOs on the application of the 
value principle. It is pleasing to see that all the auditing firms concurred that the oversight board 
should implement and practice all the principles mentioned above. 
Deductions 
The findings on the values principle were very positive. The application within the auditing firms 
was excellent, and the fact that the CEOs all agreed on the responsibilities that the oversight board 
should have with regards to values indicate that the firms understood the importance of these 
provisions. It is also an indication that the auditing firms were willing to implement such 
provisions should a corporate governance code for auditing firms be developed in future. 
The CEOs of the auditing firms made the following comments: 
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“The oversight board should play a monitoring role, and should only take the lead when EXCO 
is not fulfilling its mandate in respect of the established Terms of Reference. A variety of 
committees such as Social and Ethics, Compliance and Governance, cover some of the matters 
raised above. Our experience is that additional layers of governance which may duplicate 
responsibilities will squeeze profitability even further, resulting in the auditing profession 
continuing to be an unattractive option for new entrants.” 
“The above answers are provided on the basis that an oversight is mandatory for auditing 
firms—I am however of the opinion that the leadership of auditing firms are able to implement 
the required governance structures.” 
“The oversight board can be valuable also in helping with restoring trust in the entire 
profession.” 
“The oversight structure for an audit practice will have its nuances given that the shareholders 
are the partners in the firm (no external Investors). Serving public interest is the key priority. 
We support the Audit Quality Board as recommended by SAAPTI.” 
“Auditing firms serve public interest and must therefore be governed the same as other PIEs.” 
“Code of conduct monitoring is executive management’s responsibility; oversight board needs 
to make sure that executives do that.” 
6.3.3 Independent non-executive directors 
Objective 
The objective of these questions was to determine firstly the application of the ‘independent non-
executive’ principle as contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. Secondly, it was also 
important to obtain the expert opinions of the CEOs on the INED provisions. These opinions are 
presented in the tables below. 
205 
Findings 
Table 6.18 Application of INED principle in auditing firms 
Application in the firm 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Independent members on the oversight board? C.1. 2 22.20 7 77.80 9 100 
Indemnity insurance? C.3.4. 6 66.70 3 33.30 9 100 
Disclose on its website procedures for dealing with 
any fundamental disagreement? 
C.3.6. 1 11.10 8 88.90 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.18 provides the findings on the appointment of INEDs to the oversight board of auditing 
firms. It was found that two of the auditing firms had appointed INEDs while six indicated that 
they had indemnity insurance in place in case of legal action against any INEDs. It seems that 
more auditing firms have implemented this precaution even though they may not yet have 
appointed the INEDs. It is concerning to see that only one audit firm disclosed on its website the 
procedures that should be taken for dealing with any fundamental disagreements between the 
INEDs and the firm’s management team or governance structures. 
Expert opinions 
The principle of INED is divided into four different sections, namely, (i) involvement of INEDs, 
(ii) disclosure of INEDs, (iii) characteristics of INEDs and (iv) rights and responsibilities of 
INEDs. As there are many provisions within this principle, the findings are presented according to 
these four sections as depicted in Tables 6.19 to 6.22. 
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Table 6.19 Involvement of INEDs: Expert opinion of CEOs 
With reference to the INEDs on the oversight 
board 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Consists of majority of INEDs? C.1.1. 1 11.10 8 88.90 9 100 
Has at least three INEDs?  C.1.1. 3 33.30 6 66.70 9 100 
Has INEDs who oversee public interest matters? C.1.1. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Has a majority of INEDs who are members of other 
relevant governance structures in the firm? 
C.1.1. 3 33.30 6 66.70 9 100 
Has INEDs who report on risk and audit quality?  C.1.1. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.19 represents the findings on the involvement of INEDs in the audit firm. Interestingly, 
only one CEO believed that the oversight board should consist of a majority of INEDs while three 
CEOs stated that the oversight board should consist of at least three INEDs. Eight CEOs indicated 
that the oversight board should have INEDs who oversaw public interest matters. Three CEOs 
believed that the oversight board should have a majority of INEDs who were also members of 
other relevant governance structures in the firm. Eight CEOs indicated that the oversight board 
should have INEDs who reported on risk and audit quality. 
Table 6.20 Disclosure about INEDs: Expert opinion of CEOs 
With reference to the INEDs on the oversight 
board 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Appointment, retirement and resignation of 
INEDs 
C.1.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Remuneration of INEDs C.1.2. 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Duties of INEDs C.1.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
INEDs discharge of duties C.1.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Firm support to INEDs C.1.2. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
How the firm positioned INEDs C.1.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.20 presents the information that should be disclosed about the INEDs on the oversight 
board. Eight CEOs believed that the appointment, retirement and resignation of the INEDs should 
be disclosed, seven believed that the remuneration of the INEDs should be disclosed and eight 
believed that the duties and how INEDs discharged their duties should be disclosed. All the CEOs 
concurred that auditing firms should disclose how they supported INEDs in discharging their 
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duties. Eight CEOs believed that firms should disclose how they positioned INEDs, either on the 
EXCO or on the oversight board. 
Table 6.21 Characteristics of INEDs: Expert opinion of CEOs 
With reference to the INEDs on the oversight 
board 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Has INEDs who command respect from owners C.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Has INEDs who enhance shareholder 
confidence 
C.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Has INEDs who have skills and experience in 
audit 
C.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Has INEDs who are competent in 
auditing/accounting 
C.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
INEDs’ impact on independence C.2.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.21 presents the opinion of CEOs about the characteristics that INEDs on the oversight 
board should possess. Eight of the CEOs strongly believed that the INEDs should command 
respect from the owners of the auditing firms, enhance shareholder confidence, have experience 
and skills in audit and should be competent in auditing and/or accounting. All the CEOs agreed 
that the audit firm should have criteria for assessing the impact of the INEDs on the firms’ 
independence as auditors and their independence from the firm and its owners. 
Table 6.22 Rights and responsibilities of INEDs: Expert opinion of CEOs 
With reference to the INEDs on the oversight 
board 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
INEDs: Have rights  C.3. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
INEDs: Have right to access information C.3. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
INEDs: Have right to access people C.3. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
INEDs: Have contract with their rights and 
duties 
C.3.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
INEDs: Be appointed for specific time C.3.2. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
INEDs: Review of independence C.3.2. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
INEDs: Oversee policies and procedures C.3.3. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
INEDs: Maintain firm reputation C.3.3. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
INEDs: Reduce risk of audit failure C.3.3. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
INEDs: Provided with authority C.3.4. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
INEDs: Provided with resources C.3.4. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
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Table 6.22 presents the opinions of the CEOs on the rights and responsibilities that INEDs on 
oversight boards should have. It is pleasing to see that all the CEOs agreed about the rights and 
responsibilities of INEDs. Only one CEO disagreed with the provision that INEDs should be 
tasked with reducing the risk of audit firm failure. 
Deductions 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the majority of the CEOs agreed about the importance 
of the provisions in the INED principle. The main disagreement regarded the ‘involvement of the 
INEDs’ provision. It can be seen that the majority of the CEOs did not believe that the oversight 
board should consist of a majority of INEDs, only three CEOs believed that the oversight board 
should consist of at least three INEDs and that the majority of the oversight board should consist 
of INEDs. The negative response to these provisions could be due to the fact that it is very difficult 
for auditing firms to identify and appoint individuals who are fully independent, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
The CEOs of the auditing firms made the following comments: 
Characteristics of INEDs: 
“In a partnership set-up, it is still important to have [a] majority [of] independent executive 
members due to the nature of the practice.” 
“Auditing firms do not have external investors; the objective must be to create oversight 
structures that ensure the firm is focused on serving Public Interest, High Quality Audits, Strong 
Ethics and Culture.” 
“We should not be dogmatic about absolute number of non-executive directors.” 
Rights and responsibilities of INEDs: 
“Should an independent non-exec have to rely on laws and regulations to access information 
and people, then the firm should consider whether they are ready for this type of governance. It 
should be available freely and willingly.” 
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“Non-executive members of the oversight board can be helpful in restoring the trust in the 
profession.” 
“Independent non-executive directors should have same rights and duties as those of PIEs.” 
“We currently do not have a legal framework for oversight board.” 
6.3.4 Operations 
The operations principle is explained in three separate tables because the responses in the 
questionnaire were different for some questions. The first two tables illustrate the current practice 
in the audit firm while the last table illustrates the expert opinions of the CEOs regarding the 
operations principle. 
Objective 
The objective of these questions was to determine whether the EXCO of the auditing firms applied 
and practised the operations principle and provisions as contained in the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code. The questionnaire also sought the expert opinion of the CEOs of the auditing 
firms on the provisions in the Code. 
Findings 
Table 6.23 EXCO operations in auditing firms 
Application in the firm by EXCO 






































Total Total % 
Maintaining a sound system of internal control D.2. 8 1 0 9 100 
Maintaining a sound system of risk management D.2. 8 1 0 9 100 
Annual review of the system of internal control? D.2.1. 5 3 1 9 100 
INEDs reviewing all material controls D.2.1. 3 1 5 9 100 
INEDs promoting an appropriate culture D.2.1. 2 2 5 9 100 
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Disclosure: Effectiveness of the internal control system D.2.2. 4 2 3 9 100 
Disclosure: Weaknesses in internal control system? D.2.2. 2 4 3 9 100 
Disclosure: Actions to be taken to deal with weaknesses D.2.2. 2 4 3 9 100 
Assessment of the principal risks D.2.3. 7 2 0 9 100 
Policies and procedures for managing people D.3. 9 0 0 9 100 
Disclosure: How does the firm support its commitment to 
professionalism, openness and risk management? 
D.3. 6 2 1 9 100 
Establishing whistleblowing policies and procedures? D.4. 8 1 0 9 100 
Disclosure: Whistleblowing policies and procedures D.4. 6 2 1 9 100 
Reporting whistleblowing issues to INEDs D.4.1. 2 1 6 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.23 indicates that eight of the auditing firms maintained a sound system of internal control 
and risk management over the operations of the firm. Only five of the firms conducted an annual 
review of the effectiveness of the system of internal control, to a large extent and three firms to a 
lesser extent. One firm stated that it was totally ineffective, thus no annual review was conducted. 
With reference to independence, only three auditing firms had INEDs who reviewed the material 
controls in the audit firm. One firm stated that this was done to a lesser extent, and the remaining 
five firms stated that this function was totally ineffective. Only two firms indicated that their 
INEDs promoted an appropriate culture which was underpinned by sound values and behaviour. 
Two firms indicated that this was done to a lesser extent, and five auditing firms indicated that this 
control was totally ineffective within their firms. 
Four auditing firms indicated that they disclosed in their transparency report that a review was 
performed on the effectiveness of the internal control system. Two firms disclosed this to a lesser 
extent, and three auditing firms not at all. Four auditing firms indicated that they disclosed in their 
transparency report which process was applied to perform a review of the effectiveness of the 
internal control system. Two firms disclosed this to a lesser extent, and three firms not at all. 
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Two auditing firms indicated that they disclosed in their transparency report the weaknesses that 
were identified in the review of the effectiveness of the internal control system. Four firms 
indicated that they disclosed this to a lesser extent, and three firms did not disclose this at all. 
Two firms indicated that they disclosed in their transparency report the actions that were taken to 
deal with weaknesses identified in the review of the internal control system. Four firms indicated 
that they disclosed this to a lesser extent but three firms did not disclose it at all. 
Seven auditing firms indicated that they carried out a robust assessment of the principal risks the 
audit firm was faced with, described the risks and explained how they were being managed. Two 
firms indicated that they did this to a lesser extent. All the firms also indicated that they applied 
policies and procedures for managing people across the whole firm. 
Six of the auditing firms indicated that they disclosed on their website how the firm supported its 
commitment to professionalism, openness and risk management. Two firms disclosed this to a 
lesser extent but one firm did not disclose this at all. 
Eight auditing firms indicated that they established whistleblowing policies and procedures, but 
only six disclosed the policies and procedures on their website to a large extent. Two firms 
disclosed this to a lesser extent and one firm did not disclose any whistleblowing policies and 
procedures. Two firms indicated that they reported to the INEDs on issues raised under the 
whistleblowing policies and procedures. One audit firm did this to a lesser extent but six did not 
do this at all—most probably because of a lack of INEDs in the firm. 
The CEOs of the auditing firms provided the following commentary on the above questions. Most 
of the comments addressed the presence of INEDs within the firm, once again highlighting the 
lack of independence in auditing firms. 
“The questions suggest that non-execs should be appointed to appropriate Boards. We have had 
this previously but IRBA were not in support of it.” 
“Our firm does not have any independent non-executive directors.” 
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“The process of appointing non-executive directors is underway and to be completed by end of 
June 2021.” 
“Many of the procedures mentioned above are dependent on the integration of our national firm, 
which is still in the early stages of development. We also do not have any independent directors 
on the governance council yet.” 
“The firm does not currently have non-executive directors. It does, however, have an 
independent chair of risk committee. The firm does not publish transparency report, it plans to 
do that from next year 2021. The global transparency report is, however, published on network.” 
“We do not have non exec directors.” 
Table 6.24 Application of operations principle in auditing firms 
Application in the firm 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Complies with professional standards and 
legal/regulatory requirements? 
D.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Operations promote audit quality D.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Policies and procedures for compliance D.1.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Policies and procedures for signing audit reports to 
comply with applicable standards 
D.1.2. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Policies and procedures for the reliance of other 
auditors’ work 
D.1.2. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Policies and procedures to manage conflicts of 
interest 
D.1.3. 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Takes action on concerns identified by audit 
regulators 
D.1.4. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
All the auditing firms indicated that they complied with professional standards and applicable legal 
and regulatory requirements; operated in a way that promoted audit quality and the reputation of 
the firm; established policies and procedures for complying with applicable legal and regulatory 
requirements; established policies and procedures for individuals signing audit reports to comply 
with applicable standards; established policies and procedures for the reliance on work performed 
by other auditors, whether from the same network or otherwise; and took action to address areas 
of concern identified by audit regulators in relation to the firm’s audit work. Only seven of the 
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firms stated how the audit firm applied policies and procedures to manage potential and actual 
conflicts of interest. 
Table 6.25 illustrates the expert opinion of the CEOs on the operations provisions. 
Expert opinions 
Table 6.25 Operations of the INEDs on the oversight board 
Should the INEDs of the oversight board: 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Be involved in reviewing people management 
policies and procedures to protect the public 
interest? 
D.3.2. 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
As shown in Table 6.25, eight CEOs agreed that INEDs on the oversight board should be involved 
in reviewing the policies and procedures to protect the public interest. 
Deductions 
From the above findings, the application of the operations principle and provisions was good. Even 
though some firms indicated that they were applying the provisions to a lesser extent, there was 
nonetheless some form of application. This could be improved with more structured guidelines, 
explaining what should be practised in the auditing firms. The two provisions that were not applied 
as desired dealt with the INEDs. The reason for the weak application of these provisions could be 
directly linked to the lack of INEDs in the auditing firms. It could therefore be argued that 
application would improve once more INEDs were appointed to the auditing firms. 
6.3.5 Reporting 
Objective 
The objective of these questions was to determine whether the auditing firms applied the reporting 
principle as contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. 
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Findings 
Table 6.26 Reporting of risks 











Total Total % 
Describing the risks and explaining how they are 
being managed or mitigated? 
E.3.1. 7 2 0 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.26 indicates that seven auditing firms carried out a robust assessment of the principal risks 
the firm was faced with, described the risks and explained how they were being mitigated. Two 
firms indicated that they did this to a lesser extent. 
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Table 6.27 Application of reporting principle in auditing firms 




Yes % No % Total Total % 
Supplies information in a timely manner E.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Supplies quality information E.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Includes a commentary on the firm’s 
performance, position and prospects 
E.3. 6 66.70 3 33.30 9 100 
Includes fair and balanced information E.3.2. 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Explains everything in an understandable 
manner 
E.3.2. 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Has an audit committee E.4.1. 3 33.30 6 66.70 9 100 
Has an audit committee which monitors 
the quality of external reporting 
E.4. 3 33.30 6 66.70 9 100 
Audit committee maintains relationship 
with firm’s auditors 
E.4. 3 33.30 6 66.70 9 100 
Discloses on website the audit 
committee’s membership details 
E.4.1. 1 11.10 8 88.90 9 100 
Has terms of reference for the audit 
committee 
E.4.1. 3 33.30 6 66.70 9 100 
Publishes how the audit committee 
discharge its duties 
E.4.1. 2 22.20 7 77.80 9 100 
Publishes audited financial statements E.5. 6 66.70 3 33.30 9 100 
Publishes audited financial statements 
prepared with the financial reporting 
framework 
E.5. 6 66.70 3 33.30 9 100 
Publishes audited financial statements 
that are clear and concise 
E.5. 6 66.70 3 33.30 9 100 
Explains who is responsible for preparing 
the financial statements 
E.5.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Auditors make a statement about their 
reporting responsibilities 
E.5.1. 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
States whether the firm adopts the going 
concern basis and identifies material 
uncertainties 
E.5.2. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.27 shows the current practice of the reporting principle in the auditing firms. It can be seen 
that all the firms supplied members of its governance structures, including owners and INEDs, 
with information in a timely manner and with quality information to enable them to discharge their 
duties. It can be seen that six of the auditing firms included a commentary on the firm’s 
performance, position and prospects, seven included fair and balanced information and conveyed 
information in an understandable manner in the transparency report. 
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Only three of the firms appointed an audit committee while six did not have an audit committee. 
The three auditing firms that did have an audit committee indicated that it monitored the quality 
of external reporting and maintained an appropriate relationship with the firm’s auditors. All three 
firms had terms of reference for their audit committee. Only one firm disclosed its audit committee 
membership details on the company website. Two firms published a description of how the audit 
committee discharged its duties on an annual basis. 
The CEOs of the auditing firms made the following comments: 
“We don’t have independent non-executive members on the audit committee yet.” 
“We operate in a partnership model and not that of a public company. The Board structure allows 
for the functions of audit committee.” 
“The internal finance committee plays role of audit committee as well.” 
Six auditing firms indicated that they published audited financial statements that were prepared in 
accordance with the recognised financial reporting framework, believing these to be clear and 
concise. All auditing firms explained who is responsible for preparing the financial statements. 
Seven of the firms indicated that auditors made a statement about their reporting responsibilities, 
in accordance with the extended audit report standards. All the auditing firms stated whether it was 
appropriate to adopt the going concern basis of accounting and identified any material uncertainties 
in its ability to continue to do so, with supporting assumptions or qualifications as necessary. 
The CEOs of the auditing firms made the following comments: 
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“The Annual Financial Statements are part of our Integrated Report.” 
“The firm is not a public company but a partnership. Financial statements are audited.” 
“We produce audited financial statements in South Africa, but they are not published locally. 
We do publish consolidated audited AFS for the global firm.” 
“Circulation of audited financial statements is limited to internal and business associates 
including banks it’s not for general public.” 
Deductions 
From the findings above, the provisions that were most concerning were those dealing with the 
audit committee. Only three of the auditing firms had appointed audit committees. From the 
responses given by the CEOs, it can be seen that some of the firms delegated the audit committee 
responsibilities and duties to the board or other committees in the firm. It is possible that the 
auditing firms do not understand the purpose and value that an audit committee can add to the firm. 
6.3.6 Dialogue 
Objective 
The objective of these questions was to obtain the expert opinions of the CEOs on the dialogue 
principle as contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. 
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Findings 
Table 6.28 Dialogue by the oversight board 
Should the oversight board (have): 
Ref to 
UK Code 
Yes % No % Total Total % 
Dialogue with listed company shareholders about 
corporate governance matters 
F.1. 5 55.6 4 44.4 9 100 
Enhance mutual communication and understanding 
with shareholders 
F.1. 9 100 0 0 9 100 
Disclose policies and procedures for dialogue with 
listed company shareholders and listed companies? 
F.1.1. 4 44.4 5 55.60 9 100 
Report on the dialogue the audit firm had during the 
year? 
F.1.1. 6 66.70 3 33.30 9 100 
Disclose the nature and extent of the involvement of 
INEDs in the dialogue? 
F.1.1. 4 44.4 5 55.60 9 100 
Dialogue with shareholders to enhance mutual 
communication and understanding? 
F.2. 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Dialogue about process of appointment and re-
appointment of auditors 
F.3. 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Source: SPSS output 
Table 6.28 presents the principles that the CEOs felt were most relevant for the oversight board 
and stakeholder inclusivity. Five of the CEOs believed that the oversight board should have 
dialogue with listed company shareholders about corporate governance matters. Four CEOs did 
not agree with this principle. All CEOs believed that the oversight board should enhance mutual 
communication and understanding to ensure that the audit firm kept in touch with shareholder 
opinion, issues and concerns. Only four of the CEOs believed that their policies and procedures 
for dialogue with listed company shareholders and listed companies should be disclosed on their 
website. However, six CEOs believed that the oversight board should report on the dialogue which 
the audit firm had during the year. Only four CEOs believed that the oversight board should 
disclose the nature and extent of the involvement of the INEDs in that dialogue. Lastly, seven 
CEOs believed that the oversight board should have dialogue with shareholders to enhance mutual 
communication and understanding as well as having dialogue with listed companies on the 
appointment and re-appointment of auditors and making considered use of votes in relation to such 
recommendations. 
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The CEOs of the auditing firms made the following comments: 
“Our firm is in regular contact with the ARC’s of both listed clients and listed targets of the firm 
with regard to a variety of matters related to quality, partner performance, firm capacity, 
resources and the like. It is not often that we engage with shareholders of listed clients.” 
“As Auditing firms we are bound by Independent rules and the terms of reference of the 
Independent members of Audit Quality Board have to be in line with our Independence 
obligations.” 
“We think engagement on matters of audit firm governance would be best directed at the audit 
committees of listed companies, rather than shareholders.” 
“It may not be practical to engage with shareholders as firm representative. Discussions with 
shareholders best handled at institutional levels.” 
Deductions 
The findings on the dialogue principle reveal that not all the auditing firms were in agreement. 
Although the auditing firms agreed that mutual communication and understanding with 
shareholders was important, not all concurred that policies and procedures should be disclosed and 
that the nature and extent of INEDs’ involvement in the dialogue should be disclosed. 
It is important that the auditing firms understand the value that such provisions would add to the 
users of the reports and the meaningful information that would be provided to the public, rather 
than seeing the reporting simply as an obligation. According to the IRBA (2018), auditing firms 
are required to release transparency reports that provide information on certain elements of the 
firm and its operations. It is submitted that specific guidelines on the above provisions would assist 
the firms in reporting in a consistent and complete manner, and that such guidelines would also 
explain the importance of reporting on dialogue to the auditing firms. 
Sections 6.3.7 to 6.3.12 discuss additional questions that were posed in the questionnaire which 
fell outside the principles and provisions of the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. These questions 
sought the expert opinion of the CEOs on a South African Audit Firm Governance Code, should 
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one be developed in the near future, as well as any concerns that should be taken into account 
when drafting such a code. 
6.3.7 ‘Apply and explain’ basis framework for South Africa 
Objective 
The objective of this question was to determine if the CEOs of the auditing firms believed that an 
‘apply and explain’ basis framework would be best-suited for South African auditing firms. 
Findings 
Table 6.29 Apply and explain framework 
 Yes % No % Total Total % 
Apply and explain framework 7 77.80 2 22.20 9 100 
Source: CEO questionnaire (SPSS output) 
Table 6.29 indicates that seven CEOs believed that an ‘apply and explain’ basis would be the most 
appropriate approach for an Audit Firm Governance Framework for South African auditing firms. 
The CEOs made the following comments on the above question: 
“The information published in the Transparency Reports of those firms who have published 
such a report vary significantly, suggesting that Governance Frameworks are equally varied. A 
consistent approach would allow direct comparisons to be made which would hopefully 
contribute to reduced market concentration as decision makers became more familiar with 
structures in place outside of the Big 4.” 
“Apply and explain promote [sic] transparency overall.” 
“This will enhance quality of reporting.” 
“Akin to the King IV Report.” 
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“This will ensure that firms are transparent and provide the reasons where there [sic] in non-
compliance.” 
“We believe the better approach would be rules-based. The differences in size and resources 
among the firms are too big and resource limitations could easily be used as an excuse for not 
fully applying many of the principles.” 
“Each firm is unique.” 
Literature and deductions 
According to the literature review, King IV applies the ‘apply and explain’ basis. The 16 principles 
can be adopted by any company and it is necessary to substantiate the practice of corporate 
governance (IoDSA, 2016). The required explanation gives effect to each principle and enables 
stakeholders to make an informed decision on whether a company is well governed or not. The 
explanation also helps in shifting the focus of companies from a compliance mindset to a 
qualitative mindset, which encourages the achievement of objectives through careful consideration 
of the entity’s circumstances (IoDSA, 2016; Piek, 2016). 
From the above discussion, it can be deduced that the majority of the auditing firms believe that 
an ‘apply and explain’ basis would be the most appropriate approach for auditing firms in South 
Africa. This is in line with the basis used in King IV, thus confirming that a sector supplement in 
future King developments would be acceptable to most of the large and medium-sized auditing 
firms. 
6.3.8 Difficulties in implementing an audit firm governance framework in South Africa 
Objective 
The objective of this question was to determine the difficulties with implementing an Audit Firm 
Governance Framework in South Africa, as expressed by the CEOs of the top nine auditing firms 
in South Africa. 
Findings 
The CEOs made the following comments on the above question: 
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“Lack of resources in firms outside the Big 4. In particular financial resources where the cost of 
audit quality has eroded profits. There may still be a large proportion of partners who believe in 
a partnership model rather than a corporate model and believe these governance structures are 
an overkill for a professional firm, which is run by the shareholders on a day to day basis.” 
“Auditing firms are largely privately owned entities despite the fact that they may have a public 
interest mandate.” 
“Limited pool of independent non-executive directors as well conflict of interest.” 
“Global Firm Management Structures will introduce certain limitations.” 
“The Auditing Profession Act. 2005 needs amendment as it does not allow for Independence. 
All Directors/Partners must be shareholders of the firm.” 
“None. It will however be a lot more of a conducive environment if the regulator institutes a 
limited liability regime in line with most jurisdictions in the world.” 
“Resources available to small and medium firms. The initial framework must be simple enough 
for any firm to implement and can be expanded on in the future. If transformation is to be 
considered in the composition of the governance structure, then the availability of willing 
experienced directors may be a challenge.” 
“The complexities of structures of various firms, especially the concept of multidisciplinary 
practices not recognised by regulators.” 
“The cost and the burden of further compliance that would increase costs to the client and 
ultimately to the consumers.” 
Literature and deductions 
The literature review in Chapter 4 discussed the concerns about corporate governance in auditing 
firms, namely, (i) the lack of a specific corporate governance code for auditing firms, (ii) how to 
determine the independence of a director appointed to an audit firm board and (iii) the lack of 
independence on oversight boards that have been implemented at some auditing firms, (iv) 
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legislation such as the APA that prevent auditing firms from appointing INEDs to their EXCO. It 
was also highlighted that even though most large auditing firms have oversight boards, there was 
still very little independence on these boards. 
The above comments once again reflect the contradicting opinions of the various CEOs in the 
population. Some CEOs believed that there would be no difficulties in implementing such code 
while other (possibly smaller) auditing firms believed that it would result in a financial burden on 
the firms. An important point was also made by one of the CEOs (which is also supported in the 
literature review). The CEO stated that the APA would have to be amended to allow for the 
appointment of INEDs in auditing firms. These are all valid concerns, but not concerns that should 
completely stop the implementation and practice of corporate governance within auditing firms. 
6.3.9 Appointment of an oversight board 
Objective 
This question sought to establish whether the CEOs of the auditing firms believed that the auditing 
firms needed to appoint an oversight board which would be responsible for the corporate 
governance of the audit firm in order to properly fulfil their public interest responsibilities. 
Findings 
Table 6.30 Appointment of oversight board 
 Yes % No % Total Total % 
Appointment of an oversight board 8 88.90 1 11.10 9 100 
Source: CEO questionnaire (SPSS output) 
Table 6.30 indicates that eight of the auditing firms believed that it was necessary to appoint an 
oversight board which would be responsible for the corporate governance of the firm, in order to 
properly fulfil their public interest responsibilities. 
Below are comments made by the CEOs on the above question. 
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“The public interest and resulting perception of auditing firms has increased significantly and 
auditors cannot be blind to responding appropriately in order to regain the public confidence. If 
greater transparency and improved governance leads to this, the profession will be in a better 
place.” 
“Audit firm leadership are the custodians of the firm and as such are responsible for discharging 
their public interest responsibilities.” 
“The oversight board will bring a perspective that is independent from that of executive board 
members. They will also be valuable in educating the public on the role of auditors because 
currently anything that goes wrong in a company the blame lies with auditors.” 
“Audit Quality Board focused on the Audit Practice.” 
“Evident from the Brydon review in the UK and new FRC principles.” 
“The independent members would ensure that the firm serves public interest.” 
“Auditing firms are for profit organisations. Independent oversight is needed to ensure that the 
profit motive does not overshadow public interest responsibility.” 
Literature and deductions 
The FRC (2010) states that the appointment of INEDs to auditing firms indicates that regulation 
is not a replacement for effective governance but rather, that good governance supplements 
regulation in the promotion of audit quality. At present, the corporate structures of auditing firms 
are flawed. Some auditing firms argue that they need not comply with the codes of corporate 
governance as their business model is based on a ‘partnership’ (Aberian, 2019). According to 
Nkuhlu (2020), all auditing firms need to appoint INEDs and place risk and ethics under their 
oversight. 
The above findings illustrate that the majority of the CEOs of the auditing firms agree that the 
appointment of an independent oversight board would assist in restoring public interest in the 
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profession. This is in line with the literature, which states that there is a need for independent 
oversight in auditing firms. 
6.3.10 Audit vs non-audit part of auditing firms 
Objective 
The objective of this question was to determine if the CEOs believed that the corporate governance 
framework should distinguish between the audit and non-audit parts of auditing firms. 
Findings 
Table 6.31 Frameworks for audit and non-audit parts 
 Yes % No % Total Total % 
Different framework for audit and non-audit 6 66.70 3 33.30 9 100 
Source: CEO questionnaire (SPSS output) 
From Table 6.31, it is evident that six of the CEOs believed that there should be different 
frameworks for the audit and non-audit parts of the auditing firms. 
Below are some of the comments made by the CEOs on this question: 
“Our experience is that the individuals offering advisory services often have different drivers 
and as a result may need to have different governance in place. Examples of this are earnings 
models for Advisory divisions and in some cases a reduced focus on conflicts of interest, 
independence etc.” 
“The code of ethics, quality standards, all policies and procedures are to be complied with by all 
within the audit firm.” 
“The Audit Practice is Regulated whereas other parts of the business are not.” 
“The focus is on audit quality.” 
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“There’s a perception that firms are more focused on consulting and its profit than on the public 
interest function and the focus will go a long way in mitigating the situation.” 
“Having different rules and processes might confuse the organisation.” 
Deductions 
From the above comments, it is clear that there are conflicting views and opinions from the CEOs. 
However, it appears that the majority of the CEOs believes that two different frameworks will not 
be necessary. 
6.3.11 Key areas in terms of governance 
Objective 
This question sought to identify the areas that the CEOs believed should be addressed to ensure 
that the public interest was protected. 
Findings 
Below are the answers to the open-ended question which were posed to the CEOs. Quality and 
ethics seem to be the main factors identified. 
“Independence, conflict of interest, quality, ethics and external stakeholder communication.” 
“Leadership, Audit Quality, Risk Management.” 
“Audit quality, risk management, conflict of interest, corporate governance matters, control 
environment and regulatory matters.” 
“Audit Quality Management, Independence, Ethics, Culture, Audit Quality Indicators.” 
“Audit quality.” 
“Audit quality and ethics.” 
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“The areas in line with King IV, adapted for auditing firms, i.e. more focus on quality, ethics 
and focus on public interest.” 
“Auditor independence, due to its impact on audit quality.” 
“Quality audits and total independence and through audits.” 
Literature and deductions 
According to the Institute on Governance (2020), governance consists of the following principles, 
which also frequently recur in much of the literature. These include legitimacy and voice, direction, 
performance, accountability and fairness. In Chapter 1, the definition of corporate governance was 
formulated as: 
A set of responsibilities and practices instituted by the governing body in order to direct 
a company to achieve its strategic objectives while remaining sustainable, accountable 
and transparent and acting in the best interest of all the stakeholders. 
Based on the comments from the CEOs and the definitions on corporate governance in the 
literature, the auditing firms seem to be in agreement that the most important areas that should be 
focused on include independence, managing conflicts of interest, ethics, leadership and audit 
quality. These areas would be specifically applicable to auditing firms, and emphasise the need for 
a code or guidelines particularly designed for auditing firms. 
6.3.12 Additional comments in questionnaire to assist the study 
The CEOs were also asked to provide any additional comments on the study, as indicated below: 
“Audit rotation and transformation should be handled with caution to avoid any further failures 
and disappointments in the profession.” 
“The responses related to governance are in the context of the nature of our organisation i.e. 
ownership structure and regulatory environment. As an example, the King Code may not be 
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applicable in its entirety but certain elements can be adopted. It is important to factor that in 
assessing the most appropriate governance structure.” 
“Governance structures should align with ISQM 1 principles and should not be prescriptive.” 
“Auditing firms have a small window to rebuild public trust. They need to address all the 
criticism that are [sic] levelled against them seriously if the profession is to survive.” 
From the above comments, it is clear that the CEOs concur that public trust should be restored in 
the audit profession, but that this should be carefully thought through and done with caution. It is 
also evident that a specific code for auditing firms should be developed, which is aligned with the 
current audit regulations and legislation. This is because King IV, as it currently stands, will not 
be applicable to auditing firms in its entirety. This finding supports the objective of the study, 
which calls for a sector supplement for auditing firms to be included in future iterations of the 
King Code. 
6.3.13 Conclusion  
Section 6.3 explained in detail the quantitative findings from the questionnaires that were sent to 
the CEOs of the top nine auditing firms in South Africa. The findings were categorised according 
to the six principles contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. The application of the 
principles and provisions in the auditing firms was examined and the expert opinions of the CEOs 
were provided thereafter. Reference was made to the literature supporting each finding, followed 
by deductions at the end of each principle. The findings on the additional questions included in the 
questionnaire were also discussed and the expert opinions of the CEOs were provided. 
The development of an Audit Firm Governance Code for South African auditing firms is critical 
for the effective application and disclosure of corporate governance principles in South African 
auditing firms. The CEOs of the auditing firms are highly qualified professionals, with high 
standing and impeccable character; as such, their expert views on this topical problem are held in 
high regard. The questionnaire completed by them provided valuable information on their current 
corporate governance structures as well as their views and opinion on the development of a 
corporate governance framework for auditing firms in South Africa. 
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From the information obtained via the questionnaire, it is evident that corporate governance plays 
a key role in auditing firms; the firms also understand the importance of good corporate 
governance. However, South African auditing firms are facing serious challenges, such as finding 
members who are independent, have the relevant skills, experience and competence and who are 
prepared to serve on an oversight board of an audit firm. Some of the firms also indicated that 
limited financial resources would prevent them from implementing strict corporate governance 
guidelines. 
The following concluding remarks from the respondents reflect the high standing and importance 
of corporate governance, the challenges it faces and the value of this research. 
Why a corporate governance code is necessary and supported: 
“The presence of independent members heightens awareness on others members of their 
custodianship of good governance.” 
“The oversight board can be valuable also in helping with restoring trust in the entire profession.” 
“Apply and explain promote transparency overall and will enhance the quality of reporting.” 
“We believe the better approach would be rules-based. The differences in size and resources 
among the firms are too big and resource limitations could easily be used as an excuse for not fully 
applying many of the principles.” 
“The public interest and resulting perception of auditing firms has increased significantly and 
auditors cannot be blind to responding appropriately in order to regain the public confidence. If 
greater transparency and improved governance leads to this, the profession will be in a better 
place.” 
“The oversight board will bring a perspective that is independent from that of executive board 
members. They will also be valuable in educating the public on the role of auditors because 
currently anything that goes wrong in a company the blame lies with auditors.” 
“The independent members would ensure that the firm serves public interest.” 
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“Auditing firms are for profit organisations. Independent oversight is needed to ensure that the 
profit motive does not overshadow public interest responsibility.” 
“Auditing firms have a small window to rebuild public trust. They need to address all the criticism 
that are levelled against them seriously if the profession is to survive.” 
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Why a corporate governance code could be challenging: 
“The questions suggest that non-execs should be appointed to appropriate Boards. We have had 
this previously but IRBA were not in support of it.” 
“Our firm does not have any independent non-executive directors.” 
“We operate in a partnership model and not that of a public company.” 
“Our experience is that additional layers of governance which may duplicate responsibilities 
will squeeze profitability even further, resulting in the auditing profession continuing to be an 
unattractive option for new entrants.” 
“We currently do not have a legal framework for an oversight board.” 
“King IV might not be entirely applicable to audit firm environment and structure.” 
“The information published in the Transparency Reports of those firms which have published 
such a report vary significantly, suggesting that Governance Frameworks are equally varied. A 
consistent approach would allow direct comparisons to be made which would hopefully 
contribute to reduced market concentration as decision makers became more familiar with 
structures in place outside of the Big 4.” 
“Lack of resources in firms outside the Big 4. In particular financial resources where the cost of 
audit quality has eroded profits. There may still be a large proportion of partners who believe in 
a partnership model rather than a corporate model and believe these governance structures are 
an overkill for a professional firm, which is run by the shareholders on a day to day basis.” 
“Auditing firms are largely privately owned entities despite the fact that they may have a public 
interest mandate.” 
“Limited pool of independent non-executive directors as well conflict of interest.” 
232 
“The Auditing Profession Act 2005 needs amendment as it does not allow for independence. All 
directors/partners must be shareholders of the firm.” 
“Resources available to small and medium firms. The initial framework must be simple enough 
for any firm to implement and can be expanded on in the future. If transformation is to be 
considered in the composition of the governance structure, then the availability of willing 
experienced directors may be a challenge.” 
“The complexities of structures of various firms, especially the concept of multidisciplinary 
practices not recognised by regulators.” 
6.4 Points of triangulation 
In Chapter 5, it was explained that a data transformation triangulation model (Creswell, 2003) was 
adopted in this study. Section 6.2 provided a qualitative analysis of the transparency reports of the 
top nine auditing firms in South Africa. The findings were then transformed into frequency counts 
(Creswell, 2003), which quantified the data. Selected data from the frequency counts is now 
compared with the CEO questionnaire feedback from the top nine auditing firms in South Africa. 
The objective is to triangulate the data collected from the content analysis of the transparency 
reports with the responses received from the CEOs. This is done to validate, compare and 
interrelate the corporate governance applied and disclosed in auditing firms in South Africa. 
The triangulation is presented according to the six principles contained in the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code. 
6.4.1 Leadership 
Table 6.32 Triangulation: Reports published 





Yes No Yes No 
Transparency report A.1.2. 7 2 7 2 
Integrated report A.1.2. 2 7 3 6 
Source: SPSS calculation, own comparison. 
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As can be seen in Table 6.32, the above triangulation presents a perfect correlation between the 
content analysis and the questionnaire. This is also a confirmation that all the published 
transparency reports were included in the content analysis, which was conducted for the qualitative 
research. It also confirms that the seven auditing firms that published transparency reports made it 
relatively easy to obtain the reports. The transparency reports which were available on the websites 
were easier to obtain than the ones which had to be requested from the auditing firms themselves 
via email. One recommendation would for all transparency reports to be publicly available on the 
auditing firms’ website. 
With reference to the integrated reports, there was a slight difference in the findings. The 
researcher was able to obtain only two integrated reports from the auditing firms. A search of the 
websites of the other auditing firms revealed no integrated report. Consequently, a personal email 
was sent to each audit firm requesting their integrated report. No auditing firms responded to this 
request. It could be argued that the email was not delivered to the relevant person and therefore, 
hence the discrepancy in the findings. 
It can therefore be concluded that the two types of reports could be combined and, with the 
assistance of corporate governance guidelines or a formal code, the auditing firms could disclose 
information consistently and understand clearly what was expected of them. This would also 
minimise the duplication of information in two separate reports. 









Yes No Yes No 
EXCO information disclosed in transparency report. A.1.1. 7 0 9 0 
Oversight board information disclosed in transparency report. A.1.1. 2 5 7 2 
Source: SPSS calculation, own comparison. 
As can be seen in Table 6.33, only seven of the auditing firms disclosed that they had an EXCO, 
whereas in actual fact, all the auditing firms had an EXCO. This discrepancy is due to the fact that 
two of the auditing firms did not issue a transparency report. It is rather concerning that only two 
of the auditing firms disclosed information about a South African oversight board in their 
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transparency report, when it was indicated through the questionnaire that seven of the firms 
actually had a South African oversight board. It appears that these firms are not making use of a 
valuable opportunity to communicate important governance oversight structures and practices to 
their stakeholders. 





Is the following disclosed in the transparency report 
about the EXCO? 
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes No Yes No 
Duties A.1.2. 2 5 8 1 
Decisions  A.1.2. 1 6 8 1 
Job titles A.1.3. 3 4 9 0 
Election and appointment A.1.3. 1 6 9 0 
Terms A.1.3. 1 6 8 1 
Length of service A.1.3. 2 5 8 1 
Meeting attendance A.1.3. 0 7 8 1 
Biographical details  A.1.3. 0 7 9 0 
Source: SPSS calculation, own comparison. 
As shown in Table 6.34, the auditing firms did not disclose the necessary information about their 
EXCO. From the questionnaires, the CEOs provided their expert opinions on the above provisions, 
with the majority of the firms believing that the disclosure of information about the EXCO was 
important. The lack of disclosure in the transparency reports could be due to the fact there is 
currently no code to guide the auditing firms on the information that should be disclosed. 





Is the following disclosed in the transparency report about 




Yes No Yes No 
Duties A.1.2. 2 5 8 1 
Decisions  A.1.2. 2 5 8 1 
Job titles A.1.3. 3 4 9 0 
Election and appointment A.1.3. 1 6 9 0 
Terms A.1.3. 1 6 8 1 
Length of service A.1.3. 2 5 8 1 
Meeting attendance A.1.3. 1 6 8 1 
Biographical details  A.1.3. 1 6 9 0 
Source: SPSS calculation, own comparison. 
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Table 6.35 presents once again a variance between the qualitative and the quantitative findings. 
The qualitative findings state that very few auditing firms disclose the above information in their 
transparency reports with reference to their oversight boards. This is obviously also due to lack of 
oversight boards within auditing firms. It is, however, pleasing to note that at least eight (and in 
some cases more) of the auditing firms believed that these principles were very important and that 
the stated information should be disclosed about the members of the oversight board. This is a 
positive outcome and already a step in the right direction since it shows that the CEOs of 
understood the importance of disclosing such information to the public about their oversight board. 
6.4.2 Values 






Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes No Yes No 
Code of conduct on website B.1.3. 5 2 6 3 
Discloses on the website to whom the code of conduct is 
applicable 
B.1.3. 5 2 6 3 
Source: SPSS calculation, own comparison. 
As can be seen in Table 6.36, five of the auditing firms disclosed their codes of conduct on their 
website as well as to whom the code of conduct was applicable. Six of the firms stated that they 
disclosed such information. However, there was a slight difference between the content analysis 
and the questionnaire. In providing additional comments, one of the firms indicated that their code 
of conduct was disclosed in their ‘Clarity Charter’. The researcher was not aware of this and 
regarded it as non-disclosure. It was, however, subsequently confirmed by the researcher that the 
audit firm’s code of conduct was included in the ‘Clarity Charter’ and therefore the qualitative and 
quantitative findings correlated with one another. 
Below is a comment provided by the CEO: 
“Our audit firm has launched our Clarity Charter which is a purpose statement setting out our 










Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes No Yes No 
Consists of majority of INEDs? C.1.1. 0 7 1 8 
Has at least three INEDs?  C.1.1. 2 5 3 6 
Discloses reasons for not having at least three INEDs? C.1.1. 0 7 8 1 
Has a majority of INEDs who are members of other relevant 
governance structures in the firm? 
C.1.1. 2 5 3 6 
Disclose: Appointment, retirement and resignation of INEDs C.1.2. 1 6 8 1 
Disclose: Remuneration of INEDs C.1.2. 1 6 7 2 
Disclose: Duties of INEDs C.1.2. 1 6 8 1 
Disclose: INEDs discharge of duties C.1.2. 1 6 8 1 
Disclose: Firm support for INEDs C.1.2. 1 6 9 0 
Disclose: How the firm positions INEDs C.1.2. 3 4 8 1 
Has INEDs who have skills and experience in audit C.2. 2 5 8 1 
Has INEDs who are competent in auditing/accounting C.2.1. 2 5 8 1 
Disclose: INEDs’ impact on independence C.2.1. 1 6 9 0 
Discloses on its website procedures for dealing with any 
fundamental disagreement 
C.3.6. 0 7 1 8 
Source: SPSS calculation, own comparison 
As shown in Table 6.37, there were very large discrepancies between the content analysis and the 
questionnaires. The content analysis found that only one audit firm disclosed the information on 
the appointment, retirement, resignation, remuneration and duties of INEDs, the manner in which 
the INEDs discharged their duties and how the audit firm supported the INEDs in discharging their 
duties. From the CEOs’ opinions, it emerged that more than seven of the auditing firms regarded 
these principles as important to be disclosed in the transparency reports. The obvious reason for 
this variance was the lack of INEDs appointed to auditing firms, and clearly, if the firms did not 
have INEDs, they would not be able to disclose such information. However, it was concerning to 
note that although the CEOs admitted the importance of the disclosure of such information, they 
did not apply the principles. 
Three of the auditing firms disclosed how they positioned their INEDs (on the EXCO or the 
oversight board) and eight CEOs regarded this as important information to disclose in the 
transparency report. 
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Only one of the auditing firms disclosed the criteria for assessing the impact of INEDs on the 
firms’ independence as auditors and their independence from the firm and its owners, yet all of the 
CEOs agreed that this was an important principle to disclose in the transparency report. 
From the above, it can be deduced that the CEOs understood the importance of appointing INEDs 
and the disclosure of information about the INEDs in the transparency report. The real challenge 
came with the implementation of these principles and the appointment of the INEDs in the auditing 
firms. 
As can be seen in Table 6.37, only two of the auditing firms disclosed that they have at least three 
INEDs on their oversight board, as well as INEDs that were part of other governance structures 
and who had the relevant skills and experience in audit and were competent in auditing and/or 
accounting. Only three of the CEOs thought it was important to have at least three INEDs on the 
oversight board as well as INEDs who were part of other structures of the audit firm. The 
divergence in opinions and the higher negative opinions could be due to the fact that there are 
difficulties in appointing so many INEDs within auditing firms. Eight of the CEOs believed that 
the skills, experience and competence of the INEDs in accounting and auditing were important. 
None of the firms disclosed reasons for not having at least three INEDs on their oversight board, 
yet eight of the CEOs regarded this as an important provision. 
None of the auditing firms had an oversight board with a majority of INEDs. Only one CEO found 
this to be important whereas the remainder believed it was not necessary. This could be directly 
linked to the fact that it is difficult to appoint INEDs who are totally independent from the auditing 
firms. 
The content analysis revealed that none of the auditing firms disclosed on their website the 
procedures for dealing with fundamental disagreements between INEDs and members of the firm’s 
management team and/or governance structures. This is clearly linked to the fact that only three of 
the firms had appointed INEDs. The CEOs’ responses indicated that one audit firm disclosed this 
information while the remaining eight did not. However, the one firm that disclosed this 
information stated that it did so somewhere on its website, in a document which was not easily 
accessible to the public. 
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6.4.4 Operations 
Table 6.38 Triangulation: Operations 
  Content Analysis Questionnaire 
  
Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes No Yes No 
Policies and procedures to manage conflicts of interest D.1.3. 4 3 7 2 
Disclosure: Effectiveness of the internal control system D.2.2. 2 5 6 3 
Disclosure: Weaknesses in internal control system D.2.2. 2 5 6 3 
Disclosure: Actions to deal with weaknesses D.2.2. 2 5 6 3 
Disclosure: How the firm supports its commitment to 
professionalism, openness and risk management 
D.3. 1 6 8 1 
Disclosure: Whistleblowing policies and procedures D.4. 6 1 8 1 
Source: SPSS calculation, own comparison 
The content analysis revealed that four of auditing firms indicated how the firm applied policies 
and procedures for managing potential and actual conflicts of interest. The questionnaire findings 
stated that seven of the auditing firms indicate how the firm applied policies and procedures for 
managing potential and actual conflicts of interest.  
Table 6.38 indicates the variances between the qualitative and quantitative findings. Very few 
auditing firms two disclosed information about their internal controls and their effectiveness, any 
identified weaknesses, and actions taken to address those weaknesses. In contrast, six of CEOs 
stated that their auditing firms disclosed this information in their transparency reports. 
There was a large discrepancy between the disclosure on the auditing firms’ websites on how the 
firms supported their commitment to professionalism, openness and risk management. Only one 
firm disclosed such information clearly on its website, yet eight of the firms stated that they did 
disclose this on their websites. The qualitative study found that only six of the auditing firms 
disclosed their whistleblowing policies and procedures, yet eight of the CEOs stated that their 
auditing firms did disclose these policies and procedures. 
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6.4.5 Reporting 









Yes No Yes No 
Includes a commentary on the firm’s performance, position and 
prospects 
E.3. 3 4 6 
3 
Includes fair and balanced information E.3.2. 4 3 7 2 
Explains everything in an understandable manner E.3.2. 6 1 7 2 
Has an audit committee E.4.1. 3 4 3 6 
Publishes audited financial statements E.5. 0 7 6 3 
Publishes audited financial statements prepared with the financial 
reporting framework 
E.5. 0 7 6 
3 
Publishes audited financial statements that are clear and concise E.5. 0 7 6 3 
Explains who is responsible for preparing the financial statements E.5.1. 0 7 9 0 
Source: SPSS calculation, own comparison. 
Only three of the auditing firms included commentary on the firm’s performance, position and 
prospects, yet six of firms stated that they did so in their transparency reports. 
Only four of the firms included information in their transparency reports that was deemed fair and 
balanced (as evaluated by the researcher), yet seven of the firms believed that their information 
was fair and balanced. This finding could be subjective due to different individuals interpreting 
the reports differently. 
There was a smaller difference with regards to the understandability of the information. The 
content analysis showed that six of the auditing firms explained information in an understandable 
manner whereas seven of the firms believed that their information was understandable. 
Table 6.39 indicates a correlation between the disclosure in the transparency reports and the 
responses of the CEOs on the existence of audit committees. Only three of the auditing firms had 
audit committees and only one of these committees was constituted in terms of the principles of 
King IV. 
Table 6.39 presents a significant variation between the findings of the content analysis and the 
questionnaires completed by the CEOs. The content analysis found no published audited financial 
statements in the transparency or integrated reports of the auditing firms, yet the six of the CEOs 
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indicated that their firms published audited financial statements. Because no financial statements 
could be found for any of the auditing firms, the questions relating to the recognised financial 
reporting framework, clear and concise statements and who was responsible for the preparation of 
the statements could not be analysed and ‘No’ answers were recorded for these questions. All of 
the CEOs stated that they explained who was responsible for the preparation of the financial 
statements. This could be that they disclosed who prepared the financial statements vaguely in the 
transparency reports, however, no evidence could be found of such information. 
6.4.6 Dialogue 






Ref to UK 
Code 
Yes No Yes No 
Discloses policies and procedures for dialogue with listed 
company shareholders and listed companies? 
F.1.1. 3 4 4 5 
Discloses the nature and extent of the involvement of INEDs in 
the dialogue? 
F.1.1. 1 6 4 5 
Source: SPSS calculation, own comparison 
Table 6.40 indicates that only three of the auditing firms’ dialogue policies and procedures could 
be found on their websites. It could be that the policies were not easily accessible or visible on the 
websites. The second principle was more concerning, as evidence of the nature and extent of 
INEDs’ involvement in dialogue with shareholders could only be found for one firm, yet four firms 
stated that they disclosed this information. 
These discrepancies could be due to the websites being diverse and information not being easily 
accessible. It was also found that auditing firms disclosed their information in different documents 
and reports, making it difficult for the public to access the information easily. 
The development of a governance code for auditing firms which specifies where the relevant 
information should be disclosed would ensure that all auditing firms disclose the same information 
through the correct platforms. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the findings of the empirical study. Given the 100% response rate and the 
professionalism and expertise of the respondents, the information is considered to be representative 
of the large and medium-sized auditing firms in South Africa. 
The results of the empirical study found strong evidence indicating that the current corporate 
governance practices and disclosures in South African auditing firms lack structure and 
consistency. The findings of the triangulation revealed discrepancies between the firms’ current 
disclosure in their transparency reports and what is being practised in the firms versus what they 
consider to be important in terms of corporate governance. Most of the principles mentioned in the 
questions were strongly supported by the majority of the auditing firms. This is a positive outcome 
since it validates the need for an Audit Firm Governance Code for South African auditing firms. 
Chapter 7 discusses the findings of the study and recommendations are made for improving 
corporate governance in auditing firms. Areas of future research are also identified.   
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Chapter 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the study by describing how the research objectives were met and how the 
underlying research problem was addressed. Recommendations are formulated based on the results 
and areas for future research are indicated. 
Chapters 1 to 4 contained the literature relevant to this study. This review contributed to the 
existing body of knowledge and assisted in addressing the research problem. Chapter 6 presented 
the findings of the empirical research, describing the governance disclosures and practices at 
auditing firms in South Africa to address the research problem. This chapter provides a detailed 
explanation of how the research objectives were met. 
7.2 Overview of the research objectives 
To address the research problem, research objectives were formulated. These were achieved 
through a comprehensive literature review and empirical study. The transparency reports and 
integrated reports of large and medium-sized auditing firms in South Africa were analysed. 
Questionnaires were then sent to the CEOs of the auditing firms and the results were triangulated 
between the two data sets to compare and validate the data. 
The following section discusses how each research objective was met. The discussion is structured 
according to the six objectives, providing details on how the literature review and the empirical 
study assisted in achieving the objectives. The empirical study also indicates (where relevant) 
which specific principles of the UK Audit Firm Governance Code were used to address the 
objectives. Each section has its own conclusion to summarise the findings. 
In Chapter 1 the research problem for the study was defined as follows: 
Auditing firms in South Africa do not have effective governance structures and are not applying 
corporate governance practices and principles. This is evident from the amount of corporate 
scandals and failures that have taken place recently and the auditor implication in these 
scandals. The current corporate governance code in South Africa, King IV, does not have a 
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specific sector supplement for auditing firms. Therefore, this study aims to provide guidelines on 
corporate governance practices and oversight structures for auditing firms in South Africa which 
could possibly be included as a sector supplement in future King Code iterations. 
This research problem was addressed through the six research objectives, as discussed below. 
7.2.1 Research objective 1: Corporate governance developments in the UK, USA, Australia, 
the Netherlands and more specifically, in South Africa 
The aim of this research objective was to conduct a literature review examining the developments 
in corporate governance in the UK, USA, Australia, the Netherlands and South Africa. This was 
done to identify the corporate governance codes that have been introduced over the years and to 
determine which of these could be applied to South African auditing firms. The literature review 
also aimed to identify any corporate governance codes or legislation that was specifically 
developed for auditing firms. The literature review went in to examine theories of corporate 
governance, thereby providing the theoretical framework for the study. The stakeholder theory and 
the shareholder theory were deemed to be best-suited for the purposes of this study. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the stakeholder theory was found to be the most appropriate for the suggested 
corporate governance guidelines. This theory was incorporated into the design of the checklist and 
questionnaire used in the study. 
The following section outlines the key findings from the literature review that support research 
objective 1. 
Literature findings 
i. From the literature study it is evident that corporate governance is not a new concept, 
developing across the world over the last 40 years. The renewed emphasis on corporate 
governance can be attributed to the major corporate collapses and business failures taking 
place in recent years. The auditing profession has been in the news for all the wrong reasons 
and the lack of corporate governance at auditing firms has been one of the main 
contributors to these corporate failures where auditing firms have been involved. 
ii. Corporate governance is often described in terms of two seemingly opposing models—the 
shareholder model and the stakeholder model. These two models are also known as one-
tier and two-tier board structures. From the literature, it is evident that auditing firms should 
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apply a two-tiered board structure to appoint an independent oversight board. In South 
Africa, due to limitations created by the APA of 2005, INEDs cannot be appointed as 
members of the EXCO of auditing firms. 
iii. Corporate governance codes arose out of deep-seated concerns stemming from well-
publicised corporate failures. With the current corporate failures and scandals on the rise 
in South Africa, there is an urgent need for a corporate governance code specifically for 
auditing firms. 
iv. The APA provides information on the governance of the regulatory board of the audit 
profession, such as the IRBA, but not specifically for auditing firms as organisations. ISQC 
1 and ISA 220 provide information on the governance and leadership and ethical 
requirements of auditing firms. This information is, however, very limited, with no detailed 
guidelines on audit firm governance. The UK’s Brydon Report emphasises the principles 
of corporate auditing and the importance of acting in the public interest. This report, like 
most other reports, acts or codes, focuses more on the governance of the individual auditor 
rather than the auditing firm specifically. This shortcoming emphasises the need for a 
sector supplement specifically for auditing firms. 
v. The literature review found that the UK Audit Firm Corporate Governance Code of 2010 
(reviewed in 2016) was designed specifically for auditing firms. The Code consists of six 
principles: (1) leadership, (2) values, (3) independent non-executives, (4) operations, (5) 
reporting and (6) dialogue. These are the principles which were used in the empirical 
research of this study. The provisions contained in this Code also informed the design of 
the checklist and the questionnaire. 
vi. The literature found that South Africa has a strong colonial legacy with resultant ties with 
the UK. As the UK already has a corporate governance code specifically for auditing firms, 
this code, together with King IV, can be used as the basis to create guidelines on corporate 
governance practices and oversight structures for auditing firms in South Africa. The UK 
Code was used in the empirical research of this study to establish the current governance 
practices and disclosures of auditing firms in South Africa. 
The following section discuss how research objective 1 was achieved through the empirical study. 
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Empirical findings 
The empirical study was informed by the findings of the literature review. Thus, the corporate 
governance codes identified in the literature review, such as the UK Audit Firm Governance Code 
and King IV, were used as the basis to develop the checklist and the questionnaires. As stated 
above, due to the strong colonial legacy and resultant ties with the UK, South Africa could make 
use of the UK Audit Firm Governance Code as the basis for the development of a corporate 
governance code for South African auditing firms. The findings of the empirical study were thus 
used to determine the current governance practices and disclosures in South African Auditing 
firms. 
Conclusion for research objective 1: 
The literature review found that the UK is the only country with an Audit Firm Governance 
Code. The principles and provisions of this Code were specifically designed with auditing firms 
in mind. 
This Code was used in the empirical study to develop the checklist and the questionnaire. The 
empirical research found that the principles contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code 
could easily be applied to South African auditing firms. The triangulation in Chapter 6 indicated 
that many of the firms believe the principles and provisions in the Code are important and would 
add value to the auditing firms and all stakeholders. The checklist and the questionnaire found 
that many of the principles and provisions are already applied in auditing firms in South Africa. 
However, the application is inconsistent and differs from one firm to the next, depending on 
firm size and resources. A formal South African code or guidelines would assist auditing firms 
to adopt the same principles and practices. Consequently, the disclosures of such principles 
would be more consistent across auditing firms. This finding adds weight to the suggestion that 
audit firm governance should be included as a sector supplement in future King Code iterations.  
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7.2.2 Research objective 2: Comparison between the UK Audit Firm Governance Code and 
King IV to identify corporate governance similarities 
The second research objective aimed to identify similarities between the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code and King IV. This comparison determined whether the principles contained in 
the UK Code were more or less in line with those contained in King IV. It was postulated that, 
should the principles between the two codes be similar, it would be easier for South African 
auditing firms to apply and accept a corporate governance code for auditing firms. This is because 
the firms were already familiar with King IV and had already implemented some of its principles, 
albeit only to a very limited extent. The UK Audit Firm Code was first introduced in 2010, thus, 
the UK has already experienced and eliminated most of the teething issues that one would expect 
following the introduction of a new code. As stated earlier, the Cadbury Report was used as the 
basis for the development of the King Code. Consequently, the UK Audit Firm Governance Code 
could, in turn, be used as the basis for the development of a South African audit firm governance 
code. 
The key findings of the literature study are outlined below. 
Literature findings 
The comparison between the UK Audit Firm Governance Code and King IV (see Annexure I and 
Chapter 2) indicate that the majority of the principles and provisions contained in the UK Code 
are also found in King IV. This means that King IV as it currently stands, already contains 
principles that could easily be implemented in auditing firms in South Africa. A sector supplement 
for auditing firms would be an ideal addition to future King Code iterations. A summary of the 
comparison is provided below. 
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Table 7.1: Comparison between the UK Audit Firm Governance Code Principles and King 
IV principles 
UK Audit Firm Governance 
Code Principles 
KING IV principles that address the same principle 
as the UK Code 
Leadership Principles 6, 7, 9 and 10 
Values Principles 1, 2, 16 
Independent non-executives Principle 7 
Operations Focuses on auditing firms, thus not applicable in King 
IV 
Risk Management Principle 11 
Reporting Principles 5, 11, 8 
Dialogue Principle 16 
Source: Researcher’s own comparison 
The following section discusses how research objective 2 was achieved through the empirical 
study. 
Empirical findings 
The disclosure in the transparency reports of the auditing firms, as identified through the content 
analysis, revealed that South African auditing firms are already applying some of the principles 
contained in the UK Code and thus indirectly in King IV. However, this disclosure between the 
firms is inconsistent, although as stated, this could largely be due to the lack of guidelines for 
auditing firms on corporate governance practices and disclosures. The empirical study requested 
the expert opinions of the CEOs of the auditing firms about the implementation of the UK 
principles. The findings indicated that the majority of the CEOs believe that the principles 
contained in the UK Code should be implemented in South African auditing firms. One of the 
CEOs stated that there are no difficulties in implementing King IV in South African auditing firms. 
This finding supports the above comparison from the literature review, namely, that the King IV—
with some adjustments for auditing firms—could be applied to auditing firms in South Africa. This 
also supports the objective that future King iterations should include a sector supplement 
specifically for auditing firms. 
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Conclusion for research objective 2: 
The literature review identified the principles and provisions contained in the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code and King IV. The comparative study found that the majority of the principles 
contained in the UK Code are already contained in King IV. However, one principle—
operations—was specifically designed for auditing firms and is therefore not covered in King 
IV.  
7.2.3 Research objective 3: Financial corporate failures in the UK, USA, Australia, the 
Netherlands and South Africa and the role of auditing firms in these failures 
The aim of this objective was to establish how the lack of corporate governance in auditing firms 
had contributed to some of the worse financial corporate failures in the UK, USA, Australia, the 
Netherlands and South Africa. The literature review thus identified the major governance concerns 
at auditing firms that contributed to corporate failures. From the literature, it was evident the lack 
of independent oversight at auditing firms was one of the major contributors. 
The key findings of the literature study are outlined below. 
Literature findings 
i. The UK has experienced major corporate failures, such as Robert Maxwell, Barings Bank, 
BP, Tesco, Carillion and Patisserie Valerie, to mention only a few. The literature 
highlighted how unethical behaviour and a lack of independence between the corporations 
and the auditors contributed to these failures. 
ii. In the USA, there were many corporate failures, starting with McKesson & Robbins, the 
infamous Enron scandal, the WorldCom failure, Lehman Brothers and more recently, AIG 
and GE. The USA also saw the complete collapse of one of the largest auditing firms, 
Arthur Andersen. These corporate failures and ultimately, the audit firm failure of Arthur 
Andersen, underscored the importance of corporate governance. 
iii. In Australia, the corporate failures of HIH was one of the worst in Australia and as Arthur 
Andersen was their auditors, governance issues also came to the fore as a major concern. 
The lack of independence was a key contributor to the failure. The failure of Harris Scarfe 
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emphasised the importance of ethical behaviour by both the corporate entities and the 
auditing firms. 
iv. In the Netherlands, the most significant corporate failure was that of Royal Ahold. The 
Netherlands is already applying a two-board structure. The benefit of such a structure were 
indicated in the literature findings on the Royal Ahold failure. The audit firm, Deloitte, put 
an end to the fraud, identifying irregularities at an early stage. Thus, Ahold was the one 
case where the auditors did not contribute to the failure due to a lack of corporate 
governance. 
v. Lastly, in South Africa, the literature identified many recent corporate failures, such as 
Steinhoff, Tongaat Hulett and VBS Bank. KPMG South Africa came under media scrutiny 
due to their involvement in some of these corporate failures. Other auditing firms, such as 
Deloitte and PwC, also came under the media spotlight. Nkonki collapsed due to issues of 
auditor independence, unethical behaviour and a lack of corporate governance. These 
South African failures undermined public trust, highlighting that the lack of corporate 
governance in auditing firms is a serious matter that should be addressed. 
vi. Many members of the accounting profession claim that the reputation of the profession has 
been irreparably damaged by corporate scandals. The negative publicity that accountants 
have brought upon themselves has jeopardised the reputation of the profession and it is 
time that the reputation of the profession be restored. 
vii. From the literature, it can be seen that ethical behaviour and independence are two major 
concerns in terms of corporate governance in auditing firms. This finding was used to 
inform the empirical study, with many of the questions addressing the importance and role 
of an independent oversight board. This is discussed in the empirical findings below. 
The following section discusses how research objective 3 was achieved through the empirical 
study. 
Empirical findings 
From the issues identified in the literature review, the most prominent was the lack of values, 
proper internal controls, independence and ethical leadership in auditing firms. It was therefore 
essential to analyse the application and disclosure of these principles contained in the UK Audit 
Firm Governance Code within large and medium-sized auditing firms in South Africa. This was 
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achieved through the empirical study, which found that the disclosure of these principles was 
lacking. This finding could be attributed to the lack of guidance given to auditing firms on 
corporate governance. The application at the auditing firms, according to the responses of the 
CEOs, was better than what the disclosure revealed in the content analysis. As a result, the readers 
of transparency reports may not obtain correct and relevant information to form an informed 
opinion about the governance at auditing firms. This is a negative finding for the auditing firms. 
The CEOs of the large and medium-sized auditing firms were mostly in agreement that the 
principles and provisions contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code should be applied to 
auditing firms in South Africa. This is elaborated on below, with a detailed explanation of each of 
these principles. 
The disclosure on the leadership principle was found to be inadequate, with auditing firms mostly 
providing information about their EXCO, but very little about their oversight boards. Only two 
auditing firms disclosed information about their oversight boards. With regards to the application 
of these principles, the questionnaires found that the leadership principle was mostly applied 
within the auditing firms. It was also found that seven of the nine auditing firms were currently 
applying some of the principles contained in King IV. The CEOs also provided their expert 
opinions on the disclosure of the leadership principle and provisions in the transparency report. 
The outcome was that almost all of the firms believed that all the provisions contained in the UK 
Code should be disclosed by South African firms in their transparency reports. This supports the 
notion that the UK Code could be used to inform the development of a South African code. 
With reference to the values principle, the disclosure was more positive, with auditing firms 
appearing to have the correct polices in place. The concern was thus whether these values are 
applied as they should be. In terms of the application of the values principle, the CEOs were all in 
agreement that the responsibilities of the oversight board, as contained in the UK Code, should be 
applied in South Africa. 
In terms of the INEDs principle, the disclosure was not as desired. The auditing firms had disclosed 
scant information about oversight boards and their independence. This lack of disclosure goes hand 
in hand with the lack of guidance provided to auditing firms as well as the difficulty of appointing 
INEDs due to the constraints imposed by APA in South Africa. The application of the INEDs 
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principle was also not as desired, with only two firms having INEDs on their oversight boards. 
The CEOs agreed about the responsibilities of the INEDs, but stated that the amount of INEDs on 
the oversight board should not be determined by a code. With reference to the information that 
should be disclosed about INEDs, the auditing firms were mostly in agreement, with the majority 
supporting the disclosure requirements contained in the UK Code. With regards to the 
characteristics and the rights and responsibilities of INEDs, the CEOs were mostly in agreement 
that the principles and provisions in the UK Code should be applied in South Africa. 
The disclosure of the operations principle was found to be inadequate. Many of the principles and 
provisions were not disclosed by the majority of the auditing firms. The empirical study found that 
the EXCO of the auditing firms was not applying the operations principle as stated in the UK Code. 
The CEOs concurred that the disclosure was not optimal, thus supporting the content analysis 
findings. The policies and procedures with regards to whistleblowing were mostly implemented in 
the auditing firms. The CEOs indicated that their application of compliance was good, providing 
an indication that the auditing firms would easily be able to implement the operations principle 
and provision contained in the UK Code. However, their disclosure would need to improve, which 
could be achieved through a formal South African Audit Firm Governance Code. 
Conclusion for research objective 3: 
The literature revealed that there were numerous corporate failures in the world. In many of the 
cases, the weak corporate governance at the auditing firms contributed to these failures. This 
lack of corporate governance could stem from the fact that there is only one corporate 
governance code for auditing firms in the world—the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. This 
means that most countries do not have a standardised code or framework which governs auditing 
firms. There is a need for such codes in many countries and South Africa is no exception. The 
empirical findings revealed that the principles contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code 
are mostly accepted by the majority of the auditing firms in South Africa as best practice and 
should be used as the basis for the development of a South African code, or possibly, a sector 
supplement in future King Code iterations.  
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7.2.4 Research objective 4: Current legal and governance structures in auditing firms as well 
as the challenges with implementing corporate governance within auditing firms 
This research objective aimed to review the literature on the legal and governance structures of 
auditing firms. It also discussed the challenges that auditing firms are currently facing with regards 
to the implementation of governance. The lack of research focusing on auditing firms was evident, 
affirming the importance of this study. 
The key findings in the literature study are outlined below. 
Literature findings 
i. The literature found that most auditing firms were generally set up as partnerships or 
personal liability (incorporated) companies. 
ii. Most auditing firms elect directors to be members of the EXCO, which is responsible for 
the day-to-day operations of the firm. The EXCO is not responsible for the governance of 
the audit firm. 
iii. Due to the requirements in the legislation, all shareholders and directors of auditing firms 
must be auditors registered with the IRBA. This makes it impossible to appoint INEDs to 
the EXCO. For this reason, there is a need for the internal appointment of an independent 
oversight board, which would provide independent governance and oversight to the EXCO 
and the audit firm. 
iv. There is currently no specific corporate governance code for auditing firms in South Africa 
and thus auditing firms have applied very few corporate governance principles. Moreover, 
not all firms have appointed independent oversight boards or applied a two-tier board 
structure. 
v. The literature also found that there are several codes or pieces of legislation available that 
regulate auditing firms. However, these contain no detailed guidelines on how South 
African auditing firms could practice corporate governance. Many of these codes and 
legislation focus on audit quality and the individual auditor, but not on the audit firm itself 
and how it should be governed. 




The content analysis of disclosures in the transparency reports confirmed that auditing firms are 
either partnerships or personal liability (incorporated) companies. The partnership legal structure 
is applied far less that the incorporated legal structure. The content analysis also indicated that 
very few auditing firms disclose information about their oversight boards. All of the auditing firms 
revealed that they appointed an EXCO, but no INEDs were appointed to these committees. 
The empirical questionnaire found that auditing firms are unable to appoint INEDs to their EXCO 
due to the limitations created by the APA. The UK Audit Firm Governance Code suggests that an 
independent oversight board should be established to appoint INEDs to auditing firms. The 
questionnaire found that two of the South African auditing firms had already appointed an 
oversight board and only one of the auditing firms had at least three INEDs on its oversight board. 
This is certainly a step in the right direction, with this audit firm leading by example, demonstrating 
to other South African firms that this is possible. 
The CEOs also provided their expert opinions on the challenges that auditing firms face in 
appointing INEDs and in implementing the principles of a corporate governance code. Most of the 
challenges were linked to financial constraints and limited resources. Some of the CEOs also 
pointed out that it was difficult to appoint INEDs within an audit firm structure and to identify 
individuals who were fully independent. Some of the CEOs also maintained that King IV should 
be adapted for auditing firms. This confirmed the need for a sector supplement for auditing firms 
in future King Code iterations. 
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Conclusion for research objective 4: 
This research objective was achieved as the study added to the body of knowledge on auditing 
firms and their legal and governance structures. All auditing firms have an EXCO, but not all 
auditing firms have an independent South African oversight board. The literature also 
emphasised the need for change in the regulation of auditing firms in South Africa. There is also 
a need for guidance through a code which would guide auditing firms on how to govern their 
firms and how to appoint INEDs to provide governance oversight. This would create consistency 
across all auditing firms, ensuring that transparency reports provide relevant governance 
information. The challenges identified in the literature and empirical findings should be taken 
into consideration during the development of a South African audit firm governance code.  
7.2.5 Research objective 5: Governance disclosure of auditing firms in their transparency 
reports 
This objective sought to determine which of the disclosure principles and provisions contained in 
the UK Audit Firm Governance Code were currently being disclosed by South African auditing 
firms in their transparency reports. This would identify the current disclosure as well as the whether 
the auditing firms were already applying some governance principles and provisions as contained 
in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. Should the firms already be disclosing the majority of 
the principles and provisions, it would be easier for auditing firms to implement a South African 
governance code in future. 
The key findings in the literature study are outlined below. 
Literature findings 
i. Auditing firms are expected to release any information that might affect market confidence 
and improve transparency (Kumar & Zattoni, 2014; Mallin, 2002; OECD, 2015b). The 
literature confirms that issuing a transparency report is important. The IRBA (2018) 
explains that the release of a transparency report provides the public with information on 
various aspects of the firm and its operations. This is affirmed by the IAASB (2014), which 
states that audit firm transparency reports assist third parties, such as the public and users 
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of the audited financial statements, to understand the characteristics of the individual audit 
firm and the drivers of audit quality in the firm. According to La Rosa et al. (2018), 
transparency reports provide meaningful information about audit firm quality and 
independence. 
ii. Huddart (2013) maintains that the call for greater transparency and disclosure by auditing 
firms is supported by the high-profile audit firm failures and the lack of confidence in the 
financial market in the post-global financial crisis era. 
iii. The IRBA suggests that all auditing firms issue a transparency report, however, at this 
point it is not compulsory for auditing firms to do so. 
The following section discusses how research objective 5 was achieved through the empirical 
study. 
Empirical findings 
The principles ‘reporting and dialogue’ in the UK Code assisted in achieving this objective. 
The findings of the content analysis revealed that the disclosure of the reporting principle was very 
poor. However, the questionnaire indicated that the auditing firms were applying this reporting 
principle to some extent. This finding contradicted those of the content analysis. The CEOs of the 
auditing firms indicated that they applied the principle and provisions, except for those relating to 
the audit committee. 
The disclosure of the dialogue principle was very poor in the transparency reports. The empirical 
research found that the CEOs believed that the dialogue principle contained in the UK Code was 
important and should applied in South African auditing firms. Once again, this is an indication that 
the CEOs agree that the principles are important, but the lack of guidance on how to apply and 
disclose them creates a weak governance environment. 
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Conclusion of research objective 5: 
The empirical research found that the disclosure of corporate governance information in the 
transparency reports and integrated reports was not always of the quality and quantity that would 
be expected of reputable companies. 
The lack of disclosure reduces the reliance that stakeholders can place on the corporate 
governance of the auditing firms. This has an impact on public trust in the profession. The 
minimal disclosure by auditing firms confirms that the firms appear unaware of the information 
that they should be disclosing in their transparency reports. There is a strong need for guidelines 
on the disclosure that is expected of auditing firms. Formal guidelines or a code would ensure 
that auditing firms disclose necessary and consistent information to the public.  
7.2.6 Research objective 6: Current corporate governance practice at auditing firms and the 
expert opinions of the CEOs of auditing firms on corporate governance in auditing firms 
The aim of this objective was to determine which of the principles and provisions contained in the 
UK Audit Firm Governance Code were being applied in South African auditing firms. The 
empirical questionnaire was used to obtain the expert opinions of CEOs on the importance of a 
corporate governance code for South African auditing firms. This was to help establish whether 
the auditing firms would accept the development of such code for the South African context. The 
questionnaire also obtained some expert opinions from the CEOs on the difficulties in 
implementing such a code in South Africa. 
The key findings of the literature review are outlined below. 
Literature findings 
The following section discusses how research objective 6 was achieved through the literature 
review. 
i. According to Sikka (2003), any reform of auditing and accountancy should bring about a 
major change in the values that govern auditing firms. 
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iv. According to the UK’s FRC (2010), strong audit firm governance is a way of maintaining 
public trust. 
v. Aberian (2019) observes that the corporate structure of some auditing firms seems to be 
flawed as they fail to apply codes of corporate governance. 
vi. Currently in South Africa, there is no corporate governance structure that regulates the 
corporate governance of auditing firms. From the literature, it is evident that the UK is at 
the forefront of corporate governance for auditing firms. No evidence of other corporate 
governance codes, specifically with reference to auditing firms, could be found. 
vii. For this reason, the study sought to determine the current application of corporate 
governance in South African firms to emphasise the gap in the research and the need to 
draft a South African Audit Firm Governance Code or include a sector supplement for 
auditing firms in future King Code iterations. 
Empirical findings 
The empirical findings illustrate that the role of an audit firm governance code for South African 
auditing firms is critical for the effective application and disclosure of corporate governance 
principles in South Africa auditing firms. The key findings from the empirical research are 
summarised below. 
i. With reference to the leadership principle, it was found that seven of the auditing firms had 
an oversight board but of these, only two disclosed such information. Although there was 
an evident lack of disclosure on many of the leadership principles and provisions, the 
majority of the auditing firms stated they applied these principles. Seven of the auditing 
firms indicated they applied some of the King IV principles. From the CEOs’ comments, 
it seems that the appointment of INEDs was where they fell short. The majority of the 
CEOs believed that leadership provisions should be disclosed in auditing firms’ 
transparency reports. 
ii. With reference to the values principle, the empirical study found that application was good. 
The CEOs agreed that all the principles and provisions on values should be applied by the 
oversight board. The CEOs also stressed the importance of an oversight board and its role 
in an audit firm. 
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iii. With reference to the principle of INEDs, the empirical study found that its application in 
the auditing firms was not as desired. These findings emphasised the challenges of auditing 
firms in appointing INEDs. The majority of the CEOs agreed that the involvement of 
INEDs was important, but that the number of INEDs on the oversight board should not 
have to be specified as at least three. The majority of the CEOs concurred with the 
characteristics of INEDs as well as their responsibilities, as described in the UK Code. 
iv. With reference to the operations principle, the application by the EXCOs of South African 
auditing firms was found to be lacking. The principles dealing with the policies and 
procedures were applied to some extent. The auditing firms were in agreement that the 
INEDs of the oversight board should be involved in protecting the public interest. 
v. With reference to the empirical findings on the reporting principle, the application in the 
auditing firms was found to be lacking. The provisions dealing with the audit committee 
were not applied to the desired extent as only three of the firms had audit committees. 
vi. With reference to the dialogue principle, the auditing firms concurred that mutual 
communication and understanding with shareholders were important, but not all were in 
agreement that the policies and procedures should be disclosed and that the nature and 
extent of the involvement of INEDs in the dialogue should be disclosed. 
vii. The CEOs believed that an ‘apply and explain’ framework would be the most suitable for 
a future code of corporate governance for auditing firms. 
viii. The CEOs conveyed that there would be some difficulties in implementing an audit firm 
governance code in South Africa, but these would be mostly linked to resources. 
ix. The majority of the CEOs agreed that an oversight board should be appointed within 
auditing firms. 
x. The CEOs indicated that separate frameworks for the audit and non-audit parts of the firms 
would not be necessary. 
xi. The CEOs stated that the key areas of focus should be independence, managing conflicts 
of interest, ethics, leadership and audit quality. 
xii. In the additional commentary provided in the questionnaire, the CEOs indicated that the 
audit profession should restore public interest and that a corporate governance code for 
auditing firms in South Africa should be developed. 
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Conclusion for research objective 6: 
From the information obtained, it is evident that corporate governance plays a critical role in the 
governance structures of auditing firms and that auditing firms also understand its importance. 
However, auditing firms in South Africa are facing serious challenges, such as finding members 
who are independent, have the relevant skills, experience and competence and who are prepared 
to serve on an oversight board of an audit firm. Some of the auditing firms also indicated that 
limited financial resources would prevent them from implementing strict corporate governance 
guidelines. 
From the findings, it can be concluded that the UK Audit Firm Governance Code would be a 
good starting point to develop a code for South African auditing firms.  
7.3 Recommendations 
7.3.1 Best practice recommendations for governance in auditing firms 
i. It is recommended that all auditing firms consider the implementation and practice of good 
corporate governance to enjoy the benefits that it offers. As the principles embodied in 
King IV are similar to those contained in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code, the auditing 
firms could start by implementing the relevant principles of King IV until further 
developments in future. 
ii. Corporate governance should not merely exist as a ‘tick box’ exercise, but should be 
effective and applied for the benefits that it will offer to auditing firms and all stakeholders. 
The corporate governance practices and disclosures should be supported by the EXCO and 
all shareholders of the audit firm. 
iii. An oversight board should be appointed by auditing firms and should be supported by the 
EXCO. The oversight board should have all the necessary resources, support and authority 
to effectively discharge its duties and responsibilities. The oversight board should consist 
of members who are independent and who have the necessary financial expertise and 
knowledge. 
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iv. The oversight board should diligently perform the responsibilities entrusted to it by the 
oversight board charter. However, members must be careful not to accept responsibilities 
that they are not qualified for, have no time to perform or that fall outside their remit. 
v. The oversight board should report to the shareholders and other stakeholders of the audit 
firm. 
vi. The oversight board should ensure that sufficient information is provided in the 
transparency report on the oversight board structure, functioning and responsibilities so 
provide readers with an informed view of the board. 
vii. Auditing firms should consider combining their transparency reports and integrated 
reports. This would minimise the duplication of the information in these two reports. 
7.3.2 Regulatory and statutory recommendations 
7.3.2.1 King IV 
It is recommended that the IoDSA consider the inclusion of a sector supplement for auditing firms 
in future King Code iterations. 
7.3.2.2 IRBA 
The IRBA is responsible for regulating the auditing profession. In the IRBA’s 2019/2020 Annual 
Report, former CEO Bernard Agulhas claims that governments and audit authorities are now 
calling for changes internationally and are keenly examining recommendations and research on 
reform of the audit profession and how it is governed. He states that the IRBA is specifically 
focusing on developments in the UK. The current negative state of the profession brought on by 
the unprofessional actions of a few has undermined trust in the auditing profession. He stated that 
the regulator would work even harder to restore confidence and make the profession one of the 
most trusted and valued once again. The auditing industry was called on to review current practices 
to restore faith in the profession. Such trust would be strengthened if all participants in the financial 
reporting chain—including management, those in charge of governance and investors— assumed 
the obligation to rebuild the requisite trust (IRBA, 2019). This literature from 2019 emphasises 
that the IRBA is already considering reform, with the aim of improving governance in auditing 
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firms. The IRBA should consider using the findings of this study and the developments in the UK, 
to provide guidelines for auditing firms on corporate governance. 
7.3.2.3 Audit Profession Act (APA) 
It is recommended that an amendment of the APA be considered to facilitate the appointment of 
INEDs for auditing firms. 
7.3.2.4 Institutions and professional bodies 
Professional bodies and institutions such as SAICA, IoD and SAAPTI should consider providing 
best practice standards on corporate governance at auditing firms. Similarly, the IoD (or the IRBA, 
as the regulator) should consider providing a statement for auditing firms, giving them guidance 
in corporate governance practices (such as the UK Audit Firm Governance Code provided by the 
FRC). 
Consideration should also be given to the establishment of a register of INEDs who are available 
for selection to oversight boards. To qualify as an accredited member, certain requirements would 
need to be met, including independence, minimum experience, financial literacy and other 
governance aspects. 
7.3.2.5 Media 
Informed and credible journalism can play a significant role in promoting corporate governance in 
auditing firms and the value it can add for the firm and all stakeholders. In this regard, it is 
recommended that academics, practitioners and others provide journalists with articles, 
information and facts that can be published to create greater awareness of the value of corporate 
governance at auditing firms. 
7.4 Areas for future research 
i. The application of corporate governance at smaller auditing firms should be investigated. 
These smaller auditing firms may have unique circumstances that require different 
corporate governance measures. 
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ii. The application of corporate governance in auditing firms internationally should be 
investigated. As the UK is the only country with a corporate governance code for auditing 
firms, other countries would also need to draft such a code for their auditing firms. 
iii. A corporate governance code for South African auditing firms should be developed. The 
unique circumstances, challenges and opportunities of the auditing profession should be 
taken into consideration. South Africa is a leader in corporate governance and could play 
an important role in upliftment in this field. 
iv. Amendments to the APA should be considered to ensure that auditing firms in South Africa 
are able to appoint INEDs. 
7.5 Limitations of the study 
The results of this study focused on large and medium-sized auditing firms in South Africa, 
consequently, generalisation is subjective. The scope of this study is limited to the population 
outlined in Chapter 1 and it is acknowledged that many other aspects could have influenced the 
research problem. 
7.6 Contributions to the existing body of knowledge 
This study contributed to the description of corporate governance structures in large and medium-
sized auditing firms. These auditing firms all have 20 or more audit partners. The findings of the 
study provide a holistic view of the corporate governance practices and disclosures, which could 
be used by professional institutions, such as SAAPTI and the IoDSA, to develop a corporate 
governance code specifically for auditing firms in South Africa. The results could also be used by 
auditing firms to add value; by adopting the guidelines suggested in this study, the firms could 
improve their application and disclosure of corporate governance and provide transparent and 
valuable information to the public on their governance structures. 
This study contributed to the existing body of knowledge in the area of corporate governance in 
auditing firms by analysing the corporate governance disclosure and practices of large and 
medium-sized auditing firms in South Africa. This could be used in local and global studies to 
compare practices and disclosure in other auditing firms in the world. 
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The study identified six key corporate governance principles from the UK Audit Firm Governance 
Code, which are similar to many of the principles found in King IV. The challenges facing auditing 
firms with regard to corporate governance were also identified. The study then discussed the 
principles that should be considered by auditing firms to improve their corporate governance 
structures. 
Lastly the study contributed to the research design and methodology for auditing studies and could 
be used as a benchmark for data collection. In this regard, SPSS software was used to quantify the 
qualitative research data, which assisted in interpreting the results. 
Thus, the study contributes to the limited body of knowledge on corporate governance in auditing 
firms, not only internationally, but more specifically, in South Africa. It is suggested that using the 
guidelines emerging from this study will assist auditing firms to improve their corporate 
governance structures. 
7.7 Conclusion 
This study found that the application of corporate governance in large and medium-sized auditing 
firms is inadequate. This was evident from the findings of the empirical research, the content 
analysis and the responses of the CEOs of auditing firms. The main reason for the lack of corporate 
governance in South African auditing firms is attributed to the fact that there is no South African 
corporate governance code for auditing firms. Thus, auditing firms are applying elements of King 
IV as they see fit and wish. Moreover, the APA makes it impossible for auditing firms to appoint 
INEDs as members of EXCO. For this reason, some auditing firms have appointed oversight 
boards, but unfortunately, only two of the firms have INEDs on these boards. As stated by Maranga 
(2018), oversight boards should implement internal controls in auditing firms to ensure good 
corporate governance. This would foster honesty, openness and accountability in the firms. 
Corporate governance may be indicated through the EXCO, the oversight board and auditing. 
Accountants and auditors must protect shareholders’ interests, enforce policies to ensure 
accountability and transparency and perform regular risk assessments (Maranga, 2018). 
The primary objective of this study, as stated in Chapter 1, Section 1.8, was to provide guidance 
to auditing firms on practices and structures that should be implemented to establish oversight on 
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the corporate governance of auditing firms. This guidance was provided in Chapter 7, section 7.3. 
The findings in Chapter 6 can also be used by auditing firms to implement the principles and 
provisions of the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. South African audit forms can make use of 
these guidelines to protect the public interest, to change the negative perceptions currently 
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ANNEXURE A: Other corporate governance developments around 
the world 
According to the The European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) (2020), the following 
corporate governance codes also exist around the world. 
Country Detail regarding the corporate governance code 
Austria The Austrian Working Group for Corporate Governance created a set of rules 
and standards for the responsible management of companies in Austria. The 
Austrian Corporate Governance Code is principally non-binding and only 
applies to listed companies.  
Belgium Belgian corporate governance practices for listed companies have been 
partially codified in the Belgian Company Code. 
Brazil The Brazilian Corporate Governance Code is applicable to listed companies 
and follows a ‘comply or explain’ approach. 
Canada Corporate governance practices in Canada are shaped by legal rules and best 
practices promoted by institutional shareholder groups, the media and 
professional associations such as the Institute of Corporate Directors. Sources 
of legal rules include provincial corporate statutes, securities laws and rules, 
stock exchange requirements and common law as well as a wide variety of 
other regulatory statutes, regulations and policies. 
Denmark The Danish corporate governance regime consists of hard law as well as soft 
law provisions. 
Finland Finnish corporate governance is based primarily on the Finnish Companies 
Act. The Act regulates the governance of companies such as the role of the 
board of directors, managing directors and shareholders as well as their duties 
and responsibilities. 
France Corporate governance rules are mainly set out in statutory provisions contained 
in the French Commercial Code and in recommendations contained in 
corporate governance codes (such as the French Association of Private 
Enterprises (AFEP), Movement of French Enterprises (MEDEF) Code) or in 
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positions expressed by various professional bodies and associations. Indeed, 
the AFEP-MEDEF Code has become a reference in matters of corporate 
governance. It is based on recommendations issued over the past 21 years and 
sets the corporate governance standards for listed companies. 
Germany The corporate governance of German stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaft), 
the legal form most common among listed companies in Germany, is 
determined by both statutory law and non-binding best practice rules. 
Ghana The corporate governance regime for listed companies in Ghana is essentially 
a combination of statutory law, subsidiary legislation and regulatory guidelines 
and directives. The Ghanaian Corporate Governance Code does not have the 
force of law and is merely used as a benchmark for assessing the governance 
practices of listed companies and companies that operate within the securities 
industry. 
India The Indian corporate governance framework is composed of statutes and 
regulations that require supervision by multiple regulators. 
Indonesia A company’s articles of association are the general governance document of 
the company. In practice, companies normally also prepare their own corporate 
governance manual as a reference for the companies’ ethics and business 
practices. 
Ireland In Ireland, companies listed on the principal Irish securities market, Euronext 
Dublin, are required to comply with both the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(Corporate Governance Code) and the Irish Corporate Governance Annex. 
Japan Companies in Japan are generally regulated by the Companies Act. In addition, 
Japan’s Corporate Governance Code was released on 1 June 2015 and was 
most recently revised on 1 June 2018. The Code, which is applicable to all 
companies listed on securities exchanges in Japan, establishes fundamental 
principles for effective corporate governance. 
Kenya The Kenyan capital market is regulated by the Capital Markets Authority 
(CMA). In 2016, the CMA published a code for corporate governance practices 
for publicly listed companies. The Code replaced the Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance Practices by Public Listed Companies in Kenya, 2002. The code 
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was informed by the need to respond to the changing business environment 
coupled with the desire to align Kenyan local standards to global best practice 
to promote institutional strengthening for listed companies.  
Luxemburg Luxembourg’s main statutes on corporate governance include the Companies 
Act, the EU Market Abuse Regulation and the Securitisation Act. The 
Companies Act was reviewed in 2016 to modernise Luxembourg corporate 
law. A consolidated version of the Act was published in December 2017. 
Nigeria The Nigerian corporate governance regime is characterised by a combination 
of a statutory framework and subsidiary legislation enacted by the relevant 
regulatory authorities. These laws can be divided into two categories: general 
laws and sector-specific laws. While the general laws govern every entity 
incorporated in Nigeria, the sector-specific laws govern only companies that 
operate within their specific sector or industry. 
Norway Iimportant guidelines for corporate governance in listed companies have been 
established in the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance 
(NCCG). The NCCG provides Norwegian listed companies with guidelines for 
governing the relationship between shareholders, boards of directors and 
executive management more comprehensively than the applicable legislation. 
The NCCG consists of 15 recommended principles of corporate governance, 
each of which is coupled with explanatory commentaries. 
Poland In Poland, general corporate governance rules applicable to companies, 
including listed companies, are laid down in the Commercial Companies Code 
of 2000 (CCC), which replaced the former Commercial Code of 1934. The 
CCC sets out the general duties and powers of the various corporate bodies, as 
well as rules on representation, conflicts of interest and the liability of 
management board members. 
Portugal The main legal sources of corporate governance rules in Portugal are the 
Portuguese Commercial Companies Code, enacted by Decree-Law No. 
262/86, of 2 September, which sets out the general legal framework governing 
companies.  
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Russia Best practice provisions for listed companies are set out in the Corporate 
Governance Code and the listing rules of licensed stock exchanges. 
Singapore The Singapore corporate governance regulatory framework is contained in 
certain mandatory rules, comprising the Companies Act, the Securities and 
Futures Act and, for companies listed on the Singapore Exchange, the Listing 
Manual. Other benchmarks include best practice recommendations as set out 
in the Code of Corporate Governance and the accompanying Practice 
Guidance issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. The Code was first 
introduced in Singapore in March 2001 and was revised in 2005, 2012 and 
2018. The revised 2018 Code applies with effect to annual reports covering 
financial years commencing from 1 January 2019. 
Sweden The report contains the Board’s activity report and statistics on companies’ 
application of the Swedish Corporate Governance Code. 
Switzerland The statutory corporate law set out in the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO) is 
the main source of Swiss corporate governance regulation. The CO applies to 
private and public companies. 
  
298 
ANNEXURE B: Principles of the UK combined code 
According to the Financial Reporting Council (2019), the 2018 UK Combined Code consists of 
the following corporate governance principles. 
1. Board leadership 
and company 
purpose. 
a) A successful company is led by an effective and entrepreneurial 
board, whose role is to promote the long-term sustainable success of 
the company, generating value for shareholders and contributing to 
wider society. 
b) The board should establish the company’s purpose, values and 
strategy and satisfy itself that these and its culture are aligned. All 
directors must act with integrity, lead by example and promote the 
desired culture. 
c) The board should ensure that the necessary resources are in place for 
the company to meet its objectives and measure performance against 
them. The board should also establish a framework of prudent and 
effective controls, which enable risk to be assessed and managed. 
d) In order for the company to meet its responsibilities to shareholders 
and stakeholders, the board should ensure effective engagement with 
and encourage participation from, these parties. 
e) The board should ensure that workforce policies and practices are 
consistent with the company’s values and support its long-term 
sustainable success. The workforce should be able to raise any 
matters of concern. 
2. Division of 
responsibilities: 
 
(f) The chair leads the board and is responsible for its overall 
effectiveness in directing the company. The chair should demonstrate 
objective judgment throughout their tenure and promote a culture of 
openness and debate. In addition, the chair facilitates constructive 
board relations and the effective contribution of all non-executive 
directors and ensures that directors receive accurate, timely and clear 
information. 
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(g) The board should include an appropriate combination of executive 
and non-executive directors (and in particular, independent non-
executive directors), so that no one individual or small group of 
individuals can dominate the board’s decision-making. There should 
be a clear division of responsibilities between the leadership of the 
board and the executive leadership of the company’s business. This 
is supported by Dedman (2016), who states that according to the 
agency view of the Combined Code, [a] chief executive should not 
go on to be chairman of the same company because this empowers 
boards against powerful CEOs who are reluctant to step aside for a 
successor. Further, a chairman who is independent upon 
appointment, is believed to provide effective board oversight and 
monitoring of the incoming CEO. 
(h) Non-executive directors should have sufficient time to meet their 
board responsibilities. They should provide constructive challenge, 
strategic guidance and specialist advice as well as holding 
management to account. 
(i) The board, supported by the company secretary, should ensure that it 
has the policies, processes, information, time and resources it needs 




j) Appointments to the board should be subject to a formal, rigorous 
and transparent procedure and an effective succession plan should be 
maintained for board and senior management. Both appointments 
and succession plans should be based on merit and objective criteria 
and, within this context, should promote diversity of gender, social 
and ethnic backgrounds, cognitive and personal strengths. 
k) The board and its committees should have a combination of skills, 
experience and knowledge. Consideration should be given to the 
length of service of the board as a whole and membership should be 
regularly refreshed. 
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l) Annual evaluation of the board should consider its composition, 
diversity and how effectively members work together to achieve 
objectives. Individual evaluation should demonstrate whether each 
director continues to contribute effectively. 
4. Audit, risk and 
internal control: 
 
(m) The board should establish formal and transparent policies and 
procedures to ensure the independence and effectiveness of internal 
and external audit functions and satisfy itself on the integrity of 
financial and narrative statements. 
(n) The board should present a fair, balanced and understandable 
assessment of the company’s position and prospects. 
(o) The board should establish procedures to manage risk, oversee the 
internal control framework and determine the nature and extent of 
the principal risks the company is willing to take on to achieve its 
long-term strategic objectives. 
5. Remuneration: p) Remuneration policies and practices should be designed to support 
strategy and promote long-term sustainable success. Executive 
remuneration should be aligned to company purpose and values and 
be clearly linked to the successful delivery of the company’s long-
term strategy. 
q) A formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on 
executive remuneration and determining director and senior 
management remuneration should be established. No director should 
be involved in deciding their own remuneration outcome. 
r) Directors should exercise independent judgment and discretion when 
authorising remuneration outcomes, taking account of company and 
individual performance and wider circumstances. 
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ANNEXURE C: Audit firm corporate governance code by the FRC 




 Owner accountability principle. The management of a firm should be 
accountable to the firm’s owners and no individual should have 
unfettered powers of decision. 
 Management principle: A firm should have effective management 
which has responsibility and clear authority for running the firm 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2016). 
Values 
 
 Professionalism principle: A firm should perform quality work by 
exercising judgment and upholding values of integrity, objectivity, 
professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional 
behaviour in a way that properly takes the public interest into 
consideration and meets auditing and ethical standards. 
 Governance principle: A firm should publicly commit itself to this 
Audit Firm Governance Code. 
 Openness principle: A firm should maintain a culture of openness 
which encourages people to consult and share problems, knowledge and 
experience in order to achieve quality work in a way that properly takes 







 Involvement of INE principle: A firm should appoint INEDs to the 
governance structure who, through their involvement, collectively 
enhance the firm’s performance in meeting the purpose of the Audit 
Firm Governance Code. 
 Characteristics of INE principle: The INEDs’ duty of care is to the 
firm. They should command the respect of the firm’s owners and 
collectively enhance shareholder confidence by virtue of their 
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independence, number, stature, experience and expertise. They should 
have a balance of relevant skills and experience including audit and a 
regulated sector. At least one INED should have competence in 
accounting and/or auditing, gained, for example, from a role in an audit 
firm. 
 Rights and responsibilities of INE principle: INEDs of a firm should 
have rights consistent with their role including the right of access to 
relevant information and people to the extent permitted by law or 
regulation, the right to report a fundamental disagreement regarding the 
firm to its owners and, where ultimately this cannot be resolved and the 




 Compliance principle: A firm should comply with professional 
standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements. Operations 
should be conducted in a way that promotes audit quality and the 
reputation of the firm. The INEDs should be involved in the oversight 
of operations. 
 Risk management principle: A firm should maintain a sound system 
of internal control and risk management over the operations of the firm 
as a whole to safeguard the firm and reassure stakeholders. 
 People management principle: A firm should apply policies and 
procedures for managing people across the whole firm, supporting 
commitment to professionalism, openness and risk management 
principles of the Audit Firm Governance Code. 
 Whistleblowing principle: A firm should establish and apply 
confidential whistleblowing policies and procedures across the firm 
which enable people to report, without fear, any concerns about the 
firm’s commitment to quality work and professional judgment and 
values in a way that properly takes the public interest into consideration. 
The INEDs should be satisfied that there is an effective whistleblowing 




 Internal reporting principle: The management of a firm should 
ensure that members of its governance structures, including owners and 
INEDs, are supplied with information in a timely manner and in a form 
and of a quality appropriate to enable them to discharge their duties. 
 Governance reporting principle: A firm should publicly report how 
it has applied in practice each of the principles of the Audit Firm 
Governance Code and make a statement on its compliance with the 
Code’s provisions or give a considered explanation for any non-
compliance. 
 Transparency principle: A firm should publish on an annual basis in 
its transparency report a commentary on the firm’s performance, 
position and prospects. 
 Reporting quality principle: A firm should establish formal and 
transparent arrangements for monitoring the quality of external 
reporting and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the 
firm’s auditors. 
 Financial statements principle: A firm should publish audited 
financial statements prepared in accordance with a recognised financial 
reporting framework such as International Financial Reporting 
Standards or UK GAAP. Moreover, these statements, should be clear 
and concise (Financial Reporting Council, 2016). 
Dialogue 
 
 Firm dialogue principle: A firm should have dialogue with listed 
company shareholders as well as with listed companies and their audit 
committees, about matters covered by the Audit Firm Governance 
Code. This is intended to enhance mutual communication and 
understanding and ensure that the firm keeps in touch with shareholder 
opinion, issues and concerns. 
 Shareholder dialogue principle: Shareholders should have dialogue 
with auditing firms to enhance mutual communication and 
understanding. 
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 Informed voting principle: Shareholders should have dialogue with 
listed companies on the process of recommending the appointment and 
re-appointment of auditors and should make considered use of votes in 
relation to such recommendations (Financial Reporting Council, 2016). 
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ANNEXURE D: Comparison of the UK corporate governance code 
and auditing firms 
Below is a comparison between the UK Corporate Governance Code and how this code could be 
applied to auditing firms (potentially already incorporated into the UK Audit Firm Code) 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2016). 




Role of the Board 
Every company should be headed by an effective board which is collectively 
responsible for the long-term success of the company. 
Already in 
A1.1 The board should meet sufficiently regularly to discharge its duties 
effectively. There should be a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved for 
its decision. The annual report should include a statement of how the board 
operates, including a high-level statement of which types of decisions are to be 
taken by the board and which are to be delegated to management. 

A.1.2 The annual report should identify the chairman, the deputy chairman (where 
there is one), the chief executive, the senior independent director and the chairmen 
and members of the board committees. It should also set out the number of 
meetings of the board and those committees and individual attendance by directors. 
Already in 
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A.1.3 The company should arrange appropriate insurance cover in respect of legal 





Division of responsibilities 
There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company 
between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running 
of the company’s business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of 
decision. 

A.2.1 The roles of chairman and chief executive should not be exercised by the 
same individual. The division of responsibilities between the chairman and chief 




The chairman is responsible for leadership of the board and ensuring its 
effectiveness in all aspects of its role. 

A.3.1 The chairman should, upon appointment, meet the independence criteria set 
out in B.1.1 below. A chief executive should not go on to be chairman of the same 
company. If exceptionally a board decides that a chief executive should become 
chairman, the board should consult major shareholders in advance and should set 





As part of their role as members of a unitary board, non-executive directors should 




A.4.1 The board should appoint one of the INEDs to be the senior independent 
director to act as a sounding board for the chairman and to serve as an intermediary 
for the other directors. The senior independent director should be available to 
shareholders should they have concerns that have not been resolved through the 
normal channels, namely, through the chairman, chief executive or other executive 





A.4.2 The chairman should hold meetings with the non-executive directors without 
the executives present. Led by the senior independent director, the non-executive 
directors should meet without the chairman present at least annually to appraise 





A.4.3 Where directors have concerns which cannot be resolved about the running 
of the company or a proposed action, they should ensure that their concerns are 
recorded in the board minutes. On resignation, a non-executive director should 
provide a written statement to the chairman for circulation to the board, if they 





Composition of the board 
The board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of skills, 
experience, independence and knowledge of the company to enable them to 





B.1.1 The board should identify in the annual report each non-executive director it 




independent in character and judgment and whether there are relationships or 
circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s 
judgment. The board should state its reasons if it determines that a director is 
independent notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances which 
may appear relevant to its determination. These include if the director: 
has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; 
has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the 
company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee 
of a body that has such a relationship with the company; 
has received or receives additional remuneration from the company apart from a 
director’s fee, participates in the company’s share option or a performance related 
pay scheme, or is a member of the company’s pension scheme; 
has close family ties with any of the company’s advisors, directors or senior 
employees; 
holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through 
involvement in other companies or bodies; 
represents a significant shareholder; or 
has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of their first election. 
context of 
INEDs) 
B.1.3 Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the 
chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be 





Appointments to the board 
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There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment 




B.2.1. There should be a nomination committee which should lead the process for 
board appointments and make recommendations to the board. A majority of 
members of the nomination committee should be INE directors. The chairman or 
an INE director should chair the committee, but the chairman should not chair the 
nomination committee when it is dealing with the appointment of a successor to 
the chairmanship. The nomination committee should make available its terms of 





B.2.2 The nomination committee should evaluate the balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge on the board and, in the light of this evaluation, 






B.2.3 Non-executive directors should be appointed for specified terms subject to 
re-election and to statutory provisions relating to the removal of a director. Any 
term beyond six years for a non-executive director should be subject to particularly 
rigorous review and should take into account the need for progressive refreshing 





B.2.4 A separate section of the annual report should describe the work of the 
nomination committee, including the process it has used in relation to board 
appointments. This section should include a description of the board’s policy on 
diversity, including gender, any measurable objectives that it has set for 
implementing the policy and progress on achieving the objectives. An explanation 
should be given if neither an external search consultancy nor open advertising has 






external search consultancy has been used, it should be identified in the annual 
report and a statement made as to whether it has any other connection with the 
company. 
Commitment 
All directors should be able to allocate sufficient time to the company to discharge 
their responsibilities effectively. 

B.3.1 For the appointment of a chairman, the nomination committee should 
prepare a job specification, including an assessment of the time commitment 
expected, recognising the need for availability in the event of crises. A chairman’s 
other significant commitments should be disclosed to the board before 
appointment and included in the annual report. Changes to such commitments 
should be reported to the board as they arise and their impact explained in the next 
annual report. 

B.3.2 The terms and conditions of appointment of non-executive directors should 
be made available for inspection. The letter of appointment should set out the 
expected time commitment. Non-executive directors should undertake that they 
will have sufficient time to meet what is expected of them. Their other significant 
commitments should be disclosed to the board before appointment, with a broad 






B.3.3 The board should not agree to a full-time executive director taking on more 
than one non-executive directorship in a Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 




All directors should receive induction on joining the board and should regularly 
update and refresh their skills and knowledge. 
B.4.1 The chairman should ensure that new directors receive a full, formal and 
tailored induction upon joining the board. As part of this, directors should avail 
themselves of opportunities to meet major shareholders. 

B.4.2 The chairman should regularly review and agree with each director on their 
training and development needs. 

Information and support 
The board should be supplied in a timely manner with information in a form and 





B.5.1 The board should ensure that directors, especially non-executive directors, 
have access to independent professional advice at the company’s expense where 
they judge it necessary to discharge their responsibilities as directors. Committees 





B.5.2 All directors should have access to the advice and services of the company 
secretary, who is responsible to the board for ensuring that board procedures are 
complied with. Both the appointment and removal of the company secretary should 
be a matter for the board as a whole. 

Evaluation 
The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own 
performance and that of its committees and individual directors. 
Already in 
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B.6.1 The board should state in the annual report how performance evaluation of 
the board, its committees and its individual directors has been conducted. 
Already in 
B.6.2 Evaluation of the board of FTSE 350 companies should be externally 
facilitated at least every three years. The external facilitator should be identified in 
the annual report and a statement made as to whether they have any other 







B.6.3 The non-executive directors, led by the senior independent director, should 
be responsible for performance evaluation of the chairman, taking into account the 
views of executive directors. 
Potentially 
Re-election 
All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals, subject to 
continued satisfactory performance. 
Already in 
B.7.1 All directors of FTSE 350 companies should be subject to annual election 
by shareholders. All other directors should be subject to election by shareholders 
at the first annual general meeting after their appointment and to re-election 
thereafter at intervals of no more than three years. Non-executive directors who 
have served longer than nine years should be subject to annual re-election. The 
names of directors submitted for election or re-election should be accompanied by 
sufficient biographical details and any other relevant information to enable 
shareholders to take an informed decision on their election. 

B.7.2 The board should set out to shareholders in the papers accompanying a 
resolution to elect a non-executive director why they believe an individual should 

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be elected. The chairman should confirm to shareholders when proposing re-
election that, following formal performance evaluation, the individual’s 
performance continues to be effective and demonstrates commitment to the role. 
Financial and business reporting 
The board should present a fair, balanced and understandable assessment of the 
company’s position and prospects. 
Already in 
C.1.1 The directors should explain in the annual report their responsibility for 
preparing the annual report and accounts and state that they consider the annual 
report and accounts, taken as a whole, is fair, balanced and understandable and 
provides the information necessary for shareholders to assess the company’s 
position and performance, business model and strategy. There should be a 
statement by the auditor about their reporting responsibilities. 
Already in 
C.1.2 The directors should include in the annual report an explanation of the basis 
on which the company generates or preserves value over the longer term (the 
business model) and the strategy for delivering the objectives of the company. 

C.1.3 In annual and half-yearly financial statements, the directors should state 
whether they considered it appropriate to adopt the going concern basis of 
accounting in preparing them and identify any material uncertainties to the 
company’s ability to continue to do so over a period of at least 12 months from the 
date of approval of the financial statements. 
Already in 
Risk management and internal control Already in 
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The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the principal risks 
it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should maintain 
sound risk management and internal control systems. 
C.2.1 The directors should confirm in the annual report that they have carried out 
a robust assessment of the principal risks facing the company, including those that 
would threaten its business model, future performance, solvency or liquidity. The 
directors should describe those risks and explain how they are being managed or 
mitigated. 
Already in 
C.2.2 Taking account of the company’s current position and principal risks, the 
directors should explain in the annual report how they have assessed the prospects 
of the company, over what period they have done so and why they consider that 
period to be appropriate. The directors should state whether they have a reasonable 
expectation that the company will be able to continue in operation and meet its 
liabilities as they fall due over the period of their assessment, drawing attention to 
any qualifications or assumptions as necessary. 
Already in 
C.2.3 The board should monitor the company’s risk management and internal 
control systems and, at least annually, carry out a review of their effectiveness and 
report on that review in the annual report. The monitoring and review should cover 
all material controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls. 
Already in 
Audit committee and auditors 
The board should establish formal and transparent arrangements for considering 
how they should apply the corporate reporting and risk management and internal 




C.3.1 The board should establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case 
of smaller companies two, INE directors. In smaller companies the company chair 
may be a member of, but not chair, the committee in addition to the INE directors, 
provided he or she was considered independent on appointment as chair. The board 
should satisfy itself that at least one member of the audit committee has recent and 














C.3.2 The main role and responsibilities of the audit committee should be set out 
in written terms of reference and should include: 
to monitor the integrity of the financial statements of the company and any formal 
announcements relating to the company’s financial performance, reviewing 
significant financial reporting judgments contained in them; 
to review the company’s internal financial controls and, unless expressly addressed 
by a separate board risk committee composed of independent directors, or by the 
board itself, to review the company’s internal control and risk management 
systems; 
to monitor and review the effectiveness of the company’s internal audit function; 
to make recommendations to the board, for it to put to the shareholders for their 





removal of the external auditor and to approve the remuneration and terms of 
engagement of the external auditor; 
to review and monitor the external auditor’s independence and objectivity and the 
effectiveness of the audit process, taking into consideration relevant UK 
professional and regulatory requirements; 
to develop and implement policy on the engagement of the external auditor to 
supply non-audit services, taking into account relevant ethical guidance regarding 
the provision of non-audit services by the external audit firm; and to report to the 
board, identifying any matters that may need action or improvement and make 
recommendations as to the steps to be taken; and 
to report to the board on how it has discharged its responsibilities. 
C.3.3 The terms of reference of the audit committee, including its role and the 
authority delegated to it by the board, should be made available. 
Already in 
C.3.4 Where requested by the board, the audit committee should provide advice on 
whether the annual report and accounts, taken as a whole, are fair, balanced and 
understandable and provide the information necessary for shareholders to assess 
the company’s position and performance, business model and strategy. 

C.3.5 The audit committee should review arrangements by which company staff 
may, in confidence, raise concerns about possible improprieties in financial 
reporting or other matters. The audit committee’s objective should be to ensure 
that arrangements are in place for the proportionate and independent investigation 





C.3.6 The audit committee should monitor and review the effectiveness of internal 
audit activities. Where there is no internal audit function, the audit committee 

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should consider annually whether there is a need for an internal audit function and 
make a recommendation to the board and the reasons for the absence of such a 
function should be explained in the relevant section of the annual report. 
C.3.7 The audit committee should have primary responsibility for making a 
recommendation on the appointment, reappointment and removal of the external 
auditors. FTSE 350 companies should put the external audit contract out to tender 
at least every ten years. If the board does not accept the audit committee’s 
recommendation, it should include in the annual report and in any papers 
recommending appointment or re-appointment, a statement from the audit 
committee explaining the recommendation and should set out reasons why the 
board has taken a different position. 

C.3.8 A separate section of the annual report should describe the work of the 
committee in discharging its responsibilities. The report should include: 
the significant issues that the committee considered in relation to the financial 
statements and how these issues were addressed; 
an explanation of how it has assessed the effectiveness of the external audit process 
and the approach taken to the appointment or reappointment of the external auditor 
and information on the length of tenure of the current audit firm and when a tender 
was last conducted; and 
if the external auditor provides non-audit services, an explanation of how auditor 
objectivity and independence are safeguarded. 
Already in 
Level and components of remuneration 
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Executive directors’ remuneration should promote the long-term success of the 
company. Performance-related elements should be transparent, stretching and 
rigorously applied. 
D.1.1 In designing schemes of performance-related remuneration for executive 
directors, the remuneration committee should follow the provisions in Schedule A 
to this Code. Schemes should include provisions that would enable the company 
to recover sums paid or withhold the payment of any sum and specify the 
circumstances in which it would be appropriate to do so. 

D.1.2 Where a company releases an executive director to serve as a non-executive 
director elsewhere, the remuneration report should include a statement as to 
whether or not the director will retain such earnings and, if so, what the 
remuneration will be. 

D.1.3 Levels of remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect the time 
commitment and responsibilities of the role. Remuneration for non-executive 
directors should not include share options or other performance- related elements. 
If, exceptionally, options are granted, shareholder approval should be sought in 
advance and any shares acquired by exercise of the options should be held until at 
least one year after the non-executive director leaves the board. Holding of share 
options could be relevant to determining a non-executive director’s independence 
(as set out in provision B.1.1). 

D.1.4 The remuneration committee should carefully consider what compensation 
commitments (including pension contributions and all other elements) their 
directors’ terms of appointment would entail in the event of early termination. The 
aim should be to avoid rewarding poor performance. The committee should take a 

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robust line on reducing compensation to reflect departing directors’ obligations to 
mitigate loss. 
D.1.5 Notice or contract periods should be set at one year or less. If it is necessary 
to offer longer notice or contract periods to new directors recruited from outside, 
such periods should be reduced to one year or less after the initial period. 

Procedure 
There should be a formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on 
executive remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual 
directors. No director should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration. 

D.2.1 The board should establish a remuneration committee of at least three, or in 
the case of smaller companies two, INE directors. In addition, the company 
chairman may also be a member of, but not chair, the committee if he or she was 
considered independent on appointment as chairman. The remuneration committee 
should make available its terms of reference, explaining its role and the authority 
delegated to it by the board. Where remuneration consultants are appointed, they 
should be identified in the annual report and a statement made as to whether they 
have any other connection with the company. 

D.2.2 The remuneration committee should have delegated responsibility for setting 
remuneration for all executive directors and the chairman, including pension rights 
and any compensation payments. The committee should also recommend and 
monitor the level and structure of remuneration for senior management. The 
definition of ‘senior management’ for this purpose should be determined by the 
board but should normally include the first layer of management below board level. 

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D.2.3 The board itself or, where required by the Articles of Association, the 
shareholders should determine the remuneration of the non-executive directors 
within the limits set in the Articles of Association. Where permitted by the Articles, 
the board may, however, delegate this responsibility to a committee, which could 
include the chief executive. 

D.2.4 Shareholders should be invited specifically to approve all new long-term 
incentive schemes (as defined in the Listing Rules) and significant changes to 
existing schemes, save in the circumstances permitted by the Listing Rules. 

Dialogue with shareholders 
There should be a dialogue with shareholders based on the mutual understanding 
of objectives. The board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a 
satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes place. 

E.1.1 The chairman should ensure that the views of shareholders are 
communicated to the board as a whole. The chairman should discuss governance 
and strategy with major shareholders. Non-executive directors should be offered 
the opportunity to attend scheduled meetings with major shareholders and should 
expect to attend meetings if requested by major shareholders. The senior 
independent director should attend sufficient meetings with a range of major 
shareholders to listen to their views in order to help develop a balanced 
understanding of the issues and concerns of major shareholders. 

E.1.2 The board should state in the annual report the steps they have taken to ensure 
that the members of the board and in particular the non-executive directors, 
develop an understanding of the views of major shareholders about the company, 

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for example through direct face-to-face contact, analysts’ or brokers’ briefings and 
surveys of shareholder opinion. 
Constructive use of general meetings 
The board should use general meetings to communicate with investors and to 
encourage their participation. 

E.2.1 At any general meeting, the company should propose a separate resolution 
on each substantially separate issue and should in particular propose a resolution 
at the AGM relating to the report and accounts. For each resolution, proxy 
appointment forms should provide shareholders with the option to direct their 
proxy to vote either for or against the resolution or to withhold their vote. The 
proxy form and any announcement of the results of a vote should make it clear that 
a ‘vote withheld’ is not a vote in law and will not be counted in the calculation of 
the proportion of the votes for and against the resolution. 

E.2.2 The company should ensure that all valid proxy appointments received for 
general meetings are properly recorded and counted. For each resolution, where a 
vote has been taken on a show of hands, the company should ensure that the 
following information is given at the meeting and made available as soon as 
reasonably practicable on a website which is maintained by or on behalf of the 
company: 
the number of shares in respect of which proxy appointments have been validly 
made; 
the number of votes for the resolution; 
the number of votes against the resolution; and 
the number of shares in respect of which the vote was directed to be withheld. 

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When, in the opinion of the board, a significant proportion of votes has been cast 
against a resolution at any general meeting, the company should explain when 
announcing the results of voting what actions it intends to take to understand the 
reasons behind the vote result. 
E2.3 The chairman should arrange for the chairmen of the audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees to be available to answer questions at the AGM and for all 
directors to attend. 

E.2.4 The company should arrange for the Notice of the AGM and related papers 
to be sent to shareholders at least 20 working days before the meeting. For other 
general meetings this should be at least 14 working days in advance. 

Financial Reporting Council (2016)  
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ANNEXURE E: Titles of the USA Sarbanes-Oxley Act 








Title I consists of nine sections and establishes the PCAOB to 
provide independent oversight of public accounting firms providing 
audit services ("auditors"). It also creates a central oversight board 
tasked with registering auditors, defining the specific processes and 
procedures for compliance audits, inspecting and policing conduct 
and quality control and enforcing compliance with the specific 




Title II consists of nine sections and establishes standards for 
external auditor independence, to limit conflicts of interest. It also 
addresses new auditor approval requirements, audit partner rotation 
and auditor reporting requirements. It restricts auditing companies 
from providing non-audit services (e.g., consulting) for the same 
clients (Murdock & Murdock, 2018). 
III. Corporate 
Responsibility 
Title III consists of eight sections and mandates that senior 
executives take individual responsibility for the accuracy and 
completeness of corporate financial reports. It defines the interaction 
of external auditors and corporate audit committees and specifies the 
responsibility of corporate officers for the accuracy and validity of 
corporate financial reports. It enumerates specific limits on the 
behaviours of corporate officers and describes specific forfeitures of 
benefits and civil penalties for non-compliance. For example, 
Section 302 requires that the company’s ‘principal officers’  
typically the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer  
certify and approve the integrity of their company financial reports 






Title IV consists of nine sections. It describes enhanced reporting 
requirements for financial transactions, including off-balance-sheet 
transactions, pro-forma figures and stock transactions of corporate 
officers. It requires internal controls for assuring the accuracy of 
financial reports and disclosures and mandates both audits and 
reports on those controls. It also requires timely reporting of material 
changes in financial condition and specific enhanced reviews by the 




Title V consists of only one section, which includes measures 
designed to help restore investor confidence in the reporting of 
securities analysts. It defines the codes of conduct for securities 
analysts and requires disclosure of knowable conflicts of interest 





Title VI consists of four sections and defines practices to restore 
investor confidence in securities analysts. It also defines the SEC’s 
authority to censure or bar securities professionals from practice and 
defines conditions under which a person can be barred from 
practising as a broker, advisor or dealer (Murdock & Murdock, 
2018). 
VII. Studies and 
Reports 
Title VII consists of five sections and requires the Comptroller 
General and the SEC to perform various studies and report their 
findings. Studies and reports include the effects of consolidation of 
public accounting firms, the role of credit rating agencies in the 
operation of securities markets, securities violations and 
enforcement actions and whether investment banks assisted Enron, 
Global Crossing and others to manipulate earnings and obfuscate 
true financial conditions (Murdock & Murdock, 2018). 
VIII. Corporate and 
Criminal Fraud 
Accountability 
Title VIII consists of seven sections and is also referred to as the 
“Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002”. It 
describes specific criminal penalties for manipulation, destruction or 
alteration of financial records or other interference with 
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investigations, while providing certain protections for whistle-
blowers (Murdock & Murdock, 2018). 




Title IX consists of six sections and is also called the White Collar 
Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002. This section increases the 
criminal penalties associated with white-collar crime and 
conspiracies. It recommends stronger sentencing guidelines and 
specifically adds failure to certify corporate financial reports as a 
criminal offence (Murdock & Murdock, 2018). 
X. Corporate Tax 
Returns 
 
Title X consists of one section. Section 1001 states that the Chief 





Title XI consists of seven sections. Section 1101 recommends a 
name for this title: Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002. It 
identifies corporate fraud and records tampering as criminal offences 
and joins those offences to specific penalties. It also revises 
sentencing guidelines and strengthens their penalties. This enables 
the SEC to resort to temporarily freezing transactions or payments 




ANNEXURE F: ASX corporate governance principles and 
recommendations 
1. Lay solid foundations for 
management and oversight:  
A listed entity should clearly delineate the respective roles and 
responsibilities of its board and management and regularly 
review their performance. 
2. Structure the board to be 
effective and add value 
The board of a listed entity should be of an appropriate size 
and collectively have the skills, commitment and knowledge 
of the entity and the industry in which it operates to enable it 
to discharge its duties effectively and to add value. 
3. Instill a culture of acting 
lawfully, ethically and 
responsibly 
A listed entity should instill and continually reinforce a culture 
across the organisation of acting lawfully, ethically and 
responsibly. 
4. Safeguard the integrity of 
corporate reports 
A listed entity should have appropriate processes to verify the 
integrity of its corporate reports. 
5. Make timely and balanced 
disclosure 
A listed entity should make timely and balanced disclosure of 
all matters concerning it that a reasonable person would 
expect to have a material effect on the price or value of its 
securities. 
6. Respect the rights of 
security holders 
A listed entity should provide its security holders with 
appropriate information and facilities to allow them to 
exercise their rights as security holders effectively 
7. Recognise and manage risk A listed entity should establish a sound risk management 
framework and periodically review the effectiveness of that 
framework. 
8. Remunerate fairly and 
responsibly 
A listed entity should pay director remuneration sufficient to 
attract and retain high quality directors and design its 
executive remuneration to attract, retain and motivate high 
quality senior executives and to align their interests with the 
creation of value for security holders and with the entity’s 
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ANNEXURE G: Dutch corporate governance code principles 
According to the Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee (2016), the principles of the 
2016 Code are divided into five chapters, with each chapter containing several principles, as stated 
below. 
Chapter 1: Long-term Value Creation 
Principle 1.1 
Long-term value creation 
 
The management board is responsible for the continuity of the 
company and its affiliated enterprise. 
Principle 1.2 
Risk management 
The company should have adequate internal risk management 
and control systems in place. The management board is 
responsible for identifying and managing the risks associated 
with the company’s strategy and activities.  
Principle 1.3 
Internal audit function 
The duty of the internal audit function is to assess the design 
and the operation of the internal risk management and control 
systems. The management board is responsible for the internal 
audit function. The supervisory board oversees the internal 
audit function and maintains regular contact with the person 




The management board should render account of the 
effectiveness of the design and the operation of the internal 
risk management and control systems.  
Principle 1.5 
Role of the supervisory board 
 
The supervisory board should supervise the policies carried 
out by the management board and the general affairs of the 
company and its affiliated enterprise. In so doing, the 
supervisory board should also focus on the effectiveness of 
the company’s internal risk management and control systems 
and the integrity and quality of the financial reporting.  
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Principle 1.6 
Appointment and assessment 
of the functioning of the 
external auditor 
The supervisory board should submit the nomination for the 
appointment of the external auditor to the general meeting and 
should supervise the external auditor’s functioning.  
Principle 1.7 
Performance of the external 
auditor’s work 
 
The audit committee and the external auditor should discuss 
the audit plan and the findings of the external auditor based on 
the work the external auditor has undertaken. The 
management board and the supervisory board should maintain 
regular contact with the external auditor.  
 
Chapter 2: Effective Management and Supervision 
Principle 2.1 
Composition and size 
The management board and the supervisory board should be 
composed so that the requisite expertise, background, 
competencies and – as regards the supervisory board – 
independence, are present for them to carry out their duties 
properly. The size of these two bodies should reflect these 
requirements.  
Principle 2.2 
Appointment, succession and 
evaluation 
The supervisory board should ensure that a formal and 
transparent procedure is in place for the appointment and 
reappointment of management board and supervisory board 
members as well as a sound plan for the succession of 
management board and supervisory board members, with due 
regard to the diversity policy. The functioning of the 
management board and the supervisory board as a collective 
and the functioning of individual members should be 
evaluated on a regular basis.  
Principle 2.3 
Organisation of the 
supervisory board and 
reports 
The supervisory board should ensure that it functions 
effectively. It should establish committees to prepare the 
supervisory board’s decision-making. The foregoing does not 
affect the responsibility of the supervisory board as an organ 
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and of the individual members of the supervisory board for 




The management board and the supervisory board should 
ensure that decisions are made in a balanced and effective 
manner while taking account of the interests of stakeholders. 
The management board should ensure that information is 
provided in a timely and sound manner. The management 
board and the supervisory board should keep their knowledge 
and skills up to date and spend sufficient time on their duties 
and responsibilities. They should ensure that, in performing 
their duties, they have the information that is required for 




The management board is responsible for creating a culture 
aimed at long-term value creation for the company and its 
affiliated enterprise. The supervisory board should oversee the 





The management board and the supervisory board should be 
alert to indications of actual or suspected misconduct or 
irregularities. The management board should establish a 
procedure for reporting actual misconduct or suspicion of any 
misconduct or irregularities and take appropriate follow-up 
action on the basis of these reports. The supervisory board 
should monitor the management board in this task.  
Principle 2.7 
Preventing conflicts of 
interest 
 
Any form of conflict of interest between the company and the 
members of its management board or supervisory board 
should be prevented. To avoid conflicts of interest, adequate 
measures should be taken. The supervisory board is 
responsible for the decision-making on dealing with conflicts 
of interest regarding management board members, 
supervisory board members and majority shareholders in 
relation to the company.  
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Principle 2.8 Takeover 
situations 
 
In the event of a takeover bid for the company’s shares or for 
the depositary receipts for the company’s shares, in the event 
of a private bid for a business unit or a participating interest, 
where the value of the bid exceeds the threshold referred to in 
Section 2:107a(1)(c) of the Dutch Civil Code and/or in the 
event of other substantial changes in the structure of the 
organisation, both the management board and the supervisory 
board should ensure that the stakeholder interests concerned 
are carefully weighed and any conflict of interest for 
supervisory board members or management board members is 
avoided. The management board and the supervisory board 
should be guided in their actions by the interests of the 
company and its affiliated enterprise.  
 
Chapter 3: Remuneration: 
Principle 3.1 
Remuneration policy – 
management board 
The remuneration policy applicable to management board 
members should be clear and understandable, should focus on 
long-term value creation for the company and its affiliated 
enterprise and take into account the internal pay ratios within 
the enterprise. The remuneration policy should not encourage 
management board members to act in their own interest, nor 
to take risks that are not in keeping with the strategy 
formulated and the risk appetite that has been established. The 
supervisory board is responsible for formulating the 




The supervisory board should determine the remuneration of 
the individual members of the management board, within the 
limits of the remuneration policy adopted by the general 
meeting. The remuneration committee should prepare the 
supervisory board’s decision-making regarding the 
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determination of remuneration. The inadequate performance 
of duties should not be rewarded.  
Principle 3.3 
Remuneration – supervisory 
board 
The supervisory board should submit a clear and 
understandable proposal for its own appropriate remuneration 
to the general meeting. The remuneration of supervisory board 
members should promote an adequate performance of their 






In the remuneration report, the supervisory board should 
render account of the implementation of the remuneration 
policy in a transparent manner. The report should be posted 
on the company’s website.  
 
Chapter 4: The General Meeting 
Principle 4.1 
The general meeting 
 
The general meeting should be able to exert such influence on 
the policies of the management board and the supervisory 
board of the company that it plays a fully-fledged role in the 
system of checks and balances in the company. Corporate 
governance requires the fully-fledged participation of 
shareholders in the decision-making in the general meeting.  
Principle 4.2 
Provision of information 
The management board and the supervisory board should 





Participation of as many shareholders as possible in the 
general meeting’s decision-making is in the interest of the 
company’s checks and balances. The company should, in so 
far as possible, give shareholders the opportunity to vote by 
proxy and to communicate with all other shareholders.  
Principle 4.4 
Issuing depositary receipts 
for shares 
Depositary receipts for shares can be a means of preventing a 
majority (including a chance majority) of shareholders from 
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controlling the decision-making process as a result of 
absenteeism at a general meeting.  
 




The composition and functioning of a management board 
comprising both executive and non-executive directors must 
be such that the supervision by non-executive directors is 




ANNEXURE H: King IV Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa 2016 principles 
Below are the principles as contained in King IV (IoDSA, 2016). 
1. The governing body should lead ethically and effectively. 
2. The governing body should govern the ethics of the organisation in a way that supports the 
establishment of an ethical culture. 
3. The governing body should ensure that the organisation is and is seen to be, a responsible 
corporate citizen. 
4. The governing body should appreciate that the organisation’s core purpose, its risks and 
opportunities, strategy, business model, performance and sustainable development are all 
inseparable elements of the value creation process. 
5. The governing body should ensure that reports issued by the organisation enable 
stakeholders to make informed assessments of the organisation’s performance and its short-, 
medium- and long-term prospects. 
6. The governing body should serve as the focal point and custodian of corporate governance 
in the organisation. 
7. The governing body should comprise the appropriate balance of knowledge, skills, 
experience, diversity and independence for it to discharge its governance role and 
responsibilities objectively and effectively. 
8. The governing body should ensure that its arrangements for delegation within its own 
structures promote independent judgment and assist with balance of power and the effective 
discharge of its duties. 
9. The governing body should ensure that the evaluation of its own performance and that of its 
committees, its chair and its individual members, supports continued improvement in its 
performance and effectiveness. 
10. The governing body should ensure that the appointment of and delegation to, management 
contribute to role clarity and the effective exercise of authority and responsibilities. 
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11. The governing body should govern risk in a way that supports the organisation in setting and 
achieving its strategic objectives. 
12. The governing body should govern technology and information in a way that supports the 
organisation setting and achieving its strategic objectives. 
13. The governing body should govern compliance with applicable laws and adopted, non-
binding rules, codes and standards in a way that supports the organisation being ethical and 
a good corporate citizen. 
14. The governing body should ensure that the organisation remunerates fairly, responsibly and 
transparently so as to promote the achievement of strategic objectives and positive outcomes 
in the short, medium and long term. 
15. The governing body should ensure that assurance services and functions enable an effective 
control environment and that these support the integrity of information for internal decision-
making and of the organisation’s external reports. 
16. In executing its governance role and responsibilities, the governing body should adopt a 
stakeholder-inclusive approach that balances the needs, interests and expectations of 
material stakeholders in the best interests of the organisation over time. 
17. The governing body of an institutional investor organisation should ensure that responsible 
investment is practised by the organisation to promote the corporate governance and the 
creation of value by the companies in which it invests (IoDSA, 2016). 
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ANNEXURE I: Comparison between the UK Audit Firm 
Governance Code and King IV 
A desktop study was conducted to compare the only current code for auditing firms  the UK’s 
Audit Firm Governance Code  with the King IV Code that currently exists in South Africa. This 
comparison was used to identify the Principles and Values which were included in the 
questionnaire that was sent to the auditing firms (IoDSA, 2016; FRC, 2016). 
UK Audit Firm Governance Code King IV 
A Leadership  
A.1 Owner accountability principle 
The management of a firm should be 
accountable to the firm’s owners and no 
individual should have unfettered powers of 
decision. 
Principle 6: The governing board (GB) should 
serve as the focal point and custodian of 
corporate governance in the organisation. 
Principle 7: The GB should comprise the 
appropriate balance of knowledge, skills, 
experience, diversity and independence. 
Principle 9: Evaluation of its own 
performance and that of its committees, its 
chair and its individual members, support 
continued improvement in its performance and 
effectiveness. 
Provisions: 
A.1.1 The firm should establish a board or 
equivalent governance structure, with 
matters specifically reserved for its decision, to 





Principle 6 Practice 
The GB should exercise its leadership role by: 
• steering the organisation and setting its 
strategic direction; 
• approving policy and planning that 
give effect to the direction provided; 
• overseeing and monitoring the 








A.1.2 The firm should state in its transparency 
report how its governance structures and 
management operate as well as their duties and 
the types of decisions they take. In doing so the 
firm should explain how its governance 
structure provide oversight of both the audit 
practice and the firm as a whole to ensure that 
the Code’s purpose is achieved. If the 
management and/or governance of the firm 
rest at an international level, it should 
specifically set out how management and 
oversight of audit is undertaken and how the 
Code’s purpose achieved in the UK. 
 
 
A.1.3 The firm should state in its transparency 
report the names and job titles of all members 
of the firm’s governance structures and its 
management, how they are elected or 
appointed and their terms, length of service, 






• ensuring accountability for 
organisational performance by, among 
others, reporting and disclosure. 
 
Principle 7 Practice: 
Disclosure with regards to the composition of 
the GB: 
• Satisfaction with regards to the 
appropriate mix of knowledge, skills, 
experience, diversity and 
independence on the GB. 
• The targets set for gender and race 
representation in the membership of 
the GB and progress made against 
these targets. 
• The categorisation of each member as 
executive or non-executive. 
• The categorisation of each non-
executive member as independent or 
not and, when a non-executive member 
of the GB has been serving for longer 
than nine years, a summary of the 
views of the GB on the independence 
of the member. 
• The qualifications and experience of 
members. 
• Each member’s period of service on the 
GB. 
• The age of each member. 
• Other GB and professional positions 





A.1.4 The members of a firm’s governance 
structures and management should be subject 
to formal, rigorous and ongoing performance 
evaluation and, at regular intervals, members 
should be subject to re-election or re-selection. 
 
• The reasons why any members of the 
GB have been removed, resigned or 
retired 
 
Principle 9 practice: 
 
• Evaluation of the GB’s performance and 
that of its committees, its chair and its 
individual members. 
• The GB should appoint an INED member 
to lead the evaluation of the chair’s 
performance if a lead independent is not in 
place. 
• A formal process should be followed every 
two years. 
• Every alternate year there should be a 
discussion regarding performance. 
• There should be a description of how the 
performance is evaluated. 
• Disclose the evaluation results. 
• Disclose if GB is satisfied with the results 
or what the improvement plan is. 
A.2 Management principle 
A firm should have effective management 
which has responsibility and clear authority for 
running the firm. 
Principle 10: Appointment of and delegation 
to, management. 
Provision: 
A.2.1 Management should have terms of 
reference that include clear authority over the 
whole firm including its non-audit businesses 
The delegation of authority framework 
addresses the authority to appoint executives 
who will serve as ex officio executive 
members of the GB and to make other 
executive appointments. 
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and these should be disclosed on the firm’s 
website. 
 
B Values  
B.1 Professionalism principle 
A firm should perform quality work by 
exercising judgment and upholding values of 
integrity, objectivity, professional competence 
and due care, confidentiality and professional 
behaviour in a way that properly takes the 
public interest into consideration and meets 
auditing and ethical standards. 




B.1.1 The firm’s governance structures and 
management should establish and promote 
throughout the firm an appropriate culture, 
supportive of the firm’s public interest role and 
long-term sustainability. This should be 
achieved in particular through the right tone 
from the top, through the firm’s policies and 
practices and by management publicly 
committing themselves and the whole firm to 
quality work, the public interest and 
professional judgment and values. 
 
B.1.2 Firms should introduce KPIs on the 
performance of their governance system and 





Members of the GB should individually and 
collectively cultivate the following 
characteristics and exhibit them in their 
conduct: Integrity, Competence, 















B.1.3 The firm should have a code of conduct 
which it discloses on its website and requires 
everyone in the firm to apply. The board and 
INEDs should oversee compliance with it. 
Principle 2 Practice: 
The GB should: 
• Assume responsibility for the governance 
of ethics and approve codes of conduct and 
ethics policies. 
• Ensure that codes of conduct and ethics 
policies: 
• encompass the organisation’s 
interaction with both internal and 
external stakeholders and the broader 
society; and 
• address the key ethical risks of the 
organisation. 
• Employees and other stakeholders should 
be able to familiarise themselves with the 
codes of conduct and ethics policies.  
B.2 Governance principle 
A firm should publicly commit itself to this 
Audit Firm Governance Code. 
• Not applicable, as there is no Audit Firm 
Governance Code in South Africa. 
• King IV only makes reference to 
compliance to the Constitution of South 
Africa (including the Bill of Rights), the 
law, leading standards and adherence to its 
own codes of conduct and policies in 
Principle 3. 
• Principle 13 makes reference to the 
compliance with applicable laws and 




B.2.1 The firm should incorporate the 
principles of this Audit Firm Governance Code 
into an internal code of conduct. 
B.3 Openness principle 
A firm should maintain a culture of openness 
which encourages people to consult and share 
problems, knowledge and experience in order 
to achieve quality work in a way that properly 
takes the public interest into consideration. 
Principle 16 refers to applying a stakeholder 
inclusive approach. 
 
Principle 16 practice: 
• The GB should encourage proactive 
engagement with shareholders, including 
engagement at the annual general meeting 
(AGM). 
• All directors should be available at the 
AGM. 
• The GB should ensure that shareholders 
are equitably treated and the interests of 
minority shareholders are protected. 
• The minutes of the AGMs of listed 
companies should be made publicly 
available. 
C INEDs   
C.1 Involvement of INEDs principle 
A firm should appoint INEDs to the 
governance structure who through their 
involvement collectively enhance the firm’s 
performance in meeting the purpose of the 
Code.  
Principle 7: The GB should comprise the 
appropriate balance of knowledge, skills, 
experience, diversity and independence. 
Provisions 
C.1.1 INEDs should number at least three and 
be in the majority on a body that oversees 
public interest matters; and/or be members of 
other relevant governance structures within the 
Principle 7 practice: 
Comprise of a majority of non-executive 




firm. They should also meet as a separate 
group to discuss matters relating to their remit. 
They should have full visibility of the entirety 
of the business but should pay particular 
attention to and report on risks to audit quality 
and how they are addressed. If a firm considers 
that having three INEDs is inappropriate given 
its size or number of public company clients, it 
should explain this in its transparency report 
and ensure a minimum of two at all times. 
Where the firm adopts an international 
approach to its management it should have at 
least three INEDs with specific responsibility 
and relevant experience to focus on the UK 
business and to take part in governance 
arrangements for this market; or explain why it 
regards a smaller number to be more 
appropriate, in which event there should be a 
minimum of two. 
 
C.1.2 The firm should disclose on its website 
and in its transparency report information 
about the appointment, retirement and 
resignation of INEDs; their remuneration; their 
duties and the arrangements by which they 
discharge those duties; and the obligations of 
the firm to support them. The firm should 
report on why it has chosen to position its 
INEDs in the way it has (for example, as 
members of the main Board or on a public 





















Disclosure with regards to the composition of 
the GB: 
• Satisfaction with regards to the appropriate 
mix of knowledge, skills, experience, 
diversity and independence on the GB; 
• The targets set for gender and race 
representation in the membership of the 
GB and progress made against these 
targets; 
• The categorisation of each member as 
executive or non-executive; 
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disclose on its website the terms of reference 
and composition of any governance structures 














C.1.3 The INEDs should report in the firm’s 
transparency report on how they have worked 
to meet the purpose of the Code defined as: 
 Promoting audit quality; 
 Helping the firm secure its reputation 
more broadly, including in its non-
audit businesses; and 
 Reducing the risk of firm failure. 
 
C.1.4 INEDs should have regular contact with 
the Ethics Partner, who should have a reporting 
line to them under the ethical standards. 
• The categorisation of each non-executive 
member as independent or not and, when a 
non-executive member of the GB has been 
serving for longer than nine years, a 
summary of the views of the GB on the 
independence of the member; 
• The qualifications and experience of 
members; 
• Each member’s period of service on the 
GB. 
• The age of each member; 
• Other GB and professional positions held 
by each member; and 
• The reasons why any members of the GB 
have been removed, resigned or retired. 
 
Transparency reports are not mandatory in 
South Africa and not all auditing firms issue 
transparency reports. The Big Four auditing 
firms do have transparency reports. However, 
disclosure is very limited in this regard. C1.3 




C1.4 is not in the King IV principles. 
 
C.2 Characteristics of INEDs principle 
 




The INEDs’ duty of care is to the firm. They 
should command the respect of the firm’s 
owners and collectively enhance shareholder 
confidence by virtue of their independence, 
number, stature, experience and expertise. 
They should have a balance of relevant skills 
and experience including of audit and a 
regulated sector. At least one INED should 
have competence in accounting and/or 
auditing, gained for example from a role on an 
audit committee, in a company’s finance 
function, as an investor or at an audit firm 
A director is not independent if any of the 
following is applicable: 
• Significant provider of financial capital; 
• Participates in a share-based incentive 
scheme offered by the company; 
• Owns securities in the company; 
• Is an executive manager during the 
preceding three financial years, or is a 
related party to such executive manager; 
• Was the designated external auditor, or a 
key member of the audit team during the 
preceding three financial years; 
• Is a significant or ongoing professional 
advisor to the organisation; 
• Is a significant customer of, or supplier to 
the organisation; 
• Is a member of the GB or the executive 
management of another organisation which 
is a related party to the organisation; or 
• Is entitled to remuneration contingent on 
the performance of the organisation. 
Provision 
C.2.1 The firm should state in its transparency 
report its criteria for assessing the impact of 
INEDs on the firm’s independence as auditors 
and their independence from the firm and its 
owners. 
 
Not in King IV. 






Nothing provided in King IV. 
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INEDs of a firm should have rights consistent 
with their role including a right of access to 
relevant information and people to the extent 
permitted by law or regulation and a right to 
report a fundamental disagreement regarding 
the firm to its owners and, where ultimately 
this cannot be resolved and the INED resigns, 
to report this resignation publicly. 
Provisions 
C.3.1 Each INED should have a contract for 
services setting out their rights and duties. 
C 3.2 INEDs should be appointed for specific 
terms and any term beyond nine years should 
be subject to particularly rigorous review and 
explanation. 
C 3.3 The responsibilities of an INED should 
include, but not be limited to, oversight of the 
firm’s policies and processes for: 
 Promoting audit quality; 
 Helping the firm secure its reputation 
more broadly, including in its non-
audit businesses; and 
 Reducing the risk of firm failure. 
C.3.4 The firm should ensure that appropriate 
indemnity insurance is in place in respect of 
legal action against any INED in respect of 
their work in that role. 
C.3.5 The firm should provide each INED with 
sufficient resources to undertake their duties 
including having access to independent 
professional advice at the firm’s expense 
Principle 7 practice 
A non-executive member of the GB may 
continue to serve, in an independent capacity, 
for longer than nine years. 
 
No detail on this in King IV, as it is not 
specifically focused on auditing firms. 
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where an INED judges such advice necessary 
to discharge their duties. 
C.3.6 The firm should establish and disclose 
on its website, procedures for dealing with any 
fundamental disagreement that cannot 
otherwise be resolved between the INEDs and 
members of the firm’s management team 
and/or governance structures. 
D Operations   
D.1 Compliance principle 
A firm should comply with professional 
standards and applicable legal and regulatory 
requirements. Operations should be conducted 
to promote audit quality and the reputation of 
the firm. The INEDs should be involved in the 
oversight of operations. 
King IV does not make specific reference to 
audit quality and standards as it is not a code 
for auditing firms. It does make reference to 
the governance of compliance with applicable 
laws and adopted, non-binding rules, codes 
and standards in Principle 13, as stated above.  
Provisions 
D.1.1 The firm should establish policies and 
procedures for complying with applicable 
legal and regulatory requirements and 
international and national standards on 
auditing, quality control and ethics, including 
auditor independence. 
D.1.2 The firm should establish policies and 
procedures for individuals signing group audit 
reports to comply with applicable standards on 
auditing dealing with group audits including 
reliance on other auditors whether from the 
same network or otherwise. 
D.1.3 The firm should state in its transparency 
report how it applies policies and procedures 
 
No specific reference to audit and audit 
quality.  
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for managing potential and actual conflicts of 
interest. 
D.1.4 The firm should take action to address 
areas of concern identified by audit regulators 
in relation to the firm’s audit work. 
D.2 Risk management principle 
A firm should maintain a sound system of 
internal control and risk management over the 
operations of the firm as a whole to safeguard 
the firm and reassure stakeholders. 
Principle 11: The governance of risk. 
Provisions 
D.2.1 The firm should, at least annually, 
conduct a review of the effectiveness of the 
firm’s system of internal control. INEDs 
should be involved in the review which should 
cover all material controls, including financial, 
operational and compliance controls and risk 
management systems as well as the promotion 
of an appropriate culture underpinned by 










D.2.2 The firm should state in its transparency 
report that it has performed a review of the 
Principle 11 practice 
The GB should consider: 
• The opportunities and associated risks to 
be considered when developing strategy; 
• The potential positive and negative effects 
of the same risk on the achievement of 
organisational objectives; 
• The organisation’s risk appetite; and 
• The limit of the potential loss that the 
organisation can tolerate. 
The GB should delegate to management the 
responsibility to implement and execute 
effective risk management. 
The GB should receive periodic independent 




The nature and extent of the risks and 
opportunities they are willing to take should be 
disclosed. 
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effectiveness of the system of internal control, 
summarise the process it has applied and 
confirm that necessary actions have been or are 
being taken to remedy any significant failings 
or weaknesses identified from that review. It 
should also disclose the process it has applied 
to deal with material internal control aspects of 
any significant problems disclosed in its 
financial statements or management 
commentary. 
D.2.3 The firm should carry out a robust 
assessment of the principal risks facing it, 
including those that would threaten its business 
model, future performance, solvency or 
liquidity. This should reference specifically the 












King refers to risk assessment as stated above. 
D.3 People management principle 
A firm should apply policies and procedures 
for managing people across the whole firm that 
support its commitment to the professionalism, 
openness and risk management principles of 
the Audit Firm Governance Code. 
No information on this in King IV, as the code 
is not specifically for auditing firms.  
Provisions 
D.3.1 The firm should disclose on its website 
how it supports its commitment to the 
professionalism, openness and risk 
management principles of the Audit Firm 
Governance Code through recruitment, 
development activities, objective setting, 
performance evaluation, remuneration, 
 
No information on this in King IV, as the code 
is not specifically for auditing firms. 
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progression, other forms of recognition, 
representation and involvement. 
D.3.2 INEDs should be involved in reviewing 
people management policies and procedures, 
including remuneration and incentive 
structures, to ensure that the public interest is 
protected. 
D.4 Whistleblowing principle 
 
A firm should establish and apply confidential 
whistleblowing policies and procedures across 
the firm which enable people to report, without 
fear, concerns about the firm’s commitment to 
quality work and professional judgment and 
values in a way that properly takes the public 
interest into consideration. The INEDs should 
be satisfied that there is an effective 
whistleblowing process in place. 
 
 
No information of whistleblowing in King IV.  
Provision 
D.4.1 The firm should report to INEDs on 
issues raised under its whistleblowing policies 
and procedures and disclose those policies and 
procedures on its website. 
 
No information of whistleblowing in King IV.  
E Reporting  
E.1 Internal reporting principle 
The management of a firm should ensure that 
members of its governance structures, 
including owners and INEDs, are supplied 
with information in a timely manner and in a 
form and of a quality appropriate to enable 
them to discharge their duties. 
The King IV Code refers to disclosure 
throughout the Code. 
 
King IV encourages transparent and 
meaningful reporting to stakeholders. 
Principle 5 specifically refers to integrated 
reporting and states that the GB should ensure 
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that reports issued by the organisation enable 
stakeholders to make informed assessments of 
the organisation’s performance and its short, 
medium and long-term prospects. 
E.2 Governance reporting principle 
A firm should publicly report how it has 
applied in practice each of the principles of the 
Audit Firm Governance Code and make a 
statement on its compliance with the Code’s 
provisions or give a considered explanation for 
any non-compliance. 
 
Entities listed on the JSE are required to 
disclose how they have applied King IV.  
Provisions 
E.2.1 The firm should publish on its website an 
annual transparency report containing the 
disclosures required by Code Provisions A.1.2, 
A.1.3, B1.2, C.2.1, D.1.3, D.2.2, E.2.2 and 
E.3.1. 
E2.2 In its transparency report the firm should 
give details of any additional provisions from 
the UK Corporate Governance Code which it 
has adopted within its own governance 
structure. 
 
King IV does not make reference to 
transparency reports, as the Code is not 
specifically for auditing firms. 
The IRBA has requested that auditing firms 
issue a transparency report, however, in South 
Africa this is not yet compulsory. 
E.3 Transparency principle 
A firm should publish on an annual basis in its 
transparency report a commentary on the 
firm’s performance, position and prospects. 
The GB should ensure that the following 
information is published on the organisation’s 
website, on other platforms or through other 
media as is appropriate for access by 
stakeholders: 
• Corporate governance disclosures required 
in terms of the Code; 
• Integrated reports; and 
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• Annual financial statements and other 
external reports. 
Provisions 
E.3.1 The firm should confirm that it has 
carried out a robust assessment of the principal 
risks facing the audit firm, including those that 
would threaten its business model, future 
performance, solvency or liquidity. The firm 
should describe those risks and explain how 
they are being managed or mitigated. 
E.3.2 The transparency report should be fair, 
balanced and understandable in its entirety.  
 
Principle 11 addresses the governance of risk, 






No information on transparency reports in 
King IV.  
E.4 Reporting quality principle 
A firm should establish formal and transparent 
arrangements for monitoring the quality of 
external reporting and for maintaining an 
appropriate relationship with the firm’s 
auditors. 
Principle 8: Delegation should promote 
independent judgment and assist with balance 
of power and the effective discharge of its 
duties. 
 
This principle discusses the appointment of an 
audit committee.  
Provision 
E.4.1 The firm should establish an audit 
committee and disclose on its website 
information on the committee’s membership 
and terms of reference which should deal 
clearly with its authority and duties, including 
its duties in relation to the appointment and 
independence of the firm’s auditors. On an 
annual basis, the audit committee should 
publish a description of its work and how it has 
discharged its duties. 
Principle 8 Practice: 
It is a statutory requirement to have an audit 
committee for some organisations. 
The audit committee provides oversight of: 
• The effectiveness of the organisation’s 
assurance functions and services; and 
• The integrity of the annual financial 
statements. 
All members of the audit committee should be 
independent, non-executive members of the 
GB. 
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The GB should appoint an independent, non-
executive member to chair the audit 
committee. 
The audit committee should meet annually 
with the internal and external auditors 
respectively, without management being 
present. 
A statement should be disclosed as to whether 
the audit committee is satisfied that the 
external auditor is independent of the 
organisation.  
E.5 Financial statements principle 
A firm should publish audited financial 
statements prepared in accordance with a 
recognised financial reporting framework such 
as International Financial Reporting Standards 
or UK GAAP. These statements should be 
clear and concise. 
Principle 5: The GB should ensure that reports 
issued by the organisation enable stakeholders 
to make informed assessments of the 
organisation’s performance and its short-, 
medium- and long-term prospects. 
Provisions 
E.5.1 The firm should explain who is 
responsible for preparing the financial 
statements and the firm’s auditors should make 
a statement about their reporting 
responsibilities, preferably in accordance with 
the extended audit report standards. 
E.5.2 The firm should state whether it 
considers it appropriate to adopt the going 
concern basis of accounting and identify any 
material uncertainties to its ability to continue 
to do so, with supporting assumptions or 
qualifications as necessary. 
 
The GB should oversee that reports such as the 
annual financial statements, sustainability 
reports, social and ethics committee reports or 
other online or printed information or reports 
are issued as necessary, to comply with legal 
requirements and/or to meet the legitimate and 




F Dialogue   
F.1 Firm dialogue principle 
A firm should have dialogue with listed 
company shareholders, as well as listed 
companies and their audit committees, about 
matters covered by the Audit Firm Governance 
Code to enhance mutual communication and 
understanding and ensure that it keeps in touch 
with shareholder opinion, issues and concerns. 
King IV does recommend a stakeholder- 
inclusive approach in Principle 16. 
Provision 
F.1.1 The firm should disclose on its website 
its policies and procedures, including contact 
details, for dialogue about matters covered by 
the Audit Firm Governance Code with listed 
company shareholders and listed companies. It 
should also report on the dialogue it has had 
during the year. These disclosures should 
cover the nature and extent of the involvement 
of INEDs in such dialogue. 
Principle 16 practice: 
• The GB should encourage proactive 
engagement with shareholders, including 
engagement at the AGM. 
• All directors should be available at the 
AGM. 
• The GB should ensure that shareholders 
are equitably treated and the interests of 
minority shareholders are protected. 
• The minutes of the AGMs of listed 
companies should be made publicly 
available. 
F.2 Shareholder dialogue principle 
Shareholders should have dialogue with 
auditing firms to enhance mutual 
communication and understanding.  
The designated partner of the external audit 
firm attends the AGM. 
 
F.3 Informed voting principle 
Shareholders should have dialogue with listed 
companies on the process of recommending 
the appointment and re-appointment of 
auditors and should make considered use of 
votes in relation to such recommendations. 
 
The audit committee provides oversight of the 
effectiveness of the organisation’s assurance 
functions and services. No specific reference is 
made to the re-appointment of the auditors.  
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IoDSA (2016); FRC (2016) 
When assessing the above comparison, it is clear that the King IV Code does make reference to 
almost all of the principles that are in the UK Audit Firm Governance Code. As that the King 
Codes are based on the UK Corporate Governance Codes (previously, the Cadbury Report), the 
UK Audit Firm Code is used in this study as a basis and benchmark for developing a corporate 
governance code specifically for auditing firms in South Africa. The King IV Code does contain 
more principles which are not specifically addressed in the UK Audit Firm Code and these are 
considered during the development phase. The questionnaire was formulated based on the 
information provided above.  
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ANNEXURE J: Ethical clearance certificate 
 
SCHOOL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (SAREC) 
Dear Rozanne 
 
ETHICAL APPROVAL GRANTED FOR RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
This letter serves to confirm that the proposed research project indicated in the table below, has 
been reviewed by the School of Accounting Research Ethics Committee at the University of 
Johannesburg. Ethical clearance is granted for 5 years, from 10 September 2020 to 9 September 
2025. 
 
Applicant Mrs RJ Smith 
Supervisor Prof B Marx 
Staff number 720016433 
Title of Research 
PhD Auditing 
The application of corporate governance in 
large and medium sized South African auditing 
firms 
Decision date at meeting 8 September 2020 
Reviewers M Bornman, M Hlobo & M Wassermann 
Ethical clearance code SAREC20200908/01 
Rating of application CODE 01 
CODE 01 - Approved     CODE 02 - Approved with suggestions without re-submission 
CODE 03 - Referred back    CODE 04 - Disapproved, cannot re-submit 
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The researcher/s may now commence with the study providing that: 
1. The researcher will ensure that the project adheres to ethical research requirements; 
2. The researcher will be conducting the study as set out in the approval application; 
3. The researcher will ensure that the project adheres to all applicable legislation, scopes of 
practice, professional codes of conduct and scientific standards as it pertains to the field of 
study; 
4. The researcher will bring to the attention of the research ethics committee any proposed 
changes, concerns that arise and unexpected ethical management issues; 
5. Any changes that can affect the study-related risks for participants or researchers must be 
reported to the committee in writing; 
6. All relevant permission required to access data, organisations, etc. has been obtained; 
7. No fieldwork activities may continue after the ethical clearance has expired. A request for 
an extension of ethical clearance can be made in writing to the REC. 
 
 
Prof M Bornman 
Chairperson: SAREC 
Email: mbornman@uj.ac.za 
Telephone: 011 559 3873  
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ANNEXURE K: Cover letter from supervisor – Professor Ben Marx 
COVER LETTER FROM PROFESSOR BEN MARX TO THE CEO OF THE AUDIT 
FIRM 
 
To: <PERSONALISED NAME> From: ROZANNE SMITH 
Date: SEPTEMBER 2020 
 
Subject: QUESTIONNAIRE: AUDIT FIRM 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
Corporate governance codes for corporate entities are well established worldwide. However, 
corporate governance codes specifically applicable to auditing firms are rare and exist in only 
one country  the United Kingdom. The recent high-profile corporate failures which have taken 
place overseas and in South Africa highlight the lack of sound governance that often exist in 
auditing firms. These corporate failures  which are often seen as audit failures  cast a very 
negative light on the auditing profession as whole. This study is being undertaken to develop 
sound corporate governance practices for South African auditing firms, to ‘set the tone at the 
top’ in order to restore public trust in the profession. Specific focus is placed on the oversight 
board of auditing firms and its governance. 
 
The research is being conducted by Rozanne Smith, an academic at the University of 
Johannesburg and is supported by the South African Auditing Profession Trust Initiative 
(SAAPTI). It forms part of a PhD study on the corporate governance structures of the top 10 
auditing firms in South Africa that have 20 or more partners, as classified by the IRBA. 
 
Your input as a leader in corporate South Africa is critical and will be of immense value to the 
success of the study. 
Should you have any objection to completing the questionnaire, please state your reason and 
return the questionnaire for control purposes. 
 
We thank you in advance of your co-operation 
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Professor Ben Marx 
MCom, DCom, CA(SA) 
Study leader 
 
Your response is vital to the success of this study 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
1. The questionnaire should be completed electronically. 
a. Click on the following link and follow the prompts to complete the questionnaire. 
b. Mark your answer in the appropriate box with a cross (X) by clicking in the 
appropriate block with your mouse or type the relevant information as requested. 
c. Should you wish to change your answer in any of the boxes, simply click on that 
box again to clear it and re-select your answer. 
d. Once you have completed the questionnaire, please click on ‘submit’. 
e. Google form link to be included here. 
2. Please do not hesitate to supply additional information that might be of relevance to this 
research. 
3. The due date for the completed questionnaire is 30 September 2020. 
4. Should you wish to contact Rozanne Smith, you can do so on 072 246 9244 or 
rozannes@uj.ac.za. 
5. All information will be treated as confidential and will only be used to produce aggregate 
results. 
6. Should you wish to receive a copy of the study and findings, please indicate so on the 
questionnaire.  
Your co-operation is greatly appreciated 




ANNEXURE L: Cover letter from SAAPTI 
COVER LETTER FROM MR DION SHANGO TO THE CEO OF THE AUDIT FIRM 
 
To: <PERSONALISED NAME> From: ROZANNE SMITH 
Date: SEPTEMBER 2020 
 
Subject: QUESTIONNAIRE: AUDIT FIRM 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
 
I would be grateful if you could take a few minutes to complete the attached questionnaire on 
corporate governance practices at auditing firms, with specific reference to the governing body. 
The research is extremely relevant given the recent corporate failures in South Africa that have 
involved auditing firms and the governance at the auditing firms. The research results will add to 
future developments of the King Code and may possibly be included as a sector supplement to 
future King Code iterations. As a business leader and CEO of an auditing firm, your input is 
essential. 
The research is undertaken by Rozanne Smith, an academic at the University of Johannesburg and 
is supported by the South African Auditing Profession Trust Initiative (SAAPTI). Rozanne is 
currently completing her PhD in Auditing. The study is supervised by Professor Ben Marx, a well-
known professor, with numerous publications on auditing and corporate governance. 
The questionnaire should not take longer than 20 minutes. As part of the nine auditing firms 
involved in the study, your response is critical to the success of the research. 
 
The questionnaire can be completed by clicking on this link: Link to be included here. Once you 
have completed the questionnaire, please click on ‘submit’. 
 
Should you wish to contact Rozanne Smith, you can do so on 072 246 9244 or rozannes@uj.ac.za. 
Your co-operation is greatly appreciated. 
 
Dion Shango 
Chairman of SAAPTI  
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ANNEXURE M: Checklist data collection tool 
Control sheet for the analysis of the transparency reports 
Name of the company or firm: (This will only be used should additional information be 
required after the completion of the questionnaire. The names of the auditing firm will not be 
made public in the research and all information will be treated as confidential and only reported 




           [Yes=Y; No=N] 
  Y N 




  Y N 
2 If ‘YES’ to question number ‘1’, where is the transparency report 
published? 
  
2.1 Company website?   




  Y N 





  Y N 
4 If ‘YES’ to question number ‘3’, where is the integrated report published?   
4.1 On the company website?   




This question requires a response with regards to both, the 
Transparency Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR). 
TR IR 
  Y N Y N 
5. Does the audit firm disclose information about the Board of 
Directors? 




This question requires a response with regards to both, the 
Transparency Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR). 
TR IR 
  Y N Y N 
6. Does the audit firm disclose information about the Oversight 
Board? 




This question requires a response with regards to both, the Transparency 
Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR). 
TR IR 
7. With regards to the composition of the Board of Directors, what 
information is disclosed on the composition of the Board of Directors? 
  
7.1 Number of members   
7.2 Number of Executive directors   
7.3 Number of Non-executive directors   
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7.4 Number of INED directors   
7.5 Race (number of members)   
 a. Black   
 b. Coloured    
 c. Indian   
 d. White   
7.6 Gender (number of members)   
 a. Male   




This question requires a response with regards to both, the Transparency 
Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR). 
TR IR 
8. With regards to the composition of the Oversight Board, what 
information is disclosed on the composition of the Oversight Board? 
  
8.1 Number of members   
8.2 Number of Executive directors   
8.3 Number of Non-executive directors   
8.4 Number of INED directors   
8.5 Race (number of members)   
 a. Black   
 b. Coloured    
 c. Indian   
 d. White   
8.6 Gender (number of members)   
 a. Male   





This question requires a response with regards to both, the 
Transparency Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR). 
TR IR 
  Y N Y N 
9. From the information disclosed on the Board of Directors, 
does the Board of Directors consist of: 
    
9.1 
A majority of INED directors? 
    
9.2 
At least three INED directors?  
    
9.3 
If your answer in 6.2 is “no”, do you disclose the reason for not 
having at least three INED directors on the Board of Directors? 
    
9.4 
A majority of INED directors whom are members of other 
relevant governance structures in the firm? 
    
9.5 
INED directors who have a balance of relevant skills and 
experience in audit? 
    
9.6 
At least one INED director who has competence in accounting 
and/or auditing? 




This question requires a response with regards to both, the 
Transparency Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR) disclosure. 
TR IR 
  Y N Y N 
10. From the information disclosed on the Oversight Board, 
does the Oversight Board consist of: 
    
10.1 
A majority of INED directors? 
    
10.2 
At least three INED directors?  
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10.3 
If your answer in 10.2 is “no”, do you disclose the reason for 
not having at least three INED directors on the Oversight 
Board? 
    
10.4 
A majority of INED directors whom are members of other 
relevant governance structures in the firm? 
    
10.5 
INED directors who have a balance of relevant skills and 
experience in audit? 
    
10.6 
At least one INED director who has competence in accounting 
and/or auditing? 




This question requires a response with regards to both, the 
Transparency Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR) disclosure. 
TR IR 
  Y N Y N 
11. With regards to the disclosure of information pertaining to 
the Board of Directors does the transparency report or the 
integrated report: 
    
11.1 
State how the audit firm’s Board of Directors operate their 
duties? 
    
11.2 
State what type of decisions are made by the Board of 
Directors? 
    
11.3 
State the names and job titles of all members of the Board of 
Directors? 
    
11.4 
State how the members of the Board of Directors was elected 
or appointed? 
    
11.5 
State the terms of the members of the Board of Directors? 
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11.6 
State the length of service of the members of the Board of 
Directors? 
    
11.7 
State the meeting attendance in the year of the members of the 
Board of Directors? 
    
11.8 
State any biographical details of the members of the Board of 
Directors? 
    
11.9 
Include information on the appointment, retirement and 
resignation of INED directors? 
    
11.10 
Include information on the remuneration of the INED 
directors? 
    
11.11 
Include information on the duties of the INED directors? 
    
11.12 
Include arrangements by which the INED directors discharge 
their duties? 
    
11.13 
Include how the supports the INED directors in discharging 
their duties? 
    
11.14 
Explain how the audit firm has positioned its INED directors 
(on the Board of Directors or the Oversight Board)? 
    
11.15 
State the criteria for assessing the impact of INED directors on 
the firm’s independence as auditors and their independence 
from the firm and its owners? 




This question requires a response with regards to both, the 
Transparency Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR). 
TR IR 
  Y N Y N 
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12. With regards to the disclosure of information pertaining to 
the Oversight Board does the transparency report or the 
integrated report: 
    
12.1 
State how the audit firm’s Oversight Board operate their 
duties? 
    
12.2 
State what type of decisions are made by the Oversight Board? 
    
12.3 
State the names and job titles of all members of the Oversight 
Board? 
    
12.4 
State how the members of the Oversight Board was elected or 
appointed? 
    
12.5 
State the terms of the members of the Oversight Board? 
    
12.6 
State the length of service of the members of the Oversight 
Board? 
    
12.7 
State the meeting attendance in the year of the members of the 
Oversight Board? 
    
12.8 
State any biographical details of the members of the Oversight 
Board? 
    
12.9 
Include information on the appointment, retirement and 
resignation of INED directors? 
    
12.10 
Include information on the remuneration of the INED 
directors? 
    
12.11 
Include information on the duties of the INED directors? 
    
12.12 
Include arrangements by which the INED directors discharge 
their duties? 
    
12.13 
Include how the supports the INED directors in discharging 
their duties? 
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12.14 
Explain how the audit firm has positioned its INED directors 
(on the Board of Directors or the Oversight Board)? 
    
12.15 
State the criteria for assessing the impact of INED directors on 
the firm’s independence as auditors and their independence 
from the firm and its owners? 




This question requires a response with regards to both, the 
Transparency Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR). 
TR IR 
  Y N Y N 
13. With regards to the disclosure of information pertaining to 
risk management, does the transparency report or the 
integrated report: 
    
13.1 
Disclose that a review was performed on the effectiveness of 
the system of internal control? 
    
13.2 
Disclose which process was applied to perform a review on the 
effectiveness of the system of internal control? 
    
13.3 
Disclose what weaknesses were identified in the review on the 
effectiveness of the system of internal control? 
    
13.4 
Disclose what actions will be taken to deal with weaknesses 
identified in the review of the system of internal control?  
    
13.5 
Disclose on the audit firm’s website how the firm will support 
its commitment to the professionalism, openness and risk 
management? 
    
13.6 
Disclose on the auditing firms’ website the whistleblowing 
policies and procedures? 





This question requires a response with regards to both, the 
Transparency Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR). 
TR IR 
  Y N Y N 
14. With reference to disclosure in the transparency report and 
the integrated report, does your auditing firm: 
    
14.1 State how the firm applies policies and procedures for 
managing potential and actual conflicts of interest? 
    
14.2 Include a commentary on the firm’s performance, position and 
prospects? 
    
14.3 Include fair and balanced information?     




15 With regards to disclosure on the audit firm’s website, is the following 
information disclosed on the audit firm’s website 
Y N 
15.1 
Discloses on its website its policies and procedures for dialogue with listed 
company shareholders and listed companies? 
  
15.2 




Disclose its code of conduct on the audit firm website? 
  
15.4 
Disclose on the website to whom the code of conduct is applicable to? 
  
15.5 
Disclose on its website, procedures for dealing with any fundamental 
disagreement between the INEDs and members of the firm’s management 






This question requires a response with regards to both, the 
Transparency Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR). 
TR IR 
  Y N Y N 
16. Does the auditing firm disclose information on any of the 
following committees: 
    
16.1 
Audit committee 
    
16.2 
Risk Committee 
    
16.3 
Nomination Committee 
    
16.4 
Remuneration Committee 
    
16.5 
Ethics Committee 




  Y N 
17 
If the auditing firms has an audit committee, is it constituted according 





This question requires a response with regards to both, the 
Transparency Report (TR) and the Integrated Report (IR). 
TR IR 
  Y N Y N 
18. With reference to audited financial statements, does the 
auditing firm:  
    
18.1 
Publish audited financial statements? 
    
18.2 
Publish audited financial statements that are prepared in 
accordance with the recognised financial reporting framework? 
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18.3 
Publish audited financial statements that are clear and concise? 
    
18.4 
Explain who is responsible for preparing the financial 
statements 





ANNEXURE N: Questionnaire data collection tool 
QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE AUDIT FIRM 
Your response is vital to the success of this study 
INSTRUCTIONS 
1. The questionnaire should be completed electronically. 
a. Click on the following link and follow the prompts to complete the questionnaire. 
b. Mark your answer in the appropriate box with a cross (X) by clicking in the 
appropriate block with your mouse or type the relevant information as requested. 
c. Should you wish to change your answer in any of the boxes, simply click on that 
box again to clear it and re-select your answer. 
d. Once you have completed the questionnaire, please click on ‘submit’. 
e. Google form link to be included here. 
2. Please do not hesitate to supply additional information that might be of relevance to this 
research. 
3. The due date for the completed questionnaire is 30 September 2020. 
4. All information will be treated as confidential and will only be used to produce aggregate 
results. 
5. Should you wish to receive a copy of the study and findings, please indicate so on the 
questionnaire.  
 
Your co-operation is greatly appreciated 
Thank you in advance 
 





Introduction and background 
This questionnaire forms part of a PhD study entitled The Application of Corporate Governance 
in Large and Medium Sized South African Auditing Firms. An analysis of the transparency reports 
of the largest auditing firms in South Africa revealed that there are differences in the legal structure 
and governance oversight structures of auditing firms. 
Thus, auditing firms can be either a partnership or incorporated as a company. 
For an audit firm that is incorporated as a company, all shareholders are directors and all directors 
have to be Registered Auditors (RA). 
For auditing firms that are partnerships, all partners are directors and all directors have to be 
Registered Auditors (RA). 
In both these types of structures, the audit firm elects directors to form an Executive Committee 
(EXCO) which is responsible for the day-to-day management of the firm. 
It was also found that some auditing firms appoint an independent oversight structure. This body, 
which is not part of the day-to-day management of the firm, provides oversight of the EXCO and 
governance. 
This questionnaire refers to both the EXCO and the oversight board. It is therefore important to 
understand how these structures are defined. 
Please note that the questions below relate specifically to South Africa and not to global Executive 
Committees/Boards or global Oversight Boards. 
The study focuses on governance and oversight and the structures used within auditing firms to 
ensure sound governance and oversight. 
The study does not specifically focus on audit quality, although it is recognised that sound 
governance and oversight by an independent board should result in a high level of audit quality 
and public trust.  
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 Y N 
Do you provide consent that the data gathered in this questionnaire may be used 
for research purposes? 
  
 
Name of the firm: This will only be used should additional information be required after the 
completion of the questionnaire. The name of the auditing firm will not be made public in the 
research. All information will be treated as strictly confidential and only reported in aggregate. 
 
 
The following questions are on the current practice at your audit firm. Please keep in mind that 
the questions relate specifically to South African boards/committees. 
 Y N 
Does your audit firm currently have an EXCO?   
If yes, what is this board or committee named in your audit firm? 
 
 
 Y N 
Does your audit firm currently have an oversight board?   
If yes, what is this board or committee named in your audit firm? 
 
If “yes”, do you have independent members on the oversight board? 
 
If “no”, do you plan on appointing an oversight board in the near future? 
 
If “no”, why do you not plan on appointing an oversight board? 
 
If “no”, how do you ensure independence oversight within your audit firm? 
 
 
Please select the option(s) that are most applicable to your audit firm. Please click on the box 
which is relevant. 
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If your audit firm has an oversight board, does this board apply corporate governance 
principles as contained in King IV? 
Only some of the principles  
All of the principles  




Are you of the opinion that the members of your EXCO and/or oversight board 
understand: 
 
Their role in corporate governance?  
The objective of practising good corporate governance?  
The value that corporate governance can add to the board of directors and/or the oversight 
committee? 
 
That they are the focal point and custodian of corporate governance in the organisation?  
The function and responsibilities of the board of directors and/or the oversight committee 





Are you of the opinion that your EXCO is effective in discharging its 




































Maintaining a sound system of internal control?    
Maintaining a sound system of risk management over the operations of the 
firm? 
   
Conducting an annual review of the effectiveness of the firm’s system of 
internal control? 
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INED directors reviewing all material controls in the audit firm?    
INED directors promoting an appropriate culture underpinned by sound 
values and behaviour in the firm? 
   
Disclosing in the transparency report that a review was performed of the 
effectiveness of the internal control system? 
   
Disclosing in the transparency report which process was applied to perform 
a review of the effectiveness of the internal control system? 
   
Disclosing in the transparency report what weaknesses were identified in 
the review of the effectiveness of the internal control system? 
   
Disclosing, in the transparency report what actions will be taken to deal with 
weaknesses identified in the review of the internal control system?  
   
Carrying out a robust assessment of the principal risks the audit firm is faced 
with? 
   
Describing the risks and explaining how they are being managed or 
mitigated? 
   
Applying policies and procedures for managing people across the whole 
firm? 
   
Disclosing, on the firm’s website, how the firm will support its commitment 
to professionalism, openness and risk management? 
   
Establishing whistleblowing policies and procedures?    
Disclosing, on the firm’s website, the whistleblowing policies and 
procedures? 
   
Reporting to the INED directors on issues raised under the whistleblowing 
policies and procedures? 




Please select the applicable answer by clicking on either Y [Yes] or N [No]. 
 
 With reference to reports, does your auditing firm: Y N 
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Issue a transparency report on an annual basis?   




 Y N 
With reference to disclosure in the transparency report, does your auditing 
firm: 
  
State how the firm applies policies and procedures to manage potential and actual 
conflicts of interest? 
  
Include a commentary on the firm’s performance, position and prospects?   
Include fair and balanced information?   
Explain everything in an understandable manner?   




 Y N 
With reference to the corporate governance of the auditing firm, in your 
opinion does your auditing firm: 
  
Have formal, rigorous and ongoing performance evaluations of the members of the 
governance structure? 
  
Introduce KPIs for the performance of their governance system?   
Disclose its code of conduct on the firm’s website?   
Disclose on the website to whom the code of conduct is applicable?   
Ensure that appropriate indemnity insurance is in place in case of legal action 
against any INED member’s work in that role? 
  
Disclose on its website procedures for dealing with any fundamental disagreement 




Comply with professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory 
requirements? 
  
Operate in a way that promotes audit quality and the reputation of the firm?   
Establish policies and procedures for complying with applicable legal and 
regulatory requirements? 
  
Establish policies and procedures for individuals signing audit reports to comply 
with applicable standards? 
  
Establish policies and procedures for the reliance on work performed by other 
auditors, whether from the same network or otherwise? 
  
Take action to address areas of concern identified by audit regulators in relation to 
the firm’s audit work? 
  
Supply members of its governance structures, including owners and INEDs, with 
information in a timely manner? 
  
Supply members of its governance structures, including owners and INEDs, with 





 Y N 
With specific reference to the financial statements of the audit firm, does your 
firm: 
  
Publish audited financial statements?   
Publish audited financial statements that are prepared in accordance with the 
recognised financial reporting framework? 
  
Publish audited financial statements that are, in your opinion, clear and concise?   
Explain who is responsible for preparing the financial statements?   
Do auditors make a statement about their reporting responsibilities in accordance 
with the extended audit report standards? 
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State whether it considers it appropriate to adopt the going concern basis of 
accounting and identify any material uncertainties to its ability to continue to do so, 





 Y N 
Does your audit firm:   
Have terms of reference/framework for EXCO for the delegation of authority?   
Have terms of reference/framework for EXCO that include clear authority over the 
whole firm, including its non-audit business?  
  




 Y N 
With reference to an audit committee, does your auditing firm:   
Have an audit committee?   
Have an audit committee which monitors the quality of external reporting?   
Have an audit committee which maintains an appropriate relationship with the 
firm’s auditors? 
  
Disclose on its website the audit committee’s membership details?   
Have terms of reference for the audit committee?   
On an annual basis, publish a description of how the audit committee has discharged 
its duties? 
  
Have an audit committee which is constituted in accordance with the 






The ‘Audit Firm Governance Code’ in the UK is the only corporate governance code in the 
world which is specifically applicable to auditing firms. The questions below are derived 
from the UK Code and require your expert opinion on the development of a corporate 
governance oversight framework for South African auditing firms. 
 
Please select the applicable answer by clicking on either Y [Yes] or N [No]. 
 
 Y N 
Are you of the opinion that there should be a corporate governance framework 
that regulates the governance of South African auditing firms? 
  
If yes, are you of the opinion that any of the following platforms should be used to guide 
audit firm governance? 
A Code of Corporate Governance, such as King IV?  
JSE  
Regulation or legislation?  
None of the above.  
If “no”, why not? 
 
 
 Y N 
If a corporate governance framework should be developed to provide guidance 
to auditing firms, do you believe that an oversight board should have the 
responsibility of governance and oversight? 
  
If “no”, why not? 
 
 
 Y N 
Do you think that the appointment of INED directors to the oversight board is 
important? 
  




 Y N 
In your opinion, do you think that independent directors play an important role 
in governance and oversight within an audit firm? 
  
If “no”, why not? 
 
 
 Y N 
Do you believe that an independent oversight board can add value to an audit 
firm? 
  
If “no”, why not? 
 
 
 Y N 
Are you of the opinion that an oversight board of an audit firm should:   
Be properly constituted in terms of corporate governance codes such as King IV?   
Operate according to a well-formulated charter?   
Be provided with the necessary authority to be able to effectively discharge its 
responsibilities in terms of corporate governance? 
  
Be provided with the necessary resources to be able to effectively discharge its 
responsibilities in terms of corporate governance? 
  
Lead ethically?   
Lead effectively?   
Uphold values of objectivity?   
Take the public interest into consideration?   
Comply with auditing and ethical standards?   
Promote an appropriate ethical culture?   
Assist the audit firm in achieving an appropriate ethical culture?   
Oversee compliance with a code of conduct?   
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Commit itself to a corporate governance code?   
Incorporate the principles of a corporate governance code into the internal code of 
conduct? 
  
Maintain a culture of openness which encourages people to share their problems, 
knowledge and experience? 
  




 Y N 
Are you of the opinion that an oversight board of an audit firm should consist 
of: 
  
A majority of INED directors?   
At least three INED directors?    
INED directors who oversee public interest matters?   
A majority of INED directors who are members of other relevant governance 
structures in the firm? 
  
INED directors who pay particular attention to and report on risk and audit quality?    
INED directors who command respect of the firm’s owners?   
INED directors who collectively enhance shareholder confidence by virtue of their 
independence, number, stature, experience and expertise? 
  
INED directors who have a balance of relevant skills and experience in audit?   




 Y N 
Are you of the opinion that the INED directors who are appointed to the 
oversight board of an audit firm should: 
  
Have rights consistent with their role to the extent permitted by law or regulation?   
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Have the right to access relevant information to the extent permitted by law or 
regulation? 
  
Have the right to access people to the extent permitted by law or regulation?   
Have a contract for their services, setting out their rights and duties?   
Be appointed for a specific term?   
Be subject to a rigorous review of independence in cases where their term extends 
beyond nine years? 
  
Be involved in reviewing people management policies and procedures (e.g. 
remuneration) to protect the public interest? 
  
Have at least the following duties:   
 Oversight of the firm’s policies and procedures.   
 Helping the firm maintain its reputation (in audit and non-audit business).   




 Y N 
Are you of the opinion that the following information should be included in the 
transparency report of an audit firm with regards to the governance structure? 
  
How the audit firm’s governance structure and management operate their duties?   
What type of decisions are made by the audit firm’s governance structure and 
management? 
  
The names and job titles of all members of the firm’s governance structures and 
management? 
  
How the members of the governance structure and its management were elected or 
appointed? 
  
The terms of the members of the governance structure and its management?   




The yearly meeting attendance of the members of the governance structure and its 
management? 
  
Any biographical details of the members of the governance structure and its 
management? 
  
Any additional practices and principles from the King IV Corporate Governance Code 





 Y N 
With reference to the INED directors, are you of the opinion that the 
transparency report should include: 
  
Information on the appointment, retirement and resignation of INED directors?   
Information on the remuneration of the INED directors?   
Information on the duties of the INED directors?   
Arrangements by which the INED directors discharge their duties?   
How the firm supports the INED directors in discharging their duties?   
How the firm has positioned its INED directors (on the board or the oversight board)?   
The criteria for assessing the impact of INED directors on the firm’s independence as 





 Y N 
With reference to having a stakeholder-inclusive approach, are you of the 
opinion that the oversight board of your audit firm should: 
  
Have a dialogue with listed company shareholders about corporate governance 
matters? 
  
Enhance mutual communication and understanding to ensure that the audit firm keeps 
in touch with shareholder opinion, issues and concerns? 
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Disclose on its website its policies and procedures for dialogue with listed company 
shareholders and listed companies? 
  
Report on the dialogue the audit firm had during the year?   
Disclose the nature and extent of the involvement of the INED directors in this 
dialogue? 
  
Have dialogue with shareholders to enhance mutual communication and 
understanding? 
  
Have dialogue with listed companies on the process of recommending the 
appointment and re-appointment of auditors and make considered use of votes in 





 Y N 
Are you of the opinion that an ‘apply and explain’ basis will be the most 
appropriate for an Audit Firm Governance Framework for South African 
auditing firms? 




In your opinion, what would be the difficulties in implementing an Audit Firm Governance 
Framework in South Africa? 
 
 
 Y N 
Do you believe that auditing firms need to appoint an oversight board which is 
responsible for the corporate governance of the audit firm, in order to properly 
fulfil their public interest responsibilities? 





 Y N 
Do you believe that the audit part of auditing firms needs a specific governance 
focus that may be different from the governance of the non-audit part of the 
firm? 




What are the areas you believe the governance forum of an audit firm should focus on to 
ensure that the firm is governed in the public interest? 
 
 
 Y N 
Would you like to receive a copy of the completed research study?   
 
Please feel free to provide any information below which you might feel is relevant to this 
study and which has not been addressed in the questionnaire. 
 
 
Thank you for your time. 




ANNEXURE O: Email send to the participants by the researcher 
Dear XXX 
This questionnaire forms part of a PhD study entitled ‘The Application of Corporate Governance 
in Large and Medium Sized South African Auditing Firms’ at the University of Johannesburg under 
the supervision of Professor Ben Marx. Please see attached the cover letter from Professor Ben 
Marx. 
Approval for the research has been granted by the University of Johannesburg’s Ethics Committee 
and SAAPTI. Please see attached the ethical clearance and the cover letter from SAAPTI. 
The questionnaire should be completed electronically. 
i. Click on the link below and follow the prompts to complete the questionnaire; 
ii. Once you have completed the questionnaire, please click on ‘submit’; 
iii. This questionnaire will take you no more than 20 minutes to complete; 
iv. CONFIDENTIALITY: The name of the auditing firm and yourself will not be made public 
in the research. All information will be treated as strictly confidential and only reported in 
aggregate; 
v. https://forms.gle/UHuuC9XJVW74dzQi9. 
VALUE OF YOUR RESPONSE 
As your auditing firm is one of the top nine auditing firms in South Africa, your audit firm was 
selected as part of the population for this study. As a business leader and CEO of an auditing firm, 
your input is essential. Your input as a leader in corporate South Africa is critical and will be of 
immense value to the success of the study. 
Should you have any objection to completing the questionnaire, please state your reason and return 
the questionnaire for control purposes. 
Thank you in advance 
Kind regards, Rozanne Smith. 
